BT  21  . S532  1864  v.2 
Shedd,  William  Greenough 
Thayer,  1820-1894. 

A  history  of  Christian 


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A  HISTORY  V  > 


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CHRISTIAN  DOCTRINE 


BY 


WILLIAM  Gr.  T.  SHEDD,  D.  D. 


I II  TWO  VOLUMES 


VOL.  II. 


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NEW  YORK: 

CHARLES  SCRIBNER,  124  GRAND  STREET, 

1864. 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1868,  by 
CHARLES  SCRIBNER, 

In  the  Clerk’s  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern  District 

of  New  York. 


JOTTN  F.  TROW, 

Printer,  Stereotyfer,  and  Electrotyper, 

No.  50  Greene  Street,  New  York. 

7  * 


CONTENTS 


OF  THE  SECOND  VOLUME. 


BOOK  FOURTH. 

HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Theories  of  the  Origin  of  the  Soul. 

PAGB 

§  1.  Pre-existence,  ......  3 

§  2.  Creationism,  .  .  .  .  .  .  10 

§  3.  Traducianism,  .  .  .  .  .  .13 

§  4.  Mediaeval  and  Modem  Theories,  ...  23 

CHAPTER  II. 

The  Greek  Anthropology . 

§  1.  Preliminary  statements,  .  .  .  .  .26 

§  2.  The  Alexandrine  Anthropology,  ...  31 

§  3.  Later- Alexandrine  and  Antiochian  Anthropology,  .  .  36 

§  4.  Recapitulatory  Survey,  .....  41 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Latin  Anthropology . 

§  1.  Tertullian’s  Traducianism,  .  .  .  .  .43 

§  2.  Anthropology  of  Cyprian,  Ambrose,  and  Hilary.  .  47 


11 


CONTENTS. 


/ 


§  3.  Anthropology  of  Augustine,  . 
§4.  Recapitulation,  . 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Pelagicinism  and  Semi-Pelagianism. 

§  1.  Pelagianism,  ..... 

§2.  Semi-Pelagianism,  .  .  .  . 

CHAPTER  Y. 

The  Anselmic  Anthropology. 

§  1.  Anselm’s  theory  of  Original  Sin, 

§  2.  Anselm’s  idea  of  the  Will  and  Freedom, 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Papal  Anthropology . 

§  1.  Tridentine  theory  of  Original  Sin,  . 

§2.  Tridentine  theory  of  Regeneration, 

* 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Anthropology  of  the  Reformers. 

§  1.  Lutheran-Calvinistic  theory  of  Original  Sin, 

§  2.  Lutheran-Calvinistic  theory  of  Regeneration, 

§  3.  Melanchthon’s  Synergism, 

§  4.  Zuingle’s  doctrine  of  Original  Sin, 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

The  Arminian  Anthropology. 

§  1.  Arminian  theory  of  Original  Sin, 

§  2.  Arminian  theory  of  Regeneration, 

§  3.  Recapitulation,  .... 


PAGE 

50 

91 


93 

102 


.  Ill 

127 


.  140 
149 


.  152 
164 
.  173 
174 


.  178 
186 
.  194 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Total  survey  of  the  history  of  Anthropology, 


§1. 
§  2. 
§3. 
§4. 
§5. 
§  6. 

§?. 

§8. 


§2. 

§3. 

§4. 


§5. 

§6. 

§f. 


1. 


3. 


BOOK  FIFTH. 

HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOOY. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Soteriology  of  the  Ancient  Church :  A.  D.  70-730. 

Preliminary  statements,  .... 

Gnostic  and  Ebionite  theories  of  the  Atonement, 
Soteriology  of  the  Apostolic  Fathers, 

Early  Patristic  Soteriology,  .... 

Alexandrine  Soteriology,  .... 

Soteriology  of  Athanasius,  and  the  Greek  Fathers, 
Soteriology  of  Augustine,  and  Gregory  the  Great,  . 
Recapitulatory  survey,  ..... 

CHAPTER  II. 

Soteriology  of  the  Mediaeval  Church:  A.  D.  730-1517. 

Anselm’s  theory  of  satisfaction, 

Soteriology  of  Abelard,  and  Lombard,  . 

Soteriology  of  Bernard,  and  Hugh  St.  Victor, 

Soteriology  of  Bonaventura,  .... 

Soteriology  of  Aquinas,  .... 

Soteriology  of  Duns  Scotus,  .... 

Recapitulatory  survey,  .... 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Papal  Soteriology. 

Preliminary  statements,  .... 

Soteriology  of  the  Council  of  Trent,  . 

Soteriology  of  Bellarmin,  .... 


«  •  • 

111 


PAGE 

197 


203 

205 

207 

212 

226 

287 

258 

265 


273 

286 

289 

292 

304 

315 

317 


319 

321 

328 


IV 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Soteriology  of  the  Reformers. 

§  1.  Forerunners  of  the  Reformation, 

§  2.  Protestant  and  Anselmic  Soteriologies  compared, 
§  3.  Recapitulatory  survey, 

CHAPTER  V. 

The  Grotian  Soteriology. 

§  1.  Preliminary  statements, 

§  2.  Grotian  idea  of  law  and  penalty, 

§  3.  Grotian  theory  of  relaxation  and  substitution, 

§  4.  Critical  estimate  of  the  Grotian  Soteriology, 

CHAPTER  VI. 

The  Arminian  Soteriology. 

§  1.  Positive  statements,  .... 

§  2.  Arminian  objections  to  the  theory  of  satisfaction, 

CHAPTER  VII. 

* 

The  Socinian  Soteriology. 

§  1.  Socinian  idea  of  justice, 

§  2.  Socinian  objections  to  the  theory  of  satisfaction, 


BOOK  SIXTH. 

HISTORY  OF  ESCHATOLOGY. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Second  Advent  of  Christ. 

§  1.  Millenarianism, 

§  2.  Catholic  theory  of  the  Second  Advent,  . 


PAGE 

.  333 
335 
.  345 


.  347 
350 
.  356 
366 


.  370 
374 


.  376 
379 


.  389 
398 


CONTENTS. 


V 


CHAPTER  II. 

The  Resurrection. 

PAQB 

§  1.  The  Intermediate  State,  .....  400 
§  2.  The  Resurrection-Body,  .....  403 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Final  State. 

§  1.  Day  of  Judgment,  ......  408 

§2.  Purgatory,  ......  409 

§  3.  Endless  Rewards  and  Punishment,  .  .  „  .411 


BOOK  SEVENTH. 

HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 

CHAPTER  I. 

Ancient  and  Mediaeval  Symbols. 


§  1.  Preliminary  statements,  .....  423 

§  2.  Apostles’  Creed,  ......  428 

§  3.  Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan  Symbol,  .  .  .  435 

§  4.  Chalcedon  Symbol,  .....  438 

§  5.  Athanasian  Creed,  .  .  .  .  .  .439 

§  6.  Recapitulatory  survey,  .....  440 


CHAPTER  II. 

Modern  Symbols. 


§  1.  Lutheran  Confessions,  .....  444 

1)  Augsburg  Confession,  ....  445 

2)  Apologia  Confessionis,  ....  454 

3)  Confessio  Saxonica,  .  .  .  .456 


CONTENTS. 


4)  Confessio  Wurtemburgica, 

FAGK 

.  456 

5)  Articles  of  Smalcald, 

456 

6)  Luther’s  Catechisms,  .... 

.  457 

7)  Formula  Concordiae, 

457 

Reformed  (Calvinistic)  Confessions, 

.  458 

1)  Confessio  Tetrapolitana 

458 

2)  Zuingle’s  Fidei  Ratio,  .... 

.  459 

3)  First  Helvetic  Confession,  . 

465 

4)  Consensus  Tigurinus,  .... 

.  467 

5)  Consensus  Genevensis, 

468 

6)  Second  Helvetic  Confession,  . 

.  469 

7)  Formula  Consensus  Helvetici, 

472 

8)  Heidelberg  Catechism, 

.  473 

9)  Confessio  Belgica,  .... 

.  476 

10)  Confessio  Gallicana,  .... 

.  476 

11)  Confessio  Scoticana, 

476 

12)  Canons  of  Dort,  .... 

.  476 

13)  Thirty-Nine  Articles, 

479 

14)  "Westminster  Confession, 

.  479 

15)  Savoy  Confession,  .... 

480 

16)  Cambridge  Platform,  .... 

.  482 

17)  Boston  Confession, 

485 

18)  Say  brook  Platform,  .... 

.  490 

Papal  Confessions,  .  .  . 

491 

Confessions  of  the  Greek  Church,  . 

.  494 

Arminian  Confessions,  .... 

495 

Socinian  Confessions,  . 

.  498 

BOOK  FOURTH. 

- *44 - 

HISTORY 

OP 

ANTHROPOLOGY. 


VOL.  II. — 1 


LITERATURE 


Augustinus  :  Operum  Tom.  X. 

Yossius :  Historia  de  controversiis  quas  Pelagius  ejusque  reliquiae 
moverunt. 

Gangaue  :  Metapliysische  Psychologie  des  Augustinus. 

Wiggers  :  Darstellung  des  Augustinismus  und  Pelagianismus. 

II.  Theile  (first  part  translated  by  Emerson). 

Xeander  :  Church  History,  H.  557-627. 

Guericke  :  Church  History,  §  91-93. 

Calvin  :  Institutes,  Book  H. 

Usher:  Works,  Yol.  III. 

Whitaker  :  On  Original  Sin. 

Taylor  (Jeremy)  :  On  Original  Sin. 

Whitby  :  On  Original  Sin. 

Muller  :  Christliche  Lehre  von  der  Siinde  (translated  by  Puls- 
ford). 

Hasse  :  Anselm  von  Canterbury,  Buch  II.  Cap.  ix-xi. 
Redepenning  :  Origenes,  in  locis. 

Baur  :  Der  Gegensatz  des  Catholicismus  und  Protestantismus. 
Mohler  :  Symboiik. 


01,0010 


V  tfvVrt  V  * 


'u  « 


CHAPTER  I. 

THEORIES  OF  THE  ORIGIN  OF  THE  SOUL. 


1.  Pre-existence . 


The  inquiry  and  the  theory  respecting  the  ori¬ 
gin  of  the  human  soul  exerted  a  decisive  influence 
upon  the  formation  of  the  Doctrine  of  Sin,  and 
hence  we  commence  with  this  topic. 

The  views  of  the  Ancient  Church  concerning  the 
origin  of  the  soul  ran  in  three  directions ;  though 
not  with  equal  strength,  or  to  an  equal  extent. 
The  three  theories  that  appear  in  the  Patristic  pe¬ 
riod  are :  Pre-existence ,  Creationism,  and  Tradu- 
cianism} 


1  “  La  premiere  difficulty  est, 
comment  l’ame  a  put  etre  infectee 
du  peche  originel,  qui  est  la  ra¬ 
tine  des  peches  actuels,  sans  qu’il 
j  ait  eu  de  l’injustice  en  Dieu  a 
Fy  exposer.  Cette  difficulty  a 
fait  naitre  trois  opinions  sur  l’or- 
igine  de  Fame  meme  :  celle  de  la 
preexistence  des  dines  humaines 


dans  un  autre  monde,  ou  dans  une 
autre  vie,  oil  elles  avoient  peche, 
et  avoient  ety  condamnees  pour 
cela  a  cette  prison  du  corps  hu- 
main;  opinion  des  Platonicens 
qui  est  attribuee  a  Origene,  et 
qui  trouve  encore  aujourd’hui  des 
sectateurs.  Henri  Morus  docteur 
Anglois  a  soutenu  quelque  chose- 


4 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


The  theory  of  Pre-existence  teaches  that  all  hu¬ 
man  souls  were  created  at  the  beginning  of  creation, 
— not  that  of  this  world  simply,  but  of  all  worlds. 
All  finite  spirits  were  made  simultaneously,  and  prior 
to  the  creation  of  matter.  The  intellectual  universe 
precedes  the  sensible  universe.  The  souls  of  men, 
consequently,  existed  before  the  creation  of  Adam. 
The  pre-existent  life  was  Pre- Adamite.  Men  were 
angelic  spirits  at  first.  Because  of  their  apostasy  in 
the  angelic  sphere,  they  were  transferred,  as  a  pun¬ 
ishment  for  their  sin,  into  material  bodies  in  this 
mundane  sphere,  and  are  now  passing  through  a 
disciplinary  process,  in  order  to  be  restored,  all  of 
them  without  exception,  to  their  pre-existent  and 
angelic  condition.  These  bodies,  to  which  they  are 
joined,  come  into  existence  by  the  ordinary  course 
of  physical  propagation ;  so  that  the  sensuous  and 
material  part  of  human  nature  has  no  existence  pre¬ 
vious  to  Adam.  It  is  only  the  rational  and  spirit- 


de  ce  dogme  dans  un  livre  expres. 
Quelques-uns  de  ceux  qni  soutien- 
nent  cette  pr^existence,  sont  all6s 
jusqu’a  la  metempsycose  ...  La 
seconde  opinion  est  celle  de  la 
traduction ,  comme  si  Tame  des 
enfans  etoit  engendree  (per  tra- 
ducem)  de  l’ame  on  des  ames  de 
ceux  dont  le  corps  est  engendre. 
S.  Augustin  y  etoit  porte,  pour 
mieux  sauver  le  pdche  originel. 
Cette  doctrine  est  enseignee  aussi 
par  la  plus  grand  partie  des  the- 
ologiens  de  la  Confession  d’Aus- 


bourg.  Cependant  elle  n’est  pas 
ytablie  entierement  parmi  eux, 
puisque  Jes  universites  de  Jena, 
de  Helmstat,  et  autres  y  ont  6te 
contraires  depuis  long-tems.  La 
troisieme  opinion  et  la  plus  regue 
aujourd’hui  est  celle  de  la  crea¬ 
tion:  elle  est  enseignee  dans  la 
plus  grande  partie  des  ecoles 
Chretiennes,  mais  elle  regoit  le 
plus  de  difficulty  par  rapport  au 
pechy  originel.”  Leibnitz  :  Thy* 
odicee,  Partie  I.  86. 


PRE-EXISTENCE. 


5 


ual  principle  of  which  a  Pre-Adamite  life  is  as¬ 
serted. 

The  principal  defender  of  this  theory  was  Ori- 
gen.  Some  things  akin  to  it  are  to  be  found  in  the 
Pythagorean  and  Platonic  speculations, — particu¬ 
larly  in  the  doctrine  of  metempsychosis,  or  trans¬ 
migration  of  souls  from  one  body  into  another ; 
and  in  the  theory  that  man’s  innate  ideas  are  remi¬ 
niscences  of  an  antecedent  life  in  a  higher  world 
than  that  of  sense  of  time.1  But  Origen  endeavored 


1  Gangattf  :  Psychologie  des  Au¬ 
gustinus,  p.  285  sq. ;  Beausobee: 
Manicheisme,  VI.  iv.  ;  Studien 
und  Keitiken,  Vol.  IX. — In  the 
Phsedo,  Plato  maintains  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  pre-existence  of  the 
soul.  He  lays  down  the  position 
that  rj  parpens  ovk  a^\o  ri  ?}  ava- 
livqcns.  This  position  he  supports 
by  the  following  argument.  When 
the  soul  awakes  to  consciousness, 
and  begins  to  have  intellectual 
perceptions,  it  observes  that  such 
a  thing  is  good,  and  that  such  a 
thing  is  beautiful,  and  that  such  a 
thing  is  true,  etc.  But  at  the 
same  time  it  perceives  that  these 
objects,  thus  denominated,  are 
not  goodness,  beauty,  and  truth 
themselves,  but  only  participate 
in  these  qualities.  The  soul, 
therefore,  possesses  ideas  of  good¬ 
ness,  beauty,  and  truth,  distinct 
from  any  particular  things  in 
which  such  properties  inhere. 
But  these  ideas,  the  soul  brings 
with  it.  They  are  not  derived 
from  the  things  of  time  and  sense, 


because  the  soul  carefully  distin¬ 
guishes  between  them  and  the 
concrete  sensible  object.  It  says : 
“  This  beautiful  object  which  I  see 
is  not  beauty  itself,  but  only  a  man¬ 
ifestation  of  it.”  But  these  ideas 
of  absolute  beauty,  goodness,  and 
truth  are  not  figments  of  the 
brain,  to  which  there  is  no  ob¬ 
jective  correspondent.  There  ac¬ 
tually  are  such  objects  as  eternal 
truth,  eternal  beauty,  and  eternal 
goodness.  Now,  argues  Plato, 
the  fact  that  the  soul  upon  awak¬ 
ing  to  intellectual  perception  is 
already  in  possession  of  such  ideas 
proves  that  it  has  had  a  vision  of 
the  corresponding  objects  in  a 
previous  mode  of  existence.  The 
knowledge  of  these  abstract  ideas 
is  only  the  recollection  of  a  pre¬ 
existent  vision  enjoyed  by  the 
soul,  before  its  union  with  the 
body.  ’Her av  dpa  ai  if/vxal  Kal 

nporepov,  7 Tp'iv  eivai  iv  av’Spionov 
x°° PL?  (rcoparcov,  Kal  (jjpovrjaiv 
eryav. 

“It  was  a  beautiful  system 


6 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


to  defend  the  theory  of  Pre-existence  upon  Scrip¬ 
ture  grounds,  though  he  was  undoubtedly  much 
influenced  by  the  speculations  of  pagan  philosophy 
in  adopting  it.  The  Mosaic  narrative  of  the  tempt¬ 
ation  and  apostasy,  in  Genesis  iii,  according  to  him, 
is  an  allegorical  representation  of  the  fall  of  the 
finite  spirit  from  the  higher  into  the  lower  sphere. 

!  Adam  in  the  Hebrew  is  a  generic  term,  and  denotes 
■not  an  actual  historical  individual,  but  the  image 
and  representative  of  the  race.  The  serpent  em¬ 
blematizes  the  devil ;  the  death  threatened  is  not 
temporal  but  eternal  death,  of  which  the  death  of 
the  body  is  the  shadow  and  symbol ;  the  expulsion 
from  paradise  is  the  loss  of  the  pre-existent  blessed¬ 
ness,  and  the  u  coats  of  skins  ”  signify  the  clothing 
of  the  fallen  spirit  in  a  material  body.  That  the 


which  represented  that  the  forms 
of  all  that  is  good  and  fair  in  the 
visible  world,  having  an  inde¬ 
pendent  previous  existence  in  the 
Supreme  Mind,  had  indeed  be¬ 
come  obscured  and  tarnished  in 
their  union  with  the  matter  of 
the  visible  world;  but  that  the 
souls  of  men,  having  before  their 
entrance  into  the  body  once  in  a 
higher  sphere  gazed  upon  the 
original  patterns  or  ideas  of  beau¬ 
ty,  and  justice,  and  holiness,  are 
now  from  a  faint  reminiscence 
kindled  by  such  imperfect  shad¬ 
ows  of  those  lovely  realities  as 
the  dark  and  gross  things  of  the 
earth  still  exhibit;  and  that  if 
they  cherished  by  the  exercise 


of  pure  mutual  affections  their 
love  of  these  heavenly  images, 
and  improved*  their  acquaint¬ 
ance  with  them  by  serene  con¬ 
templation,  they  should  after 
death  wing  back  their  flight  again 
to  those  realms  of  beatific  vision 
which  had  once  before  been  their 
happy  home.”  London  Quar¬ 
terly  Review.  1838. 

This  theory  reappears  also  in 
some  portions  of  English  litera¬ 
ture, — as,  for  example,  in  Words¬ 
worth’s  Ode  on  Immortality. 

“  Our  birth  is  but  a  sleep,  and  a  forgetting: 
The  soul  that  rises  with  us,  our  life’s 
star, 

Hath  had  elsewhere  its  setting, 

And  cometh  from  afar.” 


PRE-EXISTENCE. 


7 


narrative  is  to  be  explained  in  this  manner,  and  not 
to  be  understood  literally,  is  plain,  says  Origen,  to 
every  one  who  penetrates  into  the  real  meaning  of 
Scripture,  and  takes  worthy  views  of  the  Divine 
Being.  Such  allegorical  costume  for  the  higher 
truths  is  not  strange ;  it  is  found  in  the  Greek  sym¬ 
bolism.  Plato’s  myths  of  Poros  and  Penia,  in  the 
Symposium,  have  much  similarity  with  this  Mosaic 
account  of  the  fall.1  Origen  also  interprets  the  lan¬ 
guage  of  the  apostle  Paul  respecting  the  creation 
“  groaning  and  travailing  in  pain  together  ”  (Rom. 
viii.  19),  as  referring  to  the  low  and  degraded  con¬ 
dition  of  spirits  who  once  occupied  a  higher  sphere. 
Alluding  to  the  fall  of  some  of  the  angelic  spirits, 
he  says :  “  Hence  God  the  creator  made  them  bodies 
suited  to  a  most  degraded  condition  (congrua  hu- 
milibus  locis),  and  fabricated  the  visible  world  for 
them,  and  sent  into  this  world  ministering  angels, 
for  the  care  and  discipline  of  those  who  had  fallen.” 2 
Origen  also  cites  Rom.  ix.  11  sq.,  in  proof  of  the 
pre-existence  of  the  human  soul,  remarking  that 
“  there  was  no  injustice  in  Jacob’s  supplanting 
Esau  in  the  womb,  in  case  we  suppose  him  to  have 
been  chosen  of  God  on  the  ground  of  merit  acquired 
in  a  preceding  life  (ex  praecedentis  vitae  meritis),  so 
that  he  deserved  to  be  preferred  to  his  brother.” 3 

1  Origenes  :  De  Princip.  IY.  i.  2  Origenes:  DePrincipiis,  III.  v. 
16  ;  Contra  Celsum,  IY.  xxxix.  8  Origenes  :  De  Principiis,  II. 
See  TnoMAsrus  :  Origenes,  191,  ix.  (Ed.  Bas.  p.  705). 

192 ;  Schubert  :  Geschichte  der 
Seele,  p.  657. 


8 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


Another  proof  for  tlie  soul’s  pre-existence  is  derived 
by  Origen,  from  the  parable  of  the  vineyard  and 
the  laborers,  in  Matthew  xx.  1  seq.  They  who  are 
hired  first  are  Adam  and  those  of  that  time.  They 
who  are  hired  at  the  third  hour  are  Noah  and  his 
generation.  Abraham  and  his  generation  are  hired 
at  the  sixth  hour ;  Moses  and  his  generation  at  the 
ninth.  All  mankind  at,  and  since,  the  time  of  Christ, 
are  represented  by  the  laborers  employed  at  the 
eleventh  hour.1  But  these  are  described  as  having 
been  standing  idle  all  the  day  long, — that  is  during 
the  entire  saeculum  represented  by  the  “day” 
spoken  of  in  the  parable.  “  If  therefore,”  says  Ori- 
gen,  “the  soul  has  no  existence  anterior  to  the 
body,  but  is  generated  with  it  ( avveOnaQr] ),  how 
could  those  who  were  born  since  the  birth  of 
Christ  have  been  in  existence,  to  stand  idle  pre¬ 
vious  to  that  event  ?  ” 2 

The  theory  of  Pre-existence  may  be  said  to  rise 
and  set  with  Origen.  Only  here  and  there  was  a 
voice  heard  in  its  favor  after  his  death  ;  and  during 
his  life-time  it  was  confined  chiefly  to  the  Alex¬ 
andrine  school.  Cyril  of  Alexandria3  and  Nemesius 
of  Emesa,4  defend  the  doctrine  of  the  simple  pre¬ 
existence  of  the  soul,  but  not  of  its  fall  in  a  pre- 

1  This  allegorical  interpretation  3  Cyeillus  Alexandeintts  : 
is  to  be  found  in  the  middle  ages.  Com.  in  Johan.  Op.  IV.  p.  78  sq. 
See  Okdeeious  Vitalis  :  I.  40,  4  Nemesius  :  De  natura  homi- 

Bohn’s  Ed.  nis,  cap.  ii. 

2OeigejStes:  In  Matt.  Tract.  X. 

(Ed.  Basil  1571,  p.  81.) 


PRE-EXISTENCE. 


9 


existent  state.  The  theory,  however,  was  generally- 
refuted  and  combatted,  so  that  by  the  latter  part 
of  the  4th  century  it  had  become  obsolete.  Jerome1 
denominates  it  a  stulta  persuasio  to  believe  “  that 
souls  were  created  of  old  by  God,  and  kept  in  a 
treasury ;  ”  and  Philastrius 2  enumerates  it  among 
the  heresies.  Augustine 3  opposes  the  doctrine  of 
a  fall  in  a  pre-existent  state,  as  contradicting  the 
Scripture  statement  that  u  God  saw  everything  that 
he  had  made,  and  behold  it  was  very  good.”  He 
also  remarks  that  if  earthly  bodies  were  given  to 
fallen  spirits  on  account  of  the  sins  they  have  com¬ 
mitted,  the  bodies  should  be  proportioned  to  the 
degree  of  the  sins ;  and  that  the  devils,  therefore, 
should  have  worse  bodies  than  men, — which  Augus¬ 
tine  thinks  is  not  the  fact. 

The  theory  of  Pre-existence,  it  is  obvious,  is  the 
most  extreme  form  of  individualism  as  applied  to 
the  origin  of  man.  It  rejects  the  idea  of  race-con¬ 
nection,  and  race-unity,  in  every  form.  Each  human 
individual  is  created  by  a  distinct  fiat  at  the  very 
beginning  of  creation,  and  antecedent  to  all  mate¬ 
rial  worlds.  As  such,  it  has  no  physical  or  generic 
connection  with  other  souls ;  but  is  a  pure  unit  alone 
and  by  itself.  And  this  individualism,  pure  and 
simple,  pervades  its  entire  history.  It  apostatizes 
alone  and  by  itself ;  it  is  associated  with  a  material 

1  Hieeonymus  :  Ep.  LXXVIII,  3  Augustinus  :  De  civitate  DeiT . 

Ad  Marcellirram.  XI.  xxiii. 

3  Philasteius  :  Haereses,XCIX. 


10 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


body,  as  a  disciplinary  infliction,  alone  and  by  it¬ 
self;  and  it  is  redeemed  alone  and  by  itself,  only 
to  be  still  liable  to  another  and  yet  another  apos¬ 
tasy,  alone  and  by  itself.  The  notion  of  a  created 
species,  a  common  human  nature ,  is  wholly  and 
energetically  excluded  by  the  theory  of  Pre-exist¬ 
ence.  The  material  body,  into  which  the  rational 
spirit  descends  from  its  antecedent  sphere  of  exist¬ 
ence,  is,  indeed,  propagated ;  but  this  is  only  a  tem¬ 
porary  prison,  and  not  a  permanent  constituent  of 
humanity.  The  sensuous  and  earthly  part  of  man, 
according  to  the  Origenistic  theory,  is  not  a  part 
of  his  real  and  proper  humanity. 


§  2.  Creationism. 

2.  The  theory  of  Creationism  maintains  that 
God  immediately  creates  de  nihilo  a  new  soul,  in 
every  instance  that  a  new  individual  of  the  human 
family  is  born.  But  the  human  body  is  not  created 
de  nihilo,  in  this  successive  manner.  This  part  of 
man  is  created  in  and  with  Adam,  and  is  propa¬ 
gated  from  him. 

Creationism  met  with  far  more  favor  in  the 
Ancient  Church,  than  the  doctrine  of  Pre-existence. 
Its  advocates  cited  in  favor  of  it,  the  declaration  of 
Christ,  in  John  v.  17  :  “My  Father  worketh  hith¬ 
erto,  and  I  work,” — interpreting  the  “  work  ”  here 
spoken  of  as  that  of  creation,  and  not  providence 


CREATIONISM. 


11 


merely.  They  also  quoted  Ps.  xxxiii.  15 :  “  He 
fashioneth  their  hearts  alike  ;  ”  and  Zech.  xii.  1 : 
“  The  Lord  .  .  .  formeth  the  spirit  of  man  within 
him.” 

Speaking  generally,  the  theory  of  Creationism 
was  the  dominant  one  in  the  Eastern  Church,  and 
found  advocates  in  the  Western.  Jerome  asserts 
that  God  u  quotidie  fabricatur  animas,”  and  cites  in 
proof  the  above  mentioned  texts  of  Scripture.1  He 
remarks  that  Creationism  is  the  true  church  doc¬ 
trine  (ecclesiasticum  est),  though  not  much  received 
as  yet  by  the  Western  bishops.  In  another  place, 
however,  he  refers  the  inquirer  upon  the  subject  of 
the  soul’s  origin  to  Augustine,  whose  work  De 
origine  animae ,  although  it  does  not  explicitly  de¬ 
cide  the  question,  he  praises,  and  shows  an  inclina¬ 
tion  to  Augustine’s  views.2  Hilary  of  Pictavium  is 
the  most  explicit  advocate  of  Creationism  in  the 
West.  In  his  tractate  upon  Psalm  xci  (§  3),  he 
lays  down  the  position  that  the  souls  of  men  are 
daily  (quotidie)  originated  by  the  secret  and  un¬ 
known  operation  of  divine  power. 

Creationism,  it  is  obvious,  is  a  mixed  theory. 
As  respects  the  human  soul,  it  teaches  that  there 
are  as  many  repeated  and  successive  fiats  of  crea¬ 
tion,  as  there  are  individuals  in  the  series  of  human 
beings ;  while  so  far  as  the  human  body  is  concern¬ 
ed,  there  is  but  a  single  creative  fiat.  In  the  in- 

1  Hieronymus  :  Ad  Pammachi-  2  Hieronymus  :  Epist.  LXXVIII, 
urn,  a  397.  LXXIX. 


12 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


stance  of  each  and  every  individual  soul  after  Adam, 
there  is  creation,  but  not  procreation  or  propaga¬ 
tion.  In  the  instance  of  each  and  every  individual 
body  after  Adam,  there  is  procreation  or  propaga¬ 
tion,  but  not  creation.  The  physical  part  of  every 
man,  considered  as  a  creation  de  nihilo,  dates  back 
of  birth  and  individual  existence,  to  the  creative 
act  mentioned  in  Genesis  i.  27 ;  but  his  spiritual 
part,  as  a  creation  de  nihilo,  dates  back  only  to 
birth,  or  to  the  commencement  of  individual  ex¬ 
istence,  in  whatever  generation,  or  year  of  the 
world,  that  may  happen  to  be.  Reckoning  from 
the  strict  and  absolute  creation  of  each,  the  body 
of  a  man  of  this  generation,  upon  the  theory  of 
Creationism,  would  be  six  thousand  years  older  than 
his  soul ;  for  there  is  this  interval  of  time  between 
the  creative  fiat  that  originated  the  former,  and  the 
creative  fiat  that  originated  the  latter.  The  theory, 
therefore,  is  a  composite  one.  It  has  affinities  with 
Traducianism,  in  adopting  the  idea  *  of  race-connec¬ 
tion,  and  generic  unity,  so  far  as  respects  man’s  sen¬ 
suous  nature.  And  it  has  affinities  with  Origen’s 
theory  of  Pre-existence,  in  excluding  the  idea  of 
species  when  applied  to  the  human  soul,  and  in 
adopting  the  idea  of  pure  individuality  alone.  The 
tenet  of  pre-existence  in  the  angelic  world,  it  rejects. 


TRADTT  Cl  ANISM. 


13 


§  2.  Traducianism. 

The  theory  of  Traducianism  maintains  that 
both  the  soul  and  body  of  the  individual  man  are 
propagated.  It  refers  the  creative  act  mentioned  in 
Gen.  i.  27  to  the  human  nature,  or  race,  and  not  to  a 
single  individual  merely.  It  considers  the  work  of 
creating  mankind  de  nihilo,  as  entirely  completed 
upon  the  sixth  day ;  and  that  since  that  sixth  day 
the  Creator  has,  in  this  world,  exerted  no  strictly 
creative  energy*  He  rested  from  the  work  of  cre¬ 
ation  upon  the  seventh  day,  and  still  rests.  By  this 
single  act,  all  mankind  were  created,  as  to  both 
their  spiritual  and  their  sensuous  substance,  in  and 
with  the  first  human  pair,  and  from  them  have 
been  individually  procreated  and  born,  each  in  his 
day  and  generation.  According  to  Traducianism, 
creation  is  totally  distinct  and  different  from  birth. 
Creation  relates  to  the  origination  de  nihilo  of  the 
total  substance  or  nature  of  mankind,  considered  as 
a  new  and  hitherto  non-existent  species  of  being. 
Birth  is  subsequent  to  creation,  and  refers  only  to 
the  modifications  which  this  substance  undergoes, — 
its  individualization  in  the  series  of  generations. 
Hence  man  can  be  created  holy,  and  be  born  sinful. 
By  creation  he  may  be  endowed  with  the  moral 
image  and  righteousness  of  his  Maker ;  while  by 
birth,  or  rather  at  birth,  he  may  be  possessed  of  a 
moral  guilt  and  corruption  that  was  originated  after 
creation,  and  before  birth. 


14 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


This  view  of  the  origin  of  the  soul  was  first 
stated  with  distinctness  by  Tertullian,  and  from  his 
time  onward  gained  ground  and  authority  in  the 
Western  Church ;  while  the  Eastern  Church,  as  has 
been  remarked,  preferred  the  theory  of  Creation¬ 
ism.  The  Biblical  support  for  Traducianism  was 
derived  from  Paul’s  statement  of  the  Adamic  con¬ 
nection  and  the  origin  of  sin,  in  Bomans  v.  12-19, 
corroborated  by  1  Cor.  xv.  22 :  “  In  Adam  all  die,” 
Eph.  ii.  3 :  “  And  were  by  nature  children  of 
wrath,  Heb.  vii.  10 :  “  For  Levi  was  yet  in  the  loins 
of  his  father  when  Melchizedec  met  him,”  Ps.  li.  5 : 
u  Behold  I  was  shapen  in  iniquity  and  in  sin  did 
my  mother  conceive  me,”  and  Gen.  v.  3 :  u  And 
Adam  begat  a  son  in  his  own  likeness,  after  his 
image.” 

Tertullian  was  the  first  to  state  this  theory  in 
express  terms,  and  defend  it  upon  speculative 
grounds.  He  does  it  in  a  somewhat  crude  and 
materializing  manner,  because  he  attempts  to  ex¬ 
plain  and  illustrate  the  manner  in  which  the  indi¬ 
vidual  life  is  deduced  from  the  generic.  In  this 
respect,  he  falls  into  the  same  error  into  which 
Justin  Martyr,  and  the  first  theoretic  Trinitarians, 
generally,  fell,  in  the  speculative  construction  of 
the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  In  his  tract  De  Anima 
(c.  19),  Tertullian  remarks  that  “  the  soul  of  man, 
like  the  shoot  of  a  tree,  is  drawn  out  (deducta) 
into  a  physical  progeny  from  Adam  the  parent 
stock.”  In  another  place  (c.  27),  in  this  same  tract, 


TRADUCIAXISM. 


15 


he  asserts  that  “both  substances  (body  and  soul) 
are  conceived,  finished,  and  perfected  together ;  ” 
and  holds  to  both  a  corporeal  and  a  psychical  gen¬ 
eration,  each  proceeding  from  its  own  appropriate 
base,  though  each  is  inseparable  from  the  other,  and 
both  are  simultaneous.1 

The  Traducian  theory  continued  to  gain  ground 
in  the  North- African,  and  in  the  Western  European 
Church,  by  reason  of  its  affinity  with  that  particu¬ 
lar  mode  of  stating  the  doctrine  of  sin  which  pre¬ 
vailed  in  these  churches.  Jerome  remarks  that  in 
his  day  it  was  adopted  by  “  maxima  pars  occidenta- 
lium.”  Leo  the  Great  (f  461)  asserts  that  the 
“  catholic  faith  teaches  that  every  man,  with  refer¬ 
ence  to  the  substance  of  his  soul  as  well  as  of  his 
body,  is  formed  in  the  womb.” 2  Among  the  Orien¬ 
tals,  this  theory  obtained  little  currency.  Gregory 
Nyssa,3  and  Anastasius  Sinaita,4  alone,  were  inclined 
to  adopt  it. 

But  the  theologian  who  contributed  most  to  the 
currency  and  establishment  of  Traducianism  was 
Augustine.  And  yet  this  thinker,  usually  so  ex¬ 
plicit  and  decided,  even  upon  speculative  points, 
nowhere  in  his  works  formally  adopts  the  theory 
itself.  In  his  Opus  imperfectum  (IV.  104)  he  re- 

1  Nam  etsi  duas  species  confite-  2  Leo  Magnus  :  Epist.  XV,  Ad 
bimur  seminis,  corporalem  et  ani-  Turribim. 

malem,  indiscretas  tamen  vindi-  3  Gregorius  Nyss  :  De  hominis 
camus,  et  hoc  modo  coutempora-  opificio,  c.  29. 
les  ejusdemque  momenti.”  De  4  Anastasius  Sin  :  Homilia  in 

Anima,  c.  27.  Bandini  Monumenta,  II.  54. 


16 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


plies  to  Julian  :  u  You  may  blame,  if  you  will,  my 
hesitation  because  I  do  not  venture  to  affirm  or 
deny  that  of  which  I  am  ignorant ;  you  may  say 
what  you  please  concerning  the  profound  obscurity 
of  this  subject ;  nevertheless  let  this  doctrine  be 
fixed  and  unshaken  that  the  guilt  of  that  one  man 
is  the  death  of  all,  and  that  in  him  all  died.”1  Yet 
Augustine’s  entire  speculation  upon  the  origin  and 
nature  of  sin  is  indirectly,  and  by  implication,  an 
earnest  defence  of  the  Traducian  theory.  His  an¬ 
thropology,  as  we  shall  see  when  it  comes  up  for 
examination,  is  both  illogical  and  inconceivable 
without  it.  The  transmission  of  sin,  to  which 
Augustine  held,  logically  involves,  as  Tertullian 
had  perceived  before  him,  the  transmission  of  the 
sinning  soul ;  and  this  implies  the  Adamic  existence 
and  unity. 

The  attitude  and  tendency  of  Augustine’s  mind, 
in  respect  to  the  two  systems  of  Creationism  and 
Traducianism  (for  the  theory  of  Pre-existence  he 
expressly  rejects  and  argues  against),2  may  be  seen 
from  an  analysis  of  the  first  book  of  his  treatise  De 
Anima.  Renatus  had  sent  Augustine  the  work  of 
Vincentius  Victor,  in  which  the  doctrine  of  Cre¬ 
ationism  was  defended.  Augustine  in  his  critical 
reply  takes  the  ground  that  Victor  cannot  demon - 

1  Similar  statements  are  made  De  peccatornm  mentis  et  remiss, 
in  Ep.  XO,  Ad  Optatum  ;  De  II.  36,  III.  10. 

Genesi  ad  literam  X.  21  ;  Ep.  5  Augustinus  :  De  civitate  Dei, 
CXLIII,  Ad  Marcellinum  ;  and  XI.  23. 


TRADUCIAXTSM. 


17 


strate  from  Scripture,  the  position  that  souls  are 
created  and  in-breathed  in  every  instance  of  birth, 
and  asserts  that  we  are  in  ignorance  upon  the 
whole  matter.  He  examines  one  by  one  those 
texts  which  Victor  has  quoted,  and  contends  that 
they  are  insufficient  to  prove  Creationism.  In  sum¬ 
ming  up,  he  remarks,  that  if  any  one  prefers  to 
hold  that  souls  are  created  in  each  individual  in¬ 
stance,  he  must  take  care  not  to  hold  the  four  fol¬ 
lowing  errors :  1.  That  the  souls  thus  immediately 
created  are  made  sinful  at  the  instant  of  creation, 
by  the  Creator,  through  an  original  sin,  or  sinful 
disposition,  that  is  infused  into  them,  and  which  is 
not  truly  their  own  sin ;  2.  That  those  who  die  in 
infancy  are  destitute  of  original  sin,  and  do  not 
need  that  baptism  which  puts  them  in  possession  of 
the  merits  of  Christ ;  3.  That  souls  sinned  in  some 
other  sphere  before  their  connection  with  flesh,  and 
that  for  this  reason  they  were  brought  down  into 
sinful  flesh ;  4.  That  the  newly-created  souls  of  those 
who  die  in  infancy  are  not  punishable  for  existing 
sin,  but  only  for  sins  which  it  is  foreknown  they 
would  have  committed  had  they  been  permitted  to 
arrive  at  a  suitable  age.1 2 

The  difficulties  that  beset  the  subject  of  the 
origin  of  the  individual  soul,  whether  the  theory  of 
creation  or  of  traduction  be  adopted,  are  very  clear¬ 
ly  stated  by  Augustine  in  his  epistle  Ad  Optatum ,, 

1  Augustinus  :  De  Anima,  Liber  I.  (Opera  X.  481. 482,  Ed.  Migne).  ■ 

2 


18 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


his  treatise  De  peccatorum  meritis  et  remissions,  his 
tract  De  anima ,  and  his  exegetical  work  De  Genesi 
ad  literam .  We  will  briefly  give  the  line  of  re¬ 
mark  in  these  treatises,  which  we  take  from  the 
learned  and  discriminating  work  of  Gangauf1  upon 
the  Metaphysical  Psychology  of  Augustine. 

So  far  as  the  question  of  the  divine  agency  in 
creation  is  concerned,  says  Augustine,  we  may  ac¬ 
cept  either  Creationism  or  Traducianism.  By  either 
theory,  God  is  recognized  as  the  creator ;  for  even 
in  case  the  theory  of  traduction  or  generation  be 
adopted,  God  is  still  the  absolute  origin  and  author, 
inasmuch  as  in  the  primal  act  of  creating  the  human 
soul  he  so  created  it  that  it  possesses  the  power  of 
reproducing  and  perpetuating  itself  in  individual 
souls,  just  as  in  the  sphere  of  nature  and  matter  the 
first  seed  is  indued  with  the  power  to  reproduce 
individuals  after  its  own  kind.  This  endowment  of 
reproductive  power,  says  Augustine,  as  much  re¬ 
quires  creative  energy  to  account  for  its  existence, 
as  does  the  existence  of  the  first  seed,  or  the  first 
soul;  “for  who  can  make  a  seed  to  produce  indi¬ 
viduals  invariably  after  its  kind,  except  that  Being 
who  made  the  seed  itself  from  nothing?”  Never¬ 
theless,  continues  Augustine,  both  theories  have 
their  difficulties.  In  reference  to  Traducianism,  the 
question  arises,  how  it  is  possible  to  hold  to  such  a 
propagation  of  the  soul  without  falling  into  ma- 

1  Gangauf: MetapTiysischePsy-  stuck  III.  §3.  p.  248.  sq. 
ehologie  des  Augustinus,  Haupt- 


TRADUCIAXISM. 


19 


terialism,  and  regarding  the  soul  as  a  corporeal 
entity,  after  Tertullian’s  example,  whose  fancies  in 
this  respect  need  not  awaken  our  wonder,  since  he 
represents  God  the  creator  himself  as  corporeal.1 
On  the  other  hand,  he  who  adopts  Traducianism 
finds  little  difficulty  with  the  doctrine  of  original 
sin,  while  the  advocate  of  Creationism  finds  a  great 
difficulty  here.  For  the  soul  as  newly  created  (and 
it  is  newly-created  in  every  individual  instance 
according  to  the  Creationist)  cannot  be  anything 
but  a  pure  and  perfect  soul.  It  cannot  be  tainted 
with  evil  of  any  kind ;  but  on  the  contrary,  as  com¬ 
ing  immediately  from  the  creator’s  hand,  must  pos¬ 
sess  his  holy  image  and  likeness.  If,  now,  it  be 
thus  pure  and  perfect,  the  question  arises:  Why 
does  it  deserve  to  be  associated  at  very  birth  with 
a  diseased  and  dying  body,  and  to  be  stained  and 
polluted  with  a  corrupted  sensuous  nature  ? 2  The 


1  Augustine,  however,  takes 
Tertullian  too  literally.  In  com- 

V 

batting  the  Gnostic  idea  of  the 
deity,  which  was  hyperspiritual- 
izing,  Tertullian,  it  is  true,  em¬ 
ploys  phraseology  that  is  ma¬ 
terializing,  and  has  furnished 
ground  for  the  charge  of  mate¬ 
rialism.  But  if  he  is  interpreted 
by  his  context,  it  will  be  found, 
we  think,  that  he  meant  merely 
to  assert  that  God,  though  a  spirit, 
is  a  substance  or  essence.  “Cor¬ 
pus  ”  in  his  vocabulary  is  equiva¬ 
lent  to  “  substantia.”  He  express¬ 
ly  declares  that  “  God  has  not 


any  diversity  of  parts  in  himself; 
he  is  altogether  uniform.”  This, 
of  course,  could  not  be,  if  lie  were 
corporeal  or  material.  Augustine 
himself  (De  Genesi  ad  literam,  X. 
xxv.  41)  remarks  that  Tertullian, 
“quoniam  acutus  est,  interdum 
contra  opinionem  snam  visa  veri- 
tate  superatur.  Quid  enim  verius 
dicero  potuit,  quam  id  quod  ait 
quodam  loco,  ‘  Orano  corporalo 
passibile  est’  (De  anima.  c.  7)? 
Debuit  ergo  mutare  sententiam, 
qua  paulo  superius  dixerat  etiam 
Deum  corpus  esse.” 

2  This  was  an  objection  strongly 


20 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


fact  that  its  connection  with  such  a  body  does  not 
depend  at  all  upon  the  soul,  but  rests  entirely  upon 
the  will  of  the  creator,  would  seem  to  imply  that 
God  himself  is  the  cause  of  the  soul’s  deteriorated 
state  and  condition.  But  if  so,  its  restoration  would 
be  no  act  of  grace.  It  would,  rather,  be  a  matter 
of  obligation,  since  the  creator  would  be  merely 
healing  a  wound  which  he  himself  had  made.  Fur¬ 
thermore,  in  the  case  of  infants  who  die  without 
baptism, — a  thing  that  occurs  in  thousands  of  in¬ 
stances,  and  with  the  Divine  foreknowledge, — how  is 
the  justice  of  God  to  be  vindicated,  if  such  infantile 
souls,  without  any  agency  and  fault  of  their  own,  are 
visited  with  disease,  sickness,  pain,  and  death  tem¬ 
poral  and  eternal  ?  Can  we  believe  that  the  cre¬ 
ator  makes  these  newly-created  spirits  guilty  at  the 
time  of  creating  them,  and  then  inflicts  these  evils 
upon  them  as  a  punishment  ?  How,  upon  the  theory 
of  Creationism,  shall  we  find  an  interval  of  time 
between  the  act  that  creates  the  soul  and  the  act 
that  unites  it  with  a  diseased  and  mortal  body,  of 
sufficient  length  for  Satan  to  present  his  temptation, 
and  the  newly-created  spirit  to  yield  and  fall  ? 
Neither  is  it  any  relief  to  say  that  God  punishes 
the  souls  of  unbaptized  infants  upon  the  ground  of 
those  sins  which  they  would  have  committed  had 

urged  by  the  Pelagians,  as  Angus-  et  ipsa  sola  poenam  meretur ;  in- 
tine  remarks  in  De  peccatorum  justum  esse  .  .  .  ut  hodie  nata 
meritis  III.  iii.  5, — “  Si  anima  non  anima  non  ex  massa  Adae,  tam 
est  ex  traduce,  sed  sola  caro,  ipsa  antiquum  peccatum  portet  alie- 
tantum  liabet  traducem  peccati,  num.” 


TRADUCIANISM. 


21 


they  lived,  and  which  he  foreknew  they  would  com¬ 
mit.  For  this  would  conflict  with  the  nature  of 
retribution  and  the  idea  of  justice.  Punishment 
supposes  some  actual  offence  in  the  past.  It  is 
always  retrospective.  Hence  penalty  cannot  be 
anticipated.  No  being  can  be  justly  punished  in 
advance.  If  he  can  be,  then  there  is  nothing  to 
prevent  a  child  who  dies  at  the  age  of  three  years, 
from  being  punished  for  all  the  sins  which  he 
would  have  committed  had  he  lived  upon  earth  to 
the  age  of  forty,  or  sixty,  or  sixty  thousand  years. 
With  respect  to  such  questions  as  the  following, 
which  were  urged  against  the  theory  of  Creation¬ 
ism  :  Why  does  God  create  souls  for  children  who 
die  at  birth,  or  immediately  after?  and  why  does 
he  create  souls  in  the  instance  of  adulterine  off¬ 
spring  ?  Augustine  remarks,  that  he  thinks  he  could 
give  an  answer  from  the  position  of  Creationism. 
But  to  the  question :  Why  does  God  punish  an 
infant  soul  ?  he  can  give  no  answer  from  this  posi¬ 
tion. 

Augustine  finally  remarks,  that  if  one  goes  to 
the  Scriptures  for  a  decisive  settlement  of  the 
question  at  issue  between  Creationism  and  Tra- 
ducianism,  he  does  not  obtain  it.  In  respect  to  the 
doctrine  of  original  sin,  the  preponderance  of 
Scripture  proof  is  upon  the  side  of  Traducianism. 
But  passages  may  be  quoted  in  favor  of  the  soul’s 
new  creation  in  each  individual  instance;  still,  no 
one  of  them  is  so  decisive  that  it  might  not  be  in- 


22 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


terpreted  in  favor  of  its  traduction.  All  such 
passages  prove,  indeed,  that  God  is  the  giver,  the 
creator,  the  former  of  the  human  soul.  But  how  he 
is,  whether  by  in-breathing  them  newly-created,  or 
by  the  traduction  (trahendo)  of  them  from  the 
parent,  the  Scriptures  nowhere  say.1  uAs  yet,” 
says  Augustine  (Ep.  0X0,  Ad  Optatum),  u  I  have 
found  nothing  certain  and  decisive  in  the  canonical 
Scriptures,  respecting  the  origin  of  the  soul.” 2 

It  is  evident  from  these  trains  of  remark,  which 
are  drawn  from  a  very  wide  surface  in  Augustine’s 
writings,  that  his  mind  felt  the  full  force  of  the 
mysteries  that  overhang  the  origin  of  the  indi- 


1  Proinde  quia  non  dixit  ex  ani- 
ma  viri  factam  animam  mulieris, 
convenientius  creditur  eo  ipso  nos 
admonere  voluisse,  nihil  hie  aliud 
pvitare,  quam  de  viri  anima  nove- 
ramus,  id  est  similiter  datam  esse 
mulieri ;  cum  praesertim  esset 
evidentissimaa  occasionis  locus,  ut 
si  non  tunc  quando  formata  est, 
postea  certe  diceretur,  ubi  ait 
Adam,  ‘Hoc  nunc  os  ex  ossibus 
meis,  et  caro  de  carne  mea.’ 
Quanto  enim  carius  et  amantius- 
que  diceret,  Et  anima  de  anima 
mea  ?  Non  tamen  hinc  tarn  mag - 
na  quaestio  jam  soluta  est ,  ut 
unum  horum  manifestum  certum- 
gue  teneamus.”  Augustinus  :  De 
Genesi  ad  lit.  X.  i.  2. 

2  In  his  final  revision  of  his 
works  he  says  :  “  Quod  attinet 
ad  ejus  (sc.  aniini)  originem,  qua 
fit  ut  sit  in  corpore,  utrum  de  illo 


uno  sit  qui  primum  creatus  est, 
quando  factus  est  homo  in  ani¬ 
mam  vivam,  an  semper  ita  fiant 
singulis  singulae,  nec  tunc  scie- 
bam  nec  adhuc  scio.”  Eetractati- 
ones  I.  i.  3. — At  the  time  when 
Augustine  wrote  the  2d  and  3d 
books  of  his  treatise  De  libero  ar- 
bitrio,  viz.  :  about  395,  he  attrib¬ 
uted  more  value  to  the  theory  of 
pre-existence  than  he  afterwards 
did,  as  the  following  extract 
proves.  “  Harum  autem  quatuor 
de  anima  sententiarum,  utrum  de 
propagine  veniant,  an  in  singulis 
quibusque  nascentibus  novae  fi¬ 
ant,  an  in  corpora  nascentium  jam 
alicubi  existentes  vel  mittantur  cli- 
vinitus,  vel  sua  sponte  labantur , 
nullam  temere  a.fflrmare  oporte- 
biV  De  libero  arbitrio,  III.  xxi. 
58. 


MEDIAEVAL  AND  MODERN  THEORIES 


23 


vidual  soul,  and  its  inborn  sinfulness.  That  his 
mind  inclined  to  Traducianism,  the  course  of  reason* 
ing  which  has  been  delineated  plainly  shows.  That 
lie  was  not  averse  to  Creationism,  provided  the 
problem  of  sin  could  be  solved  in  a  way  to  accord 
with  what  he  believed  to  be  the  teaching  of  Scrip¬ 
ture  and  the  Christian  experience,  is  evident  from 
the  following  remark  which  he  makes  respecting 
this  theory  in  his  letter  to  Jerome  :  “  Ecce  volo  ut 
ilia  sententia  mea  sit,  sed  nondum  esse  connrmo.” 
Again  in  this  same  letter  he  says  to  Jerome :  “  Teach 
me  now,  I  beg  of  you,  what  I  shall  teach  ;  teach  me 
what  I  shall  hold ;  and  tell  me  if  souls  are  every 
day,  one  by  one,  called  into  being  from  nonentity, 
in  those  who  are  daily  being  born.” 1 


§  4.  Mediaeval  and  Modern  Theories . 

In  the  Middle  Ages,  the  theory  of  Creationism 
prevailed  over  the  rival  theory.  Traducianism  fell 
into  disrepute  with  the  Schoolmen,2  for  two  rea¬ 
sons  :  1.  Because  they  regarded  it  as  conflicting  with 

1  Augustinus  :  De  origine  ani-  caro  Adae,  et  prona  effecta  ad  li- 
mae,  seu  epistola  CLXVI,  Ad  bidinem  ;  ita  seminata  caro  secum 
Hieronymum.  Compare  Fleury  :  trabens  infectionem  vitiat  ani- 
Eccl.  Hist.  Book  XXIII.  xvii.  mam.  In  carne  est  materialiter 

2  “  Licet  igitur  anima  non  sit  ex  et  originaliter,  et  in  anima  for- 

tradnce,  tamen  originalis  culpa  ab  maliter  tanquam  in  subjecto.” 
anima  Adae  transit  ad  animas  pos-  Bonayentura  :  Compendium 

terum  mediante  carne  per  concu-  Tkeologicae  Veritatis  (De  cor- 
piscentiam  generata ;  ita  quod  si-  rnptela  peccati  Lib.  III.  cap. 
cut  ab  anima  peccanti  infecta  fuit  viii.). 


24 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


the  doctrine  of  the  soul’s  immortality,  and  as  ma¬ 
terializing  in  its  influence.  2.  Because,  rejecting 
as  most  of  them  did,  the  anthropology  of  Augus¬ 
tine,  and  adopting  the  Greek  anthropology,  they 
had  less  motive  than  Augustine  had,  for  favoring 
the  theory  of  the  soul’s  traduction. 

The  revival  of  the  Augustinian  anthropology  at 
the  Beformation  naturally  led  to  the  re-appearance 
of  the  Traducian  theory.  The  symbols  of  both  the 
Lutheran  and  the  Calvinistic  divisions,  so  far  as 
they  make  any  speculative  statement  at  all  upon 
the  subject,  generally  enunciate,  or  at  least  logic¬ 
ally  involve,  the  doctrine  of  the  Adamic  unity  in 
respect  to  both  soul  and  body.  But  as  we  have 
seen  Augustine  himself  hesitating  to  take  a  decided 
position  respecting  the  origin  of  the  individual  soul, 
it  is  not  strange  that  minds  in  the  Protestant  Church 
that  were  agreed  upon  the  doctrine  of  original  sin, 
should  differ  upon  this  metaphysical  .question.  Ad¬ 
vocates  of  both  Traducianism  and  Creationism  are 
to  be  found  among  the  early  Protestant  divines.1 


1  Luther  taught  Traducianism, 
and  the  Lutheran  theologians, 
generally,  followed  him,  with  the 
exception  of  Calixtus,  who 
adopts  Creationism  in  his  treatise, 
De  animae  creatione.  Gerhard 
(Loci  IX.  viii.  §  116,  118.)  leaves 
the  determination  of  the  manner 
to  the  philosophers;  but  holds 
that  “  animas  eorum  qui  ex  Ad- 
amo  et  Eva  progeniti  fuissent,  non 
creatas,  neque  enim  generatas, 


sed  propagatas  fuisse.”  Calovi- 
us,  III.  p.  1084,  and  Hollaz,  take 
the  same  view. 

Calvin,  and  the  Reformed  par¬ 
ty  generally,  declare  for  Creation¬ 
ism,  though  retaining  the  Augus¬ 
tinian  doctrine  of  original  sin. 
Calvin  (Inst.  II.  i.  7)  takes  the 
ground  that  the  decision  of  the 
question,  as  between  the  two  the¬ 
ories,  is  unimportant.  “Who 
will  be  solicitous  about  a  trans- 


MEDIAEVAL  AND  MODERN  THEORIES. 


25 


The  subject  itself,  like  other  purely  speculative 
ones,  has  attracted  less  attention  for  two  centuries 
past,  than  it  did  in  the  previous  history  of  the 
Church.  One  of  the  most  decided  of  modern  advo¬ 
cates  of  Traducianism  is  the  American  theologian 
Edwards,  in  his  treatise  On  Original  Sin} 


mission  of  the  soul,  when  he 
hears  that  Adam  received  the  or¬ 
naments  that  he  lost,  no  less  for 
us  than  for  himself?  that  they 
were  given,  not  to  one  man  only, 
hut  to  the  whole  human  nature  ?  ” 
Beza  (Qu  47.)  rejects  Traducian¬ 
ism  decidedly:  “Doctrina  de  ani- 
mae  traduce  mihi  perabsurda  vi- 
detur,  quoniam  aut  totam  ani- 
mam  aut  partem  ejus  traduci 
oporteret.”  Peter  Martyr 
(Thes.  705.)  declares  that:  “  Ani- 
mae  non  sunt  omnes  simul  crea- 
tae  ab  initio,  sed  creantur  quoti- 
die  a  deo  corporibus  inserandae.” 


Polanus  (p.  2183)  asserts :  “Eo- 
dem  momento  Deus  creat  animam 
simul  et  unit  corpori  infecto.” 
See  Hagenbacii  :  Dogmenge- 
schichte,  §  248 ;  Hase  :  Hutterus 
Redivivus,  §  85. 

1  Samuel  Hopkins,  also, 
(Works,  I.  289)  seems  to  have 
been  a  Traducianist.  “  The  moth¬ 
er,  therefore,  according  to  a  law 
of  nature,  conceives  both  the  soul 
and  body  of  her  son ;  she  does  as 
much  towards  the  one  as  towards 
the  other,  and  is  equally  the  in¬ 
strumental  cause  of  both.” 


CHAPTER  II. 


THE  GREEK  ANTHROPOLOGY.1 


§  1.  Preliminary  Statements . 

The  universality  of  human  sinfulness,  and  the 
need  of  divine  grace  in  Christ  in  order  to  deliver¬ 
ance  from  it,  were  acknowledged  in  the  doctrinal 
system  of  the  Christian  Church  from  the  beginning. 
There  was  no  denial,  except  among  the  confessedly 
heretical  sects,  of  the  doctrines  of  Sin  and  Redemp¬ 
tion  stated  in  this  general  form.  In  constructing 
the  more  specific  statements  there  was,  however,  a 
difference  of  opinion  in  the  Ancient  Church,  which 
showed  itself  in  two  great  tendencies.  The  one  re¬ 
sulted  in  what  we  shall  denominate  the  Greek  An- 


1  Compare  Gtueeicke  :  Church 
History,  §§  91,  92,  93.  Whitby  on 
Original  Sin  (Chapters  VI- VIII) 
cites  from  those  Fathers  who 
deny  the  imputation  of  Adam’s 
sin  to  his  posterity  as  a  ground 
of  condemnation ;  he  is  somewhat 
biased  by  his  polemic  aims,  and 


in  many  instances  gives  a  deeper 
color  to  the  quotation  as  extract¬ 
ed,  than  it  wears  in  its  original 
connections.  Wiggees’  Augus- 
tinism,  Chap.  XXII,  presents  the 
views  of  the  earlier  Fathers,  in 
respect  to  the  contested  points 
between  Augustine  and  Pelagius. 


PRELIMINARY  STATEMENTS. 


27 


thropology  ;  the  other  in  the  Latin  Anthropology } 
These  types  of  doctrine  were  not  rigorously  con¬ 
fined,  the  one  to  the  Eastern  and  the  other  to  the 
Western  Church.  But  each  was  the  predominating 
scheme  within  its  own  borders,  while  yet  each  found 
some  advocates,  and  exerted  some  influence  within 
the  limits  of  the  other. 


The  two  questions  upon  which  the  controversy 
turned  were  the  following:  1.  Is  man’s  power  to 
good  diminished  by  sin,  and  if  so  to  what  extent  ? 
2.  What  is  the  precise  relation  which  the  agency 
of  the  human  will  sustains  to  the  workings  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  in  regeneration  ? 


1U  While  in  the  Western 
Church  the  Augustinian  scheme 
of  doctrine  had  become  dominant, 
in  the  Greek  Church  the  older , 
and  more  indefinite  mode  of  ap¬ 
prehending  the  doctrines  of  grace, 
of  free-will,  and  of  providence,  a 
theory  bordering  upon  Pelagian- 
ism,  had  been  preserved.”  Ne- 
andek  :  III.  554.  The  reformers 
of  the  English  Church  recognized 
the  difference  between  the  an¬ 
thropology  of  the  East  and  the 
West,  a  fact  noticed  by  Hallam  : 
Constitutional  History,  VII.  i. 
See,  also,  Mackintosh  :  Ethical 
Philosophy,  Section  III.  (p.  106. 
Pa.  Ed.).  “He  lent  Burnet’s 
commentary  on  the  Thirty  Nine 
Articles  to  me,  and  I  have  now  a 
distinct  recollection  of  the  great 
impression  which  it  made.  I  read 
with  peculiar  eagerness  and  pleas¬ 
ure,  the  commentary  on  the  lfth 


article, — that  which  regards  Pre¬ 
destination  ;  and  I  remember  Mr. 
Mackenzie’s  pointing  out  to  me, 
that  though  the  bishop  abstained 
from  giving  his  own  opinion  on 
that  subject,  in  the  commentary, 
he  had  intimated  that  opinion  not 
obscurely  in  the  preface,  when  he 
says  that  ‘  he  was  of  the  opinion 
of  the  Greek  Church,  from  which 
St.  Austin  departed.’  I  was  so 
profoundly  ignorant  of  what  the 
opinion  of  the  Greek  Church  was, 
and  what  St.  Austin’s  deviations 
were,  that  the  mysterious  magnifi¬ 
cence  of  this  phrase  had  an  extra¬ 
ordinary  effect  on  my  imagination. 
My  boarding  mistress,  the  school¬ 
master,  and  the  parson,  were  or¬ 
thodox  Calvinists.  I  became  a 
warm  advocate  for  free  will,  and 
before  I  was  fourteen  I  was  prob¬ 
ably  the  boldest  heretic  in  the 
country.”  Mackintosh’s  Life,  1. 5. 


28 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


The  views  of  the  entire  Church,  both  the  West¬ 
ern  and  Eastern,  upon  these  points,  during  the  2d 
and  3d  centuries  were  shaped  very  much  by  the 
controversy  with  Gnosticism.  The  dualistic  theory 
of  the  universe,  held  by  the  Gnostic,  involved  the 
eternity  of  evil  as  well  as  of  good,  and  the  further 
tenet  that  man  is  sinful  by  creation ,  because  all 
creation  is  the  work  of  the  Demiurge.  In  opposi¬ 
tion  to  this  view,  the  Christian  Fathers  contended 
for  the  biblical  doctrine  that  man  was  created  holy, 
and  a  free  moral  agent,  and  that  by  the  misuse  of 
his  moral  freedom  he  is  himself  the  author  of  his 
own  sin.1  Again,  the  Gnostic,  dividing  mankind 
into  three  classes, — oi  nvtv ucjctixol,  ol  ifju%ixol,  oi 
v'kixol^ — asserted  that  only  the  first  class  were  capa¬ 
ble  of  being  redeemed,  and  that  the  other  two 
classes,  who  constituted  the  great  mass  of  mankind, 


1  Justin  Martyr  (Apol.  I.  54) 
thus  argues  against  the  Pagan 
doctrine  of  fate.  “But  lest  any 
should  infer  from  what  has  been 
said,  that  we  are  assertors  of  fa¬ 
tal  necessity,  and  conclude  that 
prophecy  must  needs  infer  pre¬ 
destination,  we  shall  clear  our¬ 
selves  as  to  this  point  also;  for 
we  learn  from  these  very  proph¬ 
ets  that  rewards  and  punishments 
are  to  be  distributed  in  propor¬ 
tion  to  the  merits  of  mankind. 
And  it  is  a  truth  which  we  our¬ 
selves  profess ;  for  if  it  be  not  so, 
but  all  things  are  determined  by 
fate,  then  farewell  freedom  of 
will ;  and  if  this  man  is  destined 


to  be  good,  and  that  one  to  be  evil, 
then  neither  the  one  nor  the  oth¬ 
er  can  be  justly  approved  or  con¬ 
demned;  so  that  unless  we  sup¬ 
pose  that  man  has  it  in  his  power 
to  choose  the  good,  and  refuse 
the  evil,  no  one  can  be  accounta¬ 
ble  for  any  action  whatever.  But 
to  prove  that  men  are  good  or 
evil  by  choice,  I  argue  in  this 
manner:  We  see  in  the  same  per¬ 
son  a  transition  to  quite  contrary 
actions  ;  but  now  were  he  neces¬ 
sitated  either  to  be  good  or  bad, 
he  would  not  be  capable  of  this 
contrariety.”  Compare,  also, 
Apologia  I.  10 ;  and  80. 


PRELIMINARY  STATEMENTS. 


29 


were  hopelessly  given  over  to  evil  lusts  and  satanic 
powers.  In  opposition  to  this  theory,  the  Christian 
Fathers  maintained  the  essential  moral  equality  and 
similarity  of  all  men,  and  contended  that  the  varie¬ 
ties  of  character  seen  in  human  society  are  varie¬ 
ties  in  the  manifestation  only,  and  not  of  the  inward 
disposition,  and  that  even  these  are  owing  to  cir¬ 
cumstances,  and  to  the  different  use  which  indi¬ 
viduals  make  of  their  faculties  and  powers. 

It  was  a  natural  consequence  of  this  polemic 
attitude  towards  Gnosticism,  that  the  anthropology 
of  the  2d  and  3d  centuries  of  both  the  Western  and 
the  Eastern  Church  was  marked  by  a  very  strong 
emphasis  of  the  doctrine  of  human  freedom.  At  a 
time  when  the  truth  that  man  is  a  responsible  agent 
was  being  denied  by  the  most  subtle  opponents 
which  the  Christian  theologian  of  the  first  centuries 
was  called  to  meet,  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that 
very  much  reflection  would  be  expended  upon  that 
side  of  the  subject  of  sin  which  relates  to  the  weak¬ 
ness  and  bondage  of  the  apostate  will.  The  Gnostic 
asserted  that  man  was  created  sinful,  and  that  he 
had  no  free  will.  The  Ancient  Father  contented 
himself  with  rebutting  these  statements,  without 
much  reference  to  the  consequences  of  human  apos- 
tacy  in  the  moral  agent,  and  the  human  will  itself. 
When,  therefore,  the  question  respecting  these  con¬ 
sequences  was  raised,  it  is  not  surprising  that  there 
was  some  variety  in  the  answers  that  were  given 


BO 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


by  the  different  theological  schools,  and  parties,  of 
Primitive  Christendom.1 


1  These  varieties  of  opinion 
have  been  observed  and  con¬ 
ceded.  Says  Calvin'  (Inst.  II.  i. 
4) :  “  On  the  subject  of  original  sin 
the  Fathers  had  much  contention, 
nothing  being  more  remote  from 
natural  reason,  than  that  all 
should  be  criminated  on  account 
of  the  guilt  of  one,  and  thus  his 
sin  become  common  ;  which 
seems  to  have  been  the  reason 
why  the  most  ancient  doctors  of 
the  Church  did  but  obscurely 
glance  at  this  point,  or  at  least 
explained  it  with  less  perspicuity 
than  it  required.”  Hooker  (On 
Justification,  Works,  II.  530), 
making  a  distinction  between 
error  of  ignorance,  and  distinct 
and  persistent  heresy,  remarks: 
“  Was  not  their  opinion  danger¬ 
ous,  who  thought  the  kingdom 
of  Christ  should  be  earthly?  was 
not  theirs,  who  thought  the  gos¬ 
pel  should  be  preached  only  to 
the  Jews?  What  more  opposite 
to  prophetical  doctrine  concern¬ 
ing  the  coming  of  Christ,  than 
the  one  ?  concerning  the  catholic 
church  than  the  other?  Yet  they 
which  had  these  fancies,  even 
when  they  had  them,  were  not 
the  worst  men  in  the  world.  The 
heresy  of  free-will  was  a  mill¬ 
stone  about  the  Pelagian’s  neck ; 
shall  we  therefore  give  sentence 
of  death  inevitable  against  all 
those  Fathers  in  the  Greek  church, 
who  being  mispersuaded,  died  in 


the  error  of  free-will  ?  ”  Whitby 
(On  Original  Sin,  Ch.  viii.)  makes 
the  following  statements.  “We 
have,  first,  the  great  Petavivs  (De 
incar.  lib.  xiv.  cap.  2.  §  1),  ingen¬ 
uously  confessing  :  ‘  That  the 

Greeks  in  their  writings  seldom 
make  any  mention,  and  never  an 
express  mention,  of  original  sin.’ 
Whitaker  (Original  Sin,  lib.  ii.  c. 
2),  after  he  had  produced  many 
passages  in  which  the  Fathers 
have  spoken  of  original  sin  and 
free  will  incautiously,  and  with 
too  little  exactness,  has  these 
words:  ‘Why  should  I  recite 
many  other  passages  of  the  same 
kind  ?  From  these  it  abundantly 
appears  that  the  Fathers  before 
the  rise  of  Pelagius  did  very  often 
think  and  write  more  inaccurate¬ 
ly  of  original  sin  and  free  will,  in 
which  two  articles  his  heresy  did 
mainly  consist,  than  it  became 
great  doctors  of  the  church  ;  and 
God  suffered  Pelagius  to  go  on 
for  a  while,  that  the  catholic  Fa¬ 
thers  might  learn  to  judge  and 
speak  more  soundly  concerning 
matters  of  so  great  consequence. 
And  therefore,  what  the  Magde¬ 
burg  CenUiriators  have  written, — 
that  the  Fathers  ascribed  too  much 
to  man’s  power,  have  something 
darkened  the  subject  of  human 
corruption,  and  explained  it  in  a 
manner  too  slight  and  mean, — is 
so  true  that  nothing  can  be  more 
certain.  Du  Moulin ,  also,  holds 


ALEXANDRINE  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


31 


§  2.  The  Alexandrine  Anthropology. 

The  most  unqualified  position,  in  reference  to 
the  power  of  free  will  in  apostate  man,  was  taken 
by  the  Alexandrine  School.  This  was  partly  the 
result  of  the  excessive  speculative  tendency  by 
which  this  school  was  characterized,  and  partly  of 
its  collision  with  Gnosticism.  The  Alexandrines 
represent  the  will  of  man  as  possessed,  notwith¬ 
standing  its  apostasy  in  a  pre-existent  state,  of  a 
plenary  power  to  good,  and  able  to  turn  from  sin 
by  the  exercise  of  its  own  inherent  energy  ( avrt - 
ovcuov ).  Clement  of  Alexandria  asserts  that  u  to 
believe  or  to  disbelieve  is  as  much  at  the  command 


with  Petavius  and  Whitaker ;  but 
Vossius  endeavors  to  prove  that 
the  Greek  and  Latin  Fathers 
taught  the  same  doctrine  of  origi¬ 
nal  sin  essentially.”  Niebuhr 
(Life  and  Letters,  p.  530.  N.  Y. 
Ed.),  remarks  that,  “  all  who  are 
acquainted  with  church  history 
know,  that  no  system  of  doctrine 
respecting  redemption,  hereditary 
sin,  grace,  &c.,  existed  for  at  least 
the  first  two  centuries  after 
Christ ;  that  on  these  points, 
opinions  and  teaching  were  un¬ 
fettered,  and  that  those  were  nev¬ 
er  considered  as  heretics  who 
simply  accepted  the  creed  (the  so- 
called  Symbolum  Apostolicum), 
kept  in  communion  with  the 
church,  and  were  subject  to  her 


discipline.” — In  investigating  the 
anthropology  of  the  Fathers,  gen¬ 
erally,  it  is  of  great  importance 
to  notice  whether  the  writer  is 
speaking  of  man  as  fallen,  or  as 
unfallen.  Assertions  made  re¬ 
specting  the  primitive  freedom 
of  man  as  he  is  by  creation  should 
not  be  transferred  to  his  apostate 
condition  ;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  statements  that  relate  to 
the  bondage  and  helplessness  of 
the  apostate  will  are  not  to  be 
applied  to  the  unfallen  human 
will.  Unless  this  distinction  is 
taken  into  view,  one  and  the 
same  writer  will,  oftentimes,  be 
found  to  teach  contradictions ; 
sometimes  asserting  freedom,  auu 
sometimes  bondage. 


32 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


of  our  will  as  to  philosophize  or  not  to  philoso¬ 
phize.”  “  Man,  like  every  other  spiritual  being, 
can  never  lose  the  power  of  arbitrary  choice.  By 
means  of  this  power,  noble  minds,  at  all  times,  here 
and  hereafter,  aided  by  that  Divine  Power  which  is 
indispensable  to  success,  are  lifting  themselves  up 
from  ignorance  and  deep  moral  corruption,  and  are 
drawing  nearer  to  God  and  the  truth.”  1 

Yet  these  statements  undergo  some  modifica¬ 
tion.  Clement  also  insists  upon  the  necessity  of 
divine  influences  in  order  to  deliverance  from  sin, 
because,  although  man  is  able  to  commence  moral 
improvement  by  the  resolute  decision  of  his  will,  he 
cannot  bring  it  to  completion  without  the  aid  of 
divine  grace.  “  God,”  he  remarks,  “  co-operates 
with  those  souls  that  are  willing.”  “  As  the  phy¬ 
sician  furnishes  health  to  that  body  which  syner- 
gizes  towards  health  [by  a  recuperative  energy  of 
its  own],  so  God  furnishes  eternal  salvation  to  those 
who  synergize  towards  the  knowledge  and  obe¬ 
dience  of  the  truth.”2 3  In  these  extracts,  which 
might  be  multiplied,  Clement  teaches  that  the 
initiative ,  in  the  renewal  and  change  of  the  sinful 
heart,  is  taken  by  the  sinner  himself.  The  first 
motion  towards  holiness  is  the  work  of  man, 
but  it  needs  to  be  succeeded  and  strengthened 
by  the  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Whenever, 

1  Redepenning  :  Origenes,  I.  dives  salvus,  Cap.  XI. ;  Stromata 

133-135.  VIII. 

3  Clemens  Alexandrinus  :  Quis 


ALEXANDRINE  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


33 


by  virtue  of  its  own  inherent  energy,  the  soul 
is  itself  willing,  then  God  co-operates,  and  concurs 
with  this  willingness.1 

These  views  of  Clement,  respecting  the  power 
to  good  in  apostate  man,  were  shared  by  Origen .2 
In  the  third  book  of  the  De  Princvpiis ,  he  argues 
that  the  assertion  of  the  apostle  that  man’s  salva¬ 
tion  “  is  not  of  him  that  willeth,”  but  “  of  God  that 
showeth  mercy,”  means  merely  that  the  existence 
of  the  will  as  a  faculty  depends  upon  Divine 
power,  and  not  that  the  use  of  the  faculty  is  thus 
dependent.  u  As  we  derive  it  from  God  that  we 
are  men,  that  we  breathe,  that  we  move,  so  also  we 
derive  it  from  God  that  we  will.  But  no  one  would 
infer  from  the  fact  that  our  capacity  to  move,  the 
hand,  e.  g.,  is  from  God,  that  therefore  the  motion 
of  our  hand  in  the  act  of  murder,  or  of  theft,  is 
from  God.”3  Throughout  this  first  chapter  of  the 
third  book  of  the  De  Pvincipiis ,  in  which  Origen 
enunciates  his  view  of  human  freedom,  and  examines 
the  Scripture  texts  that  relate  to  this  subject,  he 
holds  that  the  relation  which  the  human  will  sus¬ 
tains  to  moral  good  is  precisely  the  same  as  that 


Austin  Martyr  (Apologia  I. 
10)  remarks  that,  “though  we  had 
no  choice  in  our  creation,  yet  in 
our  regeneration  we  have  ;  for 
God  persuades  only,  and  draws 
us  gently,  in  our  regeneration,  by 
co-operating  freely  with  those  ra¬ 
tional  powers  he  has  bestowed 
upon  us.” 


3  Eor  Origen’s  anthropology, 
compare  Redepenning  :  Origen es, 
II.  318,  360.  sq. ;  Thoylasius  : 
Origenes,  p.  195.  sq. 

3Origenes:  Tom.  I.  720.  Ed. 
Bas.  mi. 


34 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


which  it  sustains  to  moral  evil.  The  will  initiates 
both  holiness  and  sin ;  so  that,  in  Origen’s  view,  it 
is  as  incorrect  to  deny  to  the  human  will,  be  it 
fallen  or  unfallen,  the  power  to  holiness,  as  it  would 
be  to  deny  it  the  power  to  sin.  Origen’s  position 
is,  that  the  will  of  man  is  the  ultimate  efficient  in 
either  direction,  or  else  it  is  the  ultimate  efficient  in 
neither  direction. 

Origen’s  view  of  the  relation  which  the  agency 
of  the  human  will  sustains  to  Divine  power  in  re¬ 
generation,  coincides  with  that  of  Clement.  The 
finite  faculty  begins  the  process  of  right  action,  and 
divine  grace  perfects  and  completes  it.  The  faculty 
by  which  to  will  the  right,  man  has  from  God  ;  but 
the  decision  itself  is  his  own  act.  God’s  part  is 
therefore  greater  than  man’s ;  as  the  creation  of  a 
faculty  is  greater  than  the  use  of  it.  Moreover, 
every  right  beginning  of  action  on  the  side  of  man, 
requires  a  special  succor  and  assistance  from  God. 
Through  the  Holy  Spirit  this  succor  is  granted, 
according  to  the  worthiness  of  the  individual ;  and 
thus  every  right  act  of  man  is  a  mixture  of  self¬ 
choice  and  divine  aid.1 

The  views  of  Clement  and  Origen  respecting 
original  sin  harmonized  with  these  views  of  free 
will  and  regeneration.  To  understand  their  theory 

1  Redepenning  :  Origenes,  II.  522 ;  De  Princ.  III.  279  ;  Sel.  in 
318.  His  citations  are  :  Fragm.  Ps.  p.  571,  672  ;  Tom.  in  Matt, 
de  Princ.  III.  p.  35  ;  Horn,  in  Jer.  XII.  561. 

VIII.  170;  Com.  in  Rom.  iv. 


ALEXANDRINE  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


35 


of  original  sin,  it  will  be  necessary  first  to  exhibit 
tlieir  psychology.  They  subdivided  the  constitu¬ 
tion  of  man  into  ocojua,  ifjvyj],  and  Ttvty^a.  The 
first,  was  the  material  part ;  the  second  included 
the  principle  of  animal  life,  together  with  the  sen¬ 
suous  appetites  and  passions  that  relate  to  the  phys¬ 
ical  world ;  while  the  third  was  the  rational  and 
spiritual  principle,  including  the  will  and  the  moral 
affections  of  human  nature.  Original  sin,  according 
to  the  Alexandrine  theologians,  was  confined  to  the 
two  first  subdivisions  in  the  trichotomy.  It  was  an 
inherited  corruption  which  has  its  seat  in  the  body 
and  the  sensuous  nature,  but  does  not  inhere  in  the 
nvtv[ia,  because  this  is  not  propagated,  and  there¬ 
fore  cannot  inherit  anything.  Adopting  then,  as 
the  Alexandrine  anthropologist  did,  the  theory  of 
pre-existence,  it  was  easy  to  see  that  the  rational 
part,  the  nvtvycc,  coming  down  from  the  angelic 
sphere,  would  be  kept,  more  or  less,  in  isolation 
from  the  body  and  its  sensuous  corruption,  and 
might  thus  be  regarded  as  able  by  its  intrinsic 
energy  to  rule  and  overcome  this  “original  sin,” 
this  corrupted  sensuousness,  that  was  all  around  it, 
but  was  not  in  it.1 

Original  sin,  being  only  physical  corruption,  and 
pertaining  only  to  the  bodily  and  physical  nature, 
was  not  regarded  as  truly  and  properly  culpable  by 

1  'AvenifteKTov  twv  ^eLpovoov  to  Princ.  ITT.  i.  Thomasius  :  Orige- 
nvcvpa.  Op.igen  in  Job.  xxxii.  nes,  p.  196. 

11;  ii.  9;  in  Matt.  x.  11;  de 


36 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


the  Alexandrine  school.  There  is  no  guilt  except 
in  the  wrong  action  of  the  nvtv^ia.  Sin,  in  the  strict 
sense,  therefore,  has  no  origin  in  Adam,  but  is  the 
act  of  the  individual  will,  either  in  a  previous  world, 
or  in  this  one.  That  the  individual  will,  in  every 
instance,  yields  to  the  solicitation  of  the  corrupt 
sensuousness,  Origen  accounts  for  by  the  force  of 
example  and  education,  and  not  by  any  connection 
or  union  between  the  posterity  and  the  progenitor. 
“Parents,”  says  Origen,  “not  only  generate  their 
children,  but  also  imbue  them ;  and  they  who  are 
born  are  not  merely  the  children,  but  the  pupils, 
of  their  parents ;  and  they  are  urged  to  the  death 
of  sin,  not  so  much  by  natural  connection  (natura), 
as  by  training.  For  illustration,  if  a  man  aposta¬ 
tizing  from  Christianity  should  take  up  the  worship 

of  idols,  would  he  not  teach  the  children  that  should 

/ 

be  begotten,  to  worship  demons  and  offer  sacrifice 
to  them  ?  This  is  what  Adam  did  when  he  apos¬ 
tatized  from  God.” 1 

* 

§  3.  Later- Alexandrine  and  Antiochian  Antliro- 

pology. 

The  Anthropology  indicated  in  these  state¬ 
ments  of  Clement  and  Origen,  in  a  modified  form, 
became  the  type  of  doctrine  in  the  Oriental  Church 
generally.  It  received  a  modification  in  three  par- 


1  Origenes  :  Com.  in  Rom.  v.  18,  Opera  II.  p.  534.  Ed.  Basil,  1571. 


LATER* ALEXANDRINE  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


37 


ticulars :  1.  The  theory  of  pre-existence  was  re¬ 
jected,  and  that  of  creationism  was  substituted. 
2.  There  was  more  recognition  of  the  indirect 
effects  of  the  Adamic  transgression  upon  the  soul 
itself,  including  the  will  (nvtv/ucc).  3.  There  was 
a  more  qualified  assertion  of  power  to  holiness  in 
the  fallen  man. 

These  modifications  are  apparent  in  the  writings 
of  the  Later- Alexandrine  School ,  composed  of  those 
Greek  theologians  who  had  felt  the  influence  of 
Origen,  viz. :  Athanasius,  Basil,  Gregory  Nazianzen, 
Gregory  Nyssa,  Cyril  of  Jerusalem,  and  Cyril  of 
Alexandria.  These  Fathers  endeavored  to  exhibit 
the  doctrine  of  the  universality  of  sin  in  its  relation 
to  the  sin  of  Adam,  yet  did  not  adopt  that  doc¬ 
trine  of  a  propagated  sinfulness  of  the  will  (nvtvfxa) 
which  we  shall  meet  with  in  the  Latin  Anthro¬ 
pology.  Original  Sin,  with  them  also,  is  not  cul¬ 
pable.  It  is  only  an  inherited  disorder  of  the  sen¬ 
suous  nature,  from  which  temptation  issues,  and  to 
which  the  will  yields ;  and  not  until  this  act  of  the 
will  is  there  any  sin,  properly  so  called,  in  man. 
Athanasius  was  engaged  with  the  discussion  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  Trinity  all  his  life,  and  exhibits  his 
anthropological  opinions  only  rarely,  and  in  passing. 
But  his  view  of  original  sin  would  probably  be  sum¬ 
med  up  in  the  above-mentioned  statement.  Hagen- 
bach  (Dogmengeschichte,  §  108)  quotes  a  remark  of 
Athanasius,  to  the  effect  that  “  many  men  have  be- 


38 


HISTOEY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


come  pure  from  all  sin,” 1  in  proof  of  his  own  state¬ 
ment  that  Athanasius  did  not  hold  to  the  universal¬ 
ity  of  sin.  But  the  remark  of  Athanasius  when  read 
in  its  original  connection  shows  that  he  was  speak¬ 
ing  not  of  the  unregenerate,  but  of  those  who  were 
the  subjects  of  renewing  divine  influence.  “  Many,” 
he  says,  “  have  been  made  holy  and  clean  from  all  sin ; 
nay  Jeremiah  was  hallowed  from  the  womb  ;  never¬ 
theless  death  reigned  from  Adam  to  Moses,  even 
over  those  that  had  not  sinned  after  the  similitude  of 
Adam’s  transgression,”  and  thus  “  man  remained 
mortal  and  corruptible  as  before ,  liable  to  the  affec¬ 
tions  proper  to  his  nature.” 

Cyril  of  Jerusalem  makes  the  following  state¬ 
ments  respecting  original  sin  :  “  When  we  come  into 
the  world  we  are  sinless  ( dvapciQvuTOi ),  but  now  we 
sin  from  choice.”  “  Where  God  first  sees  a  good 
conscience  there  he  bestows  the  saving  seal.”  “We 
did  not  sin  before  our  souls  came  into  the  world ; 
but  coming  into  it  free  from  evil,  we  transgress  by 
the  choice  of  our  mind.  There  is  no  kind  of  souls 
that  are  either  sinful  or  righteous  by  nature,  but 
that  we  are  either  the  one  or  the  other  proceeds 
only  from  free  choice.”  “  The  sentence  of  death 
threatened  against  Adam  extended  to  him  and  all 
his  posterity,  even  unto  those  who  had  not  sinned 
as  Adam  did  when  he  disobeyed  God  by  eating  the 

1  HoAXoi  yap  ovv  ayiot  yeyovcuri  Kcftapo'i  ira.(TT]s  apaprlas.  Contra  Ari- 
anos,  III.  33. 


LATER- ALEXANDRINE  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


39 


forbidden  fruit.” 1  Cyril  here  implies,  that  as  infants 
have  not  sinned  by  a  conscious  and  deliberate  act 
of  choice  they  have  not  sinned  at  all,  and  that  death 
passes  upon  them  not  as  penalty,  but  for  other  rea¬ 
sons.  Gregory  Nazianzen  denominates  unbaptized 
children  ccacpQayioTOvg  juiv,  dnovii]Qovg  ds?  Gregory 
Nyssa  asserts  a  universal  tendency  to  sin  in  man¬ 
kind,  but  denies  sin  in  the  sense  of  guilt,  in  in¬ 
fants.3 

The  Antiochian  School ,  represented  by  Theo¬ 
dore  of  Mopsuestia,  Chrysostom,  and  Theodoret, 
adopted  substantially  the  same  anthropology  with 
the  Later- Alexandrines.  They  held  the  doctrine 
of  the  Adamic  connection  only  so  far  as  the  physi¬ 
cal  nature  is  concerned,  and  taught  that  there  is  an 
inherited  evil,  or  corruption,  but  not  an  inherited 
sin.  The  best  representative  of  this  school,  and  per¬ 
haps  of  the  Greek  anthropology  generally,  is  Chry¬ 
sostom.  He  concedes  that  the  mortal  Adam  could 
beget  mortal  descendants,  but  not  that  the  sinful 
Adam  could  beget  sinful  descendants.  The  doctrine 
of  propagation,  according  to  him,  applies  to  the 
physical  nature  of  man,  but  not  to  his  spiritual  and 
voluntary.  The  first  progenitors  of  the  human  race 
brought  corruption,  i.  e.  a  vitiated  sensuousness , 
but  not  a  sinful  will  into  the  series  of  human  beings, 

1  Cyeillus  Hieros.  :  Cateche-  2  Gregorius  Naz.  :  Orationes, 
ses,  IV.  xix. ;  I.  iii.  Compare  XL.  p.  563,  B. 

Whitby:  On  Original  Sin,  Ch.  3  Gregorius  Nys.  :  De  oration© 
VI.  Dom. ;  De  Infantibus. 


40 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


and  these  latter  universally  adopt  it,  and  strengthen 
it,  by  the  strictly  individual  choice  of  their  will.  In 
his  Commentary  upon  Romans  v.,  Chrysostom  thus 
expresses  his  views.  “  It  is  not  unbefitting  (ovS&v 
cciTstxog)  that  from  that  man  who  sinned,  and  there* 
by  became  mortal,  there  should  be  generated  those 
who  should  also  sin,  and  thereby  become  mortal ; 
but  that  by  that  single  act  of  disobedience  another 
being  is  made  a  sinner ,  what  reason  is  there  in 
this  ?  ISTo  one  owes  any  thing  to  justice,  until  he 
first  becomes  a  sinner  for  himself  (oi'xo&sv).  What, 
then,  is  the  meaning  of  the  word  a^aqroXoi^  in  the 
phrase  c  were  made  sinners  ?  ’  It  seems  to  me,  to 
denote  liability  to  suffering  and  death.”  Here, 
plainly,  Chrysostom  limits  the  connection  of  Adam 
with  his  posterity  to  that  part  of  man  which  is 
other  than  the  strictly  voluntary  part.  The  union 
of  Adam  and  his  posterity  accounts  for  the  origin 
of  strong  animal  passions,  of  inordinate  sensual  ap¬ 
petites,  but  not  for  the  origin  of  voluntary  wicked¬ 
ness.  This,  as  it  is  the  act  of  will,  and  not  the 
mere  working  of  sensuous  appetite,  has  a  purely 
individual  origin. 

Chrysostom’s  theory  of  regeneration  was  firmly 
synergistic.1  If  man  upon  his  side  works  towards 
holiness,  God’s  grace  will  come  in  to  succor  and 

1  Synergism  (crvv  zpyov)  teaches  in  the  renewing  act.  But  strict 
that  there  are  two  efficients  in  re-  cooperation  implies  concert  and 
generation  ;  that  the  human  will  agreement  between  the  two  co- 
co-operates ,  in  the  strict  sense  of  operating  agents ;  hence  syner- 
the  term,  with  the  Holy  Spirit,  gism  asserts  a  certain  degree  of 


RECAPITULATORY  SURVEY. 


41 


strengthen  him.  In  his  16th  Homily  on  Romans, 
his  exegesis  is  as  follows  :  “  The  phrase  1  it  is  not  of 
him  that  willeth,  nor  of  him  that  runneth  ’  does  not 
denude  man  of  power  altogether,  but  indicates  that 
the  whole  power  is  not  of  man.  Assisting  grace  is 
needed  from  above.  For,  it  is  necessary  that  the 
man  himself  should  both  will  and  run ;  but  he  is  to 
be  courageous  (ziaqQtlv)  and  constant  [in  well  do¬ 
ing],  not  by  his  own  efforts,  but  through  God’s 
loving  kindness.”  Again,  Chrysostom  remarks,  that 
u  it  is  necessary  for  us  first  to  choose  goodness,  and 
when  we  have  chosen  it,  then  God  introduces  ( da  a - 
ytc)  goodness  from  himself.  .  .  .  It  is  our  function 
to  choose  beforehand,  and  to  will,  but  it  is  God’s 
function  to  finish  and  bring  to  completion.” 1 


§  4.  Recapitulatory  Survey. 

The  Greek  Anthropology,  commencing  with  the 
extreme  positions  of  Clement  and  Origen,  and  pass¬ 
ing  from  these  into  the  more  guarded  statements  of 
the  Later- Alexandrine  and  Antiochian  Schools,  be¬ 
came  the  general  type  of  doctrine  for  the  Eastern 
Church  ;  and  under  new  forms  and  names  has  per¬ 
petuated  itself  down  to  the  present  time.  Christen- 


right  inclination  remaining  in  the  a  maximum  or  a  minimum,  and 
human  will  after  apostasy,  by  hence  the  varieties  of  synergism, 
means  of  which  it  can  concur  1  Chrysostomus  :  Homilia  XII. 
with  the  Divine  in  regeneration.  Ad  Hebraos. 

This  degree  may  he  more  or  less, 


42 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


dom  from  the  very  beginning  became  divided  into 
two  great  dogmatic  divisions ;  in  one  of  which  the 
Greek,  and  in  the  other,  the  Latin  Anthropology  has 
prevailed.  A  recapitulatory  survey  of  the  cardinal 
points  of  the  former  presents  the  following  particu¬ 
lars:  1.  Original  Sin  is  not  voluntary,  and,  therefore, 
is  not  properly  sin  in  the  sense  of  guilt.1  2.  The* 
Adamic  connection  relates  only  to  the  corporeal 
and  sensuous  nature,  and  not  to  the  voluntary  and 
rational.  3.  The  voluntary  and  rational  nvtvfxa  is 
not  propagated,  but  is  created  in  each  individual 
instance,  and  its  action  is  individual  altogether. 
4.  The  Adamic  connection  exerts  no  immediate 
effect  upon  the  will ;  it  affects  it  only  mediately, 
through  the  fleshly  corruption.  5.  Infants  are  guilt¬ 
less,  because  they  possess  only  a  propagated  phys¬ 
ical  corruption.  6.  The  will  takes  the  initiative  in 
regeneration ;  but  though  the  first  to  commence,  it 
is  unable  to  complete  the  work;  and  hence  the 
need  of  the  Divine  efficiency,  with  which  the  human 
will  co-operates  as  itself  an  efficient,  power. 

1  “  All,  or  at  least  the  greater  any  real  original  sin.”  Wiggeks: 
part  of  the  Fathers  of  the  Greek  Augustinism  and  Pelagianism,  p. 
Church,  before  Augustine,  denied  43  (Emerson’s  translation). 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  LATIN  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


§  1.  TertuUiawus  Traducianism. 

As  has  been  observed,  the  Greek  anthropology 
was  the  dominant  theory  in  the  Eastern  Church, 
and  prevailed  extensively  in  the  Western.  In  the 
2d  and  3d  centuries,  many  of  the  Occidental  Fathers, 
judging  from  their  writings,  would  not  have  quar¬ 
relled  with  a  statement  of  the  doctrines  of  sin  and 
regeneration  substantially  like  that  of  Chrysostom. 
But  in  the  writings  of  the  leading  minds  at  the 
West,  in  the  3d  and  4th  centuries,  we  can  discover 
the  swelling  germs  of  that  other  theory  which 
afterwards  became  dominant  in  the  Latin  Church. 
The  fathers  in  whom  this  tendency  is  most  apparent 
are  Tertullian,  Cyprian,  Hilary,  and  Ambrose.1 

Tertulliarfs  Traducianism,  which  gradually  be- 

1  Hippolytus,  the  pupil  of  Ire-  ner,  and  particularly  the  doctrine 
naeus,  states  the  doctrine  of  free  of  the  origin  of  sin.  “Man  was  born 
will  in  a  somewhat  guarded  man-  a  creature  endued  with  free  will, 


44 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


came  the  received  psychology  of  the  Latin  Church, 
paved  the  way  for  the  doctrine  of  innate  sin ,  in 
distinction  from  innate  evil,  and  also  for  the  theory 
of  monergism1  in  regeneration.  This  Father,  start¬ 
ing  from  the  fact  that  from  birth  man  is  constantly 
inclined  to  sin,  deduced  from  it  his  famous  maxim : 
Tradux  animae ,  tradux  peccati , — the  propagation 
of  the  soul  implies  the  propagation  of  sin. 

His  argument,  drawn  out  in  full,  was  as  follows. 
If  there  can  be  a  traduction  of  the  soul,  there  can 
be  a  traduction  of  sin.  If  a  free-agent  can  be  prop¬ 
agated,  then  free-agency  can  be ;  for  the  agency 
follows  the  agent,  and  shares  in  all  its  character¬ 
istics.  If,  therefore,  there  be  nothing  in  a  con¬ 
tinuous  process  of  transmission  from  a  generic  unity 
that  is  incompatible  with  the  nature  of  a  rational 
and  voluntary  essence  like  the  soul,  then  there  is 


but  not  dominant  ( ovk  ap^ov )  ;  Lav¬ 
ing  reason,  but  not  able  to  govern 
everything  with  reason,  authority , 
and  power,  but  a  slave  (8ov\ov),  and 
having  all  contraries  (to.  evavrla) 
in  himself.  He,  in  having  free 
will,  generates  evil ;  but  nothing 
evil  comes  to  pass  accidentally, 
but  only  unless  thou  doest  it  [by 
design  and  intentionally].  For, 
in  the  volition  or  cogitation  of 
evil,  evil  receives  its  name,  and 
does  not  exist  from  the  begin¬ 
ning,  but  carqe  into  existence  sub¬ 
sequently.”  Wordsworth:  Ilip- 
polytus,  p.  289  (Philosophumena, 
Ed.  Miller,  p.  336). — In  another 
place  (p.  388,  Ed.  Miller,  Words¬ 


worth,  p.  295),  be  remarks  that 
“God  made  nothing  evil,  and 
man  is  endued  with  free  will, 
having  the  power  of  willing  or 
not  willing  in  himself,  and  being 
able  to  do'  both  [good  and  evil].” 

1  Monergism  (povovepyov)  teach¬ 
es  that  there  is  but  one  efficient 
agent  in  the  regeneration  of  the 
soul,  viz.  the  Holy  Spirit.  The 
apostate  will,  according  to  this 
theory,  possesses  not  the  least  de¬ 
gree  of  efficiency,  or  inclination, 
to  act  holily,  until  it  has  been 
acted  upon  by  Divine  grace,  and 
therefore  cannot  co-operate  in 
the  renovating  act. 


terttjxlian’s  traducianism. 


45 


nothing  in  such  transmission  that  is  incompatible 
with  the  activity  of  such  an  essence,  or,  in  other 
words,  with  the  voluntariness  of  sin.  If  God  can 
originate  the  entire  human  nature  by  the  method  of 
creation ,  and  then  can  individualize  this  nature  by 
the  method  oi  procreation,  it  follows  that  he  can  pre¬ 
serve  all  the  qualities  of  the  nature, — its  rationality, 
its  immateriality,  its  freedom,  &c., — in  each  of  its  in¬ 
dividualizations,  and  from  one  end  of  the  process  to 
the  other;  for  preservation  is  comparatively  less 
difficult  than  creation  from  nothing.  In  other  words, 
if  mind,  considered  as  an  immaterial  substance,  does 
not  lose  its  distinctive  qualities  by  being  procreated, 
but  continues  to  be  intelligent,  rational,  and  volun¬ 
tary  at  every  point  in  the  process,  and  in  every  one 
of  its  individualizations,  then  it  follows  that  the 
activities  and  products  of  such  a  mental  essence  do 
not  cease  to  be  rational  and  responsible  activi¬ 
ties  and  products,  though  exhibiting  themselves 
in  that  unbroken  continuity  which  marks  a  prop¬ 
agation.  It  is  evident  that  everything  depends 
upon  the  correctness  of  the  hypothesis  that  there  is 
a  tradux  animae , — that  man  is  of  one  generic  nature 
as  to  his  spiritual  part  as  well  as  his  physical,  and 
that  his  entire  humanity  is  procreated.  Hence  the 
importance  attached  to  the  Traducian  theory  of 
the  origin  of  the  soul,  by  Tertullian,  and  the  earnest¬ 
ness  with  which  he  maintained  it. 

It  is  only  the  beginnings,  however,  of  the  Latin 
or  Augustinian  anthropology,  that  we  can  trace  in 


46 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


Tertullian’s  writings.  In  some  instances,  lie  still 
speaks  of  original  sin  in  the  same  terms  with  the 
Greek  theologians.  His  well-known  plea  for  the 
delay  of  paedo-baptism  rests  upon  the  comparative 
innocency  of  infancy.  “Why  should  the  age  of 
innocency  be  in  haste  to  obtain  remission  of  sin?”1 
Yet  it  would  not  be  correct  to  infer  from  this 
phraseology,  that  Tertullian  held  to  an  absolute  in¬ 
nocency  upon  the  part  of  infants.  The  innocency 
is  relative  only  ;  the  infant  has  not  committed  “  ac¬ 
tual  ”  sins,  though  possessed  of  a  sinful  bias,  which 
Tertullian  held  to  be  condemning,  certainly  to  the 
extent  of  needing  the  remission  of  baptism. 

Tertullian  at  times,  also,  employs  phraseology 
that  looks  towards  the  synergistic  theory  of  re¬ 
generation.  “Some  things  are  by  virtue  of  the 
divine  compassion,  and  some  things  are  by  virtue 
of  our  agency”2  Yet,  in  his  writings,  generally, 
the  human  efficiency  is  a  minimum,  and  almost  dis¬ 
appears,  so  that  the  rudiments  of  the  monergistic 
theory  of  regeneration  are  distinctly  visible  in  the 
anthropology  of  the  North-African  Church,  which 
was  mainly  shaped  by  them.  In  his  tract  DeAnima , 
Tertullian,  with  allusion  to  Scripture  phraseology, 
remarks :  “  And  thus  stones  shall  become  the  chil¬ 
dren  of  Abraham,  if  they  be  formed  by  the  faith 
of  Abraham,  and  the  progeny  of  vipers  shall  bring 

1  “  Quid  festinat  innocens  aetas  5  Tertulltantjs  :  Ad  uxorem, 
ad  remissionem  peccatorum  ?  ”  c.  21. 

De  Bapt.  18. 


CYPRIAX,  AMBROSE,  HILARY. 


47 


forth  the  fruits  of  repentance,  if  they  spit  away 
the  poison  of  their  malignity.  But  this  involves 
the  energy  of  divine  grace,  more  powerful  than 
that  of  nature,  and  which  holds  in  subjection  to 
itself  that  free  power  of  will  within  us  which  is 
denominated  ccvrtgovowv”  1 

§  2.  Anthropology  of  Cyprian ,  Ambrose ,  and  Hilary . 

The  writings  of  Cyprian  (f  258)  exhibit  an  in¬ 
creasing  tendency  in  the  Western  Church  towards 
the  doctrine  of  an  original  sinfulness,  and  a  moner- 
gistic  renovation  of  the  human  soul.  The  pressure 
from  Gnosticism  was  now  less  heavy,  and  the  atten¬ 
tion  of  theologians  was  being  turned  more  to  the 
effects  of  sin  upon  the  will  itself.  As  a  consequence, 
less  emphasis  was  placed  upon  the  doctrine  of  human 
power,  and  more  upon  that  of  Divine  grace.  “  All 
our  ability,”  says  Cyprian,2  “  is  of  God.  In  him  we 
live,  in  him  we  have  strength.  Our  heart  merely 
lies  open  and  thirsts.  In  proportion  as  we  bring  a 
recipient  faith,  do  we  drink  in  the  inflowing  grace.” 
Respecting  the  guilt  of  original  sin,  Cyprian  is  fluc¬ 
tuating,  and  not  entirely  consistent  with  himself. 
He  seems  to  hold  that  original  sin  is  not  so  culpable 
as  actual  sin,  and  yet  teaches  that  it  needs  remis¬ 
sion.  “  The  infant,”  he  remarks,3  u  has  committed 

1  Teetulliaistus  :  De  anima,  c.  21.  *  Cypbianus  :  Ad  Fidum,  c.  5. 

2  Cypeianus  :  De  gratia,  ad  Do¬ 
nation,  c.  4,  5. 


48 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


no  sin.  He  has  only  contracted  the  contagion  of 
death  from  his  progenitor,  and  hence  remission  of 
sin  is  more  easy  in  his  case,  because  it  is  not  his 
own  but  another’s  sin  that  is  remitted  to  him.” 

In  the  writings  of  Ambrose  (f  391)  and  Hilary 
(f  368),  the  two  most  distinguished  Latin  theolo¬ 
gians  of  the  4th  century,  we  find  the  doctrine  of  a 
sinful ,  as  distinguished  from  a  corrupt,  nature  still 
more  distinctly  enunciated  than  in  Tertullian  and 
Cyprian,  and  more  use  made  of  the  ideas  and 
phraseology  of  the  fifth  chapter  of  Romans.  The 
following  passages  from  Ambrose 1  will  indi¬ 
cate  his  general  view  of  original  sin,  and  of  the 
Adamic  connection.  Quoting  Romans  v.  12,  which 
in  the  version  of  his  day  was  rendered  u  in  whom 
all  have  sinned,”  he  remarks :  “  Adam  existed  (fuit), 
and  we  all  existed  in  him  ;  Adam  perished,  and  all 
perished  in  him.”  u  We  all  sinned  in  the  first  man, 
and  by  the  succession  of  nature,  the  succession  of 
guilt  (culpae)  was  transfused  from  one  to  all.” 
“  Before  we  are  born,  we  are  stained  with  conta¬ 
gion,  and  before  we  see  the  light  we  receive  the 
injury  of  the  original  transgression.”  “  L  In  whom  all 


1  Augustine  (Opus  imp.  lib. 
IY.  Ed.  Migne  X.  1400)  quotes 
Ambrose  to  Julian  as  follows : 
“Audi  ergo  Juliane  :  ‘  Omnes  ’ 
inquit,  ‘in  Adam  moriuntur  ;  ’ 
quia  ‘per  unum  bominem  pecca- 
tum  intravit  in  mundum,  et  per 
peccatum  mors ;  et  ita  in  omnes 


homines  pertransiit,  in  quo  om¬ 
nes  peccaverunt ;  ’  illius  ergo  cul¬ 
pa  mors  omnium  est  (Lib.  IV.  in 
Lucam  iv.  38).  Audi  adhuc  ali- 
ud :  ‘Fuit,’ inquit,  ‘Adam,  et  in 
illo  fuimus  omnes ;  periit  Adam, 
et  omnes  in  illo  perierunt  ’  ”  (Lib. 
YU.  in  Luc.  xv.  24). 


49 


CYPRIAN,  AMBROSE,  HILARY. 

sinned,’ — thus  it  is  evident  that  all  sinned  in  Adam, 
as  if  in  a  mass  ;  for  having  corrupted  by  sin  those 
whom  he  begat,  all  are  born  under  sin.  Wherefore 
we  all  are  sinners  from  him  (ex  eo),  because  we  all 
are  [men]  from  him.”  1  Statements  similar  to  these 
are  made  by  Hilary ? 

We  find,  then,  the  germinal  substance  of  the  Au- 
gustinian  theory  of  sin,  so  far  as  concerns  the 
Adamic  connection,  in  the  century  previous  to  that 
in  which  Augustine’s  principal  dogmatic  influence 
falls.  Indeed,  it  is  evident  that  this  latter  Father 
was  the  recipient  as  well  as  the  propagator  of  that 
particular  system  which  goes  by  his  name.  He  only 
developed  an  anthropology  that  had  been  gradually 
forming  in  preceding  centuries,  out  of  that  remark¬ 
able  dogmatic  material  which  is  contained  in  the 
fifth  chapter  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans. 

Respecting  the  other  anthropological  question : 
viz.  To  what  degree  is  the  power  of  the  human 
will  weakened  by  sin  ?  both  Ambrose  and  Hilary 
teach  the  synergistic  theory;  although  with  less 
firmness,  and  more  self-contradiction,  than  we  have 
found  in  the  earlier  Latin  Fathers.  The  follow¬ 
ing  passages  from  Ambrose  illustrate  his  vacil¬ 
lation.  u  The  apostle  says,  L  Whom  he  foreknew, 
them  he  also  predestinated :  ’  for  he  did  not  pre- 

1  Cypkianus  :  Apol.  David  pos-  mentatio  in  Matthaeum  X.  §  23  ; 
terior;  Ad  Psalmnm  LII.  7 ;  In  In  Psalmum  118;  Cont.  duas 
ep.  ad  Rom.  c.  5.  Expositio  sec.  Epist.  Pelag.  lib.  IV.,  Ed.  Migne, 
Lucam  7.  X.  614. 

a  Compare  Augustine  :  Com- 
VOL.  II. — 4 


50 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


destinate  before  he  foreknew,  but  to  those  whose 
merit  he  foreknew,  he  predestinated  the  rewards  of 
merit.”  “  The  will  of  man  is  brought  into  a  state 
of  recipiency  (praeparatio)  by  God.  For  that  God 
may  be  honored  by  a  holy  will  is  through  God’s 
grace.” 1  A  comparison  of  the  latter  passage  with 
the  former  evinces  a  mental  wavering  between 
synergism  and  monergism.  Hilary  is  more 
explicit  and  firm  in  favor  of  the  theory  of  co¬ 
operation  ;  although  asserting  the  weakness  of 
the  apostate  will.  The  following  passages  indi¬ 
cate  his  views.  “  In  preserving  our  righteousness, 
unless  we  are  guided  by  God,  we  shall  be  in¬ 
ferior  through  our  own  nature.  Wherefore,  we 
need  to  be  assisted  and  directed  by  his  grace  in 
order  to  attain  the  righteousness  of  obedience.” 
u  The  persevering  in  faith  is  of  God,  but  the  origin 
and  commencement  of  faith  is  from  ourselves.”  “  It 
is  the  part  of  divine  mercy  to  assist  the  willing,  to 
confirm  those  who  are  making  a  beginning,  to  re¬ 
ceive  those  who  are  approaching..  But  the  com¬ 
mencement  is  from  ourselves,  that  God  may  finish 
and  perfect.” 2 

§  3.  Anthropology  of  Augustine . 

The  anthropology  indicated  in  these  extracts 

1  Ambrosius:  De  fide,  lib.  V.  tera  i.  12;  In  Psal.  CXIX,  litera 
n.  83  ;  Expositio  in  Lncam,  lib.  I.  xiv.  10 ;  In  Psal.  CXIX,  litera 

3  Hilarius  :  In  Psal.  CXIX,  li-  xvi.  10. 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


51 


from  Tertullian,  Cyprian,  Hilary,  and  Ambrose, 
grew  more  and'  more  definite  in  the  Latin  Church, 
and  became  theoretically  the  established  faith  with¬ 
in  it.  It  was  wrought  out  into  its  most  distinct 
form,  and  received  its  fullest  statement,  in  the 
Patristic  period,  in  the  Augustinian  anthropology, 
of  which  we  shall  now  make  a  detailed  examina¬ 


tion.1 

In  the  first  part  of  his  Christian  life,  Augustine 
was  influenced  by  the  views  of  his  teacher  Ambrose, 
and  occasionally  attributed  a  certain  amount  of  co¬ 
operating  efficiency  to  the  human  will  in  the  work 
of  regeneration.  In  his  earlier  writings,  some  ten¬ 
dency  to  synergism  is  apparent.2  For  example,  in 


his  Exposition  of  certain 

1  Compare  Guericke  :  Church 
History  §  91-93,  for  a  compre¬ 
hensive  and  compressed  state¬ 
ment. 

2  The  treatises  of  Augustine  in 
which  synergism  appears  are :  De 
libero  arbitrio  lib.  Ill;  Ad  Sim- 
plicianum  lib.  II;  De  catechizan- 
dis  rudibus ;  Expositio  propositio- 
num  ex  epistola  ad  Romanos. — 
“Augustine,  in  the  earlier  part 
of  his  Christian  life,  had  the  Semi- 
Pelagian  view  of  the  nature  of 
faith.  In  De  Praedestinatione 
Sanctorum  III,  and  De  Dono  Per- 
severantiae  XX,  Augustine  grants, 
that  at  a  former  period,  he  was 
himself  in  error,  and  held  faith 
in  God,  or  the  assent  which  we 
give  to  the  gospel,  not  as  a  gift 
from  Him,  but  as  something 


points  in  the  Epistle  to 

which  we  ourselves  produce,  by 
which  we  obtain  God’s  grace  to 
live  devoutly  and  righteously ; 
but  that  he  had  been  taught 
something  better,  especially  by 
the  words  of  Paul,  1  Cor.  iv.  7 : 
1  What  hast  thou,  that  thou  hast 
not  received ? ’”  Wiggers:  Au- 
gustinism,  translated  by  Emerson, 
p.  199.  “  But  it  will  be  said,  Am¬ 

brose,  Origen,  and  Jerome,  be¬ 
lieved  that  God  dispenses  his 
grace  among  men,  according  to 
his  foreknowledge  of  the  good 
use  which  each  individual  will 
make  of  it.  Augustine  also  was  of 
the  same  sentiment;  but  when  he 
had  made  a  greater  proficiency  in 
scriptural  knowledge,  he  not  only 
retracted  it,  but  powerfully  con¬ 
futed  it.”  Calvin:  Inst.  III.  viii. 


52 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


the  Romans  he  remarks  :  “  It  is  nowhere  said  that 
God  believes  all  things  in  ns.  Our  faith,  therefore, 
is  onr  own ;  but  the  good  works  that  we  perform 
are  of  him  who  gives  the  Spirit  to  those  who  be¬ 
lieve  ...  It  is  ours  to  believe  and  to  will ;  but  it 
is  his  to  give,  through  his  Spirit,  to  those  who  be¬ 
lieve  and  will,  the  power  of  performing  good  works. 

.  .  .  God  gives  his  holy  Spirit  to  one  whom  he 
foreknows  will  believe,  so  that  by  performing  good 
works  he  may  attain  eternal  life.” 1  The  two  last 
statements,  Augustine  formally  retracts  in  his  final 
revision  of  his  works.2 

The  external  cause  of  this  synergism  in  Augus¬ 
tine’s  earlier  writings,  besides  the  influence  of  the 
undecided  views  of  Ambrose  and  Hilary,  was  the 
Manichaeism  from  which  he  had  just  escaped,  and 
against  which  he  felt  a  strong  repugnance.3  This 
scheme,  like  the  Gnosticism  of  the  2d  and  3d  cen¬ 
turies,  made  sin  a  thing  of  creation  and  natural  ne¬ 
cessity,  so  that  the  same  motive  for  emphasizing 
the  doctrines  of  free-will  and  .  human  responsi¬ 
bility  existed  in  the  case  of  Augustine,  that  ex¬ 
isted  in  the  instances  of  Origen  and  Tertullian. 
On  the  other  hand,  his  growing  experience  of 
the  depth  of  moral  evil  within  his  own  soul,  and 
the  whole  course  of  his  Christian  life  so  vividly 

1  Expositio  quorondarum  pro-  8  Retractationes  I.  23  ;  II.  3. 

positionum  ex  Epistola  ad  Ro-  3  Confessions  VII.  iii.  4,  5,  sq. 

manos,  c.  60,  61,  6.  Compare 
Baumgakten-Crusius  :  Dogmen- 
geschichte  II.  246,  Note  b. 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


53 


portrayed  in  his  Confessions ,  were  forcing  upon  his 
notice  the  fact,  that  the  will ,  the  higher  spiritual 
faculty,  as  well  as  the  lower  sensuous  nature,  has 
felt  the  effects  of  the  apostasy  in  Adam.  The  Greek 
anthropology,  we  have  seen,  excepted  the  volun¬ 
tary  part  of  man  when  speaking  of  the  consequences 
of  Adam’s  transgression,  and  limited  them  to  the 
bodily  and  sensuous  part.  But  the  severe  conflict 
which  Augustine  was  called  to  wage  with  his  bodily 
appetites,  and  his  old  heathen  habits,  revealed  to  him 
the  fact  that  the  governing  power  of  the  soul,  the  will 
itself,  has  been  affected  by  the  same  apostasy  that 
has  affected  the  other  parts  of  human  nature.  “  I 
was  bound,”  he  says,  “not  with  another’s  irons,  but 
by  my  own  iron  will.  My  will  the  enemy  held,  and 
thence  had  made  a  chain  for  me,  and  bound  me. 
For  of  a  perverse  will  came  lust ;  and  a  lust  yielded 
to  becomes  custom ;  and  custom  not  resisted  be¬ 
comes  necessity  (necessitas).  By  which  links,  as  it 
were,  joined  together  as  in  a  chain,  a  hard  bondage 
held  me  enthralled.” 1  In  this  way,  Augustine’s 
attention  was  directed  to  the  reflex  influence  of  sin 
itself  upon  the  voluntary  faculty,  whereby  its  energy 
to  holiness  is  destroyed,  and  it  becomes  by  its  own 
act  an  enslaved  will.  His  experience  of  the  truth 
that  even  after  regeneration,  “  to  will  is  present,” 
but  “  how  to  perform,”  the  will  “  finds  not,”  led 
Augustine  to  his  fundamental  position,  that  original 

1  Augustinus  :  Confessiones  imperfectum,  Ed.  Migne  X.  1467. 
VIII.  v.  10,  11.  Compare  Opus 


54 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


sin  is  in  the  will  as  well  as  in  the  sensuous  nature, 
and  has  vitiated  the  voluntary  power  along  with  all 
the  other  powers  of  man.  This  practical  experience, 
and  the  important  speculative  conflict  with  Pela- 
gianism  and  Semi-Pelagianism,  were  the  causes  of 
Augustine’s  transition  from  the  Greek  anthropology 
of  his  earlier  days,  to  that  other  view  to  which  his 
own  name  has  been  affixed. 1 

The  following  are  the  essential  points  in  the 
Augustinian  anthropology.2  Man  was  created  in  the 
image  of  God, — that  is  with  a  will  inclined  and  de¬ 
termined  to  holiness,  and  positively  holy.  The 
primitive  holiness  of  man  was  not  his  own  product, 
in  the  sense  that  he  is  the  ultimate  author  of  it,  be¬ 
cause  he  would  then  be  entitled  to  the  glory  of  it. 
All  finite  holiness,  be  it  in  man  or  angel,  is  only 
relatively  meritorious,  because  it  is  the  result  of 
God’s  working  in  man  or  angel  to  will  and  to  do. 
As  possessed  of  this  con-created  holiness,  man  was 
immortal,  both  in  regard  to  body  and  soul.  He 
was  not  liable  to  death  in  any  form.  With 
this  condition  of  holiness,  was  coupled  the  pos¬ 
sibility  of  originating  sin  de  nihilo .3  This,  in  re- 


1  Respecting  the  alle'ged  contra¬ 
dictions  in  Augustine’s  views, 
compare  Gangauf  :  Psychologie 
des  Augustinus,  325  sq. 

2  The  Biblical  data  for  Augus¬ 
tine’s  theory  are  presented  in 
Wiggers’  Augustinism  (Emer¬ 
son’s  translation),  Chap.  XX. 

8  Augustinus  :  De  lib.  arbitrio 


II.  20  (Ed.  Migne  I.  1270).  “Mo- 
tus  ergo  ille  aversionis,  quod  fate- 
mur  esse  peccatum,  quoniam  de- 
fectivus  rnotus  est,  omnis  autem 
defectus  ex  nihilo  est ,  vide  quo 
pertineat,  et  ad  Deum  non  perti- 
nere  ne  dubites.  Qui  tamen  de¬ 
fectus  quoniam  est  voluntarius,  in 
nostra  est  positus  potestate.” 


ANTHKOPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


55 


lation  to  the  existing  determination  to  goodness,  was 
the  power  of  contrary  choice.  This  power  was  not 
added  for  the  purpose  of  making  man  a  free  agent, 
but  a  probationary  agent.  Adam  was  already  free, 
in  his  inclination  to  good.  When  God  works  in  the 
finite  will,  to  will  and  to  do,  there  is  no  compulsion. 
But  man  could  not  be  put  upon  probation,  unless  a 
power  to  the  contrary,  or  a  power  to  create  sin  out 
of  nothing,  were  superadded  to  his  freedom.  The 
power  to  the  contrary,  therefore,  was  not  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  moral  freedom,  but  only  an  accident  ex¬ 
isting  for  a  temporary  purpose  merely.  Man,  though 
endowed  with  this  power  of  contrary  choice,  was 
commanded  not  to  use  it, — which  is  another  proof 
that  it  is  not  needed  in  order  to  moral  freedom. 
Man  would  not  have  been  forbidden  to  use  a  power 
that  belongs  necessarily ,  and  intrinsically ,  to  free 
will.  But  if  the  power  were  used,  Adam  would 
become  both  sinful  and  mortal.  His  original  right¬ 
eousness  would  be  totally  lost ;  original  sin  would 
take  the  place  of  it  in  his  soul ;  his  body  would  be 
subject  to  temporal  death,  and  his  soul  to  eternal. 

Augustine  distinguished  between  absolute  per¬ 
fection,  and  relative  perfection.  The  former  is  the 
perfection  of  God,  who  is  destitute  of  the  power  of 
sinning.1  Those  angels  who  have  passed  through  pro- 

1  The  Divine  will  is  free,  and  " — 6  yap  Scos  anelpaaros  eVri.  But 
yet  it  does  not  possess  the  power  a  being  who  cannot  even  be  tempt- 
of  originating  sin.  The  apostle  ed  cannot  sin,  because  this  would 
James  affirms  that  u  God  cannot  imply  voluntary  action  without 
be  tempted  with  evil.”  The  any  motive. 

Deity  is  absolutely  untemptable, 


56 


HISTOEY  OF  ANTIIEOPOLOGY. 


bation  successfully  are  also  absolutely  perfect ;  not, 
however,  because  of  a  self-subsistent  energy  like  that 
of  God,  but  because  they  are  “kept  from  falling.”  But 
the  primitive  state  of  man  was  that  of  relative  per¬ 
fection  only.  Though  holy,  his  holiness  was  neither 
self-derived  nor  self-subsistent ;  and  neither  was  it 
so  established  by  divine  power  that  he  could  not 
apostatize.1  Whether  he  should  become  absolutely 
perfect,  like  God  and  the  elect  angels,  depended 
upon  the  use  which  he  should  make  of  his  proba¬ 
tionary  power  to  the  contrary,  during  the  period  of 
probation.  If  Adam  had  continued  to  will  holi¬ 
ness,  his  power  to  will  sin  would  have  dimin¬ 
ished,  by  the  operation  of  a  natural  law,  until  it 
reached  the  minimum  point,  and  would  then  have 
vanished  forever.  When  his  probation  was  thus 
over,  his  will  would  have  become  so  profoundly 
harmonized  with  that  of  God,  that  the  hazards  of 
apostasy  would  no  more  pertain  to  him,  than  to  the 
Deity.  The  relative  perfection  with  which  he  had 
been  endowed  by  creation,  would  have  resulted  in 
absolute  perfection  ;  that  is,  the  incapability  of  sin¬ 
ning,  which  belongs  to  God  and  the  holy  angels.2 

But  this  was  not  the  actual  result.  Adam  was 

1  “  Man  in  his  state  of  inno-  Augustintjs  :  De  Genesi  ad  lit. 
cency  had  freedom  and  power  to  XI.  vii.  (Ed.  Migne  III.  433) ; 
will  and  to  do  that  which  is  good  Howe  :  I.  133,  II.  1196  ;  Samuel 
and  well-pleasing  to  God;  but  Hopkins:  Works,  I.  143,  172, 
yet  mutably ,  so  that  he  might  173,  176. 

fall  from  it.”  Westminster  Con-  2  Augustinus:  Opera  X.  1518; 
fession  :  Oh.  IX.  Compare  also,  VII.  802  (Ed.  Migne). 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


57 


tempted,  and  induced  by  Satan  to  use  the  power 
of  contrary  choice.  He  thereby  originated  sin  de 
niliilo ,  and  by  ultimate  efficiency.  He  is  now  sinful 
in  the  inclination  and  determination  of  his  will. 
His  body  has  become  mortal,1  and  his  soul  is  con¬ 
demned  to  everlasting  death.  His  condition  is  now 
directly  contrary  to  what  it  would  have  been,  had 
he  continued  in  holiness.  Had  he  passed  through 
probation  safely,  he  would  have  become  unable  to 
sin  ;  but  having  failed  to  do  so,  he  is  now  unable  to 
originate  holiness  and  recover  himself  from  apos¬ 
tasy.2  According  to  the  Augustin ian  anthropology, 
there  are  two  reasons  for  this.  In  the  first  place, 
the  power  to  the  contrary,  in  either  direction,  is 
only  an  accident  of  voluntariness,  and  not  its  sub- 


luIf  Adam  had  not  sinned, 
he  would  not  have  been  de¬ 
spoiled  of  his  body,  but  would 
have  been  clothed  with  immor¬ 
tality  and  incorruptibility,  that 
what  is  mortal  should  be  swal¬ 
lowed  up  of  life,  i.  e.  pass  from 
the  animal  to  the  spiritual  state.” 
Augustinus  :  De  pec.  mer.  I.  ii. 
4.  “  The  death  of  the  body  is  a 

penalty,  since  the  spirit,  because 
it  voluntarily  left  God,  leaves  the 
body  against  its  will ;  so  that, 
as  the  spirit  left  God  because  it 
chose  to,  it  leaves  the  body  al¬ 
though  it  chooses  not  to.”  Au¬ 
gustinus  :  De  Trin.  IY.  xiii. ;  De 
Gen.  ad  lit.  IX.  x.  Augustine 
distinguished  between  a  “  minor  ” 
and  a  “major”  immortality. 
Adam  by  creation  possessed  the 


first, — namely,  the  possibility  of 
dying,  in  case  of  sinning.  Had 
he  not  fallen,  he  would  have  at¬ 
tained  the  latter,  which  is  pos¬ 
sessed  also  by  the  resurrection 
body,  and  the  angels, — namely, 
the  impossibility  of  dying,  found¬ 
ed  upon  the  impossibility  of  sin¬ 
ning.  Augustinus  :  Op.  Imp.  VI. 
xxx. 

2  “  Man  was  so  created  with 
free-will,  as  not  to  sin  if  he 
willed  not  to,  but  not  so,  that  if 
he  willed,  he  could  sin  with  im¬ 
punity.  What  wonder,  then,  if, 
by  transgressing,  i.  e.  by  chang¬ 
ing  the  rectitude  in  which  he 
was  made,  he  is  followed  with 
the  punishment  of  not  being  able 
to  do  right.”  Augustinus  :  Op. 
Imp.  VI.  xii.  (Ed.  Migne  X.  1522.) 


58 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


stance.  Voluntariness,  whether  it  be  holy  or  sin¬ 
ful,  consists  in  self- motion  with  absence  of  compul¬ 
sion.  Adam’s  righteousness  was  spontaneous  self- 
motion,  and  the  power  to  originate  sin  did  not  ren¬ 
der  it  any  more  so,  by  being  bestowed,  nor  would  it 
have  rendered  it  any  less  so,  by  being  withheld. 
Adam’s  sinfulness  was  pure  and  simple  self-will, 
self-decision,  and  did  not  require  the  additional 
power  to  originate  holiness,  in  order  to  be  self-will. 
Voluntariness  consists  in  positively  willing  the  one 
thing  that  is  willed,  and  not  in  the  bare  possibility 
of  willing  a  contrary  thing.  If  a  person  walk  by 
his  own  self-decision,  this  self-decision  would  be 
neither  strengthened  nor  weakened  by  endowing 
him  with  another  power  to  fly.  His  voluntariness 
depends  upon  the  single  fact  that  he  is  walking 
without  external  compulsion,  and  of  his  own  accord. 
There  are  many  other  things  which  might  be  de¬ 
nied  to  his  option,  yet  the  denial  would  not  invali¬ 
date  the  fact  that  he  is  moving  of  and  from,  his 
own  determination.  In  the  second  place,  the  power 
to  the  contrary,  in  reference  to  a  sinful  will,  would 
be  a  power  to  originate  holiness  by  an  ultimate 
efficiency.  But  this  power,  according  to  Augus¬ 
tine,  belongs  solely  to  the  Deity,  and  is  as  incom¬ 
municable  to  any  created  will  human  or  angelic,  as 
omnipotence  or  omniscience  itself  For  any  being 
who  originates  holiness  by  his  own  ultimate  effi¬ 
ciency  is  worthy  of  the  veneration  and  worship  due 
to  holiness.  The  finite  will  can  be  the  ultimate 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


59 


efficient  of  sin;  and  hence  unfallen  Adam  could  be 
endowed  with  a  power  to  originate  sin, — or,  with 
the  power  to  the  contrary,  downward.  But  holi¬ 
ness  in  the  creature  must  always  be  the  result 
of  God  working  in  him  to  will.1  Hence  fallen 
Adam  could  not  be  endowed  with  the  power  to 
originate  holiness  by  ultimate  efficiency, — or,  with 
the  power  to  the  contrary,  upward.  The  power 
of  contrary  choice,  therefore,  according  to  the  Au- 


1  “  Free  will  was  sufficient  for 
sin  ;  but  not  adequate  to  good, 
unless  aided  by  the  Omnipotent 
Good.”  Augustinus  :  De  cor.  et 
gratia,  XI.  xxxi.  (Ed.  Migne,  X. 
935).  To  the  objection  which 
the  Pelagians  continually  urged 
against  the  doctrine  of  an  enslav¬ 
ed  and  impotent  will,  that  “  God 
would  not  command  man  to  do 
what  cannot  be  done  by  man,” 
Augustine  makes  the  reply,  that, 
“  God  commands  man  to  do  what 
he  was  able  to  do  by  creation ,  but 
is  now  unable  to  do  by  reason  of 
apostasy ,  in  order  that  he  may 
come  to  know  what  he  must  seek 
from  Him  and  His  grace,” — “  ideo 
jubet  aliqua  quae  non  possumus, 
ut  noverimus  quod  ab  illo  petere 
debeamus.”  Augustinus  :  De 
gratia,  et  lib.  arbitrio,  I.  xvi.  32. 
After  quoting  the  words  of 
Christ:  “No  man  can  come  unto 
me,  except  the  Father,  which  hath 
sent  me,  draw  him  ”  (John  vi.  44), 
Augustine  remarks :  “He  does 
not  say  lead  him,  for  this  would 
imply  that  the  sinful  will  antici¬ 


pates  and  goes  before  the  Holy 
Spirit.  For  who  is  drawn,  if  he 
is  already  inclined  to  go  ?  And 
yet  no  one  comes  to  Christ  unless 
he  is  inclined.  The  sinful  man 
therefore  is  drawn ,  not  led,  in  a 
wonderful  manner,  by  Him  who 
knows  how  to  work  within  the 
hearts  of  men,  so  that  they  are 
changed  from  opposition  to  wil¬ 
lingness.”  Again,  quoting  the 
declaration  of  St.  Paul  (2  Cor.  iii. 
5)  :  “Not  that  we  are  sufficient  of 
ourselves  to  think  anything  as  of 
ourselves;  but  our  sufficiency  is 
of  God,”  he  adds  :  “  To  think  any¬ 
thing,  especially  any  good  thing. 
But  to  think  is  less  difficult  than 
to  desire;  for  we  can  think  of 
anything  that  we  desire,  but  we 
cannot  desire  anything  that  we 
think  of.  If  then  our  sufficiency 
is  of  God  in  order  to  think  any 
good  thing,  much  more  is  it  to  de¬ 
sire  and  to  do  any  good  thing.” 
Augustinus  :  Contra  duas  episto- 
las  Pelagianorum,  I.  xix.  37 ;  II. 
viii.  18, 


60 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


gustinian  anthropology,  can  be  given  in  only  one 
direction.  It  is  a  transient  and  accidental  char¬ 
acteristic  of  the  human  will,  which  is  intended 
to  belong  to  it  only  during  the  middle  or  proba¬ 
tionary  stage  in  its  history,  and  which  disappears 
either  in  a  state  of  immutable  holiness,  or  immuta¬ 
ble  sin.  The  assertions  of  Augustine  are  frequent 
upon  this  point,  and  very  explicit.  “  God,”  he 
remarks,  “  was  able  to  make  man  so  that  he  should 
not  be  able  to  sin ;  but  he  chose  rather  to  make 
him  so  that  it  should  lie  in  his  power  to  sin,  if  he 
would,  and  not  to  sin,  if  he  would  not ;  forbidding 
the  one,  enjoining  the  other ;  that  it  might  be  to 
him,  first,  a  merit  not  to  sin,  and  afterwards  a  just 
reward  to  be  unable  to  sin.  For  in  the  end,  he 
will  make  all  his  saints  to  be  without  power  to 
sm.  1 

It  is  here  that  we  notice  the  marked  difference 
between  the  Latin  and  the  Greek  anthropology,  in 
respect  to  the  idea,  and  definition ,  of  the  will.  The 
Latin  anthropology  regards  the  will  as  always  in  a 
state  of  decision,  by  its  very  nature.  Voluntariness 
belongs  as  intrinsically  to  the  faculty  of  will,  as  in¬ 
telligence  does  to  the  faculty  of  understanding.  A 
will  that  is  characterless  would  be  an  involuntary 
will ;  which  is  as  great  a  solecism  as  an  unintelligent 
understanding.  The  Greek  anthropology,  on  the 
contrary,  conceives  of  the  voluntary  faculty  as  in- 

1  Augustinus  :  De  continentia,  Church  History,  p.  379,  Note 
c.  xvi.  Compare  Guekicke  :  2. 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


61 


trinsically  undecided.  At  and  by  creation,  it  is 
without  character,  because  it  is  in  a  state  of  indif¬ 
ference.  Taken  and  held  at  the  instant  of  crea¬ 
tion,  the  human  will  is  an  inactive  and  involuntary 
essence,  because  it  is  undetermined  either  to  good 
or  evil.  From  this  unelective  and  inactive  state, 
it  starts  out  an  election,  a  voluntariness,  either  of 
good  or  evil.  Hence,  God  cannot  create  a  holy 
will,  any  more  than  he  can  create  an  evil  will ;  be¬ 
cause  this  would  imply  a  determined  will.  In  brief, 
the  Greek  idea  of  the  will  is,  that  it  is  a  vacuum 
which  is  to  make  itself  a  plenum  by  a  vacuum’s 
activity.1 

Again,  the  Latin  definition  of  freedom  is  wholly 
diverse  from  the  Greek.  In  the  Latin  anthropology, 
freedom  is  ^^-determination  ;  in  the  Greek  anthro¬ 
pology,  it  is  ^-determination,  or  indifference.  Ac¬ 
cording  to  Augustine,  a  faculty  is  free  when  it  acts 
purely  from  within  itself,  and  is  not  forced  to  act 

from  without.2  If,  therefore,  the  human  will  moves 

\  7  7 


1  Pelagitts  adopts  this  idea,  and 
applies  it  to  original  sin.  He  de¬ 
nies  that  man,  as  born,  possesses 
any  inherited  vitiosity, — “  capa- 
ces  enim  utriusqne  rei,  non  pleni 
nascimur;  sine  virtute  et  vitio 
procreamur.”  Pelagitjs  :  De  li- 
bero  arbitrio,  quoted  in  Augusti¬ 
nus:  De  peccato  orig.  c.  xiii. 

2  “  No  man  is  compelled  by  the 
power  of  God  to  evil  or  good ; 
but  that  he  wills  the  good  is  a 
work  of  grace.”  Augustinus  : 


Contra  duas  epist.  xviii.  I.  (Ed. 
Migne,  X.  567).  Augustine  ar¬ 
gues  that  the  will  is  free  (in  the 
sense  of  uncompelled)  in  sin,  be¬ 
cause  it  delights  in  sin.  “Sed 
haec  voluntas  quae  libera  est  in 
malis,  quia  delectatur  malis,  ideo 
libera  in  bonis  non  est  quia  libe- 
rata  non  est.”  Contra  duas  epist. 
Pelag.  lib.  I.  (Ed.  Migne,  X.  554). 
“Voluntariness  has  not  perished 
in  the  sinner,  because  he  sins 
with  delight,  and  delight  is  vol- 


62 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


towards  a  proposed  end,  by  its  own  self- motion,  this 
self-motion  alone  constitutes  its  voluntariness.1  It  is 
not  necessary  to  endow  it  with  an  additional  power 
to  move  in  a  contrary  direction.  Such  a  super¬ 
addition  of  power  would  add  nothing  to  the  already 
existing  fact  of  an  unforced  self- motion.  Even  when 
the  power  to  the  contrary,  or  the  possibilitas  peccan- 
di ,  is  given  for  purposes  of  probation,  the  real  free¬ 
dom  of  the  will,  according  to  Augustine,  is  seen  in 
not  using  it,  rather  than  in  using  it, — in  continuing 
to  will  the  right,  and  refusing  to  will  the  wrong. 
Persistency  in  the  existing  determination,  and  not  a 
capricious  departure  into  another  determination,  is 
the  token  of  true  rational  liberty.  “  Yelle  et  nolle, 
propriae  voluntatis  est,”2 — by  which  Augustine 
means  that,  to  will  holiness  and  to  nill  sin,  not,  to 
will  either  holiness  or  sin,  is  the  characteristic  of  the 


untariness Contra  duas  episto- 
las  Pelag.  I.  ii. 

1  Compulsion  may  be  by  physic¬ 
al  law  ;  as  when,  for  example,  the 
particles  of  water  fall  down  a  pre¬ 
cipice.  In  this  instance,  the  mole¬ 
cule  of  water  is  as  really  pushed 
down  by  the  power  of  gravitation, 
as  if  there  were  a  hand  behind  it 
urging  it  on.  The  real  motive 
power  is  the  force  of  gravity,  and 
not  a  force  in  the  particle  of  water. 
There  is,  consequently,  no  self- 
motion  in  a  water  fall.  The  same 
reasoning  also  applies  to  the 
spontaneity  of  physical  growth. 
There  is  no  self,  and  no  self- mo¬ 


tion,  in  the  plapt,  but  only  the 
movement  caused  by  the  law  of 
life.  Augustine’s  idea  of  will 
makes  it  a  power  of  origination , 
or  causation ,  in  distinction  from 
a  power  of  alternative  choice.  In 
this  respect,  his  view  resembles 
that  of  Kant  (Practische  Ver- 
nunft,  78  sq.),  with  the  important 
difference,  however,  that  Augus¬ 
tine  would  not  attribute  a  power 
of  origination  to  the  finite  will, 
upon  the  side  of  holiness ,  except 
as  the  Infinite  Will  works  in  and 
upon  it. 

2  Augustinus  :  De  gratia  et  li- 
bero  arbitrio,  c.  iii. 


ANTHKOPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


63 


will.  In  the  Greek  anthropology,  on  the  contrary, 
the  substance  of  moral  freedom  consists  in  what  the 
Latin  anthropologist  regards  as  the  accident, — viz., 
in  the  power  to  do  another  thing,  or  to  do  different¬ 
ly.  It  is  not  sufficient  that  the  will  be  uncompelled, 
and  self-moved.  It  must  possess,  over  and  above 
this,  a  power  of  alternative  choice, — the  possibilitas 
utriusque  partis .  Hence  the  human  will,  by  crea¬ 
tion  and  structure,  is  indifferent  and  undetermined. 
Having  no  choice  by  and  at  creation,  it  can  choose 
with  equal  facility  either  of  the  two  contraries,  holi¬ 
ness  or  sin.  And  in  this  fact,  and  not  in  its  positive 
self-motion,  consists  its  freedom. 

To  recapitulate,  then,  the  principal  points  in  the 
Augustinian  anthropology  are  the  following.  Adam 
as  created  and  unfallen  was  positively  holy,  in  the 
sense  of  possessing  a  holy  inclination  or  determina¬ 
tion  of  his  will.  This  holy  inclination  or  determina¬ 
tion  was  accompanied,  for  merely  probationary  pur¬ 
poses,  with  an  accidental  and  negative  power  to  the 
contrary,  or  a  possibility  of  originating  sin  de  nihilo . 
His  freedom  consisted  solely  in  this  holy  inclination, 
— in  this  unforced  self- motion  of  his  will  to  good. 
Neither  the  presence  nor  the  absence  of  a  power  to 
do  something  other  than  the  right,  could  affect  the 
fact  that  he  was  doing  the  right,  and  without  com¬ 
pulsion.  Hence,  according  to  Augustine,  Adam’s 
power  to  the  contrary,  which  was  the  power  to  ruin 
himself  and  his  posterity,  was  not  necessary  to  con¬ 
stitute  him  a  voluntary  agent.  He  would  still  have 


64 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


been  willingly  holy,  even  if  God  had  not  placed 
him  upon  probation,  and  super-added  the  power  of 
willingly  sinning.  The  possibilitas  peccandi ,  there¬ 
fore,  was  an  accident,  and  not  the  essence,  of  moral 
agency.  God  is  a  moral  agent,  and  yet  can  neither 
apostatize,  nor  be  put  upon  probation.1  Hence 
Adam  was  commanded  not  to  use  this  accident  of 
moral  agency.  It  was  intended  to  disappear  in  and 
with  the  process  of  probation  ;  and  when  it  had  so 
disappeared,  Adam  would  have  still  been,  as  before, 
willingly  holy,  without  the  possibility  of  sin  and 
self-ruin.  The  relative  perfection  of  a  creature 


1  Augustine  notices  that  there 
is  a  point,  even  in  reference  to 
the  human  will,  where  freedom 
and  necessity  coincide.  “  Some 
voluntary  things  are  also  neces¬ 
sary  things.  It  is  necessary,  for 
example,  that  we  will  to  he  hap¬ 
py  ;  for  we  cannot  will  to  he 
miserable.  And  it  is  necessary 
that  we  will  something  or  other ; 
for  we  cannot  stop  willing.  It  is 
necessary,  therefore,  that  we  will, 
and  that  we  will  happiness.  Sunt 
et  voluntaria  necessaria,  sicut  be- 
ati  esse  volumus,  et  necesse  est  ut 
velimus.”  Opus  imp.  V.  lxv.  (Ed. 
Migne,  X.  273,  1489).  Jekemy 
Taylor  (Efficient  Causes  of  Hu¬ 
man  Actions,  Rule  I.  5)  remarks 
that  “  in  moral  and  spiritual 
things,  liberty  and  indetermina¬ 
tion  are  weakness,  and  suppose  a 
great  infirmity  of  our  reason,  and 
a  great  want  of  love.  For  if  we 
understood  all  the  degrees  of 


amability  in  the  service  of  God, 
and  if  we  could  love  God  as  he 
deserves,  we  could  not  deliberate 
concerning  his  service,  and  we 
could  not  possibly  choose  or  be 
in  love  with  obedience,  we  should 
have  no  liberty  left,  nothing  con¬ 
cerning  which  wre  could  deliber¬ 
ate  ;  for  there  is  no  deliberation 
but  when  something  is  to  be  re¬ 
fused,  and  something  is  to  be 
preferred,  which  could  not  be, 
but  that  we  understand  good  but 
little,  and  love  it  less.  For  the 
saints  and  angels  in  heaven,  and 
God  himself,  love  good  and  can¬ 
not  choose  evil,  because  to  do  so 
were  imperfection  and  infelicity ; 
and  the  devils  and  accursed  souls 
hate  all  good  without  liberty  and 
indifferency:  but  between  these 
is  the  state  of  man  in  the  days  of 
his  pilgrimage,  until  he  comes  to 
a  confirmation  in  one  of  the  op¬ 
posite  terms.” 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


65 


placed  upon  temporary  trial,  to  see  if  lie  would  re¬ 
tain  his  virtue,  would  have  become  the  absolute 
perfection  of  a  creature  who  has  safely  passed 
through  probation.  On  the  other  hand,  Adam 
the  fallen  is  positively  sinful ;  in  the  sense  of 
possessing  a  sinful  inclination  or  determination 
of  will.  This  inclination  is  the  activity  of  the 
will,  and  not  its  substance.  It  is  the  creature’s 
unforced,  self-moved  energy.  It  is  not,  as  holi¬ 
ness  is,  the  activity  of  the  will  when  under  the  in¬ 
fluence  of  God  “  working  in  it  to  will.”  On  the 
contrary  it  is  the  creature’s  merest  self-will,  unin¬ 
fluenced  by  the  Holy  Ghost.  It  is,  consequently, 
the  most  extreme  kind  of  self- motion.  It  is  self- 
will,  or  wilfulness,  in  its  most  intense  form.  It  is 
voluntariness  in  the  strongest  manner  conceivable. 
This  wrong  inclination  of  the  will  is  not  accom¬ 
panied  with  a  power  to  the  contrary,  as  the  primi¬ 
tive  right  inclination  was.  And  this  for  two  rea¬ 
sons.  First,  the  power  to  the  contrary  is  not  neces¬ 
sary  in  order  to  voluntary  action.  It  is  needed  only 
for  purposes  of  probation  ;  and  after  probation  has 
been  ended  by  an  act  of  apostasy  there  is  no  further 
need  of  it,  because  it  has  answered  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  bestowed.  Secondly,  a  power  to  the 
contrary  possessed  by  a  will  with  a  sinful  inclina¬ 
tion,  would  be  a  power  to  originate  holiness  de  ni- 
hilo.  The  creature,  in  this  case,  would  be  the  ulti¬ 
mate  efficient  of  holiness  as  he  is  of  sin,  and  be 

capable  of  an  absolute  merit  as  he  is  of  an  absolute- 
Vol.  ii.— 5 


66 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


demerit.  But  such  a  power  is  incommunicable  to 
the  finite  will,  because  it  would  place  the  creature 
upon  a  level  with  the  Creator,  in  respect  to  moral 
excellence,  and  desert  of  worship.  The  guilt  of  sin 
consists  in  its  unforced  wilfulness  ;  and  this  guilt  is 
not  in  the  least  diminished  by  the  fact  that  the 
will  cannot  overcome  its  own  wilfulness.  For  this 
wicked  wilfulness  was  not  created  in  the  will,  but 
is  the  product  of  the  will’s  act  of  apostasy.  The 
present  impotence  to  holiness  is  not  an  original  and 
primitive  impotence.  By  creation  Adam  had  plen¬ 
ary  power,  not  indeed  to  originate  holiness,  for  no 
creature  has  this,  but  to  preserve  and  perpetuate  it. 
The  present  destitution  of  holiness,  and  impossi¬ 
bility  of  originating  it,  is  due  therefore  to  the  crea¬ 
ture’s  apostatizing  agency,  and  is  a  part  of  his  con¬ 
demnation.1 

Augustine’s  theory  of  regeneration  is,  conse¬ 
quently,  entirely  monergistic.2  The  work  of  the 


1  “  If  any  one  wish  to  dispute 
with  God,  and  to  escape  his  judg¬ 
ment  by  the  pretext  of  having 
been  incapable  of  acting  other¬ 
wise,  he  is  prepared  with  an  an¬ 
swer,  which  we  have  elsewhere 
advanced,  that  it  arises  not  from 
creation ,  but  from  the  corruption 
of  nature,  that  men,  being  en¬ 
slaved  by  sin,  can  will  nothing 
but  what  is  evil.  For  whence 
proceeded  that  impotence,  of 
which  the  ungodly  would  gladly 
avail  themselves,  but  from  Adam’s 


voluntarily  devoting  himself  to 
the  tyranny  of  the  devil  ?  ”  Cal¬ 
vin  :  Institutes,  II.  v.  1. 

3  “  Without  grace  we  can  do  no¬ 
thing,  achieve  nothing,  commence 
nothing.”  “There  are  certain 
characteristics  of  the  soul  which 
perish  through  an  evil  will,  and 
this  so  that  they  cannot  be  recov¬ 
ered  by  a  good  will,  unless  God 
does  that  which  men  cannot 
do.”  Augustinus  :  Ad  Bonifa- 
cium,  II.  ix. ;  Opus  imperfectum, 
YI.  xviii. 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


Holy  Spirit  is  necessary  not  merely  to  supplement 
a  deficiency  in  the  power  of  fallen  man,  but  to  take 
the  very  initiative,  and  renovate  the  will  itself. 
Divine  agency  is  the  sole  originating  cause  of  holi¬ 
ness  in  fallen  man.1  The  only  righteousness  which 
the  unrenewed  will  is  able  tcpwork  out  is  that  ex¬ 
ternal  righteousness  which  Augustine  denominates 
justitia  civilis ,  and  which  the  modern  denominates 
“  morality.”  That  internal  righteousness,  which 
consists  in  a  spiritual  and  total  conformity  to  law, 
Augustine  contended  is  beyond  the  competence  of 
the  apostate  will  to  produce.  Grace  is  imparted  to 
sinful  man,  not  because  he  believes,  but  in  order 
that  he  may  believe  ;  for  faith  itself  is  the  gift  of 
God.2  The  method  of  regeneration,  in  Augustine’s 


1  See  Augustinus  :  Cont.  duas 
epist.  lib.  IV.  (Ed.  Migne,  X. 
618)  for  tlie  Scripture  citations  : 
1  Oor.  iv.  7.  “For  who  maketh 
thee  to  differ  from  another  ?  and 
what  hast  thou  that  thou  didst 
not  receive  ?  ”  John  xv.  5.  “  With¬ 
out  me  ye  can  do  nothing.”  John 
vi.  44.  “No  man  can  (Sumrnt) 
come  to  me,  except  the  Father 
which  hath  sent  me  draw  him.” 
1  John  iv.  7.  “  Love  is  of  [from] 

God.”  Rom.  xii.  3.  “  God  hath 

dealt  to  every  man  the  measure 
of  faith.”  John  iii.  8.  “  The  wind 
bloweth  where  it  listeth.”  Rom. 
viii.  14.  “  As  many  as  are  led  by 

the  spirit  of  God,  they  are  the 
sons  of  God.”  John  vi.  65.  “  FTo 

man  can  come  unto  me,  except  it 


were  given  him  of  my  Father.” 
Jer.  xxxii.  40,  41.  “I  will  put 
my  fear  in  their  hearts,  that  they 
shall  not  depart  from  me,  and  I 
will  visit  them  that  I  may  make 
them  good”  (Sept.  Ver.).  Ezekiel 
xxxvi.  22-38. 

2  “  The  Pelagians  say  in  praise 
of  free  will,  that  ‘  grace  assists 
the  good  intention  of  every  man.’ 
This  might  be  accepted  as  a  true 
and  catholic  doctrine,  provided 
such  a  merit  were  not  supposed 
to  be  in  the  good  intention  as  de¬ 
serves  the  assistance  of  grace ; 
and  provided  it  were  acknowl¬ 
edged,  and  added  in  explanation, 
that  the  good  intention  which  has 
grace  for  its  consequent  could 
not  have  been  in  man  unless  it 


68  HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 

scheme,  is  as  follows.  The  Holy  Spirit  is  the  effi¬ 
cient  ;  the  human  spirit  is  the  recipient.  The  former 
acts  independently ;  the  latter  acts  only  as  it  is  acted 
upon.  The  consequence  of  the  divine  efficiency  is 
regeneration ;  the  consequence  of  the  human  reci¬ 
piency  is  conversion.  God  regenerates,  and  as  a 
sequence  therefrom  man  converts. 

The  following  are  the  several  degrees  of  grace, 
which  mark  the  several  stages  in  the  transition  of 
the  human  soul  from  total  depravity  to  perfect  holi¬ 
ness.  The  first  is  that  of  prevenient  grace  (gratia 
praeveniens).  In  this  stage  of  the  process,  the  Holy 
Spirit  employs  first  the  moral  law,  as  an  instru¬ 
mental  agent,  and  produces  the  sense  of  sin  and 
guilt ;  and  then,  by  employing  as  a  second  instru¬ 
mentality  the  gospel  promise  of  mercy,  it  conducts 
the  soul  to  Christ,  in  and  by  the  act  of  faith.  The 
second  stage  in  the  transition  is  the  result  of  what 
Augustine  denominates  operative  grace  (gratia 
opera/ns).  By  means  of  faith,  thus  originated  by 
prevenient  grace,  the  Divine  Spirit  now  produces 
the  consciousness  of  peace  and  justification  through 
Christ’s  blood  of  atonement,  and  imparts  a  new 
divine  life  to  the  soul  united  to  Christ.  In  this 
manner,  a  will  freely  and  firmly  determined  to 
holiness  is  restored  again  in  man,  and  the  fruits  of 
this  ptravoia,  or  change  of  heart  and  will,  begin  to 


had  had  grace  for  its  anteced-  epist.  IY.  vi.  13  (Ed.  Migne,  X. 
ent.”  Augustinus  :  Contra  duas  618). 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


69 


appear.  But  the  remainders  of  the  apostate  nature 
still  exist  in  the  regenerate  soul,1  though  in  con¬ 
tinual  conflict  with  the  new  man.  In  the  life-long 
struggle  that  now  commences,  the  now  renovated 
and  holy  will  is  efficiently  operative  for  the  first 
time,  and  co-works  with  the  Holy  Spirit.  Hence 
this  third  degree  of  grace  is  denominated  co-operat¬ 
ing  grace  ( gratia  co-operans ).2  The  final  and  crown¬ 
ing  act  of  grace  results  in  the  entire  cleansing  of 
indwelling  sin  from  the  soul,  and  its  glorified  trans¬ 
formation  into  complete  resemblance  to  its  Re¬ 
deemer, — a  state  of  absolute  perfection,  as  distin¬ 
guished  from  the  relative  perfection  with  which 
man  was  created,  and  characterized  by  the  incapa¬ 
bility  of  sinning  and  dying  ( non  posse  peccare  et 
mori ).  This  grade  of  grace  is  never  witnessed  this 
side  of  the  grave. 

Experience  and  observation  show  that  all  men 


Augustine  did  not  hold  that 
baptism  possesses  an  efficiency  in 
and  of  itself  to  remove  sin.  No¬ 
thing  but  spiritual  influence  can 
do  this.  Hence  there  is  indwell¬ 
ing  sin  even  in  the  regenerate  and 
baptized.  “For  neither  in  adults 
is  this  effected  in  baptism  (unless 
by  an  ineffable  miracle  of  the  Al¬ 
mighty  Creator)  that  the  law  of 
sin  which  is  in  our  members, 
striving  against  the  law  of  the 
mind,  is  wholly  extinguished  and 
ceases  to  be.”  “  All  his  old  in¬ 
firmity  is  not  removed  from  the 
moment  a  person  is  baptized,  but 


his  renovation  commences  with 
the  remission  of  sins.  .  .  .  For  al¬ 
though  in  baptism  there  is  a  total 
and  plenary  remission  of  sins,  yet, 
if  a  perfect  renewal  were  wrought 
in  the  mind  itself,  the  apostle 
would  not  say,  ‘  the  inward  man 
is  renewed  day  by  day.’  For  he 
who  is  daily  renewed,  is  not  yet 
totally  renewed ;  and  by  as  much 
as  he  is  not  yet  renewed,  by  so 
much  is  he  still  in  the  old  state  ” 
Augustinus  De  peccatorum  me¬ 
ntis,  I.  xxxix.  ;  II.  vii. 

2  Compare  Howe  :  Works,  I. 
555-6.  (New  York  Ed.) 


70 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


are  not  regenerated.  Now,  since,  according  to  the 
above  theory,  the  sinner  can  contribute  nothing  in 
the  way  of  efficiency  towards  his  own  regeneration, 
because  he  acts  holily  only  as  he  is  acted  upon,  it 
follows  that  the  difference  between  man  and  man,  in 
respect  to  regeneration,  must  be  referred  to  God. 
Hence  Augustine  accounts  for  the  fact  that  some  men 
are  renewed,  and  some  are  not,  by  the  uncondition¬ 
al  decree  ( decretum  absolutum ),  according  to  which 
God  determines  to  select  from  the  fallen  mass  of 
mankind  ( massa  perditionis ),  the  whole  of  whom 
are  alike  guilty  and  under  condemnation,  a  portion 
upon  whom  he  bestows  renewing  grace,  and  to 
leave  the  remainder  to  their  own  self-will  and  the 
operation  of  law  and  justice.1  This  is  a  method  of 
pure  sovereignty  upon  his  part,  wherein  are  mani¬ 
fested  both  the  u  goodness  and  severity  of  God,” — 
upon  them  who  were  not  interfered  with,  and  were 
left  to  their  own  self-will,  severe  and  exact  justice; 
upon  them  whose  obstinate  and  hostile  self-will  was 
overcome  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  unmerited  pity  and 


1  The  opponents  of  Augustine 
objected  that  “it  is  unjust  in  the 
case  of  those  who  are  alike  guilty 
to  pardon  one  and  punish  the 
other.”  To  this  Augustine  re¬ 
plies  :  “  It  is  certainly  just  to 
punish  both  ;  we  ought  then  to 
render  thanks  to  our  Saviour  that 
he  has  not  treated  us  like  our  fel¬ 
lows.  For  if  all  men  were  saved, 
the  justice  due  to  sin  would  not 
he  discerned  ;  if  none  were  saved, 


the  benefit  of  grace  would  not  be 
known.  We  must  not  then  seek 
for  a  cause,  either  in  the  distinc¬ 
tion  of  merit,  or  in  the  necessity 
of  fate,  or  in  the  caprice  of  for¬ 
tune,  but  in  the  depth  of  the 
treasures  of  God’s  wisdom,  which 
the  Apostle  admires  without  un¬ 
folding.”  Augustinus  :  Epist.  ad 
Sixtnm,  Cap.  ii.  (Ed.  Migne,  II. 
875). 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


71 


compassion.1  The  ground  and  reason  of  this  se¬ 
lection  of  only  a  portion  of  mankind,  according 
to  Augustine,  is  God’s  wise  good-pleasure,  and  not 
a  foreseen  faith  upon  the  part  of  the  individual 
man.  For  faith  itself  is  a  gift  of  God.  It  is  the 
product  of  grace,  and  grace  results  from  the  uncon¬ 
ditional  decree.2  As  the  mere  consequent  of  elect¬ 
ing  mercy,  faith  can  no  more  determine  the  divine 
decree  of  election,  than  the  effect  can  determine  its 
cause.  u  Predestination,”  says  Augustine,3  u  is  the 
preparation  for  grace,  but  grace  is  the  gift  itself.” 


1  “  Many  hear  the  word  of 
truth ;  but  some  believe,  others 
contradict.  Therefore  the  first 
have  a  will  to  believe,  the  last 
have  not.  Who  is  ignorant  of 
this?  who  would  deny  it?  But 
since  the  will  is  prepared  to  some 
by  the  Lord,  to  others  not,  we 
must  discriminate  what  proceeds 
from  his  mercy,  and  what  from 
his  justice.  That  which  Israel 
sought,  says  the  apostle,  he  ob¬ 
tained  not :  hut  the  election  ob¬ 
tained  it,  and  the  rest  were  blind¬ 
ed.  Behold  mercy  and  justice ; 
mercy  upon  the  elect  who  have 
obtained  the  righteousness  of 
God,  but  justice  upon  the  rest 
who  were  blinded.  And  yet  the 
former  believed  because  they  had 
a  will  [were  inclined]  to  believe ; 
and  the  latter  did  not  believe  be¬ 
cause  they  had  a  will  [were  in¬ 
clined]  to  disbelieve.  Mercy  and 
justice,  therefore,  were  manifest¬ 
ed  in  the  wills  themselves  (in  ip- 


sis  voluntatibus  facta  sunt).”  “  To 
know,  why,  of  two  persons  who 
hear  the  same  doctrine  or  see  the 
same  miracle,  one  believes,  and 
the  other  believes  not ;  it  is  the 
depth  of  the  wisdom  of  God, 
whose  judgments  are  unsearcha¬ 
ble,  and  are  not  the  less  just  for 
being  hidden.  ‘  He  hath  mercy 
on  whom  he  will  have  mercy, 
and  whom  he  will  he  hardeneth  ;  ’ 
hut  he  does  not  harden  in  hatred, 
but  only  in  not  showing  mercy.'1'1 
Augustinus  :  De  predestinatione, 
Cap.  vi.  (Ed.  Migne,  X.  968) ; 
Ep.  ad  Sixtum  (Ed.  Migne,  II. 
879). 

2  Howe  (Works,  I.  123)  re¬ 
marks  that  “  God  uses  a  certain 
arbitrariness,  especially  in  the 
more  exuberant  dispensation  of 
his  grace,”  in  order  that  men 
“may  be  cautioned  not  to  neglect 
lower  assistances.” 

3  Augustinus  :  De  predestina¬ 
tione,  c.  x.  (Ed.  Migne,  X.  971). 


72 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


u  God  elected  ns  in  Christ  before  the  foundation  of 
the  world,  predestinating  us  to  the  adoption  of  sons, 
not  because  he  saw  that  we  should  become  holy 
and  spotless  through  ourselves,  but  he  elected  and 
predestinated  us  that  we  might  become  so.  But  he 
did  this  according  to  the  good  pleasure  of  his  will ; 
that  man  might  not  glory  in  his  own  will,  but  in  the 
will  of  God  towards  him.” 1  “  How  can  it  be,”  he 

writes  to  Vitalis,2  “  that  God  waits  for  the  wills  of 
men  to  move  first,  that  he  may  then  impart  grace  to 
them;  since  we  properly  give  him  thanks  in  ref¬ 
erence  to  those  whom  while  unbelieving  and  per¬ 
secuting  his  truth  with  an  ungodly  will  he  antici¬ 
pates  with  his  mercy,  and  with  an  almighty  facility 
converts  unto  himself,  and  out  of  unwilling  makes 
them  willing  ?  Why  do  we  give  him  thanks  for 
this,  if  he  really  does  not  do  this  ?  ” 3 

The  unconditional  decree,  in  reference  to  the 
non-elect,  according  to  Augustine,  is  one  of  preten¬ 
tion,  or  omission  merely.4  The  reprobating  decree 
is  not  accompanied,  as  the  electing  decree  is,  with 
any  direct  divine  efficiency  to  secure  the  result. 
And  there  is  no  need  of  any ;  for  according  to  the 
Augustinian  anthropology  there  is  no  possibility  of 

1  Augustinus  :  De  predestina-  2  Augustinus  :  Ep.  OCX VI I. 
tione,  c.  xviii.  (Ed.  Migne,  X.  987).  ad  Vitalem  (Ed.  Migne,  II.  987). 

In  another  place  (Tom.  X.  582,  Ed.  3  Augustine’s  proof  texts  for 
Migne)  Augustine  defines  election  election  are  given  in  Wiggers  : 
in  the  following  terms :  “  Electio  Augustinism,  p.  295.  (Emerson’s 
dicitur,  ubi  deus  non  ab  alio  fac-  Trans.) 

turn  quod  eligat  invenit,  sed  quod  4  Augustinus  :  De  libero  arbi- 
inveniat  ipse  facit.”  trio,  II.  (Ed.  Migne,  I.  1272,  sq.) 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE.  7  3 

self-recovery  from  a  voluntary  apostasy,  and,  conse¬ 
quently,  the  simple  passing  by  and  leaving  of  the 
sinful  soul  to  itself  renders  its  perdition  as  certain, 
as  if  it  were  brought  about  by  a  direct  divine  effi¬ 
ciency. 

Not  all  grace,  but  the  grace  which  actually  re¬ 
generates,  Augustine  denominates  irresistible  ( gratia 
irresistibilis).  By  this  he  meant,  not  that  the  hu¬ 
man  will  is  converted  unwillingly  or  by  compul¬ 
sion,  but  that  divine  grace  is  able  to  overcome  the 
utmost  obstinacy  of  the  human  spirit.1  “  When  God 
wills  to  save  any  one,  no  will  of  man  resists  him.” 
“No  man  is  saved  but  he  whom  God  wills  to  be 
saved;  it  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  pray  that  he 
may  will  it,  because  if  he  wills  it,  it  must  come  to 
pass.”  “  It  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  the  human 
will  cannot  resist  [so  as  to  overcome  and  defeat] 
the  will  of  God.” 2  Divine  grace  is  irresistible,  not 
in  the  sense  that  no  form  of  grace  is  resisted  by  the 
sinner ;  but  when  grace  reaches  that  special  degree 
which  constitutes  it  regenerating ,  it  then  overcomes 
the  sinner’s  opposition,  and  makes  him  willing  in 
the  day  of  God’s  power.  The  only  sure  sign  that 
an  individual  is  one  of  the  elect  is  his  perseverance 


1  “  God  so  moves  the  creature,  flux  and  efficacy  of  Divine  grace 
that  he  may  suffer  him  in  the  does  not  take  away,  but  regulates 
mean  while  to  exercise  his  own  the  voluntary  faculty ;  does  not 
motion.”  Augustinus  :  De  Civi-  destroy,  hut  converts  the  will.” 
tate,  VII.  iii.  Pkospek,  a  follow-  2  Augustinus  :  De  correptione 
er  of  Augustine,  remarks  (De  lib.  et  gratia,  xiv. ;  Enchiridion,  cii. ; 
arbitrio,  sub  fine)  that  “  the  in-  De  libero  arbitrio. 


74 


HISTOEY  OE  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


in  the  Christian  life ;  for  he  is  elected  to  holiness,  as 
well  as  to  happiness.  Perseverance,  like  faith,  is  the 
gift  of  God,  and  Augustine  denominates  it  donum 
perseverantiae .  In  answer  to  the  objection  urged 
against  the  doctrine  of  unconditional  election,  accord¬ 
ing  to  which  it  is  impossible  for  any  but  the  elect  to 
be  saved,  drawn  from  the  text,  “  God  our  Saviour 
will  have  all  men  to  be  saved,  and  to  come  unto  the 
knowledge  of  the  truth”  (1  Tim.  ii.  4),  Augustine 
explains  this  passage  to  mean :  “  all  who  are  predes¬ 
tinated.”  “  It  is  said  that  he  wills  all  men  to  be 
saved,  that  it  may  be  understood  that  predestina¬ 
tion  is  no  respecter  of  persons,  but  that  all  classes, 
ages,  and  conditions  of  mankind  are  among  the 
elect.”  1 

Augustine  denies  that  the  heathen  are  saved,  al¬ 
though  he  is  particular  to  remark  that  there  are 
degrees  in  the  scale  of  their  condemnation.  He 
takes  this  position,  in  opposition  to  Pelagianism, 
which  contended  that  natural  virtue  may  be  a 
ground  of  salvation,  and  asserted  that  some  of  the 
more  virtuous  pagans  were  saved  by  their  personal 
excellence,  and  irrespective  of  redemption.  Argu- 


1  Augustinus  :  De  correptione 
et  gratia,  xliv.  Gregory  the 
Great  interprets  the  passage 
thus  :  “  God  wills  tliat  all  men 
should  be  saved,  that  is,  none  are 
saved  except  as  the  effect  of  the 
Divine  will ;  or,  some  are  saved 
from  every  class  of  mankind.” 
Anselm  (Opera  I.  584  Ed.  Migne) 


adds  to  this  explanation  the  fur¬ 
ther  one :  “Or  he  wills  that  all 
should  be  saved  in  the  sense  that 
he  does  not  compel  any  one  to  he 
lost.”  Howe’s  explanation  is  : 
“  Where  he  will  he  hardeneth,  or 
doth  not  prevent  hut  that  men  be 
hardened.”  (Works,  1. 123,  New 
York  Ed.) 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


75 


ing  against  Julian,  who  was  a  much  more  able  de¬ 
fender  of  Pelagianism  than  Pelagius  himself,  he  re¬ 
marks  :  “  In  the  day  of  judgment,  the  consciences 
of  the  heathen  will  ‘excuse’  them  (Pom.  ii.  15) 
only  to  the  degree  that  they  will  be  punished  more 
mildly,  in  case  they  have  been  a  law  unto  them¬ 
selves,  and  have  obeyed  it  in  some  measure.  Fabri- 
cius  will  be  less  severely  punished  than  Catiline  ; 
not  because  Fabricius  is  good,  but  because  he  was 
less  wicked  than  Catiline.  Fabricius  was  less  sinful 
than  Catiline,  not  because  he  possessed  true  holiness, 
but  because  he  did  not  depart  so  far  from  true  holi¬ 
ness.”  1  In  the  fifth  book  of  the  De  Civitate  Dei ,  Au¬ 
gustine  shows  that  God  rewarded  the  natural  vir¬ 
tues  of  the  early  Romans  with  temporal  prosperity ; 
yet  that  their  frugality,  contempt  of  riches,  mod¬ 
eration,  and  courage,  were  merely  the  effect  of  the 
love  of  glory  that  curbed  those  particular  vices 
which  are  antagonistic  to  national  renown,  without 
ceasing  to  be  a  vice  itself.  He  concedes  the  praise 
of  external  rectitude  (justitia  civilis)  to  many  ac¬ 
tions  of  the  heathen,  yet  he  maintains  that  when 
these  are  viewed  in  the  motive  or  principle  from 
which  they  sprung  they  are  sins  ;  for  whatsoever  is 
not  of  faith  is  sin  (Rom.  xiv.  23).  “It  is  sin,  then,” 
objects  Julian,  “when  a  heathen  clothes  the  naked, 
binds  up  the  wounds  of  the  infirm,  or  endures  tor¬ 
ture  rather  than  give  false  testimony  ?  ”  Augustine 


1  Augustinus  :  Contra  Julianum,  IV.  xxiii. 


! 


*76  HISTOKY  OF  AXTHEOPOLOGY. 

replies  that  the  act  in  itself,  or  the  matter  of  the 
act,  is  not  sin ;  but  as  it  does  not  proceed  from  faith, 
and  a  purpose  to  honor  God,  the  form  of  the  act, 
which  contains  the  morality  of  it,  is  sin.1  Augus¬ 
tine  supposed  that  unbaptized  infants  are  lost,2  al¬ 
though  he  believed  that  the  punishment  allotted  to 
them  is  the  mildest  possible  of  all  (omnium  mitissi- 
ma).  Yet  he  is  explicit  in  asserting  that  u  there  is 
no  middle  place  ;  so  that  he  who  is  not  with  Christ, 
must  be  with  the  devil.”  This  he  affirms  in  opposi¬ 
tion  to  that  middle  sort  of  state  which  the  Pelagi¬ 
ans  denominated  u  eternal  life,”  in  distinction  from 
the  world  of  perfect  blessedness,  which  they  held  to 
be  denoted  by  the  u  kingdom  of  heaven.” 3 

We  have  seen  that  Augustine  refused  to  declare 
for  either  Creationism  or  Traducianism,  when  the 
question  came  up  before  him  as  a  purely  speculative 
and  philosophical  one.  When,  however,  he  is  de¬ 
fending  his  view  of  the  doctrine  of  Original  Sin,  he 
makes  statements  that  are  irreconcilable  with  any 
theory  of  the  origin  of  the  human  soul,  but  that  of 
creation  by  species,  and  the  propagation  of  both 
soul  and  body.  When  endeavoring  to  justify  his 
position  that  all  men  are  guilty  of  the  Adamic 
transgression,  or  “  Adam’s  sin,”  he  distinctly  teaches 
that  all  mankind  were  created  in  Adam.  “  God  the 

1  Augustinus  :  De  civitate  Dei,  3  Augustinus  :  De  peccatorum 
Y.  xii.,  xiii. ;  Contra  Julianum,  meritis,  I.  xxviii. 

IV.  iii.  (Ed.  Migne,  X.  750). 

3  Augustinus  :  De  peccatorum 
meritis,  I.  xxi. 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


11 


author  of  nature,  but  not  of  sin  (vitium),  created 
man  upright,  but  he  having  through  his  own  will 
become  depraved  and  condemned,  propagated  de¬ 
praved  and  condemned  offspring.  For  we  were  all 
in  that  one  man,  since  we  were  all  that  one  man 
who  lapsed  into  sin  through  that  woman  who  was 
made  from  him,  previous  to  transgression.  The 
particular  form  in  which  we  were  to  live  as  individ¬ 
uals  had  not  been  created  and  assigned  to  us  man 
by  man,  but  that  seminal  nature  was  in  existence 
from  which  we  were  to  be  propagated.”  u  All  men 
at  that  time  sinned  in  Adam,  since  in  his  nature  all 
men  were  as  yet  that  one  man.”  “  Adam  was  the 
one  in  whom  all  sinned.”  u  The  infant  who  is  lost 
is  punished  because  he  belongs  to  the  mass  of  per¬ 
dition,  and  as  a  child  of  Adam  is  justly  condemned 
on  the  ground  of  the  ancient  obligation.”  1 

These  passages,  which  might  be  multiplied  in¬ 
definitely,  are  sufficient  to  indicate  Augustine’s  the¬ 
ory  of  generic  existence,  generic  transgression,  and 
generic  condemnation.  The  substance  of  this  theory 
was  afterwards  expressed  in  the  scholastic  dictum, 
“  natura  corrumpit  personam,” — human  nature  apos¬ 
tatizes,  and  the  consequences  appear  in  the  human 
individual .  In  the  order  of  nature,  man Mnd  exists 
before  the  generations  of  mankind ;  the  nature  is 

1  Augustinus  :  De  civitate  Dei,  nali,  c.  xxxvi.  Compare  also  : 
XIII.  xiv. ;  De  peccatorum  meri-  Contra  duas  epistolas  Pelagiano- 
tis,  III.  vii.  14  ;  De  peccatorum  rum,  IY.  iii.  7 ;  De  nuptiis  et 
meritis,  I.  xv. ;  De  peccato  origi-  concupiscentia,  II.  v.  15. 


78 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY". 


prior  to  the  individuals  produced  out  of  it.  But 
this  human  nature,  it  must  be  carefully  noticed,  pos¬ 
sesses  all  the  attributes  of  the  human  individual ; 
for  the  individual  is  only  a  portion  and  specimen  of 
the  nature.  Considered  as  an  essence,  human  nature 
is  an  intelligent,  rational,  and  voluntary  essence ; 
and  accordingly  its  agency  in  Adam  partakes  of  the 
corresponding  qualities.  Hence,  according  to  Au¬ 
gustine,  generic  or  original  sin  is  truly  and  properly 
sin,  because  it  is  moral  agency.  The  Latin  anthro¬ 
pology  extended  the  doctrine  of  the  Adamic  con¬ 
nection  to  the  whole  man,  instead  of  confining  it,  as 
the  Greek  did,  to  a  part  only.  Chrysostom,  for  ex¬ 
ample,  conceded  a  union  between  the  physical  part 
of  the  individual,  and  the  first  progenitor.  But  this 
logically  involved  an  existence,  as  to  the  body,  in 
Adam ;  because  it  is  impossible  to  unite  two  things, 
one  of  which  is  an  absolute  non-entity.  Even  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  Greek  anthropology,  the  physical 
nature  of  the  individual  must  have  existed  generi- 
cally  in  the  physical  nature  of  Adam,  in  order  to 
such  a  union  and  propagation.  But  what  the  Greek 
anthropologist  affirmed  of  a  part,  the  Latin  affirmed 
of  the  entire  man.  The  rational  and  voluntary 
principle,  equally  with  the  physical  and  animal,  ex¬ 
isted  in  Adam.  A  mystery  overhangs  the  existence 
of  the  posterity  in  the  progenitor,  even  when  the 
existence  is  limited  to  the  body,  and  not  extended 
to  the  soul ;  yet  the  mere  fact  of  mystery  did  not 
prevent  the  Greek  anthropology  from  adopting  the 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


79 


doctrine  of  the  Adamic  unity  up  to  the  line  that 
separates  the  sensuous  from  the  rational  part.  And, 
in  like  manner,  the  mere  fact  of  mystery  did  not 
deter  the  Latin  anthropology  from  extending  the 
oneness  and  connection  to  the  whole  man,  both  body 
and  soul. 

The  principal  source  of  this  theory  was  the  fiftji 
chapter  of  Romans.1  Augustine’s  Platonic  studies 
may  have  exerted  some  influence  upon  his  develop¬ 
ment  of  the  Scripture  data,  but  those  writers  mis¬ 
take  greatly  who  suppose  that  he  would  have  fa¬ 
voured  one  of  the  most  difficult  of  all  theories  to  un¬ 
derstand  and  defend,  if  he  had  had  no  higher  authori¬ 
ty  to  embolden  him,  than  that  of  Plato.  And  as  it 
was,  we  have  seen  that  he  shrank  from  adopting  it, 
as  a  philosopher,  however  he  might  as  a  theologian. 
But  the  fifth  chapter  of  Romans,  it  was  universally 
conceded,  teaches  an  Adamic  union  of  some  kind ; 
and  Augustine  contended  that  it  was  of  the  most 
comprehensive  species,  and  included  both  the  soul 
and  the  body.  He  was  led  to  this  exegesis,  by  a 
theological,  and  not  by  a  philosophical  interest.  In 
no  other  way  could  he  account  for  sin  at  birth,  and 
for  the  sufferings  and  death  of  infants. 

It  was  one  consequence  of  this  theory  of  the 
Adamic  unity,  that  Augustine  held  that  all  sin, 
both  original  and  actual,  is  voluntary , — meaning 
thereby,  in  accordance  with  the  Latin  idea  of  free- 

1  The  proof  texts  are  given  in  (Emerson’s  Trans.). 

Wiggeks  :  Augustinism,  Ch.  XX. 


80 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


dom,  that  it  is  unforced  self-will,  without  power  to 
the  contrary,  or  the  power  of  originating  holiness  de 
nihilo.  There  is  no  author  in  the  whole  theological 
catalogue,  who  is  more  careful  and  earnest  than 
Augustine,  to  assert  that  sin  is  s^f-activity,  and  that 
its  source  is  in  the  voluntary  nature  of  man.1  Sin, 
according  to  him,  is  not  a  substance,  but  an  agency ; 
it  is  not  the  essence  of  any  faculty  in  man,  but  only 
the  action  of  a  faculty.  The  Manichaean  theory 
that  sin  is  a  substance  created,  and  infused  into  man 
by  creative  power,  Augustine  refuted  and  combat¬ 
ted  with  all  the  more  energy  because  he  had  at  one 
time  been  entangled  in  it.  Hence,  he  was  careful 
to  teach  that  original  sin  itself,  as  well  as  the  actual 
transgressions  that  proceed  from  it,  is  moral  agency. 
But  in  order  to  agency  there  must  be  an  agent ; 
and  since  original  sin  is  not  the  product  of  the  indi¬ 
vidual  agent,  because  it  appears  at  birth,  it  must  be 
referred  to  the  generic  agent, — i.  e.  to  the  human 
nature  in  distinction  from  the  human  person,  or  in¬ 
dividual.  Hence  the  stress  which  he  laid  upon  the 


1  In  his  Retractationes  (Lib.  I.), 
Augustine  complains  that  the  Pe¬ 
lagians  quoted  his  statements  to 
this  effect,  in  his  treatise  De  libe- 
ro  arbitrio,  in  proof  that  he  con¬ 
tradicted  himself,  and  sometimes 
taught  their  views.  In  answer, 
he  remarks  first,  that  in  this 
treatise  he  was  speaking  only  of 
the  origin  of  sin,  in  opposition  to 
the  fatalist,  and  not  of  its  effects 


upon  the  soul  ;  and  secondly, 
that  in  teaching  that  sin  is  ulti¬ 
mately  in  the  will,  and  not  in  the 
physical  nature,  he  implies  that 
the  voluntary  faculty  cannot  re¬ 
new  itself,  and  therefore  needs 
renovation  by  Divine  grace.  If 
sin  were  in  the  sensuous  part 
only,  and  not  in  the  will,  the  will 
might  overcome  sin. 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


81 


act  of  transgression  in  Adam.  At  this  point  in 
the  history  of  man,  he  could  find  a  common  agent, 
and  a  common  agency ;  and  only  at  this  point. 
Ever  after,  there  are  only  portions  or  individualiza¬ 
tions  of  the  nature,  in  the  series  of  generations.  This 
one  common  agent  yields  him  the  one  common 
agency  which  he  is  seeking.  In  this  manner,  origi¬ 
nal  sin  is  voluntary  agency,  as  really  as  actual  sin 
is, — the  difference  between  the  two  being  only  for¬ 
mal.  Both  are  equally  the  product  of  human  will ; 
but  original  sin  is  the  product  of  human  will  as  yet 
unindividualized  in  Adam,  while  actual  sin  is  the 
product  of  human  will  as  individualized  in  his  pos¬ 
terity.1 

In  proof  that  Augustine  held  to  the  voluntari¬ 
ness  of  sin  in  both  its  forms,  original  and  actual,  we 
mention  the  following  of  his  positions. 


1  It  is  important  to  notice  that 
the  term  u  actual,”  applied,  to  sin 
in  this  connection,  is  employed 
in  its  etymological  signification, 
to  denote  the  sin  of  single  choices 
and  distinct  acts,  in  distinction 
from  the  sin  of  heart,  or  natural 
disposition.  The  ordinary  use 
of  the  word,  in  common  parlance, 
makes  “  actual  ”  the  opposite  of 
“imaginary,”  or  “unreal;”  and 
hence  it  is  sometimes  supposed 
that  “  original  ”  sin,  as  the  oppo¬ 
site  of  “  actual  ”  sin,  must  he  a 
fictitious  or  imaginary  sin, — that 
is,  no  sin  at  all.  But  in  the  Au- 
gustino-Calvinistic  nomenclature, 

YOL.  II. — 6 


both  forms  of  sin  are  alike  real; 
both  are  alike  the  product  of  the 
human  will.  A  similar  error  is 
also  committed  in  reference  to 
the  phrase  “  Adam’s  sin.”  To  be 
guilty  of  Adam’s  sin,  in  the  Latin 
anthropology,  meant  to  be  guilty 
of  the  Adamic  sin.  It  implied 
the  oneness  of  Adam  and  his  pos¬ 
terity,  and  a  guilt  that  belonged 
to  the  sum  total,  only  because 
the  sin  was  the  act  of  the  sum 
total. 

Samuel  Hopkins  (Works  1. 224. 
Note)  objects  to  the  distinction 
between  “original  ”  and  “ actual ” 
sin,  “  because,”  he  says,  “  the  sin- 


82  HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 

1.  In  the  first  place,  he  carefully  distinguishes 
between  the  work  of  the  Creator  and  that  of  the 
creature,  and  designates  the  former  by  the  term 
“natura.”  In  this  sense  and  use  of  the  word,  he 
denies  that  sin  is  by  “  nature,”  or  belongs  to  “  na¬ 
ture.”  “All  fault  or  sin  (vitium),”  he  says,  “is  an 
injury  to  nature,  and  consequently  is  contrary  to 
nature.” 1  “  In  one  and  the  same  man,  the  intention 

[i.  e.  the  inclination]  may  be  blamed,  but  the  nature 
praised ;  for  they  are  two  different  things.  Even 
in  a  little  child,  that  nature  which  was  created  by 
the  good  and  holy  God  is  not  the  only  thing  that 
exists ;  but  he  has  also  that  fault  (vitium  sc.  inten- 
tio),  i.  e.  intention  or  disposition,  which  through  one 
man  passed  over  to  all.”  2  For  this  reason,  Augus¬ 
tine  prefers  the  phrase  “  peccatum  originate  ”  to  the 
phrase  “  peccatum  naturale  ”  or  “  peccatum  naturae,” 
as  the  designation  of  the  Adamic  sin ;  and  employs 
it,  particularly  when  the  Pelagians  charge  him  with 
holding  to  a  “  natural,”  in  the  sense  of  a  “  created  ” 
sin.  “  The  good,”  he  remarks,  “  which  is  in  nature  as 


ful  disposition  of  the  heart  is  as 
actually  sin  as  the  expression  or 
acting  out  of  the  disposition.” 
This  is  a  criticism  that  would 
have  been  precluded  by  an  ac¬ 
quaintance  with  the  history  of 
these  theological  terms. 

1  Augustinus  :  De  civitate  Dei, 
XII.  i.  Compare  De  lib.  arbit. 
III.  xvii.  ;  De  Gen.  ad  lit.  Cap. 
xxvi. 


5  “In  uno  homine  jure  vitupe- 
ratur  intentio,  et  natura  laudatur, 
quia  duo  sunt  quae  contrariis  ap- 
plicentur.  Etiam  in  parvulo,  non 
unum  est  tantum,  id  est,  natura, 
in  qua  creatus  homo  a  Deo  bono : 
liabet  enim  et  vitium  (sc.  inten¬ 
tio)  quod  per  unum  in  omnes  ho¬ 
mines  pertransit.”  Augustinus  : 
De  nuptiis  et  concupiscentia,  II. 
xxix. 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


83 


such,  cannot  be  destroyed,  unless  nature  itself  is  de¬ 
stroyed.  But  if  nature  is  destroyed  [i.  e.  as  to  its 
substance]  by  corruption,  then  corruption  itself  will 
no  longer  remain ;  for  there  is  then  no  nature  in 
which  corruption  can  exist.”  44  If  man  had  lost  the 
whole  divine  image  [as  to  substance,  i.  e.],  there 
would  be  nothing  remaining,  of  which  it  could  be 
said, 4  Though  man  walketh  in  an  image  he  is  vainly 
disquieted  (Ps.  xxxix.  6).’”  44  That  is  good  which 

deplores  the  lost  good  ;  for  if  there  were  nothing 
of  good  remaining  in  nature,  there  would  be  no 
pain  for  the  lost  good,  as  punishment.”  44  Every¬ 
thing  good  is  from  God  ;  there  is  therefore  no  na¬ 
ture  that  is  not  from  God  (omne  autem  bonum  ex 
Deo  ;  nulla  ergo  natura  est  quae  non  sit  ex  Deo).” 1 
In  these  passages,  which  might  be  multiplied,  in 
which  44  nature  ”  is  synonymous  with  44  creation,”  sin 
is  denied  to  be  natural,  or  to  belong  to  the  course 
and  constitution  of  nature  ;  while  yet,  in  the  second¬ 
ary  signification  of  a  natural  disposition  or  inclina¬ 
tion  (intentio),  Augustine,  it  is  needless  to  say,  com 
stantly  affirms  that  sin  is  both  44  natural  ”  and  a  44  na¬ 
ture.”  In  harmony  with  these  statements,  Augus¬ 
tine  also  distinguishes  between  44 substance”  and 
44  quality,”  and  asserts  that  sin  is  not  substance  but 
quality.  Arguing  with  Julian  of  Eclanum,  he 
says :  44  Julian  speaks  as  if  we  had  said  that  some 


1  Augustinus  :  Enchiridion  iv  ;  ad  literam,  VIII.  xiv ;  De  lib.  ar- 
Retractationes,  I.  xxvi ;  De  Genesi  bit.  II.  xx. 


84 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


substance  was  created  in  men  by  the  devil.  The 
devil  persuades  to  evil  as  sin,  but  does  not  create  it 
as  nature.  But  evidently  he  has  persuaded  nature, 
as  man  is  nature  ;  and  by  persuading  has  corrupted 
it.  For  he  who  inflicts  wounds  does  not  create 
limbs,  but  injures  limbs.  But  wounds  inflicted  on 
bodies  make  the  limbs  falter  or  move  feebly,  but  do 
not  affect  that  voluntary  faculty  (virtutem)  by 
which  the  man  is  or  does  right;  but  the  wound 
which  is  called  sin,  wounds  that  voluntary  faculty 
(vitam)  by  which  man  leads  a  holy  life.  .  .  .  And 
yet  that  weakness  (languor)  by  which  the  power 
of  living  holily  perished,  is  not  nature,  but  a  cor¬ 
ruption  ;  just  as  bodily  infirmity  is  not  a  substance 
or  nature,  but  a  vitiation.”  “  Evil  is  not  a  sub¬ 
stance;  for  if  it  were  a  substance,  it  would  be  good.” 1 

2.  Secondly,  Augustine  denies  that  God  can  him¬ 
self  sin,  or  efficiently  cause  sin  in  his  creatures.  He 
maintains  that  inoral  evil  must,  from  the  nature  of 
the  case,  originate  within  the  sphere  of  the  finite 
solely.  Only  a  finite  will  can  sin,  or  be  the  author 
of  sin.  The  only  relation  which  the  Infinite  Will 
can  sustain  to  moral  evil  is  permissive  and  regula¬ 
tive.  a  Evil  does  not  arise  except  in  a  good  being ; 
and  this,  tbo,  not  in  the  Supremely  and  Immutably 
Good,  but  in  a  being  made  from  nothing,  by  the  wis- 

1  Augustinus  :  De  nuptiis  et  objects  to  tbe  Manichaeans  that 
concupiscentia,  II.  xxxiv  ;  Con-  they  regard  “  evil,  not  as  the  ac- 
fessiones,  VIII.  xii.  In  his  Opus  cident  of  a  substance,  but  as  the 
imperfectum  (III.  189),  Augustine  very  substance  itself.” 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


85 


dom  of  God.” 1  Every  finite  rational  being,  in  other 
words,  must  be  created  holy.  From  this  position  he 
lapses  into  evil.  Holiness  is  thus  always  from  the 
creator  ;  and  sin  always  from  the  creature.  Hence, 
says  Augustine,  the  efficient  cause  of  sin  cannot  be 
found  back  of  the  will  of  the  creature,  and  must  not 
be  sought  for  at  any  point  more  ultimate  than  this. 
The  caption  of  the  seventh  chapter  of  the  twelfth 
book  of  the  De  Civitate  Dei  runs  as  follows :  “  The 
efficient  cause  of  an  evil  will  is  not  to  be  sought  for.” 
By  this  Augustine  means,  as  his  argument  goes  on 
to  show,  that  it  contradicts  the  idea  of  sin  to  ask 
for  an  originating  cause  of  sin  other  than  the  sinner 
himself.  To  seek  an  efficient  cause  of  an  evil  will, 
is  to  ask  for  the  efficient  cause  of  an  efficient  cause. 
The  whole  argument  in  the  sixth  chapter  of  the 
twelfth  book  of  the  De  Civitate  Dei  aims  to  prove 
that  moral  evil  is  the  purest  possible  self-motion, 
and  consequently  cannot  be  referred  to  anything,  or 
any  being,  but  the  self .  u  Let  no  one,”  Augustine 
says,  u  seek  an  efficient  cause  for  the  evil  will  /  there 


1  “  Non  ortum  est  malum  nisi 
in  bono ;  nec  tamen  summo  et 
immutabili,  quod  est  natura  Dei, 
sed  facto  de  nihilo  per  sapientiam 
Dei.”  Augustinus  :  De  nuptiis  et 
concupiscentia,  III.  1.  Compare 
De  libero  arbitrio  I.  xi.  Augus¬ 
tine  teaches  that  God  ordains  sin, 
but  does  not  produce  it.  “  Some 
things  God  both  produces  and 
ordains  ;  others  he  only  produces. 


The  holy  he  both  produces  and 
ordains ;  but  sinners,  so  far  forth 
as  they  are  sinners,  he  does  not 
produce,  but  only  ordains.”'  De 
Genesi  ad  literam.  “Since  no 
one  by  the  act  of  memory  com¬ 
pels  the  performance  of  past  acts, 
so  God  does  not,  by  his  fore¬ 
knowledge,  compel  the  perform¬ 
ance  of  future  acts.”  De  libero 
arbitrio,  III.  iv. 


86 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


is  no  efficient  cause,  only  a  deficient  one.”  1  In  oth¬ 
er  words,  the  sinful  inclination  of  the  human  will 
is  not  a  product  originated  by  a  positive  external 
cause,  but  it  is  a  deficiency,  or  falling  away,  within 
the  will  itself,  Augustine  then  goes  on  to  show 
how  God’s  agency,  the  agency  of  an  Infinite  Being, 
can  never  be  a  deficiency,  but  must  always  be  an 
efficiency ;  and  thereby  evinces  the  impossibility  of 
sin  in  the  Divine  will.  It  is  in  such  speculations  as 
these,  that  the  Latin  Father  laid  the  foundation  of 
the  scholastic  doctrine  that  sin  is  a  negation.2  By 
this  it  was  not  meant  that  sin  is  a  non-entity ;  but 
only  a  negative,  or  privative,  entity.  It  has  exist¬ 
ence,  and  is  to  have  it  endlessly,  now  that  it  has 
come  into  existence.  But  evil  has  not  that  intrinsic 
and  positive  excellence  of  being,  that  eternal  right  to 
be,  which  good  possesses.  Hence  evil,  unlike  good, 
is  eternal  only  a  parte  post.  Holiness  is  from  eter¬ 
nity  to  eternity,  like  God.  But  sin  is  from  time, 
and  of  time,  to  eternity. 

3.  Thirdly,  Augustine  expressly  asserts  that  all 
sin,  both  original  and  actual,  is  voluntary.  u  If  sin, 
says  Julian,  is  from  will,  then  it  is  an  evil  will  that 
produces  sin ;  if  from  nature,  then  an  evil  nature. 
I  quickly  reply :  Sin  is  from  will.  Then  he  asks 
whether  original  sin  also  [is  from  will]  ?  I  an- 


1  Augustinus  :  De  civitate  Dei  trio,  I.  xx.  (Ed.  Migne,  I.  1270). 
XII.  vii.  Compare  Howe:  Works,  I.  134 

'a  Augustinus:  De  libero  arbi-  (New  York  Ed.). 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


87 


swer,  certainly,  original  sin  also ;  because  this  too 
was  transmitted  (seminatum  est)  from  the  will  of 
the  first  man,  that  it  might  both  be  in  him,  and  pass 
over  to  all.’’ 1  Here,  it  is  plain  that  Augustine  pro¬ 
ceeds  upon  the  ethical  maxim,  that  that  which 
springs  from  a  voluntary  cause  is  itself  to  be  reck¬ 
oned  voluntary,  and  places  voluntariness  beneath  all 
the  sin  of  man, — voluntariness  either  generic  or  in¬ 
dividual.  Hence  he  remarks,  in  another  place,  that 
“  moral  evil  would  not  be  in  infants  except  by  the 
voluntary  action  of  the  first  man,  and  the  traduction 
of  original  sin.” 2  Speaking,  in  his  Confessions ,  of 
his  erroneous  views  of  evil  when  involved  in  Mani- 
chaeism,  he  says  :  “  I  maintained  that  Thy  unchange¬ 
able  substance  did  err  compulsorily,  rather  than  con¬ 
fess  that  my  changeable  substance  had  gone  astray 
voluntarily,  and  now  for  punishment, lay  in  error.”3 
Arguing  with  Julian,  he  remarks:  “We,  too,  say 
that  there  cannot  be  sin  without  free  will.  Nor 
does  our  doctrine  of  original  sin  contradict  this  po¬ 
sition  ;  because  we  arrive  at  this  kind  of  sin  through 
free  will, — not,  indeed,  through  the  will  of  the  indi¬ 
vidual  at  birth,  but  through  the  will  of  him  in  whom 
all  were  originally,  at  the  time  when  he  vitiated 


1  Augustinus  :  De  nuptiis  et  untariness  of  sin  infers  the  power 
concupiscentia,  II.  sxviii.  2.  Com-  to  the  contrary  ;  and  that  there- 
pare  Whitby  On  Original  Sin,  fore  Augustine’s  definition  of  sin 
Chapter  VII.,  for  citations  to  this  contradicts  his  theory  of  grace, 
same  effect.  This  writer,  how-  2  De  nuptiis  et  concupiscentia, 
ever,  mistakenly  supposes  that  III.  1. 

Augustine’s  assertion  of  the  vol-  3  Confessiones,  IV.  xv. 


88 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


the  common  human  nature ,  by  an  evil  act  of  will. 
Hence,  infants  do  not,  at  their  birth,  originate  the 
sinful  will  which  they  have ;  but  Adam  in  that  time 
of  his  apostasy  committed  that  great  common  sin 
(magnum  ilium  peccatum)  with  a  free  will.7’ 1  Again, 
in  this  treatise  Contra  Julianum ,  he  says :  u  In  vain, 
therefore,  do  you  imagine  that  there  is  no  guilt  (de¬ 
lictum)  in  infants,  for  the  reason  that  guilt  cannot 
be  without  voluntariness,  and  there  is  no  voluntari¬ 
ness  in  infants.  This  is  true,  so  far  as  individual 
transgression  (proprium  cuj  usque  peccatum)  is  con¬ 
cerned  ;  but  not  so  far  as  concerns  the  original  con¬ 
tagion  of  the  first  [Adamic]  sin.  But  if  this  Adamic 
sin  is  a  nullity,  infants  would  not  be  involved  in  any 
evil,  and  certainly  would  not  be  exposed  to  any 
species  of  evil,  either  of  body  or  soul,  under  the 
government  of  a  perfectly  just  God.  The  guilt  that 
is  in  original  sin,  therefore,  takes  its  origin  from  the 
sinful  will  of  the  first  pair  (priorum  hominum). 
Thus,  neither  original  nor  individual  sin  can  origi¬ 
nate  but  from  a  wrong  will.” 2  In  his  treatise  De 
Vera  Religione ,  Augustine  remarks  that  “  sin  is  an 
evil  so  voluntary,  that  there  can  be  no  sin  but 
what  is  voluntary  ;  and  this  is  so  very  manifest,  that 
none  of  the  learned  few  or  the  unlearned  many  ever 
dissent.  In  fine,  if  we  do  not  perform  evil  with  our 
will,  then  ought  no  person  to  be  reproved  or  ad- 

1  Opus  imperfectum,  Cont.  Jul.  2  Contra  Julianum,  III.  v. 

IY.  xc. ;  compare  Opus  imperf. 

II.  xxi,  IY.  xci.  xcv,  Y.  xl. 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OF  AUGUSTINE. 


89 


monished ;  but  if  you  deny  this  fact,  the  Christian 
law  and  the  discipline  of  every  religion  must  be  set 
aside.” 1  In  his  Epistle  Ad  Sixtum ,  Augustine  rep¬ 
resents  the  Pelagian  as  objecting  that  “men  will 
excuse  themselves  by  saying,  c  Why  should  we  be 
blamed  if  we  live  ill,  since  we  have  not  received 
grace  to  live  well  ?  To  this  he  answers  :  “  Those 
who  live  ill  cannot  truly  say  that  they  are  not  to 
blame ;  for  if  they  do  no  ill,  they  live  well.  But  if  they 
live  ill,  it  proceeds  from  themselves ,  either  from  their 
original  evil,  or  from  that  which  they  have  them¬ 
selves  added  to  it.  If  they  are  vessels  of  wrath,  let 
them  impute  it  to  themselves  as  being  formed  out 
of  that  mass  (massa)  which  God  has  justly  condemn¬ 
ed  for  the  sin  of  that  one  man,  in  whom  all  men 
have  sinned.  .  .  .  Every  sinner  is  inexcusable,  either 
by  his  original  sin,  or  because  he  has  added  to  it  of 
his  own  will,  whether  knowingly  or  ignorantly ;  for 
even  ignorance  itself  is  without  doubt  a  sin  in  those 
who  have  chosen  not  to  know ;  and  in  those  who 
have  not  been  able  [to  know],  it  is  the  punishment 
of  sin.  The  just  judgment  of  God  does  not  spare 
even  those  who  have  not  heard  [the  law]  :  ‘  For  as 
many  as  have  sinned  without  law,  shall  also  perish 
without  law’  (Rom.  xii.).  And  although  they  may 
seem  to  have  an  excuse  for  their  disobedience,  yet 
God  does  not  admit  this  excuse,  because  he  lenows 
that  he  made  man  upright  and  gave  him  the  rule  of 


1  De  vera  religione,  xiv. 


90 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


obedience ,  and  that  it  is  only  by  the  abuse  of  free 
will  that  sin  originated  and  passed  over  to  the  pos¬ 
terity.”  1  Julian  cites  the  passage  in  Deut.  xxiv.  16  : 
“  The  fathers  shall  not  be  put  to  death  for  the  chil¬ 
dren,  neither  shall  the  children  be  put  to  death  for 
the  fathers  :  every  man  shall  be  put  to  death  for  his 
own  sin,”  in  proof  that  the  sin  of  Adam  cannot  be 
imputed  and  punished.  To  this  Augustine  replies, 
that  this  refers  to  the  fathers  and  the  children  in 
their  individual  capacity,  and  not  as  existent  in  a 
common  unity,  or  nature.  It  refers  to  a  condition 
of  things  subsequent  to  the  existence  in  Adam.  The 
individual  sins  of  a  father  cannot  be  imputed  to  the 
son,  and  vice  versa;  because  in  this  capacity,  the 
father  and  son  are  not  one.  The  doctrine  of  one¬ 
ness  does  not  apply  in  this  instance.  But,  previous 
to  birth,  and  as  existing  in  the  first  man,  parents 
and  children,  says  Augustine,  are  one  numerical  hu¬ 
man  nature,  and  the  imputation  of  the  sin  of  this 
nature  is  not,  therefore,  the  imputation  of  another's 
sin.  Original  sin  is  a  common  act  of  transgression  ; 
and  in  charging  it  upon  the  posterity,  the  very 
principle  enunciated  by  Moses  is  carried  out,  viz. : 
that  no  agent  shall  be  punished  for  another’s  agen¬ 
cy.  Augustine  concedes  that  if  Adam  and  his  pos¬ 
terity  did  not,  at  the  time  of  the  apostasy,  constitute 
one  human  nature  and  one  indivisible  agent,  it 
would  not  be  just  to  impute  the  primitive  act 


1  Opera  II.  882,  883  (Ed.  Migne). 


RECAPITULATION. 


91 


of  apostasy  to  the  posterity.  In  other  words,  he 
charges  the  posterity  with  the  Adamic  transgression, 
upon  the  principle  of  mum  cuique } 


§  4.  Recapitulation . 

The  Latin  anthropology,  in  a  recapitulation, 
presents  the  following  points.  1.  Man  was  created 
holy,  and  from  this  position  originated  sin  de  nihilo 
by  a  purely  creative  act.  Original  sin  is  voluntary 
in  the  sense  of  being  self-will,  and  is  therefore  prop¬ 
erly  punishable  as  guilt.  2.  Man  was  created  as  a 
species,  in  respect  to  both  soul  and  body  ;  and  hence 
the  Adamic  connection  relates  to  the  entire  man, — 
to  the  voluntary  and  rational  nature,  equally  with 
the  corporeal  and  sensuous.  3.  By  the  Adamic 
connection,  the  will,  the  nvtvpa,  is  corrupted,  as 
well  as  the  ifjv^r)  and  aco^a.  4.  Infants  are  guilty, 
because  they  possess  a  sinful  bias  of  will,  and  not 
merely  a  corrupt  sensuous  nature.  5.  The  corrup¬ 
tion  of  the  sensuous  nature  is  the  consequent,  and 
not  the  antecedent,  of  apostasy  in  the  rational  and 
voluntary ;  so  long  as  the  voluntary  and  rational 
powers  are  in  their  created  holy  condition,  there  is 
nothing  disordered  or  corrupt  in  the  lower  nature. 
The  corruption  of  the  flesh  ( aco^ia )  is  not  the  cause, 
but  the  effect,  of  the  corruption  of  the  reason  and 
will  ( nvtvpa ).  6.  The  Holy  Spirit  takes  the  initia- 


1  Compare  Opus  imperfectum,  III.  xii.  (Ed.  Migne,  X.  1251). 


92 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


tive  in  tlie  change  from  sin  to  holiness,  and  there  is 
no  co-operation  of  the  human  with  the  Divine  agen¬ 
cy  in  the  regenerating  act.  The  efficiency  or  activ¬ 
ity  of  the  human  will  up  to  the  point  of  regenera¬ 
tion  is  hostile  to’  God,  and  therefore  does  not  co¬ 
work  with  Him. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


PELAGIANISM  AND  SEMI-PELAGIANISM. 


§  1.  JPelagianism. 

Pelagius,  a  British  monk,  directly  by  his  own 
teachings,  and  indirectly  by  the  controversy  to 
which  he  gave  occasion,  and  the  adherents  who  de¬ 
veloped  his  views,  constructed  an  anthropology  to¬ 
tally  antagonistic  to  the  Augustinian. 

The  fundamental  points  in  his  theory  are  the 
following.  The  soul  of  man  by  creation  is  neither 
holy  nor  sinful.1  His  body  by  creation  is  mortal. 
The  fall  of  Adam  introduced  no  change  of  any  kind 
into  either  the  souls  or  the  bodies  of  his  posterity. 


1  “  Omne  bonum  ac  malum,  quo 
vel  laudibiles  vel  vituperabiles 
sumus,  non  nobiscum  oritur ,  sed 
ayitur  a  nobis ;  capaces  enim 
utriusque  rei,  non  pleni  nascimur, 
et  ut  sine  virtute,  ita  sine  vitio 
procreamur,  atque  ante  actionem 
propriae  voluntatis  id  solum  in 
homine  est,  quod  Deus  condidit.” 


Pelagius  :  Be  lib.  arbitrio,  quoted 
in  Augustinus  :  De  peccato  ori- 
ginis,  c.  xiii.  “  Nemo  naturaliter 
malus  est ;  sed  quicunque  reus  est, 
moribus,  non  exordiis  accusatur.” 
Julianus,  in  Augustinus:  Op. 
imp.  I.  cv.  Conp.  Op.  imp.  V. 
lvi.  See  Munsoher-Von  Colln  : 
Dogmengeschichte,  I.  375  sq. 


94 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


Every  man,  therefore,  when  born  into  the  world  is 
what  Adam  was  when  created.1  At  birth,  each 
man's  physical  nature  is  liable  to  disease  and  death, 
as  was  Adam’s  at  creation;2  and,  at  birth,  each 
man’s  voluntary  faculty,  like  Adam’s  at  creation,  is 
undetermined  either  to  sin  or  holiness.  Being  thus 
characterless,  with  a  will  undecided  either  for  good 
or  evil,  and  not  in  the  least  affected  by  Adam’s 
apostasy,  each  individual  man,  after  birth,  com¬ 
mences  his  own  voluntariness,  originates  his  own 
character,  and  decides  his  own  destiny,  by  the 
choice  of  either  right  or  wrong.3  Temporal  death 


1  It  was  charged  upon  Coeles- 
tius,  at  the  synod  of  Diospolis, 
and  condemned,  that  he  held  that 
“  Adam  did  not  injure  his  poster¬ 
ity,”  and  that  “new-born  infants 
are  in  the  same  condition  as 
Adam  was  before  the  fall.”  Pe- 
lagius,  according  to  Augustine 
(De  pec.  orig.  xi.),  professed  to 
disagree  with  Coelestius,  and 
made  out  the  following  points  of 
difference  between  Adam  and  his 
posterity:  1.  Adam  injured  his 
posterity  by  setting  a  bad  exam¬ 
ple;  2.  Adam  was  created  an 
adult,  but  his  posterity  are  horn 
infants ;  3.  Adam  could  con¬ 
sciously  use  his  free  will,  hut  in¬ 
fants  cannot. 

3  Augustine  (Contra  duas  epist. 
IV.  iv.  Ed.  Migne,  X.  614)  repre¬ 
sents  the  Pelagians  as  saying  that 
“  death  only,  and  not  sin  (crimen), 
passed  to  us  from  Adam.”  To 


this  he  objects  that:  “Adam 
died,  because  he  sinned  ;  hut  in 
our  case,  according  to  Pelagius, 
death  is  transmitted  without  sin ; 
and  innocent  infants  are  punished 
unjustly,  by  contracting  death 
without  the  desert  of  death.” 

3  “  All  good  and  evil,  by  which 
we  are  praiseworthy  or  blame¬ 
worthy,  does, not  originate  with 
us,  but  is  acted  by  us.  We  are 
born  capable  of  either ;  we  are 
not  born  full  [of  character] ;  we 
are  procreated  without  holiness, 
and  also  without  sin  ;  before  the 
action  of  his  own  individual  will, 
there  is  nothing  in  man  but  what 
God  has  created.”  Quoted  by 
Augustine  from  Pelagius,  in  Au¬ 
gustinus  :  De  peccato  originis,  c. 
xiii.  “Children  (filii),  so  long  as 
they  are  children,  that  is  before 
they  do  anything  by  their  own 
will,  cannot  be  punishable  (rei).” 


PELAGIAXTSM. 


95 


is  no  part  of  the  punishment  of  sin,  because  it  be¬ 
falls  man  by  creation.  His  body  is  mortal  per  se, 
and  irrespective  of  sin.1  Eternal  death  is  therefore 
the  whole  of  the  punishment  of  man’s  sin. 

The  general,  but  not  strictly  universal  preva- 
lence  of  sin  in  the  world  is  accounted  for,  by  the 
power  of  temptation,  and  the  influence  of  example 
and  of  habit.2  It  is  possible  for  any  man  to  be  en- 


Quoted  by  Augustinus  :  Op.  im- 
perf.  II.  xlii.  “Free  will  is  as 
yet  in  its  original  uncorrupted 
state,  and  nature  is  to  be  regard¬ 
ed  as  innocent  in  every  one,  be¬ 
fore  his  own  will  can  show  itself.” 
Quoted  from  Julian,  by  Augus¬ 
tinus  :  Op.  imp.  II.  xx. 

1  “  The  words  ‘  till  thou  return 
to  the  earth  from  which  thou 
wast  taken,  for  dust  thou  art  and 
unto  dust  shalt  thou  return  ’  be¬ 
long  not  to  the  curse,  but  are 
rather  words  of  consolation  to 
man.  ‘Thy  sufferings,  toils,  and 
griefs  shall  not  endure  forever, 
but  shall  one  day  end.’  If  the 
dissolution  of  the  body  were  a 
part  of  the  punishment  of  sin,  it 
would  not  have  been  said,  ‘  thou 
shalt  return  to  dust,  for  dust  thou 
art ;  ’  but,  ‘  thou  shalt  return  to 
dust,  because  thou  hast  sinned, 
and  broken  my  command.’  ” 
Quoted  by  Augustinus  :  Op.  imp. 
VI.  xxvii.  “  Adam  himself,  say 
the  Pelagians,  would  have  died 
as  to  the  body,  though  he  had 
not  sinned;  and  hence  he  did 
not  die  in  consequence  of  his 


guilt,  but  by  the  necessity  of  na¬ 
ture.”  Augustinus:  De  haer.  c. 
lxxxviii. 

2  The  (<p  w,  in  Kom.  v.  12,  Pe- 
lagius  translated,  as  did  Augus¬ 
tine  and  all  at  that  day,  by  in 
quo ;  but  he  explained  it  in  this 
phraseology :  “  It  is  said  we  sin¬ 
ned  in  Adam,  not  because  sin  is 
innate,  but  because  it  comes  from 
imitation.”  Quoted  by  Augusti¬ 
nus:  De  natura  et  gratia,  c.  x. 
Julian  explains  it  thus :  “  In  quo 
omnes  peccaverunt  nihil  aliud  in¬ 
dicat,  quam  :  quia  omnes  pecca¬ 
verunt.”  Pelagius  in  his  letter 
to  the  nun  Demetrias,  remarks : 
“While  nature  was  yet  new,  and 
a  long-continued  habit  of  sinning 
had  not  spread  as  it  were  a  mist 
over  human  reason,  nature  was 
left  without  a  [written]  law ;  to 
which  the  Lord,  when  it  was  op¬ 
pressed  by  too  7many  vices,  and 
stained  with  the  mist  of  ignorance, 
applied  the  file  of  the  [written] 
law,  in  order  that,  by  its  frequent 
admonitions,  nature  might  be 
cleansed  again,  and  return  to  its 
lustre.  And  there  is  no  other 


96 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


tirely  sinless,  and  there  have  been  some  such,  even 
among  the  heathen.  The  grace  of  the  Holy  Spirit 
is  not  absolutely,  but  only  relatively  necessary,  in 
order  to  holiness ;  it  renders  its  attainment  easier 
to  man.1  Regeneration  does  not  consist  in  the  re¬ 
newal  of  the  will  by  an  internal  operation  of  Divine 
efficiency,  but  in  the  illumination  of  the  intellect  by 
the  truth,  the  stimulation  of  the  will  by  the  threat- 
enings  of  the  law  and  the  promise  of  future  rewards, 
and  by  the  remission  of  sin  through  the  Divine  in¬ 
dulgence.  God’s  grace 2  is  designed  for  all,  but  man 


difficulty  of  doing  well,  but  the 
long-continued  habit  of  vice, 
which  has  contaminated  us  from 
youth  up,  and  corrupted  us  for 
many  years,  and  holds  us  after¬ 
wards  so  bound  and  subjugated 
to  herself,  that  she  seems  in  a 
measure  to  have  the  force  of  na¬ 
ture.”  Augustine  (Ed.  Migne,  X. 
115)  objects  to  Pelagius’s  expla¬ 
nation  of  “in  quo  peccaverunt 
omnes,”  that  men  are  not  said  to 
sin  “  in  the  devil,”  because  they 
imitate  him. 

1  “Pelagius  enim  facilius  dicit 
impleri  quod  bonum  est,  si  adju- 
vet  gratia.  Quo  additamento,  id 
est,  addendo  facilius,  utique  sig- 
nificat  hoc  se  sapere,  quod  etiam 
si  gratiae  defuerit  adjutorium,  po¬ 
test,  quamvis  difficilius,  impleri 
bonum  per  liberum  arbitrium.” 
Augustinus  :  Contra  duas  episto- 
las  Pelag.  II.  viii.  17 ;  Comp.  De 
gratia  Christi,  c.  xl. — “  Confidunt 
in  virtute  sua,  et  creatori  nostro 


quodammodo  dicunt,  Tu  nos  fe- 
cisti  homines,  justos  autem  ipsi 
nos  fecimus.”  Augustinus  :  Ep. 
clxxvii.  Ad  Innoc.  Coelestius 
was  condemned  by  the  council  of 
Carthage  as  holding  that  “lex  sic 
mittit  ad  regnum  coelorum,  quo- 
modo  et  evangelium.”  Augus¬ 
tine  (De  haer.  88)  represents  Pe- 
lagianism  as  allowing  of  no  im¬ 
mediate  divine  influence,  but  only 
that  of  the  truth:  “[deo]  adju- 
vante  per  suam  legem  et  doctri- 
nam,  ut  discamus  quae  facere  et 
quae  sperare  debeamus.” 

2  By  “grace”  Pelagius  meant: 
1.  The  natural  freedom  of  will 
which  every  man  receives  by  cre¬ 
ation  ;  2.  The  truth,  both  natural 
and  revealed  ;  3.  A  species  of  in¬ 
ward  illumination  ;  4.  The  remis¬ 
sion  of  sins.  Augustine’s  repre¬ 
sentation  is  as  follows,  in  De  ges- 
tis  contra  Pelagium,  c.  xxxv.: 
“The  Pelagians  say,  that  man’s 
nature,  which  was  made  with 


PELAGIAXISM. 


97 


must  make  himself  worthy  of  it  by  an  honest  striv¬ 
ing  after  virtue.  The  Son  of  God  became  man,  in 
order,  by  his  perfect  teaching  and  example,  to  afford 
the  strongest  motives  for  self-improvement,  and 
thereby  redeems  us.  As  we  are  imitators  of  Adam 
in  sin,  so  we  are  to  become  imitators  of  Christ  in 
virtue. 

Pelagius  held  that  infant  baptism  is  necessary 


free  will,  is  sufficient  to  keep  us 
from  all  sin,  and  to  fulfil  all 
righteousness  ;  and  that  this  is 
the  grace  of  God,  that  we  were 
so  made  that  we  could  do  this  by 
our  own  will ;  that  he  has  given 
us  the  aid  of  his  law  and  com¬ 
mandments  ;  and  that  he  pardons 
sins  that  are  past  to  those  who 
are  converted  to  him.  In  these 
things  alone,  is  the  grace  of  God 
to  be  acknowledged,  and  not  in 
assistance  given  in  our  single 
acts.”  In  his  work,  ‘  On  free 
will,’  written  against  Jerome,  and 
after  the  council  of  Diospoiis,  Pe¬ 
lagius  explained  his  view  of  will 
and  grace,  by  distinguishing  the 
faculty,  the  volition  or  decision, 
and  the  external  act  (posse,  velle, 
esse),  and  maintaining  that  the 
first  alone  is  from  God,  while  the 
other  two  are  from  man  alone. 
Augustinus  :  De  gratia  Christi¬ 
ana,  IV.  v.  Hence,  Augustine 
directed  the  attention  of  Innocent 
of  Rome,  and  John  of  Jerusalem, 
to  Pelagius’s  idea  of  “  grace,”  and 
referred  them  to  passages  in 
which  Pelagius  represented  grace 

VOL  ii.— 7 


to  be  the  natural  endowments 
of  man,  which,  inasmuch  as 
they  are  the  gift  of  God,  are 
“  grace.”  Augustinus  :  Ep.  clxxix. 
ad  Paul.  §  2.  In  his  letter 
to  Sixtus,  with  allusion  to  the 
Pelagian  position  that  the  en¬ 
dowments  with  which  man  is 
created  are  “  grace,”  since  he 
does  not  merit  them,  Augustine 
says :  “  The  grace  which  the 
Apostle  recommends,  is  not  that 
by  which  we  have  been  created 
men ;  but  that  by  which  we  have 
been  justified,  when  we  were  al¬ 
ready  bad  men.  Christ  did  not 
die  for  the  creation  of  those  who 
were  not  in  existence,  but  for 
the  justification  of  those  who 
were  in  existence,  and  were  sin¬ 
ful.”  Augustinus  :  Ep.  Sixto. 
(Ed.  Migne,  II.  877).  Julian,  ac¬ 
cording  to  Augustine  (Op.  imp. 
I.  xciv.),  includes  under  the  name 
of  “  grace  ”  all  the  gifts  of  God, — 
“innumerae  species  adjutorii  di- 
vini.”  Compare  Augustinus  :  De 
pec.  mer.  II.  xviii.  (Ed.  Migne,  X. 
168). 


98 


HISTOEY  OF  ANTHEOPOLOGY. 


in  order  to  the  remission  of  future  sins ; 1  but  chil¬ 
dren  who  died  without  baptism  he  thought  would 
be  saved,  although  they  would  experience  a  less  de¬ 
gree  of  felicity  than  the  redeemed  enjoy.2  Respect¬ 
ing  the  doctrines  of  the  trinity  and  the  deity  of 
Christ,  of  revelation,  of  prophecy,  and  of  miracles, 
Pelagius  adopted  the  supernaturalism  of  the  Church, 
although  his  anthropology  logically  developed  would 
have  brought  him  to  the  rationalistic  view  upon 
these  subjects. 

Pelagius  advanced  his  views  first  at  Rome,  from 
409  to  411,  principally  through  a  commentary  upon 
the  Pauline  Epistles.  His  system  was  brought  to 


1  Augustine  (De  pecc.  meritis, 
III.  vi.)  remarks  :  “  A  short  time 
ago,  when  I  was  at  Carthage,  I 
heard  the  passing  remark  from 
some,  that  infants  are  not  bap¬ 
tized  for  the  forgiveness  of  sins, 
but  as  an  act  of  consecration  to 
Christianity  (ut  sanctificentur  in 
Christo).”  It  is  probable  that  he 
refers  to  some  of  the  Pelagians, 
whether  Pelagius  and  Coelestius 
themselves  is  uncertain. — There 
were  some,  whom  Augustine  (De 
pec.  mer.  I.  xvii.  xxxiv.)  plainly 
distinguishes  from  Pelagians,  who 
founded  infant  baptism  upon  ac¬ 
tual  sins  committed  by  infants. 

2  According  to  Augustine  (De 
pec.  mer.  I.  xxxiv.  xxxvi.),  the  Pe¬ 
lagians  made  a  distinction  between 
“  salvation,”  or  “  eternal  life,”  and 
the  “kingdom  of  heaven.”  The 
former  could  be  gained  by  the  un¬ 


baptized  :  the  latter  was  the  sal¬ 
vation  of  Christians,  or  the  bap¬ 
tized. — Augustine  (De  Haeresi- 
bus,  lxxxviii.  Ed.  Migne,  VIII.  47) 
states  the  Pelagian  theory  of  bap¬ 
tism  as  follows :  “  The  Pelagians 
maintain,  that  infants  are  so  born 
without  any  shackles  whatever  of 
original  sin,  that  there  is  nothing 
at  all  to  be  forgiven  them  through 
the  second  birth,  but  that  they 
are  baptized  in  order  to  admission 
into  the  kingdom  of  God,  through 
regeneration  to  the  filial  state; 
and  therefore  they  are  changed 
from  good  to  better,  but  are  not 
by  that  renovation  freed  from 
any  evil  at  all  of  the  old  imputa¬ 
tion.  For  they  promise  them, 
even  if  unbaptized,  an  eternal  and 
blessed  life,  though  out  of  the 
kingdom  of  God.” 


PELAGIANISM. 


99 


the  notice  of  the  North- African  Church,  in  411,  by 
his  pupil  Coelestius,  who  was  judged  heretical  by  a 
council  at  Carthage  in  412,  and  was  excommuni¬ 
cated  upon  his  refusal  to  retract  his  opinions.  Pela- 
gius  in  411  went  to  Palestine.  The  Eastern  Church 
were  suspicious  of  his  views,  and  he  was  accused  of 
heresy  before  the  synods  of  Jerusalem  and  Diospo- 
Us.  But  he  succeeded  in  satisfying  his  judges,  by 
qualifying  his  assertions  respecting  the  possibility 
and  the  actual  fact  of  human  sinlessness.1  The 
North- African  Church,  however,  under  the  leader¬ 
ship  of  Augustine,  were  not  satisfied  with  Pelagius’s 
explanations,  and  followed  up  the  discussion.  Pela- 
gianism  was  condemned  as  a  heresy  by  the  synods 
of  Mileve  and  Carthage ,  in  416,  and  this  decision 
was  ultimately  endorsed  by  the  vacillating  Roman 
bishop  Zosimus,2  in  418,  and  thus  by  the  Latin 
Church.  The  Eastern  Church,  as  represented  at 


1  Before  the  synod  of  Jerusa¬ 
lem,  he  explained,  “that  in  assert¬ 
ing  that  man  could  live  without 
sin  if  he  only  would,  he  spoke  of 
man  after  conversion,  and  did  not 
deny  the  influence  of  grace  upon 
the  converted  man,  or  intend  to 
teach  that  any  man  had  actually 
lived  free  from  sin.”  Guericke  : 
Church  History,  §  92.  By  “  grace” 
Pelagius  meant  outward  aids,  as 
distinct  from  inward  operation. 
The  natural  endowments  of  will 
and  understanding,  the  communi¬ 
cation  of  truth,  the  knowledge  of 
the  commandments,  the  influence 


of  favorable  circumstances  would 
be  “grace,”  according  to  Pela¬ 
gius’s  use  of  the  term. 

2  In  his  statement  of  belief  to 
Zosimus,  Pelagius  said:  “We 
have  a  free  will,  either  to  sin,  or 
to  forbear  sinning  ;  and  in  all 
good  works  it  is  aided  by  the  Di¬ 
vine  assistance.  We  maintain 
that  free  will  exists  generally  in 
all  mankind,  in  Christians,  Jews, 
and  Gentiles ;  they  have  all  equal¬ 
ly  received  it  by  nature,  but  in 
Christians  only  it  is  assisted  with 
grace.  In  others,  this  good  of 
their  original  creation  is  naked 


100 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


the  Council  of  Ephesus,  in  431,  also  condemned 
Pelagianism. 

But  though  the  Eastern  Church  came  into  this 
decision,  its  opposition  to  Pelagianism  was  not  so 
earnest  and  intelligent  as  that  of  the  Western,  and 
particularly  as  that  of  the  North- African  Church. 
There  were  two  reasons  for  this.  In  the  first  place, 
the  Greek  anthropology  was  adopted  by  the  Orien¬ 
tal  bishops.  This,  we  have  seen,  maintained  the 
position  that  original  sin  is  not  voluntariness  but 
physical  corruption,  together  with  the  synergistic 
view  of  regeneration.1  The  Greek  anthropology 
would  therefore  come  in  conflict  with  the  theory  of 
Augustine  upon  these  points.  In  the  second  place, 
the  doctrine  of  unconditional  election  and  predesti¬ 
nation,  which  flowed  so  naturally  from  the  Augus- 
tinian  view  of  the  entire  helplessness  of  human 
nature,  was  extremely  offensive  to  the  Eastern 


and  unarmed.  They  shall  be 
judged  and  condemned,  because, 
though  possessed  of  free  will,  by 
which  they  might  come  to  the 
faith,  and  merit  the  grace  of  God, 
they  make  an  ill  use  of  their  free¬ 
dom;  while  Christians  shall  he 
rewarded,  because  by  using  their 
free  will  aright,  they  merit  the 
grace  of  the  Lord,  and  keep  his 
commandments.”  In  answer  to 
the  question  :  “  Where  do  unbap¬ 
tized  children  go  ?  ”  Pelagius  said : 
“  I  know  where  children  who  die 
unbaptized  do  not  go ;  hut  I  know 


not  where  they  do  go.”  Augus¬ 
tinus:  De  gratia  Christi.  Cap. 
xxxi.  (Ed.  Migne,  X.  376). 

1  “During  Pelagius’s  residence 
at  Rome,  he  fell  into  the  heresy 
against  grace,  being  instructed  by 
a  Syrian  called  Rufinus.  For  that 
error  had  already  gained  a  footing 
in  the  East.  It  was  taught  by 
Theodore  of  Mopsnestia  ;  and  it 
was  thought  to  take  its  rise  from 
the  principles  of  Origen.”  Fleu- 
et  :  Eccl.  Hist.  B.  xxiii.  §  1. 
Compare  Olshausen  :  Com.  uber 
Rom.  vii.  7-24,  p.  259. 


PELAGIANISM. 


101 


mind.  Hence  we  find  that  when  the  controversy 
between  Augustinianism  and  Pelagianism  was  trans¬ 
ferred  from  the  West  to  the  East,  and  the  examin¬ 
ation  was  conducted  in  the  Eastern  synods,  there 
were  bishops  who  either  asserted  that  the  matters 
in  dispute  were  unessential,  or  else  sided  with  Pela- 
gius,  if  the  choice  must  be  made  between  Pelagius 
and  Augustine.1  The  Antiochian  School ,  as  repre¬ 
sented  by  Theodore  of  Mopsuestia  and  Isidore  of 
Pelusium,  stood  midway  between  the  parties,  and 
the  condemnation  of  Pelagianism  which  was  finally 
passed  by  the  Council  of  Ephesus  seems  to  have 
been  owing  more  to  a  supposed  connection  of  the 
views  of  Pelagius  with  those  of  Nestorius,  than  to  a 
clear  and  conscientious  conviction  that  his  system 
was  contrary  to  Scripture,  and  the  Christian  ex¬ 
perience. 

Such  a  settlement,  consequently,  of  the  strife 
could  not  be  permanent.  Moreover,  the  views  of 
Augustine  respecting  predestination  were  misstated 
by  some  of  his  followers,  and  misrepresented  by 
some  of  his  opponents,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  im¬ 
ply  the  tenet  of  necessitated  sin, — evil  being  repre- 

r 

sented  as  the  product  of  an  efficient  decree,  instead, 
as  Augustine  taught,  of  a  permissive  one.  The 

1  During  the  controversy,  the  hand,  Irenaeus,  Cyprian,  Inno- 
Pelagians  quoted  as  upon  their  cent,  Gregory,  Hilary,  Ambrose, 
side,  Lactantius,  Hilary,  Ambrose,  Jerome,  Basil,  and  Chrysostom 
Jerome,  Basil,  Chrysostom,  The-  were  claimed  as  agreeing  with 
odore  of  Mopsuestia,  and  Dio-  Augustine.  Whitby  :  On  Sin, 
dorus  of  Tarsus  ;  on  the  other  Chap.  VIII.  p.  251. 


102 


HISTOEY  OF  AOTHEOPOLOGY. 


doctrine  of  election  was  construed  into  a  motive  for 
indifference,  instead  of  fear  and  supplication  for 
mercy.  Tlie  same  abuse  was  made  of  the  doctrine 
of  sovereign  grace  in  the  salvation  of  the  human 
soul  that  was  anticipated  and  warned  against  by 
the  Apostle  Paul.  These  causes,  and  this  condition 
of  things,  led  to  the  revival,  by  a  party  in  the  West, 
of  the  synergistic  theory  of  regeneration,  as  the  only 
thing  which,  it  was  supposed,  could  relieve  the  hon¬ 
est-minded  of  their  difficulties  respecting  predestina¬ 
tion  and  election,  and  make  conversion  an  intelligible 
and  practical  matter.  This  party  were  the  so-called 
Semi-Pelagians} 


§  2.  Semi-Pelagianism . 

The  Semi-Pelagian  controversy  arose  in  the  fol¬ 
lowing  manner.  The  monks  of  the  cloister  of  Ad- 
rumetum,  in  North- Africa,  were  most  of  them 
advocates  of  the  Augustinian  theory,  but  had  fallen 
into  dispute  respecting  its  meaning.  Some  of  them, 
by  the  doctrine  of  absolute  predestination,  had  been 
thrown  into  great  mental  doubt  and  despair.  Others 
were  making  this  doctrine  the  occasion  of  entire  in¬ 
difference,  and  even  of  licentiousness.  A  third  class 
were  supposing  that  some  virtuous  efficiency,  even 

1  This  name  was  not  given  them  mans,  from  their  principal  seat  at 
until  the  Middle  Ages;  they  were  Marseilles,  in  Southern  Gaul, 
called,  previously,  the  Mamlien - 


SEMI-PELAGIANISM. 


103 


though  it  be  very  slight,  must  be  ascribed  to  the 
human  will,  in  regeneration.  The  abbot  of  the 
cloister  referred  the  case  to  Augustine,  in  427,  who 
endeavored  in  his  two  treatises,  De  gratia  et  libero 
arbitrio ,  and  De  correptione  et  gratia ,  to  relieve  the 
difficulties  of  the  monks,  and  appears  to  have  been 
successful. 

But,  contemporaneously  with  this  occurrence,  a 
far  more  extensive  opposition  to  Augustine’s  theory 
arose  in  Southern  Gaul.  A  theological  school  was 
formed  among  these  enterprising  and  active  French 
churches  which,  in  fact,  reproduced  with  modifica¬ 
tions  the  Greek  anthropology  of  the  preceding  cen¬ 
turies.  A  Scythian  monk,  John  Cassian ,  a  pupil 
and  friend  of  Chrysostom,  and  the  founder  and  pres¬ 
ident  of  the  cloister  at  Marseilles,  stood  at  the  head 
of  it.  It  became  a  vigorous  party,  of  which  the 
most  distinguished  members  and  leaders  were  Vin¬ 
cent  of  Levins ,  Faustus  of  Fhegium,  Gennadius , 
and  Arnobius  the  Younger . 

Augustine,  also,  had  his  disciples  and  adherents 

* 

in  these  same  churches  of  Southern  Gaul.  Among: 
them  were  two  influential  theologians,  viz. :  Hilary 
and  Prosper .  These  informed  Augustine  of  the 
controversy  that  was  going  on  in  the  French 
churches,  and  he  endeavored,  as  in  the  instance  of 
the  monks  of  Adrumetum,  to  settle  the  dispute  by 
explanatory  treatises.  He  addressed  to  the  Massi- 
liensians  the  two  tracts :  De  praedestinatione  sanc¬ 
torum. ,  and  De  dono  perseverantiae.  He  meets  the 


104 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


objection  that  the  doctrine  of  predestination  minis¬ 
ters  to  moral  indifference  and  licentiousness,  by 
teaching  that  the  decree  of  election  is  not  a  decree 
to  bestow  eternal  happiness  upon  men  full  of  sin, 
but  that  only  he  can  be  sure  of  his  election  who 
runs  the  Christian  race,  and  endures  to  the  end. 
The  divine  decree  includes  the  means  as  well  as  the 
end,  and  therefore  produces  holiness  in  order  to 
secure  happiness.  Handled  in  this  manner,  the 
doctrine,  Augustine  claims,  is  not  a  dangerous  one 
for  the  common  mind  ;  but  on  the  contrary  affords 
the  only  strong  ground  of  confidence  to  a  helpless 
and  despairing  spirit.  Augustine,  however,  did  not 
succeed  in  convincing  his  opponents,  and  the  con¬ 
troversy  was  afterwards  carried  on  with  some  bit¬ 
terness  between  Prosper  and  Vincent  of  Lerins. 

The  ablest  advocate  of  the  Semi-Pelagian  theory 
was  Faustus  of  Fhegium.  His  treatise  De  gratia 
et  libero  arbitrio  greatly  influenced  the  decisions  of 
the  council  of  Arles,  in  47  5,  and  of  Lyons ,  in  the 
same  year, — both  of  which  councils  sanctioned  Semi- 
Pelagianism.  The  fortunes  of  this  system,  however, 
declined  in  Southern  Gaul,  from  two  causes.  In  the 
first  place,  the  later  defenders  of  Augustinianism, 
particularly  Fulgentius ,  while  holding  the  doctrine 
of  predestination  with  entire  strictness  in  its  relation 
to  holiness,  were  more  reserved  respecting  its  rela¬ 
tions  to  sin, — thus  affording  less  opportunity  for  the 
charge  of  necessitated  evil.  Secondly,  the  personal 
influence  of  some  highly  respected  and  excellent 


SEMI-PELAGIANISM. 


105 


bishops,  such  as  Avitus  of  Vienne ,  and  Caesarius 
of  Arles,  was  thrown  in  favor  of  the  views  of  the 
North- African  Father.  By  these  means,  a  change 
was  effected  in  the  churches  of  Southern  Gaul,  to 
such  an  extent,  that  in  the  year  529,  a  little  more 
than  fifty  years  after  the  councils  of  Arles  and 
Lyons,  they  declared  for  the  Augustinian  anthropol¬ 
ogy,  in  the  two  councils  of  Orange  and  Valence . 
The  following  are  some  of  the  decisions  of  the  coun¬ 
cil  of  Orange,  and  indicate  in  their  condemnatory 
clauses  the  Semi-Pelagian  positions,  particularly  re¬ 
specting  grace  and  free-will.  “If  any  one  assert 
that  by  reason  of  man’s  prayer  the  grace  of  God  is 
conferred,  but  that  it  is  not  grace  itself  which  causes 
that  God  is  prayed  to,  he  contradicts  the  prophet 
Isaiah  (lxi.  1),  and  the  apostle  Paul  (Bom.  x.  20) 
saying  the  same  thing :  ‘ I  was  found  of  them  that 
sought  me  not,  and  have  been  made  manifest  to 
them  that  asked  not  after  me.’  If  any  one  main¬ 
tains  that  God  waits  for  a  willingness  in  us  to  be 
purged  from  sin,  and  does  not  allow  that  the  very 
willingness  to  be  cleansed  from  sin  is  wrought  in  us 
by  the  infusion  and  operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  he 
resists  the  Holy  Ghost  saying  by  Solomon  (Prov. 
viii.  35,  Septuagint  ver.),  ‘  The  will  is  prepared  by 
the  Lord;’  and  by  the  apostle  (Philip,  ii.  13), 
‘It  is  God  which  worketh  in  you,  both  to  will 
and  to  do,  of  his  good  pleasure.’  If  any  man  say, 
that  we  believe,  will,  desire,  endeavor,  labor,  watch, 
study,  ask,  seek,  and  knock,  without  and  previous 


106 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


to  grace,  and  that  grace  is  conferred  by  God  upon 
this  ground,  and  does  not  confess  that  it  is  wrought 
in  us  by  the  infusion  and  operation  of  the  Holy 
Ghost,  that  we  believe,  will,  desire,  endeavor,  and 
do  all  the  above-mentioned  things  as  we  ought,  and 
thus  makes  the  aid  of  grace  to  follow  after  man’s 
humility  or  obedience,  and  does  not  allow  that  it  is 
the  gift  of  grace  itself,  that  we  are  obedient  and 
humble :  he  resists  the  apostle  (1  Cor.  iv.  7  ;  xv. 
10)  saying :  4  What  hast  thou,  that  thou  hast  not 
received,’  and :  c  By  the  grace  of  God  I  am  what  I 
am.’  It  is  God’s  gift  both  when  we  think  aright, 
and  when  we  hold  our  feet  from  falsehood  and  um 
righteousness.  For  as  often  as  we  do  good  things, 
God  worketh  in  us,  and  with  us,  that  we  may  work. 
There  are  many  good  things  done  in  man  which  are 
not  done  by  man  (multa  in  homine  bona  fiunt,  quae 
non  facit  homo).  But  man  doth  no  good  things 
which  God  does  not  cause  man  to  do  (quae  non 
Deus  praestet,  ut  faciat  homo).  In  every  good 
work,  we  do  not  begin,  and  are  helped  afterwards 
by  the  grace  of  God,  but  he  first  of  all,  no  good 
merits  of  ours  going  before,  inspires  into  us  both 
faith  and  love  of  himself,  that  we  may  both  believ- 
ingly  seek  the  sacrament  of  baptism,  and  after  bap¬ 
tism,  by  his  help,  may  fulfil  the  things  that  are 
pleasing  to  him.”1 

Respecting  the  Semi-Pelagian  theory  itself:  It 


Asher’s  Works,  III.  p.  540  sq. 


SEMI-PELAGIAXISM. 


107 


was  intended  by  its  advocates  to  be  a  middle-posi¬ 
tion  between  Augustinianism  and  Pelagianism.  The 
essence  of  the  theory  consists  in  a  mixture  of  grace 
and  free-will.  There  are  two  efficient  agencies  con¬ 
cerned  in  the  renovation  of  the  human  will :  viz., 
the  will  itself  and  the  Holy  Spirit.2  Hence,  the 
product  can  not  be  referred  either  to  one  or  the 
other,  as  the  sole  originating  cause.  Upon  this  co¬ 
existence  of  two  co-efficients  and  their  co-operation, 


2  The  degree  of  power  to  good 
which  the  Semi-Pelagians  assert¬ 
ed  was  certainly  less  than  that 
asserted  by  the  Alexandrine  an¬ 
thropology.  Hilary’s  account  of 
their  synergism  is  as  follows : 
u  They  agree  that  all  men  per¬ 
ished  in  Adam,  and  that  no  man 
can  he  saved  merely  by  his  own 
will.  But  this  they  say  is  agree¬ 
able  to  truth,  that  when  the  op¬ 
portunity  of  obtaining  salvation 
is  announced  to  such  as  are  pros¬ 
trate  and  would  never  rise  again 
by  their  own  strength  (prostratis 
et  nunquam  suis  viribus  surrectu- 
ris,  annunciatur  obtinendae  salutis 
occasio),  they,  by  that  merit 
whereby  they  will  to  be  healed 
of  their  disease  and  believe  that 
they  can  be,  obtain  both  an  in¬ 
crease  of  this  [slender]  faith  it¬ 
self,  and  entire  restoration  in  the 
end  (eo  merito,  quo  voluerint  et 
crediderint  a  suo  morbo  se  posse 
sanari,  et  ipsius  fidei  augmentum, 
et  totius  sanitatis  suae  consequan- 
tur  effectum).”  TIilaeii  Epist. 
ad  Aug.  Augustinus  :  Opera  II. 


p.  825.  In  this  same  letter,  Hi¬ 
lary  represents  the  Semi-Pela¬ 
gians  as  affirming  that,  “  grace  is 
not  denied,  when  such  a  species 
of  voluntariness  is  said  to  go  be¬ 
fore  grace,  as  only  seeks  and  de¬ 
sires  a  physician,  but  is  not  able 
to  do  anything  more  than  this ;  ” 
and  as  “  explaining  the  passage, 
‘  according  as  God  hath  dealt  to 
every  man  the  measure  of  faith,’ 
and  similar  ones  (e.  g.  Rom.  i.  17), 
to  mean,  that  that  man  shall  be 
assisted  who  has  commenced  to 
will ;  but  not  that  this  very  com¬ 
mencement  of  willingness  is  also 
the  effect  of  grace  (ut  adjuvetur  qui 
coeperit  velle ;  non  ut  etiam  do- 
netur,  ut  velit).”  Pkosper  charges 
the  Massiliensians  with  taking  po¬ 
sitions  that  logically,  and  in  their 
tendency,  favor  Pelagianism. 
These  positions  are  the  following : 
1.  The  beginning  of  salvation  is 
placed  in  man ;  2.  The  human 
will  is  honored  more  than  the 
Divine  ;  since  the  sinner  is  help¬ 
ed  because  he  commences  to  will, 
and  does  not  commence  to  will 


108 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


Cassian  lays  great  stress,  as  tlie  distinguishing  and 
essential  position  which  would  retain  the  element 
of  truth  that,  in  his  judgment,  was  in  Augustinian- 
ism  and  in  Pelagianism,  and  would  exclude  the 
errors  into  which,  he  believed,  both  fell.  Hence, 
in  answer  to  the  test  question :  Which  agency  be¬ 
gins  the  work  of  regeneration  ?  Cassian  affirms  that 
sometimes  it  is  the  divine,  and  sometimes  it  is  the 
human.  Sometimes  he  ascribes  the  commencement 
of  good  in  man,  to  man,  and  its  completion  to  God ; 
and  sometimes  he  derives  the  first  desire  after  grace 
itself  from  God.  Sometimes  he  even  ascribes  to  the 
human  spirit  a  compulsion  to  good.  “  Sometimes,” 
he  remarks,  “  we  are  drawn  to  salvation  against  our 
will  (inviti).”1  In  another  place,2  he  asks  :  u  What 
was  that  which  stood  in  the  way  of  Paul,  because 
he  seems  to  have  been  attracted  to  the  way  of  life, 
as  it  were  unwillingly ;  though  afterwards  consum¬ 
mating  and  perfecting  this  initial  compulsion  (ne- 
cessitas),  by  a  voluntary  devotedness.” 

Semi-Pelagianism  was  the  revival  in  the  West¬ 
ern  Church  of  the  Greek  anthropology,  though 
made  somewhat  more  guarded  by  the  discussions 
and  statements  of  the  Pelagian  controversy.  The 
following  recapitulation,  taken  from  Wiggers’  rep- 

because  he  is  helped ;  3.  The  sin-  which  God  himself  has  not  be- 
ner’s  recipiency  towards  holiness  stowed  or  produced, 
is  represented  as  originating  from  1  Cassianus  :  De  institutionibus 
himself,  and  not  from  God ;  4.  coenobitorum,  XII.  xviii. 

It  is  thought  that  God  is  pleased  2  Cassianus  :  Coll.  III.  v. 
with  something  in  the  sinner, 


SEMI-PELAGIAJNTSM. 


109 


resentation,  embraces  the  principal  points  in  the 
system.1  In  his  primitive  state,  man  was  possessed 
of  certain  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral  advan¬ 
tages  which  he  does  not  now  possess.  His  body 
was  immortal ;  he  lay  under  no  earthly  ills  or  bur¬ 
dens,  such  as  the  curse  of  labor,  and  in  the  instance 
of  woman  the  pains  of  child-bearing ;  he  possessed 
remarkable  knowledge  of  nature  and  the  moral  law ; 
and  was  entirely  sinless.  The  sin  of  the  first  pair, 
to  which  they  were  tempted  by  the  devil,  resulted, 
not  only  for  them  but  also  for  their  posterity,  in 
both  physical  and  moral  disadvantages.  The  body 
became  mortal,  and  a  moral  corruption  entered 
which  was  propagated  to  the  posterity,  and  grad¬ 
ually  becomes  greater  and  greater.  Freedom  of 
will,  in  the  sense  of  power  to  good,  is  not  wholly 
lost,  but  it  is  very  much  weakened.  Man  in  his 
present  condition  is  morally  diseased.  The  imputa¬ 
tion  of  original  sin  is  removed  in  baptism,  and  with¬ 
out  baptism  no  one  attains  salvation.  Owing  to 
his  morally  diseased  and  weakened  condition,  man 
needs  the  assistance  of  divine  grace,  in  order  to  the 
practice  of  holiness,  and  the  attainment  of  salvation. 
The  moral  freedom  of  man,  or  his  power  to  good, 
works  in  connection  with  divine  grace.  The  two 
things  are  not  to  be  separated  from  each  other. 
There  is  no  unconditional  decree  of  God,  but  pre¬ 
destination  to  salvation  or  to  perdition  depends 


1  Wiggers  :  Augustinismus :  Th.  II.  357  sq. 


110 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


upon  the  use  which  man  makes  of  the  remainder 
of  his  freedom  to  good.  The  decree  of  election  is 
therefore  a  conditional  one ;  God  determines  to 
bestow  forgiveness  and  assisting  influences  upon 
those  who  he  foresees  will  make  a  beginning. 
And  yet  the  merit  of  his  salvation  man  must  not 
ascribe  to  himself,  but  to  the  grace  of  God,  because 
without  this  grace  man’s  endeavors  would  be  un¬ 
successful. 

Wiggers  compares  the  three  systems  with  each 
other  as  follows:  Augustinianism  asserts  that  man 
is  morally  dead ;  Semi-Pelagianism  maintains  that 
he  is  morally  sick;  Pelagianism  holds  that  he  is 
morally  well. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  ANSELMIC  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


“  Many  things  have  carried  the  appearance  of  contradiction,  and  inconsist¬ 
ency,  to  the  first  view  of  our  straitened  minds,  which  afterwards  we  have,  upon 
repeated  consideration  and  endeavor,  found  room  for,  and  been  able  to  make 
fairly  accord,  and  lodge  together.” — John  Howe. 


§  1.  Anselm's  theory  of  Original  Sin. 

The  Augustinian  theory  of  sin  and  grace,  we 
have  seen,  was  adopted  as  the  anthropology  of  the 

-j 

Western  Church,  at  the  councils  of  Orange  and 
Valence.  But  it  would  be  an  error  to  suppose  that 
the  Western  Church  as  a  body  continued  to  adhere 
strictly  to  the  views  of  the  North- African  father. 
The  more  devout  and  evangelical  minds  in  the  5th 
and  6th  centuries,  like  Leo  and  Gregory ,  and  even 
in  the  8th  and  9th  centuries,  like  Bede  and  Aleuin , 
propagated  the  teachings  of  Augustine  respecting 
the  corruption  of  human  nature,  and  the  agency  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  in  its  regeneration ;  but  were  less 


112 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


distinct  and  bold,  in  their  statements  respecting  the 
preterition  and  reprobation  of  the  lost.  They 
were  content  with  affirming,  in  the  most  unqualified 
manner,  the  doctrine  of  an  enslaved  will,  and  the 
need  of  divine  efficiency  in  order  to  its  renewal  and 
liberation,  and  left  the  darker  and  more  difficult  side 
of  the  doctrine  of  predestination,  without  explana¬ 
tion.  So  far,  therefore,  as  the  practical  part  of  the 
Augustinian  anthropology, — its  relations,  namely, 
to  the  renewal  and  salvation  of  men, — is  concern¬ 
ed,- the  more  distinguished  Fathers  of  the  Western 
Church,  during  the  two  or  three  centuries  succeed¬ 
ing  that  of  Augustine,  were  steady  adherents  to  his 
■ 

opinions.  But  the  general  decline  that  was  advanc¬ 
ing  in  all  the  great  interests  of  the  church  brought 
with  it  a  departure  from  the  high  vantage-ground 
which  had  been  gained  in  the  contest  with  Pelagian- 
ism.  The  middle  theory  of  Semi-P^lagianism,  even 
in  Augustine’s  own  century,  we  have  seen,  found 
some  able  defenders,  and  was  oftentimes  associated 
with  genuine  devotion  and  piety.  Its  less  rigorous 
and  scientific  character,  together  with  its  compara¬ 
tive  silence  upon  the  more  difficult  parts  of  the  doc¬ 
trines  of  original  sin,  predestination,  and  free-will, 
recommended  it  to  a  large  class  of  minds ;  while 
the  element  of  human  efficiency  which  it  introduced 
into  the  doctrine  of  regeneration  was  thought  to 
render  it  a  more  intelligible  and  practical  doctrine. 
It  was  not  strange,  consequently,  that  in  course  of 
time,  the  Latin  Church,  though  holding  the  name 


anselm’s  theory  of  original  sin.  113 


of  Augustine  in  high  respect,  should  have  lapsed 
down  very  generally  upon  the  Greek  anthropology.1 

That  brief  chapter  in  the  doctrinal  history  of 
the  Middle  Ages  which  records  the  attempt  of 
GottschaTk  (f868)  to  revive  the  Augustinian  an¬ 
thropology  evinces  how  alien  this  system  had  at 
length  become  to  the  thinking  and  feeling  of  the 
Papal  Church.  This  serious  and  earnest-minded 
monk  contended  for  a  two-fold  predestination,  in  ac¬ 
cordance  with  the  teachings  of  the  revered  bishop 


of  Hippo.  He  simply  ap 

1  “The  debates  in  the  first  as¬ 
sembly  of  the  Council  of  Trent 
(A.  D.  1546)  between  the  Domin¬ 
icans  who  adhered  to  Aquinas, 
and  the  Franciscans  who  follow¬ 
ed  Scotus,  on  original  sin,  justifi¬ 
cation,  and  grace  .  .  .  show  how 
strongly  the  whole  Western 
Church,  through  all  the  divisions 
into  which  it  has  been  separated, 
has  manifested  the  same  unwill¬ 
ingness  to  avow  the  Augustinian 
system ,  and  the  same  fear  of  con¬ 
tradicting  it .”  Mackintosh  : 
Progress  of  Ethical  Philosophy. 
Note  I.  Petavius  cites  from  the 
earlier  writings  of  Augustine,  to 
prove  that  the  Augustinian  and 
Tridentine  anthropologies  are 
identical,  and  gives  the  following 
definition  of  a  Pelagian :  “  Ille 

vero  Pelagianus  est,  qui  libero 
isti  arbitrio  tantum  arrogat  ut 
sine  adjutorio  Dei  niti  posse  viri- 
bus  suis  ad  Deum  colendum  exis- 
timet,  hoc  est  ad  recte  agendum, 

VOL.  ii. — 8 


Dlied  the  doctrine  of  pre- 

vel  ad  Christianam  inchoandam, 
promovendam,  perficiendamque 
justitiam.”  De  Pelag.  et  Semi- 
Pelag.  haeresi,  Lib.  I.  Cap.  2.  § 
12.  Petavius  maintains  that  the 
theory  of  cooperation  in  regener¬ 
ation  is  the  truth,  and  that  the 
Papal  Church  agrees  with  Augus¬ 
tine  in  holding  it.  Hase  (Hutte- 
rus  Redivivus,  §  85)  remarks  that 
Semi-Pelagianism  maintained  that 
“durch  den  Siindenfall  entstand 
nur  allgemeinen  Neigung  zur 
Siinde,  der  Mensch  ist  krank, 
aber  er  kann  und  soil  neben  der 
gottlichen  Gnade  wirken,  obwohl 
er  nur  durch  diese  zur  vollen 
Heiligung  und  Seligkeit  gelangt. 
Diese  fur  Augustinismus  ausgege- 
hene  Meinung ,  in  der  durch  die 
Scholastiker  gegebenen  Fortbil- 
dung,  wurde  zu  Trient  Kirchen- 
lehre ;  und  auch  die  morgenlan- 
dische  Kirch  e  hat  nie  mit  vollem 
Ernste  in  den  Abgrund  der  Siinde 
geblickt.” 


114 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


destination  to  the  lost  as  well  as  to  the  saved,  being 
careful  at  the  same  time  to  limit  the  divine  efficiency , 
to  the  production  of  holiness.  His  statement  of  the 
doctrine  of  predestination  was  that  of  a  permissive 
decree,  only,  in  respect  to  sin,1  and  yet  it  was  con¬ 
demned  as  heretical  by  a  church  which  had  rejected 
Semi-Pelagianism. 

Upon  passing,  however,  into  the  period  of  Scho¬ 
lasticism,  we  find  one  thinker  who  both  reproduces 
the  Augustinian  anthropology,  and  makes  a  positive 
contribution  towards  the  metaphysical  solution  of 
the  difficult  problems  involved  in  it.  This  thinker 
is  Anselm ,  a  man  who,  in  reference  to  the  doctrine 
of  original  sin,  as  in  reference  to  that  of  the  atone¬ 
ment,  belongs  not  to  the  Papal  but  to  the  Protest- 
tant  Church. 

The  anthropology  of  Anselm  is  stated  in  his  two 
tracts,  De  conceptu  virginali  et  originali  peccato , 
and  De  libero  arbitrio.  A  rapid  analysis  of  a  por¬ 
tion  of  each  of  them,  which  we  derive  from  the  ex- 


1  “  Credo  atque  confiteor,  prae- 
scire  te  ante  secnla  quaecunque 
ernnt  futura  sive  bona  sive  mala, 
praedestinasse  vero  tantummodo 
bona.”  Quoted  by  Neander  : 
III.  475.  The  employment  of 
praescire  in  the  one  instance,  and 
of  praedestinare  in  the  other,  was 
undoubtedly  designed  by  Gott- 
schalk  to  indicate  the  different  re¬ 
lation  which  God  sustains  to  evil 
from  what  he  does  to  good  ;  while, 
yet,  both  are  equally  comprehend¬ 


ed  in  the  divine  plan.  For  had 
Gottschalk  not  been  endeavoring 
to  establish  this  latter  position, 
he  would  not  have  incurred  the 
opposition  of  the  Church.  For 
other  extracts  see  Hagenbach  : 
Dogmengeschichte,  §  103.  Gott- 
schalk’s  Augustinianism  was  de¬ 
fended  by  Ratramnus  and  Remi- 
gius,  and  opposed  by  Hincmar 
and  Erigena.  See  Guericke  : 
History  of  the  Mediaeval  Church, 
§  122. 


anselm’s  theoey  of  okiginal  sin.  115 

cellent  monograph  upon  Anselm,  by  Hasse,  will  be 
sufficient  to  indicate  the  position  of  this  profound 
and  devout  Schoolman,  respecting  the  doctrine  of 
original  sin,  and  the  kindred  doctrine  of  regen¬ 
eration. 

The  phrase  “  original  sin,”  says  Anselm,1  may 
direct  attention,  by  the  use  of  the  word  u  original,” 
either  to  the  origin  of  human  nature,  or  to  the 
origin  of  the  individual  man.  But  so  far  as  the 
origin  of  human  nature  itself  is  concerned,  this  is 
pure  and  holy.  The  phrase  “original  sin,”  there¬ 
fore,  has  no  reference  to  man  as  he  was  originated 
or  created  by  his  Maker.  It  must  refer,  conse¬ 
quently,  only  to  the  origin  of  the  individual  man, 
— either  to  his  nearer,  or  his  more  remote  origin ; 
either  to  his  birth  from  immediate  ancestors,  or  his 
descent  from  the  first  human  pair.2  For  every  man 
possesses  that  universal  quality  which  is  common  to 
all  men,  viz. :  human  nature  ;  and  also  that  peculiar 
quality,  which  distinguishes  him  from  all  other  men, 
viz. :  his  individuality.  Hence,  there  is  a  twa>fold 
sin  to  be  distinguished  in  man  ;  that  sin,  viz. :  which 
he  receives  in  the  reception  of  human  nature  at  the 
very  first  moment  of  his  individual  existence,  and 
that  which  he  afterwards  commits  as  this  or  that 

1  Anselmus  :  De  originali  pec-  creation  and  birth  must  be  care- 

cato,  c.  1.  fully  distinguished  in  order  to  a 

2  Man,  according  to  Anselm  as  correct  apprehension  of  this  an- 
well  as  Augustine,  was  not  ere-  thropology.  Man  was  created 
ated  sinful,  but  he  is  born  sin-  on  the  sixth  day ;  but  men  are 
ful.  The  distinction  between  born  ever y  day. 


116 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


particular  individual.  The  first  may  be  also  de¬ 
nominated  the  sin  of  nature,  peccatum  naturale  ;  yet 
it  does  not  belong  to  the  original  essence  of  human 
nature,  but  is  only  a  condition  or  state  into  which 
that  human  nature  has  come  since  the  creating  act. 
In  the  same  manner,  there  is  an  original  righteous¬ 
ness,  and  an  individual  righteousness.  For  human 
nature  would  have  been  propagated  in  its  original 
con-created  state  or  condition  of  holiness,  had  the 
first  human  pair  kept  their  first  estate.  But  as  they 
did  not,  original  sin,  instead  of  original  righteous¬ 
ness,  has  passed  upon  all  men.  In  this  way,  each 
individual  man  is  now  characterized  by  both  cor¬ 
ruption  and  guilt.  By  corruption,  because  the 
act  of  apostasy  has  vitiated  his  nature,  both 
upon  the  physical  and  the  spiritual  side.  By 
guilt,  because  inasmuch  as  he  was  created  in  a 
righteous  state,  the  obligation  still  lies  upon  him, 
even  in  his  apostasy,  to  have  all  that  he  was  origin¬ 
ally  endowed  with  by  his  Maker,  and  he  is  a  debtor 
to  this  obligation.1  Hence,  the  requirement  rests 
upon  human  nature  as  individualized  in  every  child, 
and  in  every  adult,  to  fulfil  that  original  and  per¬ 
fect  righteousness  which  belonged  to  it  at  creation, 
and  which  it  was  under  no  necessity  of  losing ;  and 

1  Aquinas  (De  Peccato  Origi-  Hence  the  “  blindness  of  the 
nali,  Art.  2)  affirms  that  “there  heart,”  and  the  “  ignorance  ”  spo- 
is  sin,  not  only  when  a  man  has  ken  of  as  belonging  to  the  unre- 
not  what  he  ought  to  possess,  but  generate,  in  Eph.  i.  18,  is  sin  in 
also  when  he  has  that  of  which  the  sense  of  guilt, 
he  ought  not  to  be  possessed.” 

•:N 

'  :'v» 


anselm’s  theory  of  original  sin.  117 


also  to  make  satisfaction  to  justice  for  that  sin  which 
it  was  commanded  not  to  commit.  The  inability 
of  apostate  human  nature,  in  the  child,  or  the  adult, 
to  fulfil  this  perfect  righteousness,  and  atone  for  this 
sin,  does  not  excuse  it,  because  this  inability  is  its 
own  product,  and  because  it  ought  not  to  have  lost 
the  power  with  which  it  was  previously  endowed. 

Thus,  all  sin,  original  as  well  as  actual,  is  un¬ 
righteousness  and  guilt.  But  sin  supposes  the  ex¬ 
istence  of  will.  How  then  can  original  sin  be  im¬ 
puted,  to  the  infant ,  and  why  is  the  infant  baptized 
for  its  remission  ?  Anselm  recurs  to  the  Augus- 
tinian  doctrine  of  the  Adamic  unity  for  his  answer. 
Three  facts,  he  remarks,  must  be  taken  into  account, 
in  endeavoring  to  solve  this  difficult  problem.  First, 
the  fact  that  there  is  a  common  human  nature.1  Sec- 


luThe  realism  of  Anselm,” 
says  Battr  (Dreieinigkeitslehre, 
II.  412),  “  consists  in  his  main¬ 
taining  the  actual  existence  of  a 
universal  that  is  distinguished 
from  the  individual.  He  objects 
to  Roscellin  that  he  does  not  con¬ 
ceive  of  man  except  as  an  indi¬ 
vidual.  ‘  Nondum  intelligit  quo- 
modo  plures  homines  in  specie 
sint  unus  homo, — non  potest  in- 
telligere,  aliquid  esse  hominem, 
nisi  individuum.’  ”  In  Anselm’s 
theory,  the  species  is  an  entity  as 
truly  as  the  individual.  For  him, 
the  universal  has  objective  exist¬ 
ence,  and  is  not  a  mere  name  for 
the  collective  aggregate  of  par¬ 
ticulars.  The  human  “  nature  ” 


is  prior  to  the  individuals  that 
are  produced  from  it,  and  is  as 
substantially  existent  as  they  are. 
For  the  individuals  are  only  the 
nature  distributed  ;  they  are  the 
“species”  metamorphosed  into 
persons.  The  “nature,”  there¬ 
fore,  is  not  the  collective  aggre¬ 
gation  of  individuals ;  for  in  this 
case  the  nature  is  not  an  entity, — 
it  is  only  the  name  given  to  the 
aggregation  of  particular  individ¬ 
uals,  and  the  only  entity  is  the 
individual.  On  the  contrary  (ac¬ 
cording  to  the  theory  of  Realism), 
the  nature  is  a  primary  entity, 
having  real  existence,  which  is 
metamorphosed  by  distribution 
into  a  multitude  of  individual 


118 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


ondly,  there  is  a  particular  individuality.  And, 
thirdly,  the  individual  is  a  production  from  the 
nature.  As  merely  possessing  the  common  human 
nature,  the  infant  participates  in  no  sin,  guilt,  or 
condemnation.  For  abstract  human  nature  is  the 
pure  creation  of  God.  If  the  mere  fact  of  being 
human  were  sufficient  to  constitute  an  individual 
man  a  sinner,  then  Adam  himself  would  have  been 
a  sinner  before  his  act  of  apostasy.  Neither  is  the 
second  characteristic,  viz. :  that  the  infant  possesses 
individuality,  sufficient  to  account  for  his  birth-sin  ; 
for  this  equally  with  the  generic  nature  is  a  crea¬ 
tion  of  God.  The  third  fact,  consequently,  alone 
remains  by  which  to  explain  the  sin  and  guilt  that 
belong  to  every  man  at  birth :  the  fact,  viz. :  that 
the  individual  is  produced  out  of  the  nature,  and 
the  nature  has  apostatized  subsequent  to  its  creation. 
Adam  differed  from  all  other  human  individuals  by 
containing  within  his  person  the  entire  human  na¬ 
ture  out  of  which  the  millions  of  generations  were 
to  be  propagated,  and  of  which  they  are  individual¬ 
ized  portions.  He  was  to  transmit  this  human  na¬ 
ture  which  was  all  in  himself,  exactly  as  it  had  been 
created  in  him ;  for  propagation  makes  no  radical 
changes,  but  simply  transmits  what  is  given  in  the 
nature,  be  it  good  or  bad.  If  therefore  he  had  not 

apostatized,  human  nature  would  not  have  aposta- 

* 

persons.  Compare  Banr’s  re-  a  substance  or  reality,  in  his 
marks  upon  Anselm’s  universal  Dreieinigkeitslehre,  II.  411  sq. 
not  being  a  mere  conception,  but 


anselm’s  theoey  of  oeiginal  sin. 


119 


tized,  and  would  have  been  procreated,  or  individu¬ 
alized  from  generation  to  generation  in  the  same 
holy  and  perfect  condition  in  which  it  came  from 
the  hand  of  God.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  first 
father,  by  an  act  of  apostasy,  should  introduce  a 
total  moral  change  into  the  human  nature  that  was 
included  in  him,  then  the  same  law  of  propagation 
must  operate,  and  the  individuals  produced  out  of  it 
must  be  characterized  by  a  sinful  state  and  condi¬ 
tion.  Hence  Anselm  speaks  of  a  necessity  of  being 
sinful  which  now,  since  the  apostasy,  overhangs 
the  individual ,  though  it  did  not  overhang  the  na¬ 
ture.  The  nature  in  Adam  was  under  no  compul¬ 
sion  to  apostatize.  There  is  no  original  and  created 
necessity  for  sin.  But  if  human  nature  in  Adam 
does  by  a  free  act  lose  its  original  righteousness, 
then  the  individual,  inasmuch  as  he  is  produced  out 
of  the  nature,  cannot  possibly  escape  depravity. 
The  greater  inevitably  includes  the  less;  and  no 
individual  can  be  sinless  in  case  the  nature  out  of 
which  he  is  produced,  and  of  which  he  is  a  portion, 
has  lapsed  into  sin.  Since  apostasy,  it  is  impossible 
that  any  child  of  Adam  should  be  born  sinless ;  and 
in  this  sense,  and  with  this  explanation,  Anselm 
asserts  a  necessity  of  sin  in  reference  to  the  individ¬ 
ual, — not  a  necessity  founded  in  creation,  but  in 
the  unavoidable  relation  which  an  individual  sus¬ 
tains  to  his  race.  Descent ,  then,  or  the propagation 
of  an  apostate  nature ,  is  the  fact  by  which  Anselm 
would  account  for  the  existence  of  sin  in  every  indi- 


120 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


vidual  mail  at  birth.  And  he  holds  that  the  mirac¬ 
ulous  and  anomalous  birth  of  Christ,  by  which  he 
was  kept  out  of  the  line  of  ordinary  human  genera¬ 
tion,  indicates  that  sin  now  unavoidably  flows  down 
within  that  line. 

In  endeavoring  to  impart  a  notion  of  the  precise 
relation  of  that  which  is  individual  to  that  which  is 
generic ?,  Anselm  theorizes  in  the  vein  of  Augustine. 
That  the  posterity  have  sinned  in  and  with  the 
progenitor,  supposes  an  original  existence  in  him. 
Nonentity  cannot  sin.  The  first  forefather  semi- 
nally  contained  his  posterity.1  Their  essence,  both 
on  the  spiritual  and  the  physical  side,  was  part  and 
particle  with  his ;  their  nature  was  consubstantial 
(, ojuoovaiog )  with  his.  But  this  one  common  na¬ 
ture  or  essence  is  not  yet  individualized.  The  pos- 


1  Adam  differed  from  every  one 
of  his  posterity,  in  that  his  per¬ 
son  included  the  whole  human 
“nature”  or  species.  Of  no  oth¬ 
er  human  person  is  this  true. 
The  moment  that  he  was  created 
a  solitary  individual,  the  nature 
was  all  in  him,  undistributed,  and 
unindividualized.  When  Eve,  the 
second  individual,  was  formed, 
she  was  not  created  de  nihilo, 
but  made  out  of  his  substance, — 
“bone  of  his  bone,  and  flesh  of 
his  flesh.”  The  human  “  nature  ” 
then  became  included  in  two  in¬ 
dividuals,  the  first  human  pair, — 
the  masculine  side  of  the  nature  be¬ 
ing  in  Adam,  and  the  feminine  side 


in  Eve.  Eve,  seduced  by  Satan, 
tempted  Adam  to  disobedience, 
and  in  their  joint  act  of  transgres¬ 
sion  the  entire  human  “  nature  ” 
or  species  transgressed  and  aposta¬ 
tized.  In  the  birth  of  Cain  there 
was  an  individualization  of  a  por¬ 
tion,  only,  of  this  (now)  corrupt¬ 
ed  nature.  Cain,  it  is  evident, 
did  not,  like  Adam  at  the  instant 
of  creation,  include  the  whole 
humanity  in  himself.  He  did  not 
include  Adam  and  Eve,  neither 
did  he  include  the  other  children 
of  Adam  and  Eve,  and  the  mil¬ 
lions  of  individuals  who  sprang 
from  them. 


anselm’s  theory  of  original  sin.  121 


terity  do  not  exist  in  the  progenitor  as  so  many 
distinct  persons.  Hence  a  distinction  must  be 
made  between  the  sin  which  the  nature  in  Adam 
originates,  and  the  sin  which  the  individual  after 
Adam  commits;  or,  in  the  technical  phrase,  be¬ 
tween  “  original  ”  and  u  actual  ”  sin.  In  the  case  of 
Adam,  an  individual  transgression  resulted  in  a  sin 
of  nature ;  while  in  the  case  of  his  posterity,  a  sin 
of  nature  results  in  individual  transgressions.  Adam 
by  a  single  distinct  transgression  introduced  a  cor¬ 
ruption  into  that  entire  human  nature  which  was 
in,  and  one  with,  himself.  Here,  the  individual 
vitiates  the  generic,  because  the  generic  is  included 
in  the  individual.  Adam’s  posterity,  as  so  many 
distinct  individualizations  of  this  vitiated  human 
nature,  act  out  this  corruption,  each  in  his  day  and 
generation.  Here  the  generic  vitiates  the  individual.1 


1  Aquinas  (Summa,  Pt.  II.  Q. 
81,  Art.  1)  states  the  relation  of 
the  individual  to  the  generic 
transgression  as  follows  :  “  All 
men,  who  are  horn  from  Adam, 
can  be  regarded  as  one  man  ;  just 
as  all  who  are  members  of  the 
same  civil  community,  may  he 
regarded  as  one  body,  and  the 
whole  community  as  one  man. 
Thus  all  men  who  spring  from 
Adam  are  like  members  of  one 
material  body.  But  the  act  of 
any  particular  member  of  the  hu¬ 
man  body,  say  the  hand,  ismot  a 
voluntary  act  by  reason  of  a  vol¬ 
untariness  that  is  in  the  hand  it¬ 
self,  hut  by  reason  of  the  volun¬ 


tariness  of  the  soul  which  moves 
the  hand.  In  like  manner,  the 
actual,  that  is  the  individual, 
transgression  which  is  committed 
by  some  particular  member  of 
the  body,  is  not  the  sin  of  that 
member,  except  so  far  as  that 
member  is  a  part  of  the  total 
man  himself,  and  for  this  reason 
is  called  a  human  sin  ;  and  in  like 
manner  original  sin  is  the  sin  of 
the  individual  only  so  far  as  the 
individual  receives  a  sinful  nature 
or  disposition  from  the  first  par¬ 
ent,  and  hence  it  is  denominated 
the  sin  of  nature  (peccatum  na¬ 
turae).” 


122 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


In  the  instance  of  the  progenitor,  the  “  actual  ”  sin, 
or  the  sin  of  a  single  act,  originates  the  u  original  ” 
sin,  or  the  sin  of  nature  and  disposition.  In  the  in¬ 
stance  of  the  posterity,  the  u  original  ”  sin,  or  the 
sin  of  the  nature,  originates  the  sin  of  single  acts,  or 
“  actual  ”  transgressions.  In  the  first  instance,  the 
individual  corrupts  the  nature  ;  in  the  last  instance, 
the  nature  corrupts  the  individual. 

Anselm  next  raises  the  question,  whether  the  sins 
of  the  immediate  ancestors  are  imputed  to  the  pos¬ 
terity,  as  well  as  the  sin  of  the  first  father.  This 
question  he  answers  in  the  negative ;  because  the 
individual  sins,  be  they  of  immediate  or  of  remote 
ancestors,  are  not  committed  by  the  common  nature 
in  Adam.  The  entire  nature,  at  the  moment  of  the 
temptation  and  apostasy,  was  in  two  persons.  All 
mankind  fell  in  the  first  human  pair,  who  are  con¬ 
jointly  denominated  Adam, — “  God  created  man  in 
his  own  image,  in  the  image  of  God  created  he  him  ; 
male  and  female  created  he  them  ”  (Gen.  i.  27). 
The  first  act  of  transgression  was  unique.  There 
was  never  a  second  like  it.  The  sins  of  Cain,  or 
Abel,  or  of  any  other  individual,  were  not  the 
transgressions  of  an  individual  who  included  within 
himself  the  entire  humanity.  Even  the  individual 
transgressions  of  Adam,  subsequent  to  the  first  act 
of  apostasy,  were  only  manifestations  in  his  particu¬ 
lar  person  of  the  generic  sin,  and  sustained  the  same 
relation  to  it  that  the  transgressions  of  any  other 
individual  do.  There  is,  therefore,  no  imputation 


anselm’s  theory  of  original  sin. 


123 


of  the  strictly  individual  sins  of  Adam  to  his  pos¬ 
terity.  That  only  is  imputed  to  all  men  which  all 
men  have  committed ;  and  the  only  sin  which  all 
men  have  committed  is  that  one  sin  which  they 
committed  when  they  were  all,  “ ille  unus  homo” 
one  human  nature,  in  the  first  human  pair. 

Thus,  in  Anselm’s  anthropology,  as  in  Augus¬ 
tine’s,  everything  starts  from  the  original  unity  of 
the  human  race .  If  this  idea  is  not  conceded,  the 
whole  doctrine  of  original  and  transmitted  sin,  as 
Anselm  constructs  it,  falls  to  the  ground.  Original 
sin  is  original  agency ;  but  original  agency  supposes 
an  original  agent;  and  this  original  agent  is  the 
whole  human  nature  undistributed  and  unindividu- 
aiized,  in  distinction  from  this  or  that  individualized 
part  of  it.  Original  sin,  coming  into  existence  by 
the  single  primitive  act  of  apostasy,  is  then  trans¬ 
mitted  along  with  the  nature,  from  generation  to 
generation, — the  generation  being  so  many  indi¬ 
vidualizations  of  the  common  humanity.  The  first 
pair  of  individuals  are  created,  and  contain  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  the  entire  race,  both  upon  the  spiritual 
and  the  physical  side.  All  the  posterity,  as  indi¬ 
vidualizations,  are  propagated,  not  created.  Herein 
consists  the  possibility  of  a  transmission  of  sin  from 
the  first  human  pair,  to  the  whole  posterity,  and 
also  of  a  transmission  of  holiness.  For  had  there 
been  no  apostasy,  or  change  in  the  moral  character 
of  human  nature,  as  it  existed  in  Adam,  the  propa¬ 
gation  of  human  nature  would  have  simply  trans- 


124 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


mitted  holiness, — that  original  righteousness  with 
which  man  was  endowed  by  the  creative  act.  For 
Anselm  did  not  hold  the  doctrine  of  the  later 
Schoolmen,  that  the  primitive  man  was  only  nega¬ 
tively  holy, — that  is,  created  in  puris  naturalibus , 
without  either  holiness  or  sin.  Hence,  if  human 
nature  in  the  person  of  Adam  had  remained  as  it 
was  created,  it  would  of  course  have  been  propa¬ 
gated  as  it  had  remained.  Original  righteousness 
instead  of  original  sin  would  have  been  the  inherit¬ 
ed  and  native  character  of  the  posterity.  For  prop¬ 
agation  makes  no  changes  in  the  type  or  kind. 
Propagation  does  not  originate  either  sin  or  holi¬ 
ness,  but  simply  transmits  it.  Had  holiness,  conse¬ 
quently,  continued  to  be  the  intrinsic  quality  of 
human  nature  as  generically  in  Adam,  it  would 
have  continued  to  be  that  of  all  the  individualiza¬ 
tions  of  that  nature.  But  the  original  righteousness 
with  which  mankind  in  the  person  of  Adam  was 
endowed,  was  only  a  relative  perfection.  It  was 
positive  holiness,  and  not  the  mere  negative  destitu¬ 
tion  of  any  character  either  good  or  evil ;  yet  it  was 
not  that  immutable  and  absolute  perfection  which 
belongs  to  God  and  the  angels  who  have  kept  their 
first  estate.  The  power  of  a  contrary  choice,  or  the 
possibility  of  apostasy,  was  attached  to  it,  for  pur¬ 
poses  of  probation  merely,  and  not  to  complete 
moral  freedom.  Thus,  along  with  the  possibility  of 
the  transmission  of  original  holiness  to  all  the  pos¬ 
terity,  there  was  also  established  the  possibility  of 


anselm’s  theory  of  original  sin.  125 

the  transmission  of  original  sin  ;  and  which  of  these 
it  should  be,  was  left  by  the  Creator  to  depend  upon 
the  decision  of  the  human  race  itself  in  the  person 
of  its  progenitor.  Hence  the  uncommon  and  strange 
influence  which  the  first  parents  exert  upon  the 
whole  future  of  the  posterity.  A  sinful  character 
having  been  determined  by  a  voluntary  act  for  the 
entire  race  in  the  persons  of  the  first  human  pair, 
nothing  but  the  instantaneous  intervention  of  God, 
by  a  renewing  act,  could  have  prevented  the  trans¬ 
mission  of  the  sin  thus  originated.  For  propagation 
inevitably  conveys  human  nature  precisely  as  it  finds 
it,  and  hence  if  human  nature  has,  within  itself  and 
by  its  own  act,  substituted  original  sin  for  original 
righteousness,  the  fact  must  appear  in  every  individ¬ 
ual  instance.  Thus  the  individual  is  born  in  sin, 
because  he  is  born  an  individual ;  but  he  was  not 
created  in  sin,  because  he  was  created  in  Adam  who 
was  created  holy. 

Another  fact  urged  by  Anselm  is,  that  in  the 
progenitors  the  guilt  of  the  nature ,  or  of  original 
sin ,  rests  upon  the  guilt  of  the  individual ,  but  in 
the  posterity  the  guilt  of  the  individual  rests  upon 
the  guilt  of  the  nature.  The  guilt,  in  both  in¬ 
stances,  results  from  the  loss  of  that  primitive  holi¬ 
ness  with  which  mankind  was  endowed  by  the 
Creator.  But  in  the  instance  of  the  first  pair,  this 
loss  and  lack  of  original  righteousness  is  the  conse¬ 
quence  of  an  individual  act,  while  in  the  posterity 
it  is  the  consequence  of  a  generic  act.  Adam  was 


126 


HIST0EY  OF  ANTHEOPOLOGY. 


an  individual  that  included  the  species.  By  an  act 
of  his  will,  as  an  individual  thus  inclusive  of  hu¬ 
manity  he  vitiated  human  nature.  But  the  pos¬ 
terity  of  Adam  are  none  of  them  individuals  inclu¬ 
sive  of  the  species.  They  are  purely  and  simply 
individuals.  As  such  they  cannot  perform  a  gener¬ 
ic  act.  Hence,  in  the  individual  determinations  of 
their  will,  they  merely  manifest,  but  do  not  origin - 
ate  the  generic  sin.  In  the  instance  of  the  progen¬ 
itor,  the  individual  corrupts  the  nature,  because  the 
individual  includes  the  nature  ;  but  in  the  instance 
of  the  posterity,  the  nature  corrupts  the  individual, 
because  the  individual  does  not  include  the  nature 
but  receives  it.  The  first  act  of  the  individual,  in 
the  instance  of  the  posterity,  must  consequently  be 
a  sinful  act,  from  the  nature  of  the  case ;  because 
original  sin,  or  the  sin  of  nature,  has  already  been 
brought  into  existence,  and  now  lies  as  the  poten¬ 
tial  basis  of  the  individual  life  ;  and  from  such  a 

t  ' 

source  as  this,  nothing  but  sin  can  issue.  The  origin 
of  this  original  sin  must  not  be  sought  for  within 
the  sphere  of  the  individual  life  and  experience,  but 
in  the  primary  unity  of  the  race  in  the  person  of 
Adam.  At  this  point,  mankind  were  free  to  stand 
or  fall,  and  were  endowed  with  plenary  power  to 
do  either.  But  when  the  election  has  been  made, 
and  the  apostasy  of  the  entire  race  is  a  foregone 
conclusion,  an  accomplished  fact,  nothing  but  sin 
can  appear  in  the  individual  life,  except  there  be 
an  act  of  divine  interference  immediately  succeeding 


anselm’s  idea  of  the  will.  127 

the  act  of  apostasy,  to  prevent.  The  Creator  puts 
forth  no  such  act,  and  hence  the  transmission  of 
original  sin  proceeds  parallel  with  the  individualiza¬ 
tion  of  that  common  humanity  that  was  created  in 
Adam. 

§  2.  AnselwHs  idea  of  the  will ,  and  freedom. 

The  anthropology  of  Anselm  would  be  incom¬ 
pletely  represented,  if  we  failed  to  exhibit  his  views 
respecting  the  nature  of  freedom  and  the  human 
will .  These  are  contained  in  his  Dialogue  De  liber o 
arbitriOj  from  which  we  derive  the  following  partic¬ 
ulars.1 

The  pupil,  with  whom  the  dialogue  is  held, 
brings  forward  the  popular  definition  of  freedom, 
as  the  power  of  sinning  and  of  not  sinning, — potes- 

tas  peccandi  et  non  peccandi ,  or  the  possibilitas  utri- 

usque  partis.  This  definition  Anselm  asserts  to  be 

altogether  inadequate.  For  it  does  not  hold  good 

*  _ 

when  applied  to  God  and  the  holy  angels.  These 

possess  moral  freedom,  and  yet  are  destitute  of  the 

power  to  sin.  If,  therefore,  there  is  a  species  of 

freedom  from  which  the  power  to  sin  is  absolutely 

excluded,  then  this  power  is  not  a  necessary  or 

essential  element  in  the  idea  of  moral  freedom. 

That  this  is  so,  says  Anselm,  is  evident  from  the 

nature  of  the  case.  For  he  who  possesses  that 


1  Hasse  :  Anselm  von  Canterbury,  II.  364  sq. 


128 


HISTOEY  OF  ANTHKOPOLOGY. 


which  is  right  and  excellent,  in  such  a  manner  that 
he  cannot  lose  it,  is  freer  than  he  is  who  can  lose  it, 
and  exchange  it  for  that  which  is  shameful  and  evil. 
Therefore  that  will  which,  of  itself,  and  without  ex¬ 
ternal  compulsion,  is  so  strongly  determined  to  the 
right  as  to  be  unable  to  desert  the  path  of  recti¬ 
tude,  is  freer  than  that  will  which  is  so  feebly  deter¬ 
mined  to  the  right  as  to  be  able  to  do  this.  Hence 
the  power  to  sin,  if  attached  to  a  will,  diminishes 
its  liberty,  but  if  subtracted  from  it  increases  it. 
Hence  it  is  neither  liberty  itself,  nor  a  part  of 
liberty.  But,  objects  the  pupil,  if  the  possibility 
of  sinning  does  not  belong  to  the  essence  of  free¬ 
dom,  can  we  call  that  act  by  which  the  evil  angels 
and  our  first  parents  apostatized  a  free  act?  Was 
it  not,  rather,  an  act  of  necessity  ?  For  there  is  no 
medium  between  a  free  and  a  necessary  act.  And 
if,  according  to  onr  Lord’s  saying,  “  Whosoever  com- 
mitteth  sin  is  the  servant  of  sin,”  can  we  properly 
call  such  an  one  free  ?  In  other  words,  is  not  sin  a 
compulsion ,  if  the  power  to  sin  is  no  part  of  free¬ 
dom  ?  To  this  Anselm  replies,  that  the  evil  angels 
and  the  first  human  pair  certainly  sinned  without 
being  forced  to  do  so  ;  and  in  this  sense  they  were 
free  in  the  act  of  apostasy.  It  was  unquestionably 
an  act  of  spontaneity,  and  of  pure  untrammeled  self- 
will  ; 1  though  not  an  act  of  genuine  freedom.  For 

1  li  Sin  is  an  act  so  free,  that  if  we  shall 
Say  ’tis  not  free,  ’tis  no  sin  at  all.” 

Herrick  :  Noble  Numbers. 


129 


anselm’s  idea  of  the  will. 

they  sinned  not  because  of  their  freedom, — for  their 
freedom  consisted  in  their  holiness,  and  their  power 
not  to  sin, — but  in  spite  of  their  freedom.  They 
apostatized  not  by  virtue  of  their  power  to  be  holy, 
which  constitutes  the  positive  substance  of  moral 
freedom,  but  by  virtue  of  the  possibilitas  peccandi , 
which  was  merely  a  negative  accident  attached  to 
the  positive  substance  of  moral  freedom,  for  pur¬ 
poses  of  probation.  This  negation,  this  power  to 

A 

do  otherwise  than  they  were  already  doing,  did  not 
add  anything  to  their  freedom,  because  they  were 
voluntarily  holy  without  it.  Neither  did  it  bring 
them  under  necessity,  or  force  them  to  the  act  of 
sin.  Nay,  they  were  commanded  not  to  use  it. 
“  Hence,”  says  Anselm  to  his  pupil,  “  you  draw  a 
wrong  inference,  when  you  infer  that  because  the 
power  to  sin  is  not  an  essential  part  of  moral  free¬ 
dom,  therefore  the  apostate  angels  and  man  were 
necessitated  in  the  act  of  sin.  For  to  sin  was  merely 
a  possibility,  but  not  a  necessity.  A  rich  man  can¬ 
not  be  denominated  poor,  merely  because  he  has  the 
power  to  give  away  all  his  property ;  neither  can 
the  apostate  angels  and  man  be  regarded  as  neces¬ 
sitated,  merely  because  they  were  endowed  with 
the  power  of  losing  their  true  freedom, — that  is, 
their  holy  disposition  and  determination.”  “Very 
well,”  replies  the  pupil,  “  before  the  fall  man  was 
voluntary,  but  is  he  after  it  ?  ”  u  Yes  after  it  also,” 
answers  Anselm.  “  For  although  he  has  made 

himself  the  servant  of  sin,  yet  he  has  not  thereby 
yol.  n. — 9 


130 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


destroyed  the  voluntary  faculty  itself.  His  will 
still  exists,  and  his  sin  is  the  unforced  action  of  his 
will ;  but  sinful  activity  excludes  holy  activity  from 
the  nature  of  the  case.  Self-motion  in  the  direction 
of  sin  is  incompatible  with  self-motion  in  the  direc¬ 
tion  of  holiness.  At  this  point,  Anselm  enters  upon 
an  elaborate  investigation  of  the  nature  and  true 
destination  of  the  will,  in  order  to  show  yet  more 
clearly  how  the  apostate  will  may  be  both  guilty 
in  reference  to  sin,  and  impotent  in  reference  to 
holiness. 

The  true  end  and  destination  of  the  will  is  not 
to  choose  either  good  or  evil,  but  to  choose  good.1 
The  voluntary  faculty  was  intended  by  its  Creator 
to  will  the  right,  and  nothing  else.  Its  true  free¬ 
dom,  consequently,  consists  in  its  self-determination 
to  holiness  ;  in  its  acceptance  of  the  one  single  right¬ 
eous  end  which  the  Creator  has  prescribed  to  it. 
The  notion  that  freedom  is  caprice ,  that  the  will  is 
created  with  the  liberty  of  indifference,  and  that  the 
choice  of  either  right  or  wrong  is  granted  to  it  by 
the  Creator,  Anselm  rejects.  By  creation,  the  will 
has  no  option  of  choosing  either  of  two  contrary 
objects,  but  is  shut  up  to  the  choice  of  but  one, 
namely,  holiness.  But  its  acceptance  of  this  one 
object  must  be  uncompelled.  It  must  be  a  self- 
determination,  and  not  a  compulsion  from  without. 
If  it  chooses  holiness  proprio  motu ,  by  its  own  in- 

1  “I  have  set  before  you  life  and  death  .  .  . 

Deut.  xxx.  19. 


therefore  choose  life.” 


131 


anselm’s  idea  of  the  will. 


ward  self-activity,  then  it  exercises  true  and  rational 
freedom,  and  the  power  to  choose  an  entirely  con¬ 
trary  object  like  sin  would  not  add  anything  to  this 
freedom,  because,  by  the  terms  of  the  statement, 
there  is  already  a  self-election  of  the  one  true  and 
proper  object.1  On  the  contrary,  the  power  to 
choose  the  wrong,  when  given  for  purposes  of  pro¬ 
bation,  subtracts  from  the  perfection  of  voluntary 
freedom,  because  it  exposes  it  to  the  hazards  of  an 
illegitimate  choice.  The  human  will,  according  to 
Anselm,  was  created  in  possession  of  true  and 
rational  freedom.  It  was  made  with  a  determina¬ 
tion  to  the  one  sole  proper  object,  with  an  inclina¬ 
tion  to  holiness,  with  a  choice  of  the  right.  It  was 


1  An  objection  presents  itself, 
here,  that  if  the  freedom  of  the 
will  consists  merely  in  the  fact 
that  it  is  seZ/'-moved,  and  not  at 
all  in  the  existence  of  a  power  to 
move  contrarily  to  what  it  does, 
then  must  we  not  ascribe  freedom 
to  the  animal  and  the  plant  ?  For 
the  animal  follows  its  impulses 
with  perfect  spontaneousness,  and 
reaches  its  true  end  and  destina¬ 
tion  in  every  instance.  But,  the 
animal  does  not  reach  the  end  of 
its  creation  by  a  real  s^Z/’-decision. 
It  reaches  it  by  the  operation 
within  it  of  a  law  of  nature,  un¬ 
der  which  it  is  created.  The  in¬ 
stincts  and  appetences  which  it 
obeys  are  merely  the  workings 
of  an  impersonal  principle  of  ani¬ 
mal  life.  There  is  no  true  self. 
The  agency  of  a  brute,  like  the 


process  of  growth  in  a  plant,  is 
merely  one  mode  in  which  the 
great  law  of  life  operates.  The 
water  falls  over  a  dam  by  virtue 
of  the  law  of  gravitation ;  which 

law  is  not  the  water,  or  any  ru- 

• 

dimental  part  of  it.  Hence  there 
is  no  sgZ/’-motion  in  a  water-fall, 
because  the  moving  force  is  grav¬ 
ity,  and  not  water.  In  like  man¬ 
ner,  an  animal  performs  all  its 
various  functions  and  acts  bv  vir- 
tue  of  the  law  of  vitality  and  in¬ 
stinct;  so  that  it  is  the  law  and 
not  the  animal  that  is  the  real  de¬ 
terminant  in  the  case.  But  in 
the  instance  of  man,  the  rational 
ego,  it  is  the  idill  itself,  and  not  a 
force  or  a  law  other  than  the 
will,  and  using  the  will  as  its 
mere  instrument,  which  is  the  de¬ 
terminer. 


132 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


not  created  characterless,  and  left  to  form  a  charac¬ 
ter  subsequently.  Man  was  u  made  upright,”  in  the 
possession  of  positive  rectitude,  of  which  he  was  not 
himself  the  ultimate  and  therefore  adorable  author, 
but  only  the  receptive  and  willing  subject.1  Hence, 
with  respect  to  holiness,  though  there  was  freedom, 
self-decision,  and  the  entire  absence  of  compulsion, 
on  the  part  of  the  will  of  the  unfallen  Adam,  there 
was  yet  no  absolute  merit.  The  Creator  was  the 
primal  author  of  man’s  concreated  holiness,  and  con¬ 
sequently  man’s  desert  could  only  be  of  a  secondary 
and  relative  species.  Accordingly,  the  chief  duty 
of  the  unfallen  Adam  was  to  keep  what  had  been 
given  to  him  by  the  creative  act, — not  to  originate 
holiness,  but  to  retain  holiness.  He  was  simply  to 
maintain  that  set  and  bias  of  his  will  towards  God 
and  goodness  with  which  he  had  been  endowed  by 
his  Maker.  He  was  not,  from  an  undetermined,  in¬ 
different,  and  characterless  state  of  his  voluntary 


1  Anselm  has  left  a  treatise  en¬ 
titled  De  casu  diaboli ,  in  which 
he  discusses  the  origin  of  evil  in 
its  most  absolute  and  metaphys¬ 
ical  aspects  with  a  subtlety  and 
depth  that  are  wonderful.  In 
this  tract,  he  argues  (c.  12)  that 
no  rational  creature  can  put  forth 
its  first  act  of  will  of  and  by  it¬ 
self  alone.  Before  the  first  voli¬ 
tion,  the  creature,  if  we  can  so 
conceive  of  him,  is  involuntary. 
But  no  being  that  is  in  an  invol¬ 
untary  condition  can  by  its  own 
isolated  power  start  out  a  volition 


or  originate  voluntariness  (nihil 
potest  per  se  velle,  qui  nihil  vult). 
The  first  volition  in  a  creature 
must  therefore  be  referred  to  the 
Creator,  and  must  therefore  be  a 
holy  volition.  From  this,  Anselm 
deduces  the  further  position,  that 
the  will  which  has  deserted  right¬ 
eousness  can  never  of  itself  alone 
recover  it.  If  the  will  cannot 
originate  holiness  at  the  begin¬ 
ning  of  its  existence,  still  less  can 
it  originate  it,  when  after  its 
apostasy  it  is  pre-occupied  with 
holiness.  (De  casu  diaboli,  c.  19.) 


anselm’s  idea  of  the  will. 


133 


faculty,  to  originate  holiness  de  nihilo ;  but  was 
merely  to  stay  where  he  was  put,  to  continue  just 
as  he  was  made.  His  true  freedom  consisted  in  the 
unforced  determination  of  his  will  to  holiness,  and 
of  course  the  perpetuity  of  his  freedom  depended 
simply  and  solely  upon  his  perseverance  in  this. 
And  neither  temptation,  nor  external  compulsion, 
can  force  the  human  will  out  of  its  holy  state  and 
determination.  If  it  leaves  rectitude,  it  does  so  of 
its  own  volition.  Man  cannot  sin  against  his  will. 
So  long  as  his  will  perseveres  in  its  right  decision 
and  determination,  there  is  no  power  that  can  force 
it  in  any  other  direction,  and  there  is  nothing  that 
can  force  it  to  continue  in  its  holiness ;  for  the  effi¬ 
ciency  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  not  a  compulsory  force. 
If  it  is  holy,  it  is  so  by  self-decision.  If  it  is  sinful, 
it  is  so  by  self-decision.  And  it  is  this  ^//-activity, 
in  each  instance,  which  constitutes  the  substance  of 
voluntariness.  When,  therefore,  a  holy  will  is  ex¬ 
posed  to  temptation,  as  Adam’s  was  in  the  garden, 
it  is  at  perfect  liberty,  and  possesses  plenary  power, 
to  persist  in  its  existing  holiness,  in  which  case  it 
resists  the  temptation,  or  to  desert  its  existing  holi¬ 
ness  and  take  a  contrary  choice.  In  both  courses 
alike,  it  is  voluntary ,  though  not  truly  free  in  both, 
according  to  Anselm.  If  it  persists  in  holiness,  it  is 
both  voluntary  and  free.  If  it  deserts  its  holiness, 
it  is  voluntary  but  not  free,  because  freedom  is  the 
choice  of  the  right  object,  and  not  of  the  wrong  one. 

The  pupil,  at  this  point,  alludes  to  the  very 


134 


HISTOEY  OF  AXTIIEOPOLOGY. 


great  power  which  temptation  lias  over  man’s  will, 
and  tlie  great  difficulty  which  it  finds  in  resisting 
temptation,  and  suggests  whether  the  will  is  not, 
after  all,  under  a  necessity  of  sinning.  Anselm  in 
answer  replies,  that  it  certainly  cannot  be  a  created 
and  excusable  necessity ;  because  a  holy  will,  such 
as  Adam’s  was  by  creation,  certainly  had  plenary 
power  to  continue  in  holiness,  and  therefore  if  it 
yields  to  temptation,  and  becomes  sinful,  it  must  be 
by  its  own  pure  and  mere  self-decision.  But  that 
by  the  exercise  of  this  pure  and  mere  self-will  it 
does  bring  itself  under  a  species  of  necessity,  under 
a  moral  and  guilty  necessity  of  sinning,  Anselm  does 
not  deny.  And  to  make  this  plain,  he  distinguishes 
between  the  faculty  of  the  will  and  the  act  of  the 
will,— the  two  things  being  frequently  confounded. 
As  the  term  “  vision  ”  is  sometimes  employed  to  de¬ 
note  the  organ  of  vision  and  sometimes  the  act  of 
vision,  sometimes  the  eye  and  sometimes  the  eye¬ 
sight,  so  also  the  term  u  will  ”  sometimes  means  a 
particular  faculty  of  the  human  soul, — as  when  the 
soul  is  divided  into  understanding  and  will, — and 
sometimes  it  means  the  exercise  of  this  faculty. 
The  former  is  the  instrument  itself;  the  latter  is 
the  use  which  is  made  of  the  instrument.  We  re¬ 
main,  says  Anselm,  in  possession  of  the  faculty  of 
will,  even  though  we  perform  no  act  of  will, — as, 
for  example,  when  we  are  asleep.  The  voluntary 
faculty  is  always  one  and  the  same ;  but  the  acts 
are  as  various  as  the  objects  and  motives  by  which 


anselm’s  idea  of  the  will. 


135 


the  voluntary  faculty  is  influenced.  When,  there¬ 
fore,  we  are  speaking  generally  of  the  strength  of 
the  will,  we  mean  by  it  the  natural  force  of  the 
faculty  itself,  and  not  any  particular  act  of  the  fac¬ 
ulty.  “  Suppose,”  says  Anselm  to  the  pupil,  “  that 
you  knew  a  man  who  was  strong  enough  to  hold  a 
wild  lion  so  still  that  he  could  not  stir,  would  you 
call  this  man  a  weak  man  because  upon  a  certain 
time  a  little  lamb  which  he  was  leading  slipped 
away  from  him?”  “No,”  replies  the  pupil,  “be¬ 
cause  in  this  instance  he  did  not  make  a  right  use 
of  his  strength.”  “Just  so  is  it,”  says  Anselm, 
“  with  the  will.  As  a  faculty ,  it  is  irresistible  in 
the  sense  that  no  temptation  can  force  it  to  yield  in 
opposition  to  its  own  determination.  It  cannot  be 
made  to  sin  against  its  own  choice.  But  the  use 
which  is  made  of  the  faculty,  the  activity  of  the 
faculty  itself,  is  oftentimes  weakening  and  enslaving 
in  the  highest  degree ;  and  having  reference  to  a 
particular  act  of  willing,  such  as  the  act  of  conver¬ 
sion  to  God,  we  certainly  find  the  will  powerless  in 
the  extreme.  But  in  this  case,  the  ground  and 
cause  of  the  impotence  is  always  in  the  misuse,  or 
abuse,  of  the  original  energy  of  the  will.”  Anselm 
concludes  his  reply  to  the  query  of  the  pupil  whe¬ 
ther  the  will  is  not  under  a  necessity  of  yielding  to 
temptation  and  of  sinning,  with  the  strong  assertion 
that  even  God  himself  cannot  turn  the  will  of  man 
from  the  willing  of  right  to  the  willing  of  wrong. 
God  can  reduce  to  nothing  the  entire  universe  which 


136 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


lie  lias  created  from  nothing ;  but  be  cannot  turn  a 
holy  will  away  from  the  right.  For  what  is  the 
right?  Is  it  not  that  which  the  will  ought  to 
choose  ?  And  is  not  that  which  the  will  ought  to 
choose  that  which  God  wills  that  it  should  choose  ? 
To  will  the  right,  therefore,  is  to  will  what  God 
wills  that  we  should  will.  To  say,  then,  that  God 
could  by  the  exercise  of  his  efficiency  lead  us,  or 
force  us,  away  from  willing  the  right,  would  be  the 
same  as  saying  that  God  wills  that  we  should  not 
will  what  he  himself  wills  that  we  should  will, — in 
other  words,  that  he  does  not  will  his  own  will. 
There  can  be  nothing  freer  therefore,  says  Anselm, 
than  the  holy  free  will  of  the  unfallen  Adam.  For 
there  is  absolutely  no  power  out  of  itself,  either 
finite  or  infinite,  that  can  alter  its  self-determination 
to  the  right.  Nothing  but  itself  can  bring  this 
thing  about.  And  the  only  connection  that  the 
Divine  causality  has  with  the  origin  of  sin  in  the 
human  will  is  the  merely  negative  fact  that  God 
does  not  hinder .  His  agency  in  reference  to  human 
apostasy  is  merely  permissive.  He  could  prevent 
the  apostasy  of  the  holy  will  of  Adam,  because  he 
could  concur  with  Adam’s  choice  of  holiness  in  such 
a  degree  as  to  render  Adam’s  relative  perfection  an 
absolute  one,  like  his  own.  But  he  does  not  exert 
this  degree  of  concurrence,  and  thus  establishes  for 
purposes  of  probation  a  possibility  of  apostasy,  but 
no  necessity.  Whether  this  possibility  shall  be¬ 
come  reality,  God  does  not  decide  by  any  efficiency 


anselm’s  idea  of  the  will. 


137 


of  his  own,  but  leaves  wholly  to  the  self-decision  of 
the  creature. 

The  will  of  man,  thus  having  been  created  posi¬ 
tively  holy,  and  endowed  with  a  plenary  power  of 
repelling  all  temptation,  and  remaining  holy,  it  is 
fitting  and  just,  continues  Anselm,  that  if  it  does 
surrender  its  original  holiness,  it  should  then  fall 
into  the  bondage  of  sin, — such  a  state  of  the  will  as 
disables  it  from  the  re-origination  of  perfect  holi¬ 
ness.  a  But  how,”  interrupts  the  pupil,  a  can  this 
bondage  into  which  the  will  falls,  in  case  it  aposta¬ 
tizes,  be  reconciled  with  its  continued  and  perpetual 
freedom  ?  Can  the  will  be  both  enslaved  and  free 
at  one  and  the  same  time  ?  ”  u  Certainly,”  answers 
the  teacher  ;  u  it  is  always  in  the  power  of  the  finite 
will  to  preserve  its  righteousness,  in  case  it  possesses 
righteousness ;  though  never  in  its  power  to  origin¬ 
ate  righteousness,  in  case  it  is  destitute  of  it.  If 
therefore  it  loses  its  righteousness  by  a  voluntary 
act,  it  still  remains  as  true  as  ever,  that  it  would 
have  the  power  to  maintain  itself  in  righteousness, 
if  it  had  righteousness,  and  it  had  righteousness  by 
creation.  Its  enslavement  arises  not  from  creation, 
but  solely  from  the  fact  that  it  has  dispossessed 
itself  of  its  original  dowry  of  holiness.  Having 
thus  become  destitute  of  inward  holiness,  it  cannot, 
of  course,  do  anything  but  sin.  But  this  does  not 
alter  the  fact,  that  there  was  no  necessity  of  its  los¬ 
ing  its  righteousness,  and  that  if  it  had  not  lost  it, 
it  could  do  right  as  easily  as  it  now  does  wrong. 


138 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


An  evil  tree,  to  employ  the  figure  of  Christ,  can¬ 
not  bring  forth  good  fruit ;  but  then  there  was  no 
original  created  necessity  that  the  tree  should  be  an 
evil  one. 

It  will  be  seen  from  this  analysis  of  the  An- 
selmic  anthropology,  that  everything  is  made  to 
depend  upon  the  primitive  act  of  apostasy  described 
in  Genesis.  The  sin  of  man,  considered  as  an  evil 
principle  or  nature ,  was  originated  at  the  beginning 
of  human  history ;  and  all  the  acts  of  individual 
transgression,  since  the  act  of  eating  the  forbidden 
fruit,  have  been  the  developement  of  that  principle. 
A  total  change  in  the  moral  character  of  human 
nature  was  made  by  an  unforced  act  of  self-will 
upon  the  part  of  Adam,  whose  person  included  the 
nature,  and  hence  every  individual  at  his  very  birth 
is  characterized  by  original  sin,  or  innate  depravity ; 
and  as  his  powers  unfold,  he  acts  out  this  inherent 
sinfulness  in  daily  life  and  conduct.  But  the  whole 
process  from  first  to  last,  according  to  Anselm,  is 
voluntary  /  provided  that  the  term  be  made  to  in¬ 
clude  the  activity  of  the  common  nature,  as  well  as 
the  activity  of  the  particular  individual.  Original 
sin  is  the  self-will  of  human  nature  while  in  Adam, 
and  not  yet  individualized.  Actual  sin  is  the  self- 
will  of  this  same  human  nature  individualized  in  the 
series  of  its  generations. 

The  harmony  of  Anselm’s  doctrine  of  Original 
Sin  with  that  of  Augustine  is  apparent.  Had  the 
anthropology  of  the  Mediaeval  Church  been  shaped 


Anselm’s  idea  of  the  will. 


139 


by  the  profound  contemplations  of  Anselm,  instead 
of  the  superficial  speculations  of  Lombard, — had  the 
archbishop  of  the  then  unknown  and  insignificant  see 
of  Canterbury  been  accepted  by  the  Latin  Church 
as  its  leader  and  thinker,  instead  of  the  Master  of 
Sentences, — the  history  of  the  Western  Church 
would  have  been  that  of  a  gradual  purification  and 
progress,  instead  of  a  gradual  corruption  and  de¬ 
cline.1 

1  The  anthropology  of  Bernard  Augustino-Anselmic.  For  a  good 
and  Aquinas,  though  not  so  sketch  of  Bernard’s  anthropology, 
strongly  pronounced  as  that  of  see  Helffeeich  :  Christliche  Mys- 
Anselm,  is  yet  in  the  same  gen-  tik,  I.  293  sq. 
eral  direction  with  that  of  the 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE  PAPAL  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


§  1.  Tridentine  Theory  of  Original  Sin, 

As  there  had  been  two  tendencies  within  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church, — a  stricter  one  inclining 
to  the  Augustinian  anthropology,  and  a  laxer  one 
inclining  to  the  Semi-Pelagian, — the  Council  of 
Trent  adopted  an  ambiguous  method  of  treating 
the  vexed  subject  of  original  sin.  ‘Th e  phraseology 
of  their  canons  favors  the  Augustinian  theory,  but 
the  exposition  of  the  canons  in  the  negative  anathe¬ 
matizing  clauses,  and  by  their  leading  theologians, 
supports  the  Semi-Pelagian  doctrine.  Chemnitz,1 
after  a  brief  specification  of  the  Pelagianizing  senti¬ 
ments  of  many  of  the  schoolmen,  remarks,  “  I,  for 
my  part,  should  judge  that  these  profane  opinions 
were  condemned  in  the  language  of  the  decrees  [of 
Trent].  But  Andradius,  the  expositor  of  the  coun- 


^xamen  Concilii  Tridentini,  Pars  I.  locus  iii.  sectio  1.  cap  1. 


TRIDENTINE  THEORY  OF  ORIGINAL  SIN.  141 


cil,  says  that  1  the  decrees  were  composed  with  such 
ingenuity,  that  neither  these  nor  similar  opinions  of 
Papal  theologians  respecting  original  sin  were  con¬ 
demned,  but  were  left  free  to  be  received  or  reject¬ 
ed.’  ”  A  glance  at  the  Canones ,  and  then  an  exam¬ 
ination  of  the  explanations  of  them,  particularly  by 
Bellarmin ,  will  corroborate  the  remark  of  the 
learned  Lutheran  divine. 

The  Tridentine  theologians  give  their  general 
statement  of  the  doctrine  of  Original  Sin  in  the 
following  terms.  “  If  any  one  shall  not  confess  that 
the  first  man  Adam,  when  he  had  transgressed  the 
command  of  God  in  paradise,  lost  immediately  the 
holiness  and  righteousness  in  which  he  had  been 
created,  and  incurred  through  the  offence  of  this 
disobedience  the  wrath  and  indignation  of  God,  and 
thus  the  death  which  God  had  previously  threat¬ 
ened,  and  with  death  captivity  to  the  power  of  him 
who  has  the  kingdom  of  death,  that  is  the  devil, 
and  that  the  entire  Adam,  both  soul  and  body, 
through  this  transgression  was  changed  for  the 
worse  (in  deterius)  :  let  him  be  accursed.  If  any 
one  assert  that  the  transgression  of  Adam  injured 
himself  alone,  and  not  his  posterity,  and  that  he  lost 
the  holiness  and  righteousness  which  he  had  re¬ 
ceived  from  God,  for  himself  alone  and  not  for  us, 
or,  that  having  been  polluted  by  the  sin  of  disobe¬ 
dience  he  transmitted  death  and  the  punishment  of 
the  body  only  to  the  whole  human  race,  but  not  sin 
itself,  which  is  the  death  of  the  soul,  let  him  be  ac- 


142 


HISTOKY  OF  ANTHKOPOLOGY. 


cursed,  because  he  contradicts  the  apostle  who 
says  :  c  By  one  man  sin  entered  into  the  world,  and 
death  by  sin,  and  so  death  passed  upon  all  men,  in 
whom  all  sinned  ’  (in  quo  omnes  peccaverunt).  If 
any  one  assert  that  this  sin  of  Adam,  which  is  one 
in  origin,  and,  being  transmitted  by  propagation  not 
imitation,  is  inherent  in  all  and  belongs  to  each,  is 
removable  by  the  power  of  man’s  nature,  or  by  any 
other  remedy  than  the  merits  of  the  only  Mediator 
our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  ....  let  him  be  accursed.”  1 
This  assertion  of  apostasy  and  need  of  redemp¬ 
tion  taken  by  itself,  and  with  the  construction 
which  the  phraseology  naturally  suggests,  could 
have  been  accepted  by  the  Reformers  themselves.2 
But  the  doctrine  of  Original  Sin  as  actually  formed 
by  the  leading  Roman  Catholic  divines  evinces 
plainly,  that  this  construction  was  not  intended  to 
be  put  upon  it. 

1.  The  first  peculiarity  in  the  Papal  anthropolo¬ 
gy  consists  in  the  tenet,  that  original  righteousness 
is  not  a  natural ,  but  a  supernatural  endowment . 
The  germ  of  this  view  appears  in  one  of  the  state¬ 
ments  of  the  Roman  Catechism , — a  work  which  fol¬ 
lowed  the  Tridentine  Canons,  and  is  of  equal  au¬ 
thority  with  them  in  the  Papal  Church.  u  Lastly,” 
says  the  Catechism,  “  God  formed  man  out  of  the 
clay  of  the  earth,  so  made  and  constituted  as  to  his 

1  Canones  Concilii  Teidentini,  us  ”  does  not  necessarily  teach 

Sessio  Y.  §§  1,  2,  3.  total  depravity,  however. 

2  The  phraseology  “  in  deter i- 


TRIDENTINE  THEORY  OF  ORIGINAL  SIN.  143 


material  body,  that  he  was  immortal  and  impassible, 
not  indeed  by  the  force  of  nature  itself,  but  by  a 
Divine  favor.  But  as  to  his  soul,  he  formed  him 
after  his  own  image  and  likeness,  endowed  him  with 
free-will,  and  so  tempered  within  him  all  the  emo¬ 
tions  of  his  mind  and  his  appetites,  that  they  would 
never  disobey  the  rule  of  reason.  Then  he  added 
the  admirable  gift  of  original  righteousness,  and  de¬ 
creed  that  he  should  have  the  pre-eminency  over 
other  animals.” 1  Bellarmin  2  explains  very  clearly 
what  he  understands  by  original  righteousness  as  a 
supernatural  endowment ;  and  his  explanation  is  as 
authoritative  as  any  individual  opinion  can  be  with¬ 
in  the  Papal  Church.  “  In  the  first  place  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  man  naturally  consists  of  flesh  and 
spirit.  .  .  .  But  from  these  diverse  or  contrary 
propensities,  there  arises  in  one  and  the  same  man  a 
certain  conflict*  and  from  this  conflict  great  difficul¬ 
ty  of  acting  rightly.  ...  In  the  second  place,  it  is 
to  be  observed  that  Divine  Providence,  in  the  be¬ 
ginning  of  creation  (initio  creationis),  in  order  to 
provide  a  remedy  for  this  disease  or  languor  of  hu¬ 
man  nature,  which  arises  from  the  nature  of  a  mate¬ 
rial  organization  (ex  conditione  materiae),  added  to 
man  a  certain  remarkable  gift,  to  wit,  original  right¬ 
eousness,  by  which  as  by  a  sort  of  golden  rein  the 
inferior  part  might  be  easily  kept  in  subjection  to 
the  superior,  and  the  superior  to  God ;  but  the  flesh 

1  Catechismus  Romantjs,  P.  I.  2  Bellaeminus  :  Gratia  primi 

Cap.  ii.  Q.  18.  hominis,  c.  v. 


144 


HISTOEY  OF  AXTHKOPOLOGY. 


was  thus  subjected  to  the  spirit,  so  that  it  could  not 
be  moved  so  long  as  the  spirit  was  unwilling,  nor 
could  it  become  a  rebel  to  the  spirit  unless  the  spir¬ 
it  itself  should  become  a  rebel  to  God,  while  yet  it 
was  wholly  in  the  power  of  the  spirit  to  become  or 
not  to  become  a  rebel  to  God.  ...  We  think  that 
this  rectitude  of  the  inferior  part  was  a  supernatural 
gift,  and  that,  too,  intrinsically,  and  not  accidental¬ 
ly,  so  that  it  neither  flowed  nor  could  flow  from  the 
principles  of  nature  (ex  naturae  principiis).” 1 

Upon  examining  this  statement,  it  will  be  found 
to  conflict  with  the  Latin  anthropology.  Man  as 
created  is  a  synthesis  of  body  and  soul ;  but  the  two 
are  in  antagonism  at  creation.  Creation  is  thus  im¬ 
perfect.  The  addition  of  the  original  righteousness, 
which  is  not  a  part  of  the  creative  act,  is  requisite  in 
order  that  the  higher  shall  obtain  the  victory  over 
the  lower  nature,  and  the  creature  be  made  perfect. 
It  is  true  that  this  supernatural  endowment  is  be¬ 
stowed  “  initio  creationist — still  the  work  of  cre¬ 
ation  proper  does  not  include  it,  but  this  is  super- 
added,  in  the  phrase  of  Bellarmin,  “to  provide  a 
remedy  for  the  disease  or  languor  of  human  nature.” 
The  Papal  idea  of  creation,  therefore,  differs  from 
the  Augustinian,  in  that  it  involves  imperfection. 
We  have  seen  that  the  Latin  anthropology  regards 
man  as  created  with  a  will  that  is  holy,  and  which 
thereby  possesses  entire  domination  over  the  lower 

1  By  this  Bellarmin  means,  that  over  the  flesh  could  not  issue 
such  a  domination  of  the  spirit  from  anything  in  the  “  flesh.” 


TRIDENTINE  THEORY  OF  ORIGINAL  SIN.  145 


physical  and  bodily  nature.  It  also  teaches  that 
the  physical  nature  by  creation  has  in  it  nothing 
corrupt  or  imperfect.  Original  righteousness,  ac¬ 
cording  to  Augustine’s  theory,  enters  into  the  very 
idea  of  man  as  coming  from  the  hands  of  the  Cre¬ 
ator.  It  is  a  part  of  his  created  endowment,  and 
does  not  require  to  be  superadded.  The  work  of 
the  Creator  is  perfect,  and  needs  no  improvement. 
There  is  no  “  disease  ”  or  “  languor  ”  in  it.  But  in 
the  Papal  anthropology,  man  as  he  comes  from 
God,  is  imperfect.  He  is  not  created  sinful  indeed, 
but  neither  is  he  created  holy.  To  use  the  Pa¬ 
pal  phrase,  he  is  created  in  puris  naturalibus ; 
without  positive  righteousness,  and  without  posi¬ 
tive  unrighteousness.  The  body  is  full  of  natural 
carnal  propensities,  and  tends  downward.  The 
soul  as  rational  and  immortal  tends  upward.  But 
there  is  no  harmony  between  the  two  by  crea¬ 
tion .  An  act  subsequent  to  that  of  creation,  and 
additional  to  it,  is  necessary  to  bring  this  harmony 
about ;  and  this  is  that  act  by  which  the  gift  of 
original  righteousness  is  superadded  to  the  gifts  of 
creation.  In  and  by  this  act,  the  higher  part  is 
strengthened  to  acquire  and  maintain  dominion  over 
the  lower,  and  a  positive  perfection  is  imparted  to 
human  nature  that  was  previously  lacking  in  it. 
Original  righteousness  is  thus,  in  reference  to  the 
created  and  natural  characteristics  of  man,  a  super¬ 
natural  gift. 

2.  The  second  peculiarity  in  the  Papal  anthro-  • 

VOL.  II.^-10 


146 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


pology  consists  in  tlie  tenet,  that  apostasy  involves 
the  loss  of  a  supernatural ,  but  not  of  a  natural  gift . 
By  the  act  of  transgression,  human  nature  lapses 
back  into  that  condition  of  conflict  between  the 
flesh  and  the  spirit  in  which  it  was  created.  In 
losing  its  original  righteousness,  therefore,  it  loses 
nothing  with  which  it  was  endowed  by  the  creative 
act,  but  only  that  superadded  gift  which  was  be¬ 
stowed  subsequently  to  this.  The  supremacy  of 
the  higher  over  the  lower  part  is  lost  by  the  Adam¬ 
ic  transgression,  and  the  two  parts  of  man,  the  flesh 
and  the  spirit,  fall  into  their  primitive  and  natural 
antagonism  again.  Original  righteousness  being  a 
supernatural  gift,  original  sin  is  the  loss  of  it,  and  in 
reality  the  restoration  of  man  to  the  state  in  which 
he  was  created.  Original  sin  brings  man  back 
again  to  a  negative  condition,  in  which  he  is  neither 
sinful  nor  holy.  It  is  a  state  of  conflict,  indeed,  be¬ 
tween  the  flesh  and  the  spirit ;  but  the  flesh  has  no¬ 
thing  in  it  which  was  not  created  in  it,  and  nothing 
that  does  not  naturally  and  necessarily  belong  to 
the  flesh  as  such.  And  the  spirit,  in  like  manner, 
contains  only  its  own  intrinsic  characteristics.  So 
that  the  conflict  is  one  that  arises  from  the  nature 
of  things,  or  by  creation  itself,  and  not  from  any  act 
of  apostasy  on  the  part  of  man.  Here  appears  an¬ 
other  marked  point  of  difference  between  the  Papal 
and  the  Latin  anthropology.  The  latter  does  not 
concede  that  by  creation  and  the  nature  of  things 


TRIDENTINE  THEORY  OF  ORIGINAL  SIN.  147 


the  flesh  must  be  in  conflict  with  the  spirit.1  It  re¬ 
gards  this  as  a  relic  of  the  Gnostic  idea  of  matter 
and  of  a  fleshly  organism.  On  the  contrary,  the 
Augustinian  anthropology  maintains  that  the  “flesh” 
as  it  comes  from  the  creative  hand  contains  nothing 
corrupt  or  disordered  in  it.  It  is  a  just  tempering 
and  mixture,  which  is  in  perfect  harmony  with  the 
higher  laws  of  mind  and  of  God.  If,  therefore, 
there  is  ever  found  to  be  a  conflict  between  the  flesh 
and  the  spirit,  this  is  proof  positive  that  some  change, 
some  disorder,  has  been  introduced  into  the  flesh  by 
the  action  of  the  spirit  itself.  Corruption  begins  in 
the  spirit  or  will  itself,  and  descends  into  the  sensu¬ 
ous  and  bodily  parts.  The  Augustinian  anthropol¬ 
ogy  regards  the  conflict  between  the  flesh  and  the 
spirit,  as  a  consequence  and  evidence  of  an  apostasy. 
The  Papal  anthropology,  on  the  contrary,  considers 
it  as  the  primitive  and  natural  condition  in  which 
man  was  created,  and  which  required  to  be  reme¬ 
died  by  the  addition  of  a  supernatural  gift. 

3.  A  third  characteristic,  consequently,  of  the 
Papal  anthropology  is  that  it  does  not  regard  origi¬ 
nal  sin  as  truly  and  properly  sin.  This  follows 
necessarily  from  the  position  that  human  nature  is 
not  created  with  holiness,  but  that  holiness  is  a  su- 

1  “  Sed  in  corpore  vitae  illius,  concupisceret ;  ut  ei  neoesse  esset 
ubi  homo,  nisi  peccasset,  non  erat  ant  subjugari,  aut  reluctari.”  Au- 
moriturus,  alius  procul  dubio  sta-  gustintjs  :  Op.  imperf.  cont.  Juli- 
tus  fuit:  unde  aut  nulla  ibi,  aut  anum,  lib.  V.  (Yol.  X.  p.  1449, 
tabs,  qualis  nunc  est,  libido  non  Ed.  Migne.) 
fuit,  qua  caro  contra  spiritum 


148 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


pernatural  endowment  specially  bestowed  after  the 
act  of  creation  proper  is  complete.  For  the  loss  of 
this  endowment  simply  puts  man  back  to  the  nega- 
tive  and  characterless  position  upon  which  he  stands 
by  creation.  But  this  cannot  be  a  position  of  guilt 
and  sin  properly  so  called.  If  so,  then  God  creates 
man  in  a  sinful  state.  Original  sin,  according  to  the 
Tridentine  theologians,  is,  indeed,  a  conflict  between 
the  flesh  and  the  spirit,  between  the  body  and  the 
mind.  It  is  a  state  of  corruption,  and  of  inordinate 
physical  desires.  But  this  is  not  a  state  of  sin  and 
guilt.  This  conflict  is  necessary  from  the  nature  of 
the  case.  For  by  creation ,  the  flesh  is  inordinate, 
and  the  spirit  is  weak.  It  is  not  until  something 
subsequent  to  creation  is  bestowed, — viz. :  the  super¬ 
natural  gift  that  subdues  the  lower  to  the  higher 
part, — that  righteousness  or  positive  moral  charac¬ 
ter  exists.  That  act,  therefore,  whereby  this  right¬ 
eousness  is  lost,  the  act  of  original  transgression,  is 
not  one  that  plunges  man  into  guilt  proper,  but 
only  into  corruption  or  an  inordinate  and  ungoverm 
ed  condition  of  the  lower  nature, — -which  inordinate 
condition  belongs  to  the  flesh  by  creation,  just  as 
the  properties  of  matter  belong  to  matter  by  crea¬ 
tion.  Hence,  Bellarmin  remarks  that  “  the  state  of 
man  after  the  fall  of  Adam  differs  no  more  from  the 
state  of  man  as  created  in  pur  is  naturalibus  [i.  e. 
previous  to  the  bestowment  of  the  supernatural  gift 
of  original  righteousness],  than  a  man  originally 
naked  differs  from  one  who  was  once  clothed,  but 


TRIDENTINE  THEORY  OF  ORIGINAL  SIN.  149 


has  been  stripped  of  his  clothing ;  neither  is  human 
nature  any  worse,  if  we  except  the  guilt  of  the  act 
of  transgression  in  eating  the  forbidden  fruit,  than 
it  was  made  by  God,  nor  does  it  labor  under  any 
more  ignorance  or  infirmity  than  it  labored  under 
as  created  in  ypuris  naturalibus.  Hence,  the  cor¬ 
ruption  of  nature  results,  not  from  the  subtraction 
of  any  gift  belonging  to  nature  by  creation ,  nor 
from  the  addition  to  it  of  any  evil  quality,  but  sole¬ 
ly  from  the  loss  of  a  supernatural  gift  which  was 
over  and  above  the  gifts  of  nature.” 1  In  conformi¬ 
ty  with  this,  the  Council  of  Trent  decide  that  in¬ 
dwelling  sin  in  the  regenerate  is  not  properly  sin. 
After  stating  that  concupiscence  (concupiscentia  vel 
femes)  remains  in  the  baptized,  they  add  that  “  this 
concupiscence,  which  the  apostle  sometimes  denom¬ 
inates  sin  (Rom.  vi.  12,  vii.  8),  the  holy  synod  de¬ 
clares  the  catholic  church  never  understood  to  be 
called  sin  because  it  is  really  and  truly  sin  in  the 
regenerate,  but  because  it  is  from  sin,  and  inclines 
to  sin.” 2 


§  2.  The  Tridentine  Theory  of  Regeneration: 

Holding  such  views  of  the  nature  of  original  sin, 
it  was  logical  that  the  Tridentine  theologians  should 
combat  the  doctrine  of  human  impotence,  and  the 

1  Bellaeminus  :  De  gratia  pri-  2  Canones  Teidentini  :  Sessio 
mi  hominis,  c.  v.  V. 


150 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


helpless  dependence  of  the  apostate  will  upon  the 
Divine  efficiency  in  order  to  its  renewal.  They 
adopt  the  theory  of  synergism  in  regeneration,  and 
defend  it  with  great  earnestness.  “  If  any  one,”  say 
the  Tridentine  Canons,  “  shall  affirm  that  the  free 
will  of  man  was  lost,  and  became  extinct,  after  the 
sin  of  Adam.  .  .  .  let  him  be  accursed.  If  any 
one  shall  affirm  that  the  free  will  of  man,  moved  and 
excited  by  God,  co-operates  nothing  by  assenting  to 
God  thus  exciting  and  calling,  so  that  it  disposes 
and  prepares  itself  for  obtaining  the  grace  of  justi¬ 
fication,  but  like  some  inanimate  object  does  nothing 
at  all,  but  is  merely  passive,  let  him  be  accursed. 
If  any  one  shall  affirm  that  all  works  that  are  per¬ 
formed  before  justification,  from  whatever  reason 
they  are  done,  are  really  and  truly  sins,  and  merit 
the  displeasure  of  God,  or  that  the  more  a  man  en¬ 
deavors  to  dispose  himself  for  grace,  the  more  does 
he  sin,  let  him  be  accursed.  If  any  one  shall  affirm 
that  the  sinner  is  justified  by  faith  alone,  in  the 
sense  that  nothing  else  is  requisite  which  may  co¬ 
operate  to  the  attainment  of  the  grace  of  justifica¬ 
tion,  and  that  the  sinner  does  not  need  to  be  pre¬ 
pared  and  disposed  by  the  motion  of  his  own  will, 
let  him  be  accursed.” 1 

There  was  no  part  of  the  anthropology  of  the 
Reformers  which  the  divines  of  Trent  opposed  with 
more  vehemence,  than  the  monergistic  theory  of  re- 


1  Canones  Tridentini  :  Sessio  VI.  Canones  iv.  v.  vii.  ix. 


TRIDENTINE  THEORY  OF  REGENERATION.  151 


generation.  The  theory  that  man  cannot  co-operate 
efficiently  in  the  regenerating  act  was,  and  is  to  this 
day,  represented  by  the  Papal  theologians  as  fatal¬ 
ism.  This  is  the  charge  made  by  Bellarmin,  and  by 
Mohler. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


ANTHROPOLOGY  OB'  THE  REFORMERS. 


§  1.  Luther  an-  Calvinistic  Theory  of  Original  Sin. 

The  Reformers  constructed  the  doctrines  of  Sin 
and  Regeneration  after  the  same  general  manner 
with  Augustine  and  Anselm ;  so  that  the  somewhat 
minute  account  which  we  have  given  of  the  Augus- 
tinian  and  Anselmic  anthropologies  renders  a  detail¬ 
ed  representation  of  the  Protestant  anthropology 
unnecessary.  The  principal  Lutheran  and  Calvin¬ 
istic  symbols  agree  in  their  definitions  of  sin  and 
grace,  and  from  them  we  shall  derive  our  account. 

The  leaders  of  the  Protestant  Reformation  reaf¬ 
firmed,  in  opposition  to  the  Papal  anthropology,  the 
Augustinian  doctrine  that  original  sin  is  truly  and 
properly  sin,  and  also  that  it  was  committed  in 
Adam.  The  Augsburg  Confession  is  explicit  re¬ 
specting  the  guilt  of  original  sin,  in  the  following 
terms.  “  The  churches  teach  that  after  the  fall  of 
Adam,  all  men  propagated  according  to  ordinary 


LUTHERAN-  C  AL  VINISTIC  THEORY. 


153 


generation,  are  born  with  sin,  that  is  without  the 
fear  of  God,  without  trust  in  God,  and  with  concu¬ 
piscence  (tTu&u/uia),  and  that  this  disease  (morbus) 
or  original  depravity  (vitium  originis)  is  truly  sin, 
damning,  and  bringing  eternal  death  upon  those 
who  are  not  regenerated  by  baptism  and  the  Holy 
Spirit.  They  also  condemn  the  Pelagians  and  oth¬ 
ers,  who  deny  this  original  depravity  to  be  sin.”1 
The  explanatory  defence  of  the  Augsburg  Confes¬ 
sion,  which  goes  under  the  name  of  the  Apologia , 
explains  what  the  authors  of  this  Confession  meant 
by  their  assertion  that  original  sin  is  “  concupi¬ 
scence.”  “  Some  persons  assert  that  original  sin  is 
not  a  depravity  (vitium)  or  corruption  in  the  na¬ 
ture  of  man,  but  only  a  condition  of  servitude  or 
mortality  which  the  descendants  of  Adam  come  into 
without  any  proper  and  personal  guilt.  Further¬ 
more,  they  assert  that  no  one  is  under  condemna¬ 
tion  to  eternal  death  on  account  of  original  sin.  It 
is  as  when  slaves  are  born  of  a  slave  woman,  and 
come  into  this  servile  condition  without  any  fault  of 
their  nature,  but  through  the  misfortune  of  their 
mother.2  In  opposition  to  this  view,  we  have  made 
mention  of  concupiscence,  and  have  called  it  desire, 
to  indicate  that  the  nature  of  man  is  born  corrupt 
and  vitiated.” 3 

1  Hase  :  Libri  Symbolici,  pp.  3  Hase  :  Libri  Symbolici,  p.  50 

9,  10.  sq. 

2  This  was  Zuingle’s  view ;  see 

History  of  Symbols. 


154 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


The  Papal  opponents  of  the  Reformers  had  con¬ 
verted  the  doctrine  of  original  sin  into  the  doctrine 
of  original  evil,  and  had  defined  original  sin  as  fa¬ 
mes , — not  sin  itself,  but  the  fuel  of  sin ;  not  the  de¬ 
pravation  of  the  will,  but  the  corruption  of  the 
sensuous  nature  only.  Taking  this  merely  physical 
theory  of  the  Adamic  sin,  they  had  gone  so  far  as 
to  raise  the  questions :  u  What  is  the  particular 
quality  of  the  body  in  which  this  forties  consists ; 
was  it  contracted  from  eating  the  apple  (contagio 
pomi),  or  from  the  breath  of  the  serpent ;  and  can 
it  be  cured  by  medicines  ?  ”  Alluding  to  these  no¬ 
tions,  Melanchthon,  the  author  of  the  Apology,  re¬ 
marks  that  the  “  scholastic  doctors  ”  bury  up  the 
real  matter  in  discussion.  “  When  they  speak  of 
original  sin,  they  do  not  specify  the  greater  and  gra¬ 
ver  faults  of  human  nature, — namely,  ignorance  of 
God,  contempt  of  God,  destitution  of  the  fear  of 
God  and  of  trust  in  Him,  hatred  of  the  government 
of  God,  terror  at  the  justice  of  God,  anger  against 
God,  despair  of  God’s  favor,  reliance  upon  things 
visible.” 1  It  is  this  class  of  sins  which  the  Symbol 
has  in  view,  when  it  speaks  of  original  sin,  and 
which  it  sums  up  under  that  term  and  name. 

The  same  view  of  original  sin  is  taught  with  yet 
greater  decision  and  particularity,  in  the  Formula 
Concordiae.  This  symbol  carries  out  the  doctrines 
of  the  Augsburg  Confession  to  their  logical  results, 


1  Hase  :  Libri  Symbolici,  p.  52. 


LUTHERAN-CALVINISTIC  THEORY. 


155 


and  is  the  best  expression  of  scientific  Lutheranism. 
After  distinctly  rejecting  the  view  of  Flacius,  which 
made  original  sin  to  be  the  substance  of  the  human 
soul,  and  after  asserting  that  sin  in  all  its  forms  is 
the  soul’s  agency  and  not  the  soul’s  essence,  the  For¬ 
mula  Concordiae  affirms,  that  u  Christians  ought  not 
only  to  acknowledge  and  define  actual  faults  and 
transgressions  of  the  commands  of  God  to  be  sins, 
but  they  ought  also  to  regard  that  hereditary  dis¬ 
ease  (morbus)  by  which  the  whole  nature  of  man 
is  corrupted,  as  a  specially  dreadful  sin,  and,  indeed, 
as  the  first  principle  and  source  of  all  other  sins, 
from  which  all  other  transgressions  spring  as  from 
their  root.”  The  first  position  in  the  statement  of 
the  doctrine  of  original  sin,  according  to  the  For¬ 
mula  Concordiae,  is  that  “this  hereditary  evil  is 
guilt  (culpa)  or  crime  (reatus)  ;  whence  it  results 
that  all  men,  on  account  of  the  disobedience  of 
Adam  and  Eve,  are  odious  in  the  sight  of  God,  and 
are  by  nature  the  children  of  wrath,  as  the  apostle 
testifies.” 1 

The  same  view  of  original  sin  was  adopted  by 
the  Calvinistic  division  of  the  Protestants.  Calvin 
defines  original  sin  to  be  “  an  hereditary  pravity  and 
corruption  of  our  nature,  diffused  through  all  the 
parts  of  the  soul,  rendering  us  obnoxious  to  the 
Divine  wrath ,  and  producing  in  us  those  works 
which  the  Scripture  calls  ‘  works  of  the  flesh.’ 


1  Hase  :  Libri  Symbolici,  pp.  639,  640. 


156 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


And  this  is,  indeed,  what  Paul  frequently  denomi¬ 
nates  4  sin  /  ’  while  the  works  which  proceed  thence, 
such  as  adulteries,  fornications,  thefts,  hatreds,  mur¬ 
ders,  revellings,  he  calls  the  4  fruits  of  sin,’ — though 
they  are  also  called  4  sins  ’  in  many  passages  of 
Scripture,  and  even  by  himself.  This  thing,  there¬ 
fore,  should  be  distinctly  observed:  namely,  that 
our  nature  being  so  totally  vitiated  and  depraved, 
we  are,  on  account  of  this  very  corruption,  consid¬ 
ered  as  convicted,  and  justly  condemned  in  the  sight 
of  God,  to  whom  nothing  is  acceptable  but  right¬ 
eousness,  innocence,  and  purity.  And  this  liability 
to  punishment  arises  not  from  the  delinquency  of 
another ;  for  when  it  is  said  that  the  sin  of  Adam 
renders  us  obnoxious  to  the  Divine  judgment,  it  is 
not  to  be  understood  as  if  we,  being  innocent ,  were 
undeservedly  loaded  with  the  guilt  of  his  sin  •  but, 

- 

of  his  transgression,  he  is  therefore  said  to  have  in¬ 
volved  us  in  guilt.  Nevertheless,  We  derive  from 
him,  not  the  punishment  only ,  but  also  the  pollution 
to  which  the  punishment  is  justly  due.  Wherefore 
Augustine,  though  he  frequently  calls  it  the  sin  of 
another,  the  more  clearly  to  indicate  its  transmission 
to  us  by  propagation,  yet  at  the  same  time  also  as¬ 
serts  it  properly  to  belong  to  every  individual.  And 
the  apostle  himself  expressly  declares,  that  4  death 
has  therefore  passed  upon  all  men,  for  that  all  have 
sinned,’ — that  is,  have  been  involved  in  original  sin . 
And  therefore  infants  themselves,  as  they  bring 


because  we  are  all  subject  to  a  curse,  in  consequence 


LXJTHERAX-CALVINISTIC  THEORY. 


157 


tlieir  condemnation  into  the  world  with  them,  are 
rendered  obnoxious  to  punishment  by  their  own 
sinfulness,  not  by  the  sinfulness  of  another.  For 
though  they  have  not  yet  produced  the  fruits  of 
their  iniquity,  yet  they  have  the  seed  of  it  within 
them.  .  .  .  Whence  it  follows  that  this  native  de¬ 
pravity  is  properly  accounted  sin  in  the  sight  of 
God,  because  there  could  be  no  guilt  without  crime?  1 

Calvin  does  not  examine  the  metaphysical 
grounds  for  the  imputation  of  the  Adamic  sin,  so 
fully  as  do  Augustine  and  Anselm.  But  the  extract 
cited  above  involves  the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the 
race  in  the  primitive  apostasy.  It  teaches  that  origi¬ 
nal  sin  is  not  a  mere  individual  sin,  but  is  common 
or  generic ;  otherwise,  the  individual  a  being  inno¬ 
cent  ”  would  be  “  undeservedly  loaded  with  the 
guilt  of  a  sin  not  his  own,”  and  foreign  to  him. 
We  derive  from  Adam,  “  not  the  punishment  only, 
but  also  the  pollution  to  which  the  punishment  is 
justly  due.” 

The  clearest  and  most  explicit  statement  of  the 
doctrine  of  original  sin  in  its  relations  to  the  Adamic 
connection,  that  was  made  in  any  of  the  Calvinistic 
symbols  of  the  16th  and  17  th  centuries,  is  found  in 
the  Formula  Consensus  Helvetici.  This  creed  sus¬ 
tains  the  same  relation  to  the  Calvinistic  system 
that  the  Formula  Concordiae  does  to  the  Lutheran. 
It  is  confined  to  the  doctrines  of  original  sin  and 


1  Calvin  :  Institutes,  II.  i. 


158 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


grace,  and  upon  these  subjects  makes  statements 
that  are  more  exhaustive  and  scientific  than  are 
found  in  any  of  the  other  creeds  drawn  up  by  the 
Reformed  or  Calvinistic  theologians.  It  was  com¬ 
posed  by  the  distinguished  Swiss  divines  j Heidegger, 
Turretine ,  and  Gereler ,  primarily  to  oppose  a  par¬ 
ticular  theory  of  original  sin  and  election  which  was 
obtaining  some  currency,  and  which  these  theolo¬ 
gians  regarded  as  a  deviation  from  genuine  Calvin¬ 
ism.  In  order  to  a  proper  understanding  of  the 
positions  of  the  Formula,  it  is  necessary  to  give  a 
brief  account  of  this  theory. 

In  the  year  1640,  Joshua  Placaeus ,  a  distin¬ 
guished  theologian  of  Saumur,  in  the  west  of 
France,  published  the  theory,1  that  God  cannot 
justly,  and  therefore  does  not  actually,  impute 
Adam’s  sin  itself  to  his  posterity,  but  onty  the  con¬ 
sequences  of  that  sin.  And  inasmuch  as  punish¬ 
ment  follows  imputation,  God  cannot  justly  and 
does  not  actually  punish  Adam’s  sin  itself  in  the 
posterity,  but  only  the  consequences*  of  that  sin, — • 
viz. :  the  corruption  of  nature  resulting  from  it,  and 
transmitted  by  propagation.  The  apostatizing  act 
itself  was  the  act  of  the  individual  Adam  simply 
and  solely.  The  posterity,  therefore,  did  not  par¬ 
ticipate  in  it,  and  therefore  it  could  not  be  imme¬ 
diately  imputed  to  them  as  guilt.  But  the  conse- 

1  Plaoaeus  :  Theses  theologici  de  imputatione  primi  peccati  Ad- 
de  statu  hominis  lapsi  ante  gra-  ami. 
tiam ;  followed  by  Disputationes 


LUTHERA^CALVINTSTIC  THEORY. 


159 


quences  of  that  individual  apostatizing  act  of  Adam, 
— viz. :  the  corruption  of  the  whole  nature,  issuing 
from  it  and  transmitted  to  the  posterity, — are  im¬ 
puted  to  them.  This  imputation  of  the  effects  of 
Adam’s  act  of  apostasy,  Placaeus  denominated  a  me¬ 
diate  ;  ”  while  the  imputation  of  the  apostatizing 
act  itself,  or  of  the  cause  of  these  effects,  he  called 
“  immediate.”  “  If,”  says  Placaeus,  “  by  the  first 
sin  of  Adam,  his  first  actual  sin  be  meant,  and  not 
his  habitual  sin  which  followed  it,  then  imputation 
must  be  distinguished  into  immediate  or  antecedent , 
and  mediate  or  consequent .  The  first  imputation 
occurs  immediately,  that  is  without  the  medium  of 
any  corruption.  The  last  imputation  occurs  medi¬ 
ately,  that  is  through  the  medium  of  hereditary  and 
inward  corruption.  The  former  precedes  inward 
and  hereditary  corruption,  in  the  order  of  nature ; 
the  latter  follows  it.  The  former  is  the  cause  of 
inward  and  habitual  corruption ;  the  latter  is  the 
effect.”  Placaeus  rejects  the  former,  and  admits 
the  latter.1 

In  opposition  to  this  theory  of  “  mediate  ”  impu¬ 
tation,  the  Formula  Consensus  makes  the  following 
statements.  “  As  God  entered  into  a  covenant  of 
works  with  Adam,  not  only  for  himself  but  also  with 
the  whole  human  race  in  him  as  the  head  and  root , 
so  that  the  posterity  who  were  to  be  born  of  him 
would  inherit  the  same  integrity  with  which  he  was 

1  Munscher-  Yon  Colln  -  Neudecker  :  Dogmengeschichte,  III. 
438. 


160 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


created,  provided  lie  should  continue  in  it ;  so  Adam 
by  his  sad  fall  sinned  not  for  himself  only,  but  for 
the  whole  human  race  who  were  to  be  born  4  of 
blood  and  the  will  of  the  flesh,’  and  lost  the  bless¬ 
ings  promised  in  the  covenant.  We  are  of  opinion, 
therefore,  that  the  sin  of  Adam  is  imputed  to  all 
his  posterity  by  the  secret  and  just  judgment  of 
God.  For  the  apostle  testifies  that  4  In  Adam  all 
have  sinned.  By  the  disobedience  of  one  man  many 
were  made  sinners ;  ’  and,  4  In  Adam  all  die  ’ 
(Rom.  v.  12,  19  ;  1  Cor.  xv.  21,  22).  But  it  does 
not  appear  how  hereditary  corruption ,  as  spiritual 
death ,  could  fall  upon  the  entire  human  race  by  the 
just  judgment  of  God ,  unless  some  fault  (delictum) 
of  this  same  human  race  (ejusdem  generis  humani), 
bringing  in  the  penalty  of  that  death ,  had  preceded . 
For  the  most  just  God ,  the  judge  of  all  the  earth , 
punishes  none  but  the  guilty.  Wherefore  man,  pre¬ 
vious  to  the  commission  of  any  single  or  4  actual  ’ 
transgression,  is  exposed  to  the  divine  wrath  and 
curse  from  his  very  birth  (ab  ortu  suo),  and  this  in 
a  twofold  manner ;  first,  on  account  of  the  transgres¬ 
sion  {nag  dm  coped)  and  disobedience  which  he  com¬ 
mitted  in  the  loins  of  Adam  ;  and  secondly,  on 
account  of  the  hereditary  corruption  inherent  in  his 
conception,  which  is  the  consequence  of  this  primi¬ 
tive  transgression,  and  by  which  his  whole  nature 
is  depraved  and  spiritually  dead.  Thus  it  appears 
that  original  sin,  by  a  strict  discrimination,  is  two¬ 
fold,  and  consists  of  the  imputed  guilt  of  Adam’s 


LTTTHERAH-CALVINISTIC  THEORY. 


161 


transgression  and  the  inherent  hereditary  corruption 
consequent  upon  this.  For  this  reason,  we  are  un¬ 
able  to  assent  to  the  view  of  those  who  deny  that 
Adam  represented  his  posterity  by  the  ordinance 
of  God,  and,  consequently,  deny  that  his  sin  is  im¬ 
mediately  imputed  to  them,  and  who,  under  the 
notion  of  a  L  mediate  ’  and  consequent  imputation, 
not  only  do  away  with  the  imputation  of  the  first 
sin,  but  also  expose  the  doctrine  of  innate  and  here¬ 
ditary  corruption  itself  to  grave  peril.” 1 

According  to  this  statement  of  Turretine  and 
Heidegger,  mediate  imputation  must  rest  upon  im¬ 
mediate  ;  and  both  imputations  must  be  asserted. 
They  did  not  consider  it  conformable  to  justice,  to 
impute  an  effect  without  imputing  the  cause.  The 
posterity  could  not  properly  be  regarded  as  guilty 
for  their  inward  corruption  of  heart  and  will,  unless 
they  were  guilty  for  that  primal  Adamic  act  of 
apostasy  which  produced  this  corruption.  It  does 
not  appear  reasonable,  they  say,  that  a  corrupt 
nature  should  be  transmitted  and  imputed  to  the 
universal  race  of  mankind,  a  unless  some  fault  ” 
(delictum),  some  voluntary  and  culpable  act,  u  of 
this  same  human  race  had  preceded  ”  The  attempt, 
therefore,  of  Placaeus,  to  sever  the  inherited  de- 

1  Formula  Consensus  Helye-  viz. :  the  natural  union  between 
tici,  X.-XII.  (Xiemeyer’s  Col-  Adam  and  his  posterity,  and  the 
lectio,  p.  733).  — Turretine  also  'political  or  forensic  union  where- 
asserts  both  imputations  in  his  by  he  is  “  the  representative  of 
Institutes,  upon  two  grounds,  the  whole  human  race.” 

YOU  II. — 11 


162 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


pravity  from  the  Adamic  act  of  apostasy,  to  impute 
the  effect  but  not  the  cause  of  the  effect,  appeared 
to  them  in  the  highest  degree  illogical.  More  than 
this,  it  brought  the  doctrine  of  innate  depravity 
itself  into  “  grave  peril.”  For,  according  to  the 
theory  of  u  mediate  imputation,”  moral  corruption 
together  with  temporal  and  eternal  death  come 
upon  the  posterity,  while  yet  the  posterity  have  no 
part  in  that  primitive  act  of  apostasy  which  is  the 
originating  cause,  and  sole  justifying  reason  of  this 
very  corruption  and  death.  The  justice  of  the 
Divine  procedure,  according  to  Turretine  and  Hei¬ 
degger,  is  imperilled  by  a  method  that  permits  the 
misery  and  corruption  that  issue  from  an  act  of  sin 
to  fall  upon  a  posterity  who  do  not  participate  in 
that  act,  and  are  innocent  of  it.  The  Adamic  sin 
itself  must,  therefore,  be  imputable  to  the  posterity, 
in  order  to  legitimate  the  imputation  of  its  conse¬ 
quences.  And,  furthermore,  this  act,  they  imply, 
must  be  imputed  upon  real  and  not  nominal 
grounds.  The  imputation  of  Adam’s  sin  must  not 
be  a  “  gratuitous  ”  imputation,  for  this  would  yield 
only  a  “  gratuitous  ”  condemnation.  Righteousness 
may  be  imputed  when  there  is  no  righteousness ; 
but  sin  cannot  be  imputed  when  there  is  no  sin. 
u  David  describeth  the  blessedness  of  the  man  unto 
whom  God  imputeth  righteousness  without  works : 
saying,  Blessed  are  they  whose  iniquities  are  for¬ 
given,  and  whose  sins  are  covered .  Blessed  is  the 
man  to  whom  the  Lord  will  not  impute  sin  ”  (Rom. 


LTJTHE  RAN  -  C  AL  VIXISTIC  THEORY. 


163 


iv.  6-8).  The  imputation  of  righteousness  when 
there  is  no  inherent  and  real  righteousness,  accord¬ 
ing  to  this  explanation  of  St.  Paul,  is  simply  the  for¬ 
giveness  of  iniquity,  or  the  non-imputation  of  sin. 
It  is  a  gratuitous  imputation,  and  a  gratuitous  jus¬ 
tification.  But  when  Placaeus  proposed  to  carry 
the  doctrine  of  a  gratuitous  imputation,  such  as 
holds  true  of  Christ’s  righteousness,  over  to  Adam’s 
sin,  and  proposed  to  impute  the  Adamic  guilt  with¬ 
out  any  real  and  inherent  demerit  upon  the  part  of 
the  posterity,  in  the  same  manner  that  the  right¬ 
eousness  of  Christ  is  imputed  without  any  real  and 
inherent  merit  upon  the  part  of  the  elect,  Turretine 
and  Heidegger  opposed  him.  The  doctrine  of  a 
gratuitous  justification  is  intelligible  and  rational ; 
but  the  doctrine  of  a  gratuitous  damnation  is  unin¬ 
telligible  and  absurd.  Hence  the  Formula  Consen¬ 
sus  taught  that  “  man  previous  to  the  commission 
of  any  single  or  4  actual  ’  transgression,  is  exposed 
to  the  divine  wrath  and  curse  from  his  very  birth, 
.  .  .  first,  on  account  of  the  transgression  and  dis¬ 
obedience  which  he  committed  in  the  loins  of  Adam? 
The  posterity  must  be  really,  and  not  fictitiously,  in 
the  person  of  the  progenitor,  in  order  that  they  may 
be  u  immediately  ”  and  justly  charged  with  a  com¬ 
mon  guilt.1 

1  The  Swiss  theologian  Stapfer  the  corruption  of  the  nature,  but 
and  the  elder  Edwards  have  been  denying  the  imputation  of  the 
represented  as  adopting  the  Sau-  first  act  of  apostasy.  The  late 
mur  theory  of  imputation,  that  Principal  Cunningham  so  repre- 
is,  as  affirming  the  imputation  of  sents  Stapfer  in  his  “  Reformers 


164 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


§  2.  Lutheran-Calvinistic  Theory  of  Regeneration. 

The  leading  Protestant  symbols  adopt  the  Au¬ 
gust!  nian  view  of  regeneration,  and  particularly  of 
the  impotence  to  good  of  the  apostate  will.  One 


and  the  Reformation”  (p.  384). 
But  this  seems  to  be  an  error. 
The  following  extract  from  Stap- 
fer,  which  Edwards  quotes  with 
approbation  (Original  Sin,  Works 
II.  484.  New  York  Ed.),  is  suffi¬ 
cient  to  prove  that  he  held  to  the 
imputation  of  both  the  Adamic 
sin  and  its  consequences.  “  Our 
opponents  contend  with  us  chief¬ 
ly  on  this  account  :  that  accord¬ 
ing  to  our  doctrine  of  original  sin 
such  an  imputation  of  the  first 
sin  is  maintained,  that  God  with¬ 
out  any  regard  to  universal  native 
corruption  esteems  all  Adam’s 
posterity  as  guilty,  and  holds 
them  liable  to  condemnation 
purely  on  account  of  that  sinful 
act  of  their  first  parent;  so  that 
they,  without  any  respect  to  their 
own  sin,  and  so  as  innocent  in 
themselves,  are  destined  to  eter¬ 
nal  punishment.  I  have,  there¬ 
fore,  ever  been  careful  to  show 
that  our  opponents  do  injuriously 
suppose  those  things  to  be  separa¬ 
ted,  in  our  doctrine,  which  are  by 
no  means  to  be  separated.  The 
whole  of  the  controversy  which 
they  have  with  us  about  this 
matter  evidently  arises  from  this : 
that  they  suppose  the  mediate 
and  the  immediate  imputation  are 


distinguished  one  from  the  other, 
not  only  in  the  manner  of  concep¬ 
tion,  but  in  reality.  And  hence 
they  conceive  of  imputation  as 
immediate  only,  and  abstractly 
from  the  mediate  ;  while  our  di¬ 
vines  suppose  that  neither  one 
ought  to  be  conceived  of  separately 
from  the  other.  Therefore,  I 
choose  not  to  use  any  such  dis¬ 
tinction,  or  to  suppose  any  such 
thing  [as  a  separation  of  the  two], 
in  what  I  have  said  on  the  sub¬ 
ject;  but  have  only  endeavored 
to  explain  the  thing  itself,  and  to 
reconcile  it  with  the  divine  attri¬ 
butes.  And  therefore  I  have 
everywhere  conjoined  both  of  these 
conceptions  concerning  the  impu¬ 
tation  of  Adam’s  first  sin  as  insep¬ 
arable,  and  judged  that  one  ought 
never  to  be  considered  separately 
from  the  other.  [And  although 
I  have  abstained  from  using  the 
distinction,  I  have  nevertheless 
implied  both  Tcinds  of  imputation 
in  my  statements,  nor  have  I  in 
fact  departed  from  the  opinion 
of  our  divines,  or  from  that  of 
the  apostle  Paul.”]  This  last 
clause  in  brackets  is  omitted  in 
Edwards’s  quotation  from  Stap- 
fer.  See  Stapferus  :  Institu¬ 
tions,  Gap.  xvii.  §  78.  Op.  IY.  p. 


LUTHEEAN-CALVINISTIC  THEOEY. 


165 


of  the  most  striking  characteristics  of  the  anthro¬ 
pology  of  the  first  Protestant  theologians  is  the 
marked  difference  which  they  find  between  the  nn- 


562.  Ed.  Tiguri,  1745.  Edwards 
is  equally  explicit  in  affirming  the 
imputation  of  both  the  Adamic 
transgression  and  its  conse¬ 
quences.  In  the  opening  of  his 
treatise  “  On  Original  Sin,”  he 
remarks  as  follows :  “  By  original 
sin,  as  the  phrase  has  been  most 
commonly  used  by  divines,  is 
meant  the  innate  sinful  depravity 
of  the  heart.  But  yet  when  the 
doctrine  of  original  sin  is  spoken 
of,  it  is  vulgarly  understood  in 
that  latitude  as  to  include  not  only 
the  depravity  of  nature ,  but  the 
imputation  of  Adam’s  first  sin; 
or  in  other  words,  the  liableness 
or  exposedness  of  Adam’s  posteri¬ 
ty,  in  the  divine  judgment,  to  par¬ 
take  of  the  punishment  of  that 
sin.  So  far  as  I  know,  most  of 
those  who  have  held  one  of  these 
have  maintained  the  other ;  and 
most  of  those  who  ha/oe  opposed  one 
have  opposed  the  other ;  both  are 
opposed  by  the  author  (Taylor) 
chiefly  attended  to  in  the  follow¬ 
ing  discourse,  in  his  book  on 
Original  Sin ;  and  it  may,  per¬ 
haps,  appear  in  our  future  con¬ 
sideration  of  the  subject,  that 
they  are  closely  connected,  and 
that  the  arguments  which  prove  the 
one  establish  the  other ,  and  that 
there  are  no  more  difficulties  at¬ 
tending  the  allowing  of  one  than 
the  other" — The  views  of  Stap- 


fer  respecting  the  voluntariness 
of  original  sin  are  expressed  in 
the  following  objections  and  re¬ 
plies.  u  Objection :  In  order  that 
any  action  may  be  called  sin,  it 
must  be  free  and  voluntary,  for 
whatever  occurs  compulsorily,  or 
in  unconsciousness  and  without 
our  consent  and  will,  cannot  be 
regarded  and  imputed  to  us  as 
sin.  But  if  we  are  corrupt  by 
birth,  the  consent  of  our  will  is 
excluded.  Hence,  corruption  by 
birth  cannot  be  held  to  be  sin,  or 
imputed  to  us  as  such.  Reply: 
In  the  first  place,  there  is  ample 
room  for  such  a  voluntary  con¬ 
sent,  in  the  instance  of  birth-sin. 
For  the  human  race  is  to  be  re¬ 
garded  as  one  moral  person, 
which  person  in  Adam  its  head, 
not  its  natural  merely  but  also  its 
federal  head,  made  a  covenant 
with  God,  and  in  so  doing  gave 
consent  to  all  those  things  which 
Adam  as  a  public  person  stipulat¬ 
ed  and  performed  for  himself  and 
all  his  posterity.  But  where 
there  is  consent  there  is  a  place 
for  will  and  liberty ;  and  where 
these  are,  there  can  be  transgres¬ 
sion  of  the  law  and  sin.  In  the 
second  place,  if  man  is  born  cor¬ 
rupt,  and  is  such  from  the  first 
moment  of  his  existence,  he  also 
sins  spontaneously ;  but  in  being 
a  spontaneous  transgressor  of  the 


166 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


fallen  and  the  fallen  Adam,  or  between  man  by  cre¬ 
ation  and  man  by  apostasy.  Man  as  created  has 
plenary  power  to  be  perfectly  holy.  Man  as  apos¬ 
tate  is  destitute  of  this  power.  According  to  Luther 
and  Calvin,  the  loss  of  power  to  good  is  one  of  the 
inevitable  effects  of  sin,  so  that  sin  might  be  defined 
to  be  an  inability  to  holiness.  Hence  they  refuse 
to  attribute  to  .fallen  man  those  gifts  and  energies 
of  unfallen  humanity  which  they  held  to  have  been 
lost  in  and  by  the  voluntary  act  of  apostasy.  After 
this  act  of  self-will,  which  is  subsequent  to  the  cre¬ 
ative  act,  they  concede  to  man  no  power  to  become 
spiritually  perfect  and  holy.  The  utmost  to  which 
he  is  competent,  without  renewing  grace,  is  acts  of 
external  morality.  “  The  churches,”  says  the  Augs¬ 
burg  Confession ,  u  teach  that  the  human  will  has  a 
certain  liberty  sufficient  for  attaining  morality  (civi- 
lem  justitiam),  and  choosing  things  that  appear  rea¬ 
sonable.  But  it  has  not  the  power,  without  the 
Spirit  of  God,  to  attain  holiness  or  spiritual  right¬ 
eousness,  because  the  carnal  man  cannot  (pit  dvva- 
tcu)  know  spiritual  things  (1  Cor.  ii.  14).  Augus¬ 
tine  says  this  in  the  same  words  (Hypognosticon, 
lib.  iii.),  4  We  acknowledge  that  free  will  is  in  all 
men ;  that  it  has  indeed  a  rational  judgment  by 
means  of  which  it  is  able  to  begin  and  finish,  with¬ 
out  God’s  grace,  not  those  things  which  pertain  to 
God,  but  those  works  that  relate  to  this  present 


law,  lie  consents  to  that  corrup-  sin.”  Stapfepjts  :  Institutions, 
tion,  and  thus  it  is  also  his  own  Cap.  XVI.  §  58,  59. 


LTTTHERAN-CALVINISTIC  THEORY. 


167 


life, — the  good  as  well  as  the  bad.  The  good,  I 
say  ;  meaning  those  which  are  in  their  place  right 
and  proper :  e.  g. :  to  choose  to  work  in  the  field,  to 
choose  to  eat  and  drink,  to  choose  to  have  a  friend, 
to  choose  to  have  clothes,  to  choose  to  build  a 
house,  to  marry  a  wife,  to  learn  an  art,  or  whatever 
allowable  and  proper  thing  it  may  be  that  pertains 
to  the  present  life.’  The  churches  also  condemn 
the  Pelagians  and  others  who  teach  that  wdthout 
the  Holy  Spirit,  by  natural  powers  (naturae  viri- 
bus)  alone,  we  are  able  to  love  God  supremely.”1 
Consonant  with  these  statements  of  the  Augsburg 
Confession,  is  the  following  from  the  Apology.  u  The 
human  will  is  able,  after  a  certain  sort  (aliquo  modo), 
to  attain  civil  righteousness,  or  the  righteousness  of 
works :  It  is  able  to  converse  about  God,  to  render 
to  God  an  external  worship,  to  obey  magistrates  and 
parents  in  externals,  to  keep  the  hands  from  mur¬ 
der,  adultery,  and  theft.  ...  We  concede,  therefore, 
to  the  will  of  man  the  power  to  perform  the  exter¬ 
nal  works  of  the  law,  but  not  the  inward  and  spirit¬ 
ual  works, — as,  for  example,  to  truly  revere  God,  to 
truly  trust  in  God,  to  truly  know  and  feel  that  God 
regards  us  with  pity,  hears  our  prayers,  and  pardons 
our  sins,  &c.  These  are  the  genuine  works  of  the 
first  table  of  the  law,  which  no  human  heart  is  able 
to  perform  without  the  Holy  Spirit,  as  Paul  says  (2 
Cor.  ii.  14) :  L  The  natural  man,  that  is  man  using 


1  Hase  :  Libri  Symbolici,  p.  15. 


168 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


only  Ills  natural  powers,  perceiveth  not  the  things 
of  God.’  ”  1 2  The  Formula  Concordiae ,  the  symbol 
of  High  Lutheranism,  teaches  that  u  before  man  is 
illuminated,  converted,  regenerated,  and  drawn  by 
the  Holy  Spirit,  he  can  no  more  operate,  co-operate, 
or  even  make  a  beginning  towards  his  conversion  or 
regeneration,  with  his  own  natural  powers,  than  can 
a  stone,  a  tree,  or  a  piece  of  clay.” 2  Luther's  ex¬ 
pressions  respecting  the  impotence  of  the  sinful  will 
are  marked  by  his  usual  decision  and  boldness.  At 
the  Leipsic  Disputation,  he  compared  man  to  a  saw 
in  the  hand  of  the  workman ;  and  in  his  commenta¬ 
ry  upon  Genesis  xix.  he  says :  “  In  spiritualibus  et 
divinis  rebus,  quae  ad  animae  salutem  spectant, 
homo  est  instar  statuae  salis,  in  quam  uxor  patri- 
archae  Loth  est  conversa  ;  imo  est  similis  trunco  et 
lapidi,  statuae  vita  carenti,  quae  neque  oculorum, 
oris,  aut  ullorum  sensuum  cordis  usum  habet.”  In 
his  work  De  servo  arbitrio ,  written  against  Eras¬ 
mus,  he  compares  the  divine  exhortations  to  obedi¬ 
ence  addressed  to  men,  to  the  irony  of  a  parent  who 
says  ‘  Come  now,’  to  a  little  child,  although  he  knows 
that  he  cannot  come.8 

The  Reformed  or  Calvinistic  division  of  the  Pro¬ 
testants  were  equally  positive  and  clear,  in  their  as- 

1  Hase  :  Libri  Symbolici,  pp.  3  Compare  also  Luther  :  On 

218-219.  Galatians  ii.  20. 

2  Hase  :  Libri  Symbolici,  p. 

662. 


LTTTHEEAN-CALVIXISTIC  THEOEY. 


169 


sertion  of  the  bondage  of  the  apostate  will,  and  of 
the  monergistic  theory  of  regeneration. 

The  First  Helvetic  Confession ,  an  important 
Calvinistic  symbol  drawn  up  under  the  influence  of 
Bullinger,  makes  the  following  statement.  a  We  at¬ 
tribute  free  will  to  man  in  this  sense,  viz. :  that  when 
in  the  use  of  our  faculties  of  understanding  and  will 
we  attempt  to  perform  good  and  evil  actions,  we  are 
able  to  perform  the  evil  of  our  own  accord  and  by 
our  own  power,  but  to  embrace  and  follow  out  the 
good,  we  are  not  able,  unless  illuminated  by  the 
grace  of  Christ,  and  impelled  by  his  Spirit.  For  it 
is  God  who  works  in  us  to  will  and  to  do,  according 
to  his  good  pleasure ;  and  from  God  is  salvation, 
from  ourselves  perdition.”1  The  Second  Helvetic 
Confession ,  drawn  up  entirely  by  Bullinger,  is  yet 
more  explicit  and  detailed  upon  the  subject  of  re¬ 
generation,  and  the  relations  of  the  human  will  to  it. 
It  considers  the  state  of  man  in  three  respects  :  first, 
his  state  before  his  fall ;  second,  his  state  after  his 
fall ;  third,  the  nature  of  his  agency  in  regeneration. 
Its  language  is  as  follows  :  “Man  before  the  fall  was 
upright  (rectus)  and  free ;  he  was  able  to  remain 
holy,  or  to  decline  into  evil.  He  declined  to  evil, 
and  involved  in  sin  and  death  both  himself  and  the 
whole  race  of  men.  Next,  we  must  consider  the 
condition  of  man  after  the  fall.  The  intellect  of 
man  was  not  taken  away  by  the  fall,  neither  was  he 


1  Niemeyeb  :  Collectio,  pp.  116, 117. 


170  HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 

robbed  of  his  will  and  changed  into  a  stock  or 
stone  ;  but  his  intellect  and  will  were  so  changed 
and  enfeebled  (imminuta),  that  they  cannot  any 
longer  perform  what  they  could  before  the  fall. 
The  intellect  is  darkened,  and  the  will  has  been^ 
converted  from  a  free  into  an  enslaved  faculty.  For 
it  is  the  servant  of  sin ;  not  unwillingly,  but  willing¬ 
ly.  For  it  is  still  a  will,  and  not  a  nill  (voluntas, 
non  noluntas  dicitur).  Hence,  in  respect  to  sin, 
man  is  not  coerced  either  by  God  or  by  Satan,  but 
does  evil  of  his  own  voluntariness  (sua  sponte)  ;  and 
in  this  respect  exercises  the  freest  possible  choice. 
But  in  respect  to  holiness,  the  intellect  of  man  does 
not  of  itself  rightly  judge  concerning  divine  things. 
The  scripture  requires  regeneration  in  order  to  sal¬ 
vation.  Hence  our  first  birth  from  Adam  contrib¬ 
utes  nothing  to  our  salvation.  Paul  says, 4  The  nat¬ 
ural  man  perceiveth  not  the  things  of  the  Spirit  of 
God,  for  they  are  foolishness  unto  him ;  neither  can 
he  know  them,  because  they  are  spiritually  dis¬ 
cerned.’  The  same  apostle  asserts,  that  4  we  are 
not  sufficient  of  ourselves  to  think  any  good  thing 
as  of  ourselves  ;  but  our  sufficiency  is  of  God.’  But 
it  is  evident  that  the  mind  or  intellect  is  the  guide 
and  leader  of  the  will ;  if  therefore  the  guide  is  blind, 
it  is  easy  to  see  how  far  the  will  also  is  affected. 
Wherefore,  there  is  no  free  will  to  good  in  an  un¬ 
renewed  man  ;  no  strength  for  acting  holily.  Our 
Lord,  in  the  Gospel  says :  4  Verily,  verily,  I  say  unto 
you,  whosoever  committeth  sin  is  the  servant  of 


LUTHERAX-CALVENTSTIC  THEORY. 


171 


sin.’  And  the  apostle  Paul  asserts  that  ‘the  car¬ 
nal  mind  is  enmity  against  God ;  for  it  is  not  sub¬ 
ject  to  the  law  of  God,  neither  indeed  can  be.’  In 
the  third  place,  we  are  to  consider  whether  the  re¬ 
generate  have  free  will,  and  how  far  (an  regenerati 
sint  liberi  arbitrii,  et  quatenus).  In  regeneration, 
the  intellect  is  enlightened  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  so 
that  it  apprehends  the  mysteries  and  will  of  God. 
And  the  will  itself  is  not  only  changed  (muta- 
tur)  by  the  Spirit,  but  is  strengthened  in  its  en¬ 
ergies  (instruitur  facultatibus),  so  that  it  sponta¬ 
neously  wills  and  performs  the  good.  Unless  we 
concede  this  we  deny  Christian  liberty,  and  bring 
in  legal  servitude.  The  prophet  ( J er.  xxxi. ;  Ezek. 
xxxvi.)  represents  God  as  saying :  c  I  will  put  my 
law  in  their  inward  parts,  and  write  it  in  their 
hearts.’  Our  Lord  (John  vii.)  also  says  :  ‘  If  the  Son 
make  you  free,  ye  shall  be  free  indeed.’  Paul,  also, 
says  to  the  Philippians  (Phil.  i.  29)  :  c  Unto  you  it  is 
given  in  the  behalf  of  Christ,  not  only  to  believe  oil 
him,  but  also  to  suffer  for  his  sake ;  ’  and  again  (Phil, 
i.  6)  :  ‘ I  am  confident  that  he  which  hath  begun  a 
good  work  in  you,  will  perfect  ( stutsXsgsi )  it  until 
the  day  of  Jesus  Christ;’  and  again  (Phil.  ii.  13): 
‘It  is  God  which  worketh  in  you,  both  to  will  and 
to  do.’” 

Respecting  man’s  agency  in  regeneration,  the 
Second  Helvetic  Confession  teaches  that  the  hu¬ 
man  activity  is  the  effect  of  the  Divine  activity. 
u  The  regenerate,”  says  this  creed,  u  in  the  choice 


172  HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 

and  working  of  that  which  is  good,  not  only  act 
passively,  but  actively  also  (regenerates  in  boni 
electione  et  operatione,  non  tantmn  agere  passive, 
sed  active).  For  they  are  acted  upon  by  God,  that 
they  themselves  may  act  what  they  do  act  (aguntur 
enim  a  Deo,  ut  agant  ipsi,  quod  agant).  Rightly 
does  Augustine  adduce  the  fact  that  God  is  styled 
our  helper  (adjutor).  But  no  one  can  be  helped, 
except  as  there  is  activity  in  him  (nequit  autem 
adjuvari,  nisi  is,  qui  aliquid  agit).  The  Manichaeans 
despoil  man  of  all  activity,  and  make  him  as  a  stock 
or  stone.” 1 

By  the  above  phrase  u  acting  passively,”  the 
formers  of  this  creed  appear  to  mean,  that  the  sinful 
will,  in  relation  to  the  strictly  renewing  agency  of 
the  Holy  Spirit,  is  recipient,  or  is  acted  upon,  while 
yet  it  is  a  will  and  not  a  stone  ;  and  by  u  acting  ac¬ 
tively,”  they  mean  that  as  a  consequence  of  this 
passivity  it  becomes  spontaneously  active  in  holi¬ 
ness.  The  regenerating  energy  does  not  find  or 
leave  the  human  will  inert  and  lifeless,  like  a  stock 
or  stone,  but  makes  it  willing  and  energetic  to  good, 
with  the  same  energy  and  intensity  with  which  it 
had  been  willing  and  energetic  to  evil. 


1  Niemeyek  :  Collectio  in  locis. 


173 


melanciitiion’s  synergism. 


§  3.  MdanckthorHs  Synergism . 

Melanchthon  took  a  leading  part  in  the  con¬ 
struction  of  the  Augsburg  Confession  and  the  Apol¬ 
ogy  ;  both  of  which  asserted  the  Augustinian  doc¬ 
trine  of  original  sin,  and  the  monergistic  theory 
of  regeneration.  But  when  the  difficult  points  in¬ 
volved  in  the  doctrine  of  grace  and  regeneration 
came  to  be  discussed  among  the  Protestants,  and 
the  Calvinistic  division,  in  particular,  asserted  the 
helplessness  of  the  human  will  with  great  energy, 
and  emphasized  the  tenet  of  election  and  predes¬ 
tination,  Melanchthon  receded  somewhat  from  his 
earlier  opinions,  and  adopted  a  species  of  synergism. 
He  expressed  his  views  in  a  revised  form  of  the 
Augsburg  Confession,  which  goes  under  the  name 
of  the  Variatci ,  and  in  his  important  theological 
manual,  entitled  Loci  Communes .  Instead  of  ex¬ 
plaining  regeneration  as  Luther  and  Calvin  did,  and 
as  he  himself  did  when  the  Augsburg  Confession 
was  drawn  up,  as  the  effect  of  the  Divine  efficiency 
simply  and  solely,  he  asserts  that  “  concurrunt  tres 
causae  bonae  actionis,  verbum  Dei,  Spiritus  Sanctus, 
et  humana  voluntas  assentiens  nec  repugnans  verbo 
Dei.”  The  human  soul,  according  to  Melanchthon, 
though  apostate,  yet  retains  an  appetency  faint  and 
ineffectual,  yet  real  and  inalienable,  towards  the 
spiritual  and  the  holy.  Into  this  seeking,  or  faint 
striving  (clinamen)  in  the  right  direction,  the  grace 


174 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY". 


of  God  enters,  and  brings  it  to  a  result.  This  form 
of  synergism,  though  the  nearest  to  monergism  of 
any,  because  it  reduces  down  the  human  factor  to  a 
minimum  is,  yet,  not  the  monergism  of  Luther  and 
Calvin.  Hase,  who  is  certainly  not  biassed  in  favor 
of  monergism,  remarks  that  u  the  synergism  ema¬ 
nating  from  Melanchthon  may  be  regarded  as  a  re¬ 
mote  tendency  to  Pelagianism ;  first,  in  that  the  co¬ 
operation  of  man  toward  his  own  change  of  charac¬ 
ter  (Bessrung)  appears  to  be  founded  upon  natural 
endeavors,  and  not  upon  the  inward  operation  of 
the  Holy  Spirit ;  and  secondly,  in  that  the  non- 
resistance  of  the  sinner  at  the  commencement  of  the 
change  of  heart  is  represented  as  a  positive  active 
concurrence  of  will.”  1 

§  4.  Zuingle'1  s  Doctrine  of  Original  Sin. 

The  only  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  Protestant 
Reformation  who  did  not  accept  the  Augustinian 
doctrine  of  original  sin  was  Zuingle .  This  active 
and  energetic  mind  seems  to  have  inclined  to  that 
theory,  prevalent  in  the  second  and  third  centuries, 
which  we  have  designated  by  the  general  name  of 
the  Greek  anthropology,  and  which  reappeared  in 
Semi-Pelagianism.  But  the  opinions  of  Zuingle 
upon  original  sin  were  confined  to  the  circle  of  his 


1  Ease  :  Hutterus  Redivivus,  p.  er  :  Dogmengeschichte,  III.  428. 
275.  See  further  extracts  in  Compare  History  of  Symbols,  m- 
Munscher-Von  Colln-Neudeok-  pra. 


zuingle’s  doctrine  of  original  sin.  175 

own  personal  influence,  and  did  not  spread  like 
those  of  Luther  and  Calvin  through  the  Protestant 
churches.  They  were  not  adopted  into  any  symbol, 
and  did  not  constitute  the  foundation  of  any  ecclesi¬ 
astical  body. 

Zuingle  sent  a  statement  of  his  theological  senti¬ 
ments  to  the  diet  at  Augsburg  in  1530,  where  so 
many  religious  parties  were  represented.  It  is  en¬ 
titled  Zuingle’s  Fidei  Ratio ,  and  from  it  we  extract 
the  following  representation  of  his  views  of  original 
sin.  u  I  think  this  in  regard  to  original  sin.  That 
is  properly  sin  which  is  transgression  of  the  law ;  for 
where  no  law  is  there  is  no  transgression ;  and  where 
there  is  no  transgression  there  is  no  sin  properly  so 
called, — that  is  to  say,  so  far  as  by  sin  is  meant 
wickedness,  crime,  villainy,  or  guilt.  I  acknowl¬ 
edge,  therefore,  that  our  first  father  sinned  a  sin 
that  is  truly  sin, — that  is,  wickedness,  crime,  and 
turpitude.  But  those  who  are  generated  from  that 
person  did  not  sin  in  this  manner, — for  what  one  of 
us  bit  with  his  teeth  the  forbidden  apple  in  Para¬ 
dise  ?  Hence,  whether  we  will  or  no,  we  are  com¬ 
pelled  to  admit  that  original  sin,  as  it  is  in  the  pos¬ 
terity  of  Adam,  is  not  truly  sin ,  in  the  sense  alrea¬ 
dy  spoken  of ;  for  it  is  not  a  crime  committed 
against  law.  Consequently,  it  is  properly  speak¬ 
ing  a  disease  and  condition.  A  disease ,  because 
as  Adam  fell  from  love  of  himself,  so  also  do  we 
fall.  A  condition ,  because  as  he  became  a  slave, 
and  obnoxious  to  death,  so  also  we  are  born  slaves 


176 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


and  children  of  wrath,  and  obnoxious  to  death  .  .  . 
Adam  died,  on  account  of  sin,  and  being  thus  dead, 
that  is  sentenced  to  death,  in  this  condition  [status] 
he  generated  us.  Therefore  we  also  die, — so  far  as 
he  is  concerned,  by  his  fault  and  culpability ;  but 
so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  by  our  condition  and 
disease,  or,  if  you  prefer,  ‘sin,’ — but  sin  improperly 
so  called.  Let  us  illustrate  by  an  example.  A  man 
is  taken  captive  in  war.  Upon  the  ground  of  his 
own  personal  hostility  to  his  captors,  and  treachery 
towards  them,  he  deserves  to  be  made  a  slave,  and 
is  so  held.  Now  they  who  are  born  of  him  in  this 
condition  are  slaves, — not  by  virtue  of  their  own 
fault,  guilt,  or  crime,  but  by  virtue  of  their  condi¬ 
tion  [status],  which  condition  is  the  consequence  of 
the  guilt  of  their  father,  who  had  deserved  to  come 
into  it  by  his  individual  fault.  The  children  in  this 
instance  are  not  laden  with  crime  itself,  but  with 
the  punishment,  fine,  loss,  or  damage  of  crime,— that 
is,  with  a  wretched  condition  of  servitude.”  1 

The  difference  between  this  view,  and  that  of 
the  Lutheran  and  Calvinistic  symbols  from  which 
we  have  quoted,  is  plain.  So  far  as  the  will  is  con¬ 
cerned,  Zuingle  does  not  hold  the  doctrine  of  the 
Adamic  unity,  and  hence  he  cannot  concede  from  his 
position  the  doctrine  of  a  common  apostasy  and  guilt. 
The  Adamic  transgression,  according  to  the  Zuing- 
lian  theory,  was  only  nominally  and  by  a  mental 
fiction  the  transgression  of  the  posterity,  and  hence 

1  Niemeyer  :  Collectio,  pp.  20,  21. 


zuingle’s  doctrine  of  original  sin.  177 


the  sinfulness  of  it  when  attributed  to  the  posterity, 
is  only  nominal.  At  the  same  time,  he  left  unan¬ 
swered  that  question  which  drove  Augustine  to¬ 
wards  the  theory  of  Traducianism,  viz. :  Why  are 
the  posterity  of  Adam,  who  by  the  supposition  are 
entirely  innocent  of  Adam’s  act  of  apostasy,  visited 
with  all  the  dreadful  temporal  and  eternal  conse¬ 
quences  of  that  act  ?  For  Zuingle  expressly  says 
that  the  posterity,  though  guiltless  of  the  primitive 
act  of  apostasy,  are  “  born  slaves,  and  children  of 
wrath ,  and  obnoxious  to  death.” 

YOL.  II. — 12 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


THE  ARMINIAN  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


§  1.  Arminian  theory  of  Original  Sin . 

The  Protestant  Reformation  reinstated,  we  have 
seen,  the  Augustinian  anthropology.  Both  the  Lu¬ 
theran  and  Calvinistic  creeds  teach  the  doctrines  of 
the  Adamic  unity,  both  as  to  soul  and  body,  of  the 
imputation  of  the  original  act  of  apostasy  to  all 
men  and  the  guilt  of  original  sin,  and  of  monergism 
in  regeneration. 

The  Arminians  were  a  Protestant  party  who 
receded  from  this  dogmatic  position  of  the  first  Re¬ 
formers,  and  made  some  modifications  of  the  doc- 


1  For  sources  see  :  Arminius  : 
Opera  (translated  by  Nichols) ; 
Episcopius  :  Opera,  Ed.  Roter- 
dami,  1665 ;  Limbokchus  :  Theolo- 
gia  Christiana ;  Brandt  :  History 
of  the  Reformation  in  the  Low 
Countries,  Y ol.  III. ;  Jeremy  Tay¬ 


lor  :  On  Original  Sin ;  John 
Taylor  :  On  Original  Sin  ;  Whit¬ 
by  :  On  Original  Sin ;  Owen  :  Dis¬ 
play  of  Arminianism ;  Edwards  : 
On  Original  Sin;  Hallam:  Lit¬ 
erature  of  Europe,  Yol.  II.  (Har¬ 
pers’  Ed.). 


ARMINIAN  THEORY  OF  ORIGINAL  SIN.  179 


trines  of  sin  and  grace  which  were  in  the  direction 
of  the  Greek  anthropology  and  the  Semi-Pelagian- 
ism  of  the  Ancient  Church,  though  not  identical  in 
every  respect. 

The  clearest  and  most  particular  statement  of 
the  Arminian  system,  in  its  first  form,  is  found  in  the 
Confession  or  Declaration 1  drawn  up  by  Episcopius, 
and  in  the  Apology  which  he  subsequently  compos¬ 
ed  in  explanation  and  defence  of  it.  The  writings 
of  Arminius,  although  they  do  not  furnish  any  for¬ 
mal  creed-statement,  nevertheless  throw  much  light 
upon  the  process  by  which  Arminianism  was  grad¬ 
ually  formed  by  a  mind  that  had  been  trained  up 
under  Beza,  and  had  reacted  from  his  supra-lapsari- 
anism. 

The  Arminian  anthropology  accepts  the  doctrine 
of  the  Adamic  unity,  and  states  it  in  substantially 
the  same  phraseology  with  the  Lutheran  and  Cal- 
vinistic  symbols;  but  it  explains  the  phraseology 
very  differently  from  them.  The  language  of  the 
Confession  or  Declaration ,2  upon  this  subject,  is  the 

1  Confessio  sive  Declaratio  Re-  time  when  this  sin  was  commit- 

monstrantium ;  Apologia  pro  Con-  ted,  were  in  their  loins,  and  who 
fessione.  Episcopius  :  Opera  II.  have  since  descended  from  them 
Ed.  Roterdami,  1665.  by  the  natural  mode  of  propaga- 

2  The  statement  of  Arminius  is  tion,  according  to  the  primitive 
also  very  closely  similar  in  phrase-  benediction.  For  in  Adam  ‘all 
ology  to  that  of  the  Calvinistic  have  sinned.’  Wherefore,  what- 
symbols.  “The  whole  of  this  ever  punishment  was  brought 
[Adamic]  sin,  however,  is  not  pe-  down  upon  our  first  parents,  has 
culiar  to  our  first  parents,  but  is  likewise  pervaded,  and  yet  pur- 
common  to  the  entire  race  and  to  sues  all  their  posterity.  So  that 
all  their  posterity,  who,  at  the  all  men  ‘  are  by  nature  the  chil- 


180 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


following.  u  Adam  together  with  Eve  transgressed 
the  law  of  God.  By  this  transgression,  man,  in  ac¬ 
cordance  with  the  divine  threatening,  was  made  lia¬ 
ble  to  eternal  death  and  manifold  miseries,  and  was 
deprived  of  that  primitive  felicity  which  he  had  re¬ 
ceived  in  creation  .  .  .  But  since  Adam  was  the 
stem  and  root  of  the  whole  human  race  ...  he  in¬ 
volved  all  his  posterity  who,  as  it  were  (quasi),  had 
been  shut  up  in  his  loins  and  were  to  issue  from  him 
by  natural  generation,  in  the  same  death  and  mis¬ 
ery,  and  implicated  them  with  himself,  so  that  all 
men,  indiscriminately,  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  alone 
being  excepted,  through  this  one  single  sin  of  Adam 
(per  hoc  unicum  Adami  peccatum)  have  been  de¬ 
prived  of  that  primitive  felicity,  and  have  lost  that 
true  righteousness  wrhich  is  necessary  in  order  to 
eternal  life,  and  thus  are  born  even  now  exposed  to 
that  death  which  we  have  mentioned,  and  to  mani¬ 
fold  miseries.  And  this  is  commonly  denominated 
original  sin.  In  respect  to  which ,  nevertheless ,  the 
doctrine  must  be  held ,  that  the  most  benevolent  God 
has  provided  for  all  a  remedy  for  that  general  evil 
which  was  derived  to  us  from  Adam ,  free  and  gra¬ 
tuitous  in  his  beloved  Son  Jesus  Christ,  as  it  were  a 
new  and  another  Adam.  So  that  the  hurtful  error 
of  those  is  plainly  apparent ,  who  are  accustomed  to 

dren  of  wrath,’  obnoxious  to  con-  nius  :  Disputatio  VIL  (Nichols’ 
demnation,  and  to  temporal  as  translation,  I.  486). 
well  as  to  eternal  death.”  Akmi- 


ARMINIAN  THEORY  OF  ORIGINAL  SIN.  181 


found  upon  that  [ original ]  sin  the  decree  of  absolute 
reprobation ,  invented  by  themselves.” 1 

The  doctrine  of  Redemption  seems  to  be  brought 
to  view  in  the  above  statement,  in  such  a  connection 
as  to  imply,  that  the  evil  which  has  come  upon  the 
posterity  of  Adam  is  of  the  nature  of  a  misfortune, 
and  not  of  a  fault.  It  is  not  a  sin  that  intrinsically 
merits  eternal  reprobation,  so  that  God  would  have 
been  just  had  he  provided  no  redemption  from  it. 
Mankind  are  indeed  subject  to  loss  by  their  connec¬ 
tion  with  the  progenitor,  but  the  Divine  compassion 
has  granted  a  compensation  in  the  method  of  salva¬ 
tion. 

Hence,  when  this  phraseology  respecting  the 
Adamic  connection  and  sin  comes  to  be  interpreted 
in  the  Apology ,  we  find  that  the  Arminian  theolo¬ 
gians  hold  original  sin  to  be  original  evil  only,  and 
not  guilt.  The  following  extracts  from  the  careful 
explanation  given  by  Episcopius  show  this.  “  The 
Remonstrants  do  not  regard  original  sin  as  sin  prop¬ 
erly  so  called,  which  renders  the  posterity  of  Adam 
deserving  of  the  hatred  of  God  ;  nor  as  an  evil  which 
by  thk  method  of  punishment  properly  so  called 
(per  modum  proprie  dictae  poenae)  passes  from 
Adam  to  his  posterity ;  but  as  an  evil,  infirmity, 
injury  (infirmitas,  vitium),  or  by  whatever  other 
name  it  may  be  called,  which  is  propagated  to  his 
posterity  by  Adam  devoid  of  original  righteousness. 


1  Confessio  Remonstkantium  :  Caput  VII. 


182 


HISTOEY  OF  ANTHEOPOLOGY. 


Whence  it  results,  that  all  the  posterity  of  Adam, 
destitute  of  the  same  righteousness,  are  wholly  unfit 
for,  and  incapable  of  attaining  eternal  life, — either 
to  return  of  themselves  into  favor  with  God,  or  to 
discover  a  way  whereby  they  may  return, — except 
God  by  his  new  grace  go  before  them,  and  restore 
as  w^ell  as  supply  (restituat  ac  sufficiat)  new  strength 
by  which  they  can  attain  it.  And  this  the  Remon¬ 
strants  believe  to  have  been  signified  by  the  expul¬ 
sion  of  Adam  from  paradise,  the  type  of  heaven. 
For  this  calamity  (calamitas)  happened  not  only  to 
Adam,  but  was  common  with  him  to  all  the  pos¬ 
terity  of  Adam.  But  that  original  sin  (peccatum 
originis)  is  not  evil  in  any  other  sense  than  this, — 
that  it  is  not  evil  in  the  sense  of  implying  guilt  and 
desert  of  punishment  (malum  culpae,  aut  malum 
poenae), — is  plain.  It  is  not  evil  in  the  sense  of 
implying  guilt,  because  to  be  born  is  confessedly  an 
involuntary  thing,  and  therefore  it  is  an  involuntary 
thing  to  be  born  with  this  or  that,  stain  (labes),  in¬ 
firmity,  injury,  or  evil.  But  if  it  is  not  an  evil  in 
the  sense  of  implying  guilt,  then  it  cannot  be  an  evil 
in  the  sense  of  desert  of  punishment;  because  guilt 
and  punishment  are  correlated  ...  So  far,  there¬ 
fore,  as  original  sin  is  an  evil,  it  must  be  in  the  sense 
in  which  the  Remonstrants  define  the  term ;  and 
is  called  original  sin  by  a  misuse  of  the  word  1  sin  ’ 
( xaTa%Qri6TLxtii ).  And  this  was  the  very  sentiment 
of  Zuingle, — at  least  that  which  he  at  first  asserted, 


ARMINIAN  THEORY  OF  ORIGINAL  SIN.  183 


and  defended ;  whether  he  afterwards  retracted  it, 
is  not  certain.”  1 

In  defining  the  doctrine  of  imputation,  the  au¬ 
thor  of  the  Apology  denies  that  the  posterity  were 
one  with  Adam  in  the  primal  act  of  apostasy,  and, 
consequently,  affirms  that  the  Adamic  transgression 
cannot  be  imputed  to  the  posterity  as  truly  and 
properly  their  sin.  aThe  Remonstrants  acknowl¬ 
edge  that  the  sin  of  Adam  may  be  said  to  be  im¬ 
puted  to  his  posterity,  so  far  forth  as  God  has  willed 
that  the  posterity  of  Adam  should  be  born  subject 
to  the  same  evil  to  which  Adam  subjected  himself 
by  his  sin, 2  or,  so  far  forth  as  God  has  permitted 
the  evil,  which  had  been  inflicted  upon  Adam  as  a 
punishment,  should  flow  and  pass  over  to  his  pos¬ 
terity  [not  as  punishment ,  but  as  propagated  evil]. 
But  there  is  no  ground  for  the  assertion ,  that  the  sin 
of  Adam  was  imputed  to  his  posterity  in  the  sense 
that  God  actually  judged  the  posterity  of  Adam  to 
be  guilty  of  and  chargeable  with  (reos),  the  same  sin 


1  Apologia  pro  Confessione  Re- 
monstrantium,  Cap.  VII.  in  Epis- 
copius  :  Opera  II. 

2  Yet  this  “  evil,”  according  to 
the  statement  in  the  Confessio 
sive  Declaration  is  “  eternal  death, 
together  with  manifold  miseries.” 
Eternal  death,  therefore,  falls  as 
punishment  upon  Adam,  and  as 
evil  but  not  punishment  upon  the 
posterity.  In  the  Apology ,  it  is 
taught  that  temporal  death,  or 
the  death  of  the  body,  is  not  di¬ 


rectly  a  part  of  the  penalty  threat¬ 
ened  to  Adam.  The  body  of 
Adam  was  mortal  by  creation, 
but  in  case  he  had  not  sinned, 
death  would  not  have  befallen  it, 
by  reason  of  a  divine  prevention, 
— “mortem  homini  primo  natu- 
ralem  fuisse,  sed  mortem,  quae 
naturalis  homini  futura  fuisset, 
non  eventuram  homini  fuisse  di- 
vino  beneficio,  nisi  peccaret.” 
Apologia,  Cap.  VII. 


184 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


and  crime  (culpa)  which  Adam  had  committed . 
Neither  scripture,  nor  truth,  nor  wisdom,  nor  divine 
benevolence,  nor  the  nature  of  sin,  nor  the  idea  of 
justice  and  equity,  allow  that  they  should  say  that 
the  sin  of  Adam  was  thus  imputed  to  his  posterity. 
Scripture  testifies  that  God  threatened  punishment 
to  Adam  alone ,  and  inflicted  it  upon  Adam  alone ; 
the  Divine  benevolence,  veracity,  and  wisdom,  do 
not  permit  that  one  person’s  sin  should  be  imputed, 
strictly  and  literally,  to  another  person ;  it  is  con¬ 
trary  to  the  nature  of  sin,  that  that  should  be  re¬ 
garded  as  sin,  and  be  properly  imputed  as  sin, 
which  was  not  committed  by  individual  will  (pro¬ 
pria  voluntate) ;  it  is  contrary  to  justice  and  equity, 
that  any  one  should  be  charged  as  guilty,  for  a  sin 
that  is  not  his  own,  or  that  he  should  be  judged  to 
be  really  guilty  who  in  respect  to  his  own  individ¬ 
ual  voluntariness  is  innocent,  or,  rather,  not  guilty. 
And  the  injustice  is  the  greater,  in  proportion  as  the 
punishment  which  follows  the  imputation  is  severer. 
Consequently,  it  is  the  height  of  injustice,  when  the 
penalty  is  an  eternal  suffering.” 1  Arminius,  also,  in 
his  Apology  or  Defence ,  remarks :  “  It  may  admit 
of  discussion,  whether  God  could  be  angry  on  ac¬ 
count  of  original  sin  which  was  born  with  us,  since 
it  seems  to  be  inflicted  upon  us  by  God  as  a  punish¬ 
ment  of  the  actual  sin  which  had  been  committed  by 
Adam,  and  by  us  in  him  [putatively  or  nominally, 


1  Apologia  pro  Confessione  Remonstrantium,  Cap.  VII. 


ARMINIAN  THEORY  OF  ORIGINAL  SIN.  185 

i.  e.]  ...  I  do  not  deny  that  it  is  sin,  bnt  it  is  not 
actual  sin  ...  We  must  distinguish  between  ac¬ 
tual  sin  and  that  which  is  the  cause  of  other  sins , 
and  which  on  this  very  account  may  be  denominated 
c  sin.’  ” 1  In  further  proof  of  the  position,  that  the 
hereditary  evil  which  is  transmitted  by  propagation 
does  not  render  the  soul  worthy  of  eternal  damna¬ 
tion,  as  it  would  if  it  were  really  and  properly  sin, 
the  Apology  makes  the  following  statement  respect¬ 
ing  the  character  of  infants:  “The  Remonstrants 
decide  with  confidence,  that  God  neither  will,  nor 
justly  can ,  destine  to  eternal  torment  any  infants 
who  die  without  actual  and  individual  sins,  upon  the 
ground  of  a  sin  which  is  called  L  original,’  which  is 
said  to  be  contracted  by  infants  by  no  individual 
fault  of  theirs,  but  by  the  fault  of  another  person, 
and  which  is  believed  to  be  theirs  for  no  other  rea¬ 
son  than  that  God  wills  arbitrarily  to  impute  it  to 
them.  This  opinion  is  contrary  to  the  Divine  be¬ 
nevolence,  and  to  right  reason ;  nay  it  is  uncertain 
which  is  greater,  its  absurdity  or  its  cruelty.” 

These  extracts  are  sufficient  to  prove  that  the 
Arminian  theologians  did  not  believe  that  the  unity 
between  Adam  and  his  posterity,  which  they  as¬ 
serted  in  their  Confession  or  Declaration ,  was  of 
such  a  nature  as  to  make  the  first  sinful  act  of  Adam 
a  common  act  of  mankind,  and  thereby  justify  the 
imputation  of  original  sin  as  truly  and  properly  sin. 


1  Abminius  :  Works  by  Nichols,  I.  374. 


186 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


Though  employing  the  Augustinian  phraseology 
respecting  the  Adamic  connection,  they  put  a  dif¬ 
ferent  interpretation  upon  it  from  that  which  is 
found  in  both  Lutheran  and  Calvinistic  symbols. 
Their  objection  to  the  doctrine  that  original  sin  is 
guilt,  proceeds  upon  the  assumption  that  Adam’s 
act  of  apostasy  was  purely  individual ,  and  that  the 
posterity  were  not  in  the  progenitor  in  any  such 
real  sense  as  the  phraseology  of  their  own  doctrinal 
statements,  if  taken  in  its  strict  and  literal  accepta¬ 
tion,  would  imply. 

§  2.  Arminian  Theory  of  Regeneration. 

The  Arminian  anthropology  also  accepts  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  impotence  to  good  of  the  apostate  will, 
and  states  it  in  substantially  the  same  phraseology 
with  that  of  the  Lutheran  and  Calvinistic  symbols ; 
but  it  makes  explanations  and  modifications  that 
bring  it  into  conflict  with  some  fundamental  posi¬ 
tions  of  the  Reformers  upon  this  subject. 

The  Confession  or  Declaration  of  the  Remon¬ 
strants  makes  the  following  statement :  u  Man  has 
not  saving  faith  from  himself,  neither  is  he  regen¬ 
erated  or  converted  by  the  force  of  his  own  free 
will ;  since,  in  the  state  of  sin,  he  is  not  able,  of  and 
by  himself,  to  think,  will,  or  do  any  good  thing, — 
any  good  thing  that  is  saving  in  its  nature,  partic¬ 
ularly  conversion  and  saving  faith.  But  it  is  neces¬ 
sary  that  he  be  regenerated,  and  wholly  renewed, 


AEMINIAN  THEOEY  OF  EEOENEEATION.  187 


by  God  in  Christ,  through  the  truth  of  the  gospel 
and  the  added  energy  of  the  Holy  Spirit, — in  intel¬ 
lect,  affections,  will,  and  all  his  faculties, — so  that  he  . 
may  be  able  (possit)  rightly  to  perceive,  meditate 
upon,  will,  and  accomplish  that  which  is  a  saving 
good.” 1  This  taken  by  itself,  and  understood  in  its 
literal  obvious  sense,  would  express  the  monergism 
of  Augustine,  Anselm,  and  the  Reformers  ;  but  a  the¬ 
ory  of  grace  is  associated  with  it  that  differs  essen¬ 
tially  from  theirs.  This  theory  is  presented  in  the 
following  extract  from  the  Confession  :  “  Although 
there  is  the  greatest  diversity  in  the  degrees  in  which 
grace  is  bestowed  in  accordance  with  the  Divine 
will,  yet  the  Holy  Spirit  confers,  or  at  least  is  ready 
to  confer,  upon  all  and  each  to  whom  the  word  of 
faith  is  ordinarily  preached,  as  much  grace  as  is 
sufficient  for  generating  faith  and  carrying  forward 
their  conversion  in  its  successive  stages.  Thus,  suf¬ 
ficient  grace  for  faith  and  conversion  is  allotted  not 
only  to  those  who  actually  believe  and  are  convert¬ 
ed,  hut  also  to  those  who  do  not  actually  believe ,  and 
are  not  in  fact  converted.  ...  So  that  there  is  no 
decree  of  absolute  reprobation.” 2  This  view  of  grace 
is  synergistic.  Every  man  that  hears  the  gospel  re¬ 
ceives  a  degree  of  grace  that  is  sufficient  for  regene¬ 
ration.  If,  therefore,  he  is  not  regenerated  it  must 
be  from  the  want  of  some  human  efficiency  to  co¬ 
operate  with  the  Divine ;  and  therefore  the  differ- 

1  Confessio  sive  Declaratio,  5  Oonfessio  sive  Declaratio, 
Cap.  XVII.  Cap.  XVII. 


188 


HISTOEY  OF  ANTHKOPOLOGY. 


ence  between  tbe  saved  and  tbe  lost,  tbe  elect  and 
the  non-elect,  is  ultimately  referable  to  tbe  human 
will.  So  far  as  the  divine  influence  is  concerned, 
the  saved  and  lost  stand  upon  the  same  position, 
and  receive  a  degree  of  grace  that  is  sufficient  to 
save.  But  the  former  makes  the  grace  effectual  by 
an  act  of  his  own  will ;  while  the  latter  nullifies  it 
by  the  same  method.  According  to  the  monergistic 
theory,  on  the  contrary,  no  man  receives  a  grace  that 
is  sufficient  for  regeneration  who  does  not  receive 
such  a  degree  of  Divine  influence  as  overcomes  his 
hostile  will ;  so  that  regeneration  is  not  conditioned 
upon  any  human  efficiency,  but  is  the  result  of  a 
sovereign  and  irresistible  energy.  The  dependence 
upon  grace,  in  regeneration,  in  the  Arminian  anthro¬ 
pology,  is  partial  /  in  the  Calvinistic  anthropology, 
is  total .  “  Grace,”  says  Limborch,1  u  is  not  the  soli¬ 

tary ■,  yet  it  is  the  primary  cause  of  salvation ;  for 
the  co-operation  of  free  will  is  due  to  grace  as  a 
primary  cause ;  for  unless  the  free  will  had  been 
excited  (excitatum)  by  prevenient  grace,  it  would 
not  be  able  to  co-operate  with  grace.”  Here  the 
influence  of  grace  upon  the  will  is  that  of  excitation 
or  stimulation,  and  not  of  renovation.  Hence  Lim¬ 
borch  can  properly  denominate  the  will’s  activity, 
co-operation .  The  faculty  is  inert  and  sluggish,  as 
distinguished  from  averse  and  hostile,  and  hence  it 
can  co-work  in  its  own  regeneration. 


1  Theologia  Christiana,  Lib.  IV.  cap.  xiv.  §  21. 


ARMINIAN  THEORY  OF  REGENERATION.  189 


The  doctrine  of  human  inability  and  divine 
grace  is  still  further  modified  by  the  Arminian 
theologians,  by  the  position  that  God  cannot  demand 
faith  irrespective  of  the  bestowment  of  grace.  This 
is  very  explicitly  asserted  by  Arminius,  in  his  an¬ 
swer  to  the  question :  c  Can  God,  now,  in  his  own 
right,  require  from  fallen  man  faith  in  Christ,  which 
he  cannot  have  of  himself?  Or  does  God  bestow 
on  all  and  every  one,  to  whom  the  gospel  is  preach¬ 
ed,  sufficient  grace  by  which  they  may  believe  if 
they  will  ?  ’  This  was  one  of  i  Nine  Questions  ’  that 
were  presented  to  the  professors  of  divinity  in  the 
university  of  Leyden,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
their  views ;  and  to  it  Arminius  gave  the  following 
reply :  “  The  parts  of  this  question  are  not  opposed 
to  each  other ;  on  the  contrary  they  are  in  perfect 
agreement.  So  that  the  latter  clause  may  be  con¬ 
sidered  as  giving  the  reason,  why  God  may  require 
from  fallen  man  faith  in  Christ  which  he  cannot 
have  of  himself.  For  God  may  require  this,  since 
he  has  determined  to  bestow  on  man  sufficient  grace 
by  which  he  may  believe.  Perhaps,  therefore,  the 
question  may  be  thus  stated :  c  Can  God,  now,  in 
his  own  right,  demand  from  fallen  man  faith  in 
Christ  which  he  cannot  have  of  himself,  though 
God  neither  bestows  on  him,  nor  is  ready  to  be¬ 
stow,  sufficient  grace  by  which  he  may  believe  ?  ’ 
This  question  must  be  answered  by  a  direct  negative . 
God  cannot  by  any  right  demand  from  fallen  man 
faith  in  Christ  which  he  cannot  have  of  himself, 


190 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


except  God  lias  either  bestowed,  or  is  ready  to 
bestow,  sufficient  grace  by  which  he  may  believe 
if  he  will”1 

This  doctrine  that  the  obligation  to  faith  does 
not  rest  upon  fallen  man  irrespective  of  the  aids  of 
the  Holy  Spirit  grew  logically  out  of  the  Arminian 
definition  of  original  sin.  The  inherited  corruption 
has  indeed  brought  man  into  such  a  condition  that 
he  cannot  renew  and  save  himself;  but  his  cor¬ 
ruption  is  an  ‘  infirmity’  or  ‘injury’  and  not  a  sin 
and  fault.  It  is  physical  evil,  and  not  culpable 
transgression.  It  is  the  result  of  Adam’s  individual 
act  of  apostasy,  and  not  of  an  agency  common  to  him 
and  his  posterity.  The  disability,  therefore,  under 
which  man  labors  at  birth  is  a  misfortune,  and  not 
a  crime.  Original  sin  is  not  guilt.  As  a  conse¬ 
quence,  it  is  no  more  than  equitable,  that  God 
should  furnish  a  grace  that  shall  be  a  sufficient  as¬ 
sistance  to  overcome  the  inherited  evil.  In  accord¬ 
ance  with  this  view,  the  Apology  of  the  Remon¬ 
strants  teaches  that  God  grants  a  common  grace  to 
the  heathen,  which  if  rightly  used  is  sufficient  to 
secure  moral  virtue  and  salvation.  The  argument 
is  as  follows :  u  In  order  that  an  act  may  be  morally 
good,  it  is  sufficient  if  it  accords  with  right  reason, 
— i.  e.,  if  it  proceeds  from  a  mind  which,  though  it 
be  ignorant  of  the  written  law  and  the  gospel,  is 
really  actuated  by  a  desire  for  virtue,  honesty,  and 
probity,  and  does  not  intend  to  do  anything  con- 

1  Arminius  :  Works  by  Nichols,  I.  p.  383. 


ARMINIAN  THEORY  OF  REGENERATION.  191 


trary  to  the  divine  will,  and  is  not  influenced  by 
vain  glory  and  self-love.  For  that  a  morally  good 
act  does  not  necessarily  include  the  distinct  inten¬ 
tion  to  do  only  that  which  the  written  law  or  gos¬ 
pel  commands, — viz. :  the  positive  desire  to  promote 
the  divine  glory,  and  faith  in  Christ, — is  evident 
from  the  nature  of  the  case ;  for  there  have  been 
many  in  every  age,  and  still  are  to  this  day,  who 
never  even  heard  of  the  written  law  and  gospel, 
who,  nevertheless,  no  one  would  venture  to  deny, 
were  and  are  morally  good  and  virtuous  (quos 
tamen  moraliter  bonos  ac  virtuosos  esse  aut  fuisse, 
nemo  facile  negaverit) .”  In  answer  to  the  objec¬ 
tion  drawn  from  the  text :  “  Without  faith  it  is  im¬ 
possible  to  please  God,”  the  Apology  explains  this 
to  refer  to  a  special  divine  approbation,  such  as  was 
shown  to  Enoch  in  his  translation.  It  has  no  gen¬ 
eral  reference.  Again,  the  text:  “Whatsoever  is 
not  of  faith  is  sin,”  does  not  refer  to  justifying  faith, 
but  to  sincerity  and  confidence  in  the  mind.1  With 
this,  accords  the  following  statement  of  Limborch, 
who  ranks  with  Episcopius  as  authority  in  the 
estimation  of  the  Dutch  Arminians.  The  question 
is  asked:  Are  all  those  who  are  destitute  of  the 
knowledge  of  the  gospel  to  be  numbered  among 
the  lost,  upon  the  ground  that  they  have  no  means 
whereby  they  can  attain  to  eternal  life  ?  To  this  Lim- 
borch  answers :  “  This  does  not  appear  at  all  con¬ 
formable  to  truth.  .  .  .  On  the  contrary,  if  certain 

1  Apologia  Remonstrantium,  Cap.  VI.  Episoopius  :  Opera  II.  146. 


192 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


[pagans],  in  proportion  to  tlie  measure  of  strength 
granted  to  them  through  that  grace  which  is  com¬ 
mon  to  all  men,  strive  after  natural  uprightness 
(honestati  naturali  operam  dent),  we  believe  that 
they  also  are  pleasing  to  God  (Deo  gratos  esse),  in 
proportion  to  the  kind  of  life  they  lead,  nor  are  cer¬ 
tainly  excluded  from  salvation,  and  at  the  very  least' 
are  not  to  be  adjudged  to  eternal  fire.” 1 

Such  being  the  Arminian  theory  of  original  sin 
and  regeneration,  it  was  natural  and  logical  that 
the  Arminian  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  pre¬ 
destination  and  election  should  also  differ  from 
that  of  Augustine  and  Calvin  in  a  very  marked 
degree.  Arminius’s  first  doubts  in  respect  to  the 
Calvinism  in  which  he  had  been  educated  took 
their  origin  in  this  part  of  the  system.  Beza,  under 
whom  he  had  studied  theology,  had  adopted  the 
swprorlarpsarian  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  pre¬ 
destination,  which  renders  the  doctrine  more  austere 
and  repelling  than  the  infra-lapsarian 2 3  representa¬ 
tion.  In  his  reaction,  he,  and  his  followers  after 


1  Theologia  Christiana,  Lib.  IY. 

cap.  ii. 

3  Snpra-lapsarianism  bolds,  that 
the  decree  to  eternal  bliss  or  eter¬ 
nal  woe  precedes,  in  the  order  of 
nature,  the  decree  to  apostasy; 
lnfra-lapsarianism  holds  that  it 
succeeds  it.  According  to  the 
Supra-lapsarians,  the  primary  de¬ 
cree  is  to  bliss  or  woe ;  and  the 
decrees  to  create  men,  that  they 


shall  apostatize,  and  from  this 
apostasy  some  be  recovered  and 
some  reprobated,  are  merely  the 
means  of  accomplishing  the  pri¬ 
mary  decree.  According  to  the 
Infra-lapsarians,  the  decrees  to 
create  men,  and  that  they  shall 
apostatize,  are  prior  to  that  of 
election  and  reprobation ;  because 
men  are  elected  from  out  of  a 
state  of  sin  and  ruin,  or  else  are 


ARMENIAN  THEORY  OF  REGENERATION.  193 


him,  adopted  a  theory  of  election  and  predestina¬ 
tion  which  differs  essentially  from  that  of  the  Re¬ 
formers,  and  from  the  Augustinian.  It  is  the  theory 
of  conditional  election;  or  of  election  upon  the 
ground  of  a  foreseen  faith. 

Arminius’s  views  are  explicitly  stated  by  him¬ 
self,  in  his  Declaration  of  Sentiments ,  which  he  de¬ 
livered  before  the  States  of  Holland  in  1608,  and 
are  as  follows :  “  The  first  decree  of  God  concerning 
the  salvation  of  man  is  that  by  which  he  decreed  to 
appoint  his  Son,  Jesus  Christ,  for  a  Mediator.  The 
second  decree  of  God  is  that  by  which  he  decreed 
to  receive  into  favor  those  who  repent  and  believe 
.  .  .  but  to  leave  in  sin,  and  under  wrath,  all  im¬ 
penitent  persons  and  unbelievers.  The  third  divine 
decree  is  that  by  which  God  decreed  to  administer, 
in  a  sufficient  and  efficacious  manner,  the  means 
which  were  necessary  for  repentance  and  faith.  The 
fourth  divine  decree  is  that  by  which  God  decreed 
to  save  and  damn  certain  particular  persons.  This 
decree  has  its  foundation  in  the  foreknowledge  of 
God,  by  which  he  Tcnew  from  all  eternity  those  indi¬ 
viduals  who  would  believe  through  his  preventing 
grace ,  and  through  his  subsequent  grace  would  per¬ 
severe,  .  .  .  and  by  which  foreknowledge,  he  like¬ 
wise  knew  those  who  would  not  believe  and  perse¬ 
vere.”  1 

reprobated  in  it.  Election  sup-  mar,  who  endeavoured  to  commit 
poses  apostasy  as  a  fact.  The  the  Synod  to  Supra-lapsarianism. 
Synod  of  Dort  favoured  Infra-  1  Arminius  :  Works  by  Nichols, 
lapsarianism,  in  opposition  to  Go-  I.  247. 


194 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


Upon  examining  this  phraseology  it  will  be 
found  to  teach  that  the  decree  of  election  is  not  a 
decree  to  originate  faith  in  the  sinner,  but  to  reward 
faith  in  him.  So  far  as  the  production  of  faith  itself 
is  concerned,  the  electing  decree  only  furnishes  the 
u  means  ”  which  are  necessary  for  repentance  and 
faith.  The  efficiency  that  is  to  use  these  means  is 
partly  the  energy  of  the  Holy  Spirit, — implied  in 
the  administration  of  the  means  u  in  a  sufficient  and 
efficacious  manner,” — and  partly  the  energy  of  the 
human  will.  By  this  last,  the  decree  of  election 
is  conditioned.  God  decrees  to  bestow  salvation 
upon  those  who  make  the  “  means  ”  which  he  be¬ 
stows,  and  the  degree  of  divine  influence  which  he 
grants,  actually  efficacious  by  their  own  self-deci¬ 
sion.1 


§  3.  Recapitulation . 

A  recapitulation  of  the  principal  characteristics 
of  the  Arminian  anthropology,  as  derived  from  the 
original  sources,  gives  the  following  particulars : 

1.  The  Arminians,  in  the  controversy  with  the 
Calvinists,  asserted  that  original  sin  is  not  guilt ;  and 
that  a  decree  of  reprobation  to  eternal  punishment 
could  not  be  founded  upon  it.2  2.  The  Arminians 

1  Compare  History  of  Symbols,  sufficient  to  condemn  the  whole 

2  “  The  Synod  rejects  the  error  human  race,  and  merits  temporal 
of  those  who  teach  that  it  is  not  and  eternal  punishment.”  Ca- 
true  that  original  sin  of  itself  is  nones  Synodi  Dordrechtanae, 


RECAPITULATION. 


195 


held  that  original  sin  does  not  include  a  sinful  incli¬ 
nation  of  the  will ;  it  is  an  inherited  corruption 
whose  seat  is  the  physical  and  intellectual  parts,  but 
not  the  voluntary.1  3.  The  Arminians  asserted  that 
by  reason  of  original  sin,  man  of  himself  is  unable  to 
be  morally  perfect  and  holy  ;  but  inasmuch  as  the 
inherited  corruption  which  is  the  cause  of  this  ina¬ 
bility  is  involuntary,  the  inability  is  a  misfortune 
and  not  a  fault,  and  therefore  man  is  not  obligated 
to  be  morally  perfect  without  the  renewing  grace 
of  the  gospel.  4.  Adam’s  act  of  apostasy  was  pure¬ 
ly  individual,  and  therefore  cannot  be  imputed  to 
his  posterity  as  guilt.  5.  The  will  of  man,  though 
not  competent  to  perfectly  obey  the  law  of  God 
without  the  assisting  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  is 
competent  to  co-operate  with  that  assistance.2  6. 
The  influence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  granted  upon 
condition  that  the  human  will  concurs  and  co-works. 


Cap.  III.  IV.  Niemeyer:  Collec- 
tio,  p.  717. 

1  “  The  synod  rejects  the  error 
of  those  who  teach  that  spiritual 
gifts  are  not  lost  from  the  will  of 
man  in  spiritual  death,  because 
the  will  was  never  corrupted  in 
itself,  but  is  only  impeded  by  the 
darkness  of  the  intellect  and  the 
inordinate  appetites  of  the  flesh  : 
which  impediments  being  remov¬ 
ed,  the  will  is  able  to  exert  its  in¬ 
nate  freedom, — that  is,  of  itself, 
either  to  will  or  to  choose,  or  not 
to  will  or  not  to  choose  whatso¬ 
ever  good  is  set  before  it.”  Ca- 


nones  Syn.  Dordrecht.  Niemey- 
er:  Collectio,  p.  713. 

2  “  The  synod  condemns  the  er¬ 
ror  of  those  who  teach  that  grace 
and  free  will  are  each  partial  and 
concurrent  causes  at  the  com¬ 
mencement  of  conversion ;  that 
grace  does  not  precede  the  effi¬ 
ciency  of  the  will  in  the  order  of 
causality, — that  is,  that  God  does 
not  efficiently  aid  (juvare)  the 
will  of  man  to  conversion,  before 
the  will  itself  moves  and  deter¬ 
mines  itself.”  Canones  Synodi 
Dordrechtanae,  Niemeyer  :  Col¬ 
lectio,  p.  715. 


196 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


The  success  of  the  divine  influence  depends  upon 
the  use  which  man  makes  of  his  own  will ;  conse¬ 
quently,  election  is  conditional  upon  a  foresight  that 
a  particular  man  will  co-operate  with  the  Holy 
Spirit. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


TOTAL  SURVEY  OF  THE  HISTORY  OF 
ANTHROPOLOGY. 


A  review  of  the  ground  we  have  gone  over  in 
Anthropology  will  help  to  generalize,  and  classify, 
the  materials  which  we  have  thus  collected  from  the 
various  sources  and  authorities. 

In  the  first  place,  the  doctrines  of  sin  and  grace, 
in  their  more  difficult  and  scientific  aspects,  did  not 
seriously  engage  the  attention  of  the  Church  during 
the  first  three  centuries  after  the  closing  of  the  New 
Testament  Canon.  No  controversy  arose  respecting 
original  sin  and  regenerating  grace,  until  the  open¬ 
ing  of  the  5th  century.  The  Church,  both  East  and 
West,  generally  held  the  doctrine  of  an  inherited 
corruption  as  distinguished  from  an  inherited  guilt, 
the  doctrine  of  synergistic  regeneration,  and  was  si¬ 
lent  upon  the  doctrine  of  election  and  predestination. 
Secondly .  At  the  same  time,  in  these  first  centuries, 
previous  to  the  Pelagian  controversy,  there  were 
two  tendencies  at  work,  that  had  reference  to  the 


198 


HISTORY  OF  ANTHROPOLOGY. 


doctrine  of  original  sin.  One  was,  to  convert  the 
docfrine  of  inherited  corruption  or  evil,  into  that  of 
inherited  guilt.  The  other  was,  to  abolish  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  inherited  corruption  altogether.  The  first 
tendency  reached  its  terminus  in  Augustinianism 
the  second  in  Pelagianism.  Thirdly.  The  theory 
of  Pelagius,  which  rejected  the  doctrine  of  original 
sin  in  any  definition  of  it,  was  condemned  by  the 
whole  Church,  East  and  West.  This  left  within  the 
Church  two  main  currents  of  opinion  in  anthropol¬ 
ogy, — that  of  the  2d  and  3d  centuries,  and  that  of 
Augustine  ;  or,  the  Greek  and  Latin  Anthropologies. 
The  first  was  the  doctrine  of  inherited  evil  but  not 
inherited  guilt,  with  its  logical  corollaries.  The  last 
was  the  doctrine  of  inherited  guilt,  with  its  logical 
results.  Fourthly.  The  Augustinian  anthropology 
was  rejected  in  the  East,  and  though  at  first  tri¬ 
umphant  in  the  West,  was  gradually  displaced  by 
the  Semi-Pelagian  theory,  or  the  theory  of  inherited 
evil,  and  synergistic  regeneration.  This  theory  was 
finally  stated  for  the  Papal  Church,  in  an  exact 
form,  by  the  Council  of  Trent.  The  Augustinian 
anthropology,  though  advocated  in  the  Middle  Ages 
by  a  few  individuals  like  Gottschalk,  Bede,  Anselm, 
and  Bernard,  slumbered  until  the  Reformation, 
when  it  was  revived  by  Luther  and  Calvin,  and  op¬ 
posed  by  the  Papists.  Fifthly.  After  Protestantism 
had  become  established,  the  old  antagonism  between 
the  two  theories  of  inherited  guilt  and  inherited 
evil,  again  revived  in  the  Calvinistic  and  Arminian 


TOTAL  STTEVEY. 


199 


controversy,  and  has  perpetuated  itself  down  to  the 
present  time, — the  whole  of  modern  evangelical 
Christendom  being  ranged  partly  upon  one  side, 
and  partly  upon  the  other  side  of  the  line  that  sep¬ 
arates  these  two  systems. 

The  opposing  currents  of  opinion  in  Anthropolo¬ 
gy,  then,  have  been  the  following.  In  the  Ancient 
Church ,  the  Greek  and  Latin  anthropologies  in  their 
more  general  forms  prevail  at  first,  and  gradually 
pass  over  into  the  more  distinct  statements  of  Au- 
gustinianism  and  Semi-Pelagianism, — Pelagianism 
being  rejected  by  both  parties.  In  the  Mediaeval 
Church ,  Semi-Pelagianism  has  full  sway,  with  the 
exception  of  a  few  individual  minds.  At  the 
Reformation ,  the  Protestants  re-instate  Augustinian- 
ism,  and  the  Papists  maintain  the  mediaeval  Semi- 
Pelagianism.  In  the  Modern  Church ,  the  Calvin¬ 
ists  re-affirm  the  positions  of  the  first  Protestant 
symbols,  while  the  Arminians  recede  from  them  to¬ 
wards  the  Semi-Pelagian  theory, — both  parties  alike 
rejecting  the  Socinianism  which  had  come  into  ex¬ 
istence,  and  which  corresponds  to  the  Pelagianism 
of  the  Ancient  church. 


BOOK  FIFTH. 


■  -  ■ 

HISTORY 


or 


SOTERIOLOG-Y. 


LITERATURE. 


Anselmus  :  Cur  Deus  Homo  ? 

Petayitts  :  De  theologicis  dogmatibus,  Liber  Xn. 

Bellarminus  :  Disputationes  de  controversiis  fidei  adversus  hujus 
temporis  haereticos. 

Gerhardus  :  Loci  Theologici,  Tom.  IY. 

Canones  Concilii  Tridentini  :  in  locis. 

Grotius  :  Defensio  fidei  catholicae  de  satisfactione. 

Curcellaeus  :  Institutio  religionis  Christianae,  Liber  VII. 
Socinus  :  Praelectiones  Theologicae,  Cap.  XYI.-XVIII. 

Hooker  :  On  Justification. 

Dayenant  :  Disputatio  de  justitia  (translated  by  Allport). 

Owen  :  On  Justification. 

Magee  :  On  Atonement  and  Sacrifice. 

Batjr:  V ersohnungslehre. 

* 

Mohler  :  Symbolik  (translated  by  Robertson). 

Baur  :  Der  Gegensatz  des  Katbolicismus  und  Protestantismus. 
Eyangelische  Kirchenzeitung,  1834 :  Geschicbtliches  aus  der 
V ersohnungs-und  Genugthuungslebre. 

Hasse  :  Anselm  von  Canterbury,  Bd.  H. 

Redepenning:  Origenes. 


CHAPTER  I. 


SOTERIOL  0  G Y  OF  THE  ANCIENT  CHURCH. 


§  1.  Preliminary  Statements . 

In  presenting  the  history  of  the  Doctrine  of 
Atonement,  we  shall  use  the  term  in  its  strict  signi¬ 
fication,  as  denoting  the  expiatory  work  of  Christ. 
Soteriology  has  sometimes  been  made  to  include  the 
subjects  of  Christology  and  the  Incarnation  in  such 
a  manner  that  the  distinctively  piacular  agency  of 
the  Redeemer  constitutes  only  a  very  subordinate 
part  of  this  division  of  Dogmatic  History.  The  doc¬ 
trinal  history  of  Petavius1  furnishes  a  striking  ex¬ 
ample  of  this.  This  writer  treats  of  the  work  of 
Christ  under  the  general  head  of  the  Incarnation. 
While  the  entire  work  comprises  sixteen  books, 
each  containing  upon  an  average  fifteen  chapters, 
the  sacrificial  work  of  Christ  is  briefly  discussed  in 
one,  or  at  most  in  two,2  of  the  chapters  of  the  twelfth 

1  Petayitjs  :  De  theologicis  dog-  2  Chapters  YI.  and  IX. 
matibus. 


204 


HISTOKY  OF  SOTEKIOLOGY. 


book.  This  was  owing  partly  to  the  fact  that  the 
Person  of  Christ,  in  this  history  of  ecclesiastical 
opinions,  was  far  more  in  the  eye  of  the  historian, 
than  the  worh  of  Christ ;  and  partly  because  the 
distinctively  Protestant  doctrine  of  vicarious  satis¬ 
faction  was  not  very  much  a  matter  of  interest  for 
the  strenuous  though  learned  Jesuit.  While,  there¬ 
fore,  the  history  of  the  Arian  and  Sabellian  heresies, 
and  of  the  Monophysite  and  Monothelite  controver¬ 
sies,  is  thoroughly  written,  and  drawn  from  the  im¬ 
mediate  sources,  the  opinions  of  the  apostolic,  pa¬ 
tristic,  and  scholastic  periods,  respecting  the  rela¬ 
tions  of  the  work  of  Christ  to  Divine  justice,  are 
exhibited  in  a  very  meagre  and  unsatisfactory  man¬ 
ner. 

Taking  the  term  atonement  in  its  technical  sig¬ 
nification,  to  denote  the  satisfaction  of  Divine  justice 
for  the  sin  of  man ,  by  the  substituted jpenal  sufferings 
of  the  Son  of  God ,  we  shall  find  a  slower  scientific 
unfolding  of  this  great  cardinal  doctrine  than  of  any 
other  of  the  principal  truths  of  Christianity.  Our 
investigations  in  this  branch  of  inquiry  will  disclose 
the  fact,  that  while  the  doctrines  of  Theology  and 
Anthropology  received  a  considerably  full  develop¬ 
ment  during  the  Patristic  and  Scholastic  periods,  it 
was  reserved  for  the  Protestant  church,  and  the 
Modern  theological  mind,  to  bring  the  doctrines  of 
Soteriology  to  a  correspondent  degree  of  expansion. 


GNOSTIC  AND  EBIONITE  THEORIES. 


205 


§  2.  Gnostic  and  Ebionite  Theories  of  the  Atone¬ 
ment. 

c 

During  the  first  two  centuries,  the  Christian  the¬ 
ologian  was  led  to  investigate  the  doctrine  of  the 
work  of  Christ,  either  by  the  attacks  of  heretics,  or 
the  defective  statements  of  pretended  believers.  As 
in  the  history  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  we 
found  exact  statements  to  be  forced  upon  the  church 
by  the  inaccurate  statements  of  false  teachers,  so  we 
shall  see  in  the  history  of  the  doctrine  of  Atonement, 
that  the  truth  received  its  scientific  development  no 
faster  than  the  Christian  mind  was  urged  up  either 
to  a  defensive,  or  a  polemic  position,  by  the  activity 
of  the  heretic  or  the  latitudinarian.  There  were 
two  heretical  views  of  the  Atonement,  during  the 
first  two  centuries,  which,  inasmuch  as  they  affected 
the  true  view  of  the  work  of  Christ,  gave  direction 
to  the  orthodox  statements  of  it.  These  were  the 
Gnostic  and  the  Ebionite. 

Gnosticism  appeared  in  two  forms,  and  broach¬ 
ed  two  theories  respecting  the  JPerson  and  work  of 
Christ.  That  of  Basilides  (a,  d.  125)  affirmed  only 
a  human  suffering  in  the  Redeemer,  which  was  not 
expiatory,  for  two  reasons :  first,  because  as  merely 
human  it  was  finite,  and  inadequate  to  atone  for  the 
sins  of  the  whole  world  of  mankind ;  and,  secondly, 
because  the  idea  of  substituted  penal  suffering  is  in¬ 
admissible.  Penal  suffering,  or  suffering  for  pur- 


206 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


I 


poses  of  justice,  Basilides  maintained,  of  necessity 
implies  personal  criminality  in  the  sufferer,  and 
therefore  can  never  be  endured  by  an  innocent  per¬ 
son  like  Christ.  The  principle  of  vicarious  substi¬ 
tution ,  in  reference  to  justice,  is  untenable.  The 
Gnosticism  of  Marcion  (a.  d.  150)  affirmed  a  divine 
suffering  in  the  Redeemer,  which  however  was  only 
apparent,  because  the  Logos  having  assumed  a  do- 
cetic,  or  spectral  human  body,  only  a  seeming  suffer¬ 
ing  could  occur.  This  suffering,  like  that  in  the 
scheme  of  Basilides,  could  not  of  course  be  expia¬ 
tory.1  It  was  merely  emblematical, — designed  to 
symbolize  the  religious  truth,  that  man  in  order  to 
his  true  and  highest  life  must  die  to  the  earthly 
life.  The  Ebionite  denied  any  connection  between 
man  and  God  in  the  Person  of  the  Redeemer,  other 
than  that  which  exists  in  the  life  of  any  and  every 
man.  Rejecting  the  doctrine  of  expiation  altogeth¬ 
er,  he  occupied  the  position  of  the  Jew,  whom  Paul 
so  constantly  opposes,  and  insisted  upon  a  purely 
legal  righteousness. 

If  now  we  examine  these  Gnostic  and  Judaizing 
theories,  we  find  that  they  agree  in  one  capital  re¬ 
spect, — viz. :  in  the  rejection  of  the  Scripture  doc¬ 
trine  of  a  real  and  true  expiation  of  human  guilt. 
The  Gnostic  and  the  Ebionite,  though  differing 

1  u  For  Thou  hadst  not  forgiven  by  the  crucifixion  of  a  phantasm , 
me  any  of  these  things  in  Christ :  which  I  believed  Him  to  be  ?  ” 
nor  had  He  abolished  by  His  cross  Augustine  :  Confessions,  V.  ix. 
the  enmity  which  by  my  sins  I  16. 
had  incurred.  For  how  could  He, 


SOTEEIOLOGY  OF  THE  APOSTOLIC  FATHEES.  207 


much  in  their  general  notions  respecting  the  Person 
of  Christ,  both  agreed  in  regard  to  his  atoning 
work.  Both  alike  rejected  the  doctrine  of  atone¬ 
ment ,  in  the  strict  and  proper  meaning  of  the  term, 
as  signifying  the  satisfaction  of  justice. 

§  3.  Soteriology  of  the  Apostolic  Fathers . 

The  first  endeavour  of  the  orthodox  mind,  in 
opposition  to  these  heretical  opinions,  was,  conse¬ 
quently,  to  exhibit  the  nature  and  purpose  of  the 
sufferings  and  death  of  Christ.  So  far  as  their 
nature  is  concerned,  they  were  uniformly  and  dis¬ 
tinctly  affirmed  to  be  the  sufferings  and  death  of  a 
theanthropic  Person, — i.  e.,  a  being  in  whom  Deity 
and  humanity  were  mysteriously  blended  in  the 
unity  of  a  single  personality.  With  respect  to  their 
purpose,  the  point  with  which  we  are  more  immedi¬ 
ately  concerned,  we  shall  find  less  distinctness  in  the 
earlier  than  in  the  later  periods  of  the  history  of 
this  doctrine ;  yet  at  the  same  time,  an  unequivocal 
statement  that  the  purpose  of  Christ’s  death  is  judi¬ 
cial,  and  expiatory  of  human  guilt. 

In  the  writings  of  the  Apostolic  Fathers ,  we  ob- 

...  -  °  ■ 

tain  the  views  of  the  Church  upon  the  doctrine  of 
the  Atonement  during  the  first  half  century  after 
the  death  of  the  last  inspired  apostle  (a.  d.  100- 
150).  Examining  them,  we  find  chiefly  the  rep¬ 
etition  of  Scripture  phraseology,  without  further  at¬ 
tempt  at  an  explanatory  doctrinal  statement.  There 


208 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


is  no  scientific  construction  of  the  doctrine  of  Atone- 
ment  in  tlie  writings  of  these  devout  and  pious  dis¬ 
ciples  of  Paul  and  John ;  yet  the  idea  of  vicarious 
satisfaction  is  distinctly  enunciated  by  them.  Poly r- 
carp  (f  168),  the  pupil  of  John,  writes  in  his  Epistle 
to  the  Philippians:  “  Christ  is  our  Saviour ;  for  through 
grace  are  we  righteous,  not  by  works  ;  for  our  sins, 
he  has  even  taken  death  upon  himself  ’  has  become 
the  servant  of  us  all,  and  through  his  death  for  us 
our  hope,  and  the  pledge  of  our  righteousness.  The 
heaviest  sin  is  unbelief  in  Christ ;  his  blood  will  be 
demanded  of  unbelievers  ;  for  to  those  to  whom  the 
death  of  Christ,  which  obtains  the  forgiveness  of 
sins ,  does  not  prove  a  ground  of  justification,  it 
proves  a  ground  of  condemnation.”  “Our  Lord 
J esus  Christ  suffered  himself  to  be  brought  even  to 
death  for  our  sins  ;  .  .  .  let  us,  therefore,  without 
ceasing,  hold  steadfastly  to  him  who  is  our  hope, 
and  the  earnest  of  our  righteousness,  even  Jesus 
Christ,  4  who  bare  our  sins  in  his  own  body  on  the 
tree.’”1  Ignatius  (f  116),  the  pupil  of  John,  is 
perhaps  somewhat  less  urgent  than  Polycarp,  in 
respect  to  the  point  of  vicarious  satisfaction.  He 
seems  more  inclined  to  consider  the  work  of  Christ, 
in  reference  to  the  sanctification  than  the  justifica¬ 
tion  of  the  believer.  It  is  a  favourite  view  with 
him,  that  the  death  of  Christ  brings  the  human 
soul  into  communion  with  Christ.  It  is  the  means 


1  Polycarpus  :  Ad  Philippos,  1,  8. 


SOTEKIOLOGY  OF  THE  APOSTOLIC  FATHERS.  209 


of  imparting  that  principle  of  spiritual  life  which 
was  lost  in  the  fall.  Christ’s  redemptive  work  is  a 
manifestation  of  love,  of  self-denying  and  self-impart¬ 
ing  affection  on  the  part  of  the  Redeemer,  by  which 
a  corresponding  affection  is  wrought  in  the  heart 
of  the  believer.  And  yet  the  expiatory  agency  of 
Christ  is  explicitly  recognized  by  Ignatius.  In  one 
passage,  he  speaks  of  Christ  as  the  One  u  who  gave 
himself  to  God,  an  offering  and  sacrifice  for  us?  In 
another  place,  he  bids  believers  to  “  stir  ”  themselves 
up  to  duty,  “  by  the  blood  of  God .”  In  another  place, 
he  remarks  that  u  if  God  had  dealt  with  us  accord¬ 
ing  to  our  works,  we  should  not  now  have  had  a  be¬ 
ing  ;  ”  but  that  now  under  the  gospel,  we  u  have  peace 
through  the  flesh ,  and  blood ,  and  passion  of  Jesus 
Christ^ 1  In  Barnabas ,  the  pupil  of  Paul,  we  find  a 
clear  expression  of  the  atoning  agency  of  the  Redeem¬ 
er.  Such  phraseology  as  the  following  contains  the 
doctrine  of  justification  as  distinguished  from  sancti¬ 
fication:  uThe  Lord  endured  to  deliver  his  body 
to  death,  that  we  might  be  sanctified  by  the  re¬ 
mission  of  sins  which  is  by  the  shedding  of  that 
blood.  ” 2  Clement  of  Borne ,  a  disciple  of  Paul,  in  his 
First  Epistle  to  the  Corinthians  speaks,  generally, 
more  of  Christ’s  work  than  of  other  parts  of  the 
Christian  system,  and  dwells  particularly  upon  his 
death.  The  view  of  Christ’s  sufferings,  he  says, 

1  Ignatius  :  Ad  Ephesos,  1 ;  Ad  3  Baknabas  :  Epistola,  5. 

Magnesios,  10  ;  Ad  Trallios  (Pre¬ 
face). 


210 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


consumes  pride,  teaches  us  humility,  and  draws  us 
to  the  death  of  penitence  (c.  7).  Hence  it  is  a  chief 
sign  and  duty  of  a  Christian  continually  to  have  the 
death  of  Christ  before  his  eye.  His  meaning  in 
this,  says  Dorner,  is  not  merely  that  Christ  has  pre¬ 
sented  us  an  example  of  humility  and  patience, 
though  this  thought  is  not  foreign  to  Clement 
(c.  16) ;  but  his  death  is  the  principle,  or  efficient 
cause  of  true  repentance, — i.  e.,  works  that  repent¬ 
ance  which  in  faith  receives  actual  forgiveness  of 
sins.  For  “  his  blood  was  given  for  us,  was  poured 
out  for  our  salvation ;  he  gave ,  by  the  will  of  God, 
his  body  for  our  body ,  his  soul  for  our  soul  ”  (c.  49). 
Every  explanation  of  these  passages,  continues  Dor¬ 
ner,  is  forced,  which  does  not  find  in  them  the  idea 
of  vicarious  substitution,  and  this  not  merely  in  the 
sense  of  a  subjective  disposition,  like  that  which  led 
Christ  to  suffer  for  the  good  of  others,  but  an  ob¬ 
jective  work  producing  objective  results,  in  refer¬ 
ence  to  the  Divine  nature  and  government. 1  Hence, 
the  name  so  frequently  given  to  Christ  in  the  Epis¬ 
tle  to  the  Hebrews  of  “  high  priest  ”  is  very  com¬ 
mon  in  Clement.  The  following  extracts  exhibit 
the  distinctness  with  which  Clement  discriminated 
justification  from  sanctification :  “  Let  us  look  stead¬ 
fastly  to  the  blood  of  Christ,  and  see  how  precious 
his  blood  is  in  the  sight  of  God,  which  being  shed 
for  our  salvation  hath  obtained  the  grace  of  repent- 


Dokner  :  Person  Christi,  I.  138  sq. 


SOTERIOLOGrY  OF  THE  APOSTOLIC  FATHERS.  211 

ance  to  the  whole  world.  ...  We  are  not  jus¬ 
tified  by  ourselves,  neither  by  our  own  wisdom,  or 
knowledge,  or  piety,  or  the  works  which  we  have 
done  in  holiness  of  heart,  but  by  that  faith  by  which 
almighty  God  hath  justified  all  men  from  the  be¬ 
ginning.”  1  In  the  statement  that  “  we  are  not  jus¬ 
tified  by  the  works  which  we  have  done  in  holiness 
of  heart,”  the  most  subtle  form  of  the  doctrine  of 
justification  by  works  is  precluded,  fourteen  cen¬ 
turies  before  its  enunciation  at  Trent. 

It  is  evident  from  this  examination  of  the  very 
brief  writings  of  the  Apostolic  Fathers,  that  they 
recognized  the  doctrine  of  atonement  for  sin  by  the 
death  of  the  Redeemer  as  one  taught  in  the  Scrip¬ 
tures,  and  especially  in  the  writings  of  those  two 
great  apostles,  John  and  Paul,  at  whose  feet  they 
had  most  of  them  been  brought  up.  They  did  not, 
however,  venture  beyond  the  phraseology  of  Scrip¬ 
ture  ;  and  they  attempted  no  rationale  of  the  dogma. 
Their  unanimous  and  energetic  rejection  of  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  justification  by  works  evinces  that  they  did 
not  stand  upon  the  position  of  legalism.  The  evan¬ 
gelical  tenet  was  heartily  and  earnestly  held  in  their 
religious  experience,  but  it  was  not  drawn  forth  from 
this  its  warm  and  glowing  home,  into  the  cool  and 
clear  light  of  the  intellect,  and  of  theological  science. 
The  relations  of  this  sacrificial  death  to  the  justice 
of  God  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the  conscience  of 


1  Clemens  Romanus  :  Ad  Corinthos,  7,  32. 


212 


HISTORY  OF  SOTEEIOLOGY. 


man  on  the  other, — the  judicial  reasons  and  grounds 
of  this  death  of  the  most  exalted  of  Personages, — 
were  left  to  be  investigated  and  exhibited  in 
later  ages,  and  by  other  generations  of  theolo¬ 
gians. 


§  4.  Early  Patristic  Soteriology. 

Passing  from  the  Apostolic  to  the  Primitive 
Fathers ,  we  find  some  progress  in  the  scientific 
statement  of  the  doctrine  of  Atonement.  Yet, 
taken  as  a  whole,  the  body  of  Patristic  theology 
exhibits  but  an  imperfect  theoretic  comprehension 
of  the  most  fundamental  truth  in  the  Christian  sys-, 
tern, — imperfect,  that  is,  when  compared  with  the 
very  able  scientific  construction  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  Trinity  which  we  have  found  in  the  Patristic 
writings. 

One  characteristic  of  the  Early  Patristic  Soteri¬ 
ology  which  strikes  the  attention  is  the  important 
part  which  the  doctrine  of  Satan  plays  in  it.  The 
i  death  of  Christ  is  often  represented  as  ransoming 
man  from  the  power  and  slavery  of  the  devil.  Such 
passages  as  Colossians  ii.  15,  and  Hebrews  ii.  14, — 
“  Having  spoiled  principalities  and  powers  [Satanic 
dominion],  he  made  a  show  of  them  openly,  triumph¬ 
ing  over  them  in  it.  ...  That  through  death 
he  might  destroy  him  that  had  the  power  of  death, 
that  is,  the  devil,” — were  made  the  foundation  of 


EARLY  PATRISTIC  SOTERIOLOGY. 


213 


this  view.1  The  writer  who  exhibits  it  more  plainly 
and  fully  than  any  other,  is  Irenaeus  (  f  200  ?). 
As  an  illustration  of  his  sentiments,  we  quote  a 
passage  from  the  first  chapter  of  the  fifth  book 
of  his  important  work,  Adversus  Haereses :  “  The 
Word  of  God  [the  Logos],  omnipotent  and  not 
wanting  in  essential  justice,  proceeded  with  strict 
justice  even  against  the  apostasy  or  kingdom  of  evil 
itself  (apostasiam),  redeeming  from  it  (ab  ea)  that 
which  was  his  own  originally,  not  by  using  violence, 
as  did  the  devil  in  the  beginning,  but  by  persuasion 
(secundum  suadelam),  as  it  became  God,  so  that 
neither  justice  should  be  infringed  upon,  nor  the 
original  creation  of  God  perish.”  2 

Two  interpretations  of  this  phraseology  are  pos¬ 
sible.  The  “  persuasion  ”  may  be  referred  to  Satan, 
or  to  man;  and  the  “claims”  alluded  to  may  be 
regarded  as  those  of  the  devil,  or  of  law  and  jus¬ 
tice.  The  first  interpretation  is  that  of  Baur,  who 
thinks  that  he  discovers  a  heretical  idea  in  Irenaeus, 
the  great  opponent  of  heretics ;  a  Gnosticising  tend¬ 
ency  in  the  most  vehement  opposer  of  Gnosticism. 
According  to  Baur,  Irenaeus  substitutes  the  Devil 
for  the  Demiurge,  in  his  scheme,  so  that  the  differ¬ 
ence  between  himself  and  his  opponents  is  merely 
nominal.  The  Gnostic,  with  his  crude  notions  of  a 

1  Perhaps  a  text  like  Isaiah  xlix.  2  Ieenaetjs  :  Adversus  Haereses, 

24:  u  Shall  the  prey  be  taken  from  V.  i.  1  (Ed.  Harvey).  See  further 
the  mighty,  or  the  lawful  captive  extracts  from  Irenaeus,  in  Mun- 
be  delivered  ?  ”  falls  into  the  same  schee-Von  Colln,  I.  426. 
class. 


214 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


Supreme  Deity,  and  a  descending  series  of  inferior 
divinities,  very  naturally  attributed  to  the  inferior 
being  what  properly  belongs  only  to  the  Supreme 
God.  Creation,  for  example,  was  the  work  of  a  sub¬ 
ordinate  divinity,  the  Demiurge  in  his  terminology. 
The  Creator  of  the  world  and  the  God  of  Chris¬ 
tianity,  in  the  Gnostic  scheme,  were  two  distinct 
beings,  in  necessary  and  irreconcilable  hostility  to 
one  another.  Man  has  fallen  into  the  power  of  the 
Demiurge  and  his  demons,  and  redemption,  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  Gnostic,  is  the  endeavor  of  the  Highest 
Divinity  to  deliver  man  from  their  power. 

Now,  according  to  Baur,  Irenaeus,  living  in  the 
very  midst  of  the  heat  and  glow  of  this  ingenious 
and  imposing  system  of  speculation,  though  intend¬ 
ing  to  oppose  it  with  all  his  might,  was  yet  uncon¬ 
sciously  affected  by  the  spirit  of  the  time,  and 
moulded  into  his  own  system  elements  that  were 
purely  Gnostic.  The  notion  of  a  conflict  between 
the  Redeemer  and  the  Demiurge,  Baur  contends, 
laid  the  foundation  for  the  first  form  of  the  orthodox 
theory  of  the  atonement.1  The  ransoming  of  man 
from  the  power  and  slavery  of  Satan,  in  the  view 
of  this  writer,  is  equivalent  to  the  ransoming  of  man 
from  the  power  and  bondage  of  the  Demiurge  and 
his  demons ;  and,  accordingly,  we  have  in  the 
treatise  of  Irenaeus,  though  written  professedly 
against  the  Gnostic  scheme,  only  an  expansion  of 


1  Baue  :  Versohnungslehre,  28,  29. 


EARLY  PATRISTIC  SOTERIOLOGY. 


215 


the  same  general  notions  that  appear  in  the  Ophite 
and  Marcionite  Gnosticism.1 

But  the  other  view  which  may  be  taken  of  this 
phraseology  of  Irenaeus,  and  of  the  Early  Fathers 
is  unquestionably  the  correct  one,  and  to  this  we 
turn  our  attention ;  first  making  some  preliminary 
remarks  respecting  the  Early  Patristic  Soteriology. 
It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  in  the  writings  of  the 
first  three  centuries,  disproportionate  attention  is 
bestowed  upon  the  connection  between  redemption 
and  the  kingdom  of  darkness,  and  upon  the  relation 
of  apostate  man  to  Satan.  The  attribute  of  divine 
justice  ought  to  have  been  brought  more  con¬ 
spicuously  into  view  by  the  theologian  of  this 
period,  and  the  person  and  agency  of  the  devil 
have  retired  more  into  the  back-ground.  It  was 
reserved  for  a  later  age,  as  we  shall  see,  to  make 
this  modification  in  the  mode  of  apprehending  the 
doctrine,  and  thereby  bring  the  Soteriology  of  the 
church  into  closer  agreement  with  the  general 
instructions  of  revelation.  For  it  is  very  plain  that 
in  seizing  so  rankly,  as  the  theological  mind  of  this 
age  did,  upon  those  few  texts  in  which  the  connec¬ 
tion  and  relations  of  Satan  with  the  work  of  Christ 
are  spoken  of,  and  allowing  them  to  eclipse  those 
far  more  numerous  passages  in  which  the  Re¬ 
deemer’s  work  is  exhibited  in  its  reference  to  the 
being  and  attributes  of  God,  it  was  liable  to  a  one- 

1  Compare  Doener’s  criticism  upon  this  view  of  Baur.  Person 
Christi,  I.  497  (Note). 


216 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


sided  construction  of  the  doctrine.  Redemption  un¬ 
questionably  in  one  of  its  aspects  looks  hell-ward. 
The  kingdom  of  Satan  does  feel  the  influence  of  the 
mediatorial  plan,  and  any  theory  that  should  en¬ 
tirely  reject  this  side  and  relation  of  the  atone¬ 
ment  would  be  destitute  of  some  features  that  are 
distinctly  presented  in  the  Scripture  representations 
of  the  general  doctrine.  But  it  was  an  error  in  the 
Soteriology  of  these  first  ages  that  a  subordinate 
part  of  the  subject  should  have  been  made  so  promi¬ 
nent,  and  in  some  instances  so  exclusive  a  charac¬ 
teristic.  Having  made  this  concession,  however,  in 
respect  to  the  scientific  value  of  the  Early  Patristic 
theory  of  the  atonement,  we  proceed  to  show  that 
there  was  a  difference  in  kind  between  it  and  the 
Gnostic  theory,  and  no  essential  difference  between 
it  and  the  later  Protestant  theory.  This  difference 
consists  in  the  recognition  of  the  judicial  and  piacu- 
lar  nature  of  Christ’s  work. 

All  true  scientific  development  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  Atonement,  it  is  very  evident,  must  take  its 
departure  from  the  idea  of  divine  justice.  This 
conception  is  the  primary  one  in  the  Biblical  repre¬ 
sentation  of  this  doctrine.  The  terms,  “  propitia¬ 
tion  ”  and  “  sacrifice,”  and  the  phraseology,  “  made 
a  curse  for  us,”  “made  sin  for  us,”  “justified  by 
blood,”  “saved  from  wrath,”  which  so  frequently 
occur  in  the  revealed  statement  of  the  truth,  im¬ 
mediately  direct  the  attention  of  the  theologian  to 
that  side  of  the  divine  character,  and  that  class  of 


EAELY  PATEISTIC  SOTEEIOLOGY. 


217 


divine  attributes,  which  are  summed  up  in  the  idea 
of  justice.  And  as  we  follow  the  history  of  the 
doctrine  down,  we  shall  find  that  just  in  proportion 
as  the  mind  of  the  Church  obtained  a  distinct  and 
philosophic  conception  of  this  great  attribute,  as  an 
absolute  and  necessary  principle  in  the  divine  na¬ 
ture,  and  in  human  nature,  was  it  enabled  to  specify 
with  distinctness  the  real  meaning  and  purport  of 
the  Redeemer’s  Passion,  and  to  exhibit  the  rational 
and  necessary  grounds  for  it. 

Now  turning  to  the  writings  of  the-  Patristic 
period,  we  shall  see  that  the  sufferings  and  death 
of  the  Redeemer  are,  in  the  main,  represented  as 
sustaining  their  most  immediate  and  important  rela¬ 
tion  to  the  justice  of  God.  It  is  not  to  be  dis¬ 
guised  that  the  distinctness  with  which  this  is  done 
varies  with  different  writers.  We  shall  find  in  this 
period,  as  in  every  other  one,  some  minds  for  whom 
the  pollution  of  sin  is  more  impressive  than  its 
criminality,  and  in  whose  experience  the  doctrine  of 
justification  is  less  formative  than  the  doctrine  of 
sanctification.  For,  in  tracing  the  construction  of 
a  systematic  doctrine,  we  are  to  observe  that  there 
may  be  agreement  between  the  views  of  two  differ¬ 
ent  writers,  while  yet  one  grasps  the  subject  with 
much  greater  firmness,  discriminates  with  much 
greater  distinctness,  and  affirms  with  much  greater 
confidence  and  certainty,  than  the  other.  Again, 
the  neglect  to  make  the  positive  and  scientific  state¬ 
ment  is  by  no  means  tantamount  to  a  denial  of  the 


218 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


positive  and  scientific  statement.  The  mind  may 
merely  be  in  obscurity,  and  unable  to  take  a  clear 
scientific  view,  much  more,  to  present  one.  But  its 
tendency  is  towards  the  thorough  systematic  state¬ 
ment,  and  though  unable  to  make  it  itself  would 
cordially  accept  it  when  made  by  another  mind. 
Compare  Irenaeus  with  Anselm,  for  example.  That 
part  of  the  work  against  the  Gnostic  heretics  which 
treats  of  the  atonement  is  by  no  means  equal  in 
clearness,  discrimination,  and  fullness,  to  the  Cur 
Dens  Homo /  and  yet  it  would  be  incorrect,  for 
this  reason,  to  represent  the  soteriology  of  Irenaeus 
as  contradictory  to  that  of  Anselm.  In  these  in¬ 
stances,  in  which  the  difference  between  two  writers 
is  owing  to  further  expansion,  and  not  to  intrinsic 
contradiction  in  opinions,  the  text  applies,  “  He  that 
is  not  against  us,  is  for  us.” 

Consider,  for  example,  the  following  extract 
from  the  Epistle  Ad  Diognetum.  u  God  himself 
gave  up  his  own  Son  a  ransom  for  us  ( imtQ  rgucov'), 
the  holy  for  the  unholy,  the  good  for  the  evil,  the 
just  for  the  unjust,  the  incorruptible  for  the  cor¬ 
ruptible,  the  immortal  for  the  mortal.  For  what 
else  could  cover  our  sins,  but  his  righteousness  ?  In 
whom  was  it  possible  for  us  the  unholy  and  the  un¬ 
godly  to  be  justified,  except  the  Son  of  God  alone  ? 
O  sweet  exchange !  O  wonderful  operation  !  O  un¬ 
looked  -  for  benefit !  That  the  sinfulness  of  many 
should  be  hidden  in  one,  that  the  righteousness  of 


EAELY  PATRISTIC  SOTERIOLOGY. 


219 


one  should  justify  many  ungodly.”1  Is  not  the 
whole  doctrine  of  vicarious  satisfaction  contained  in 
these  words  ?  Would  not  the  attempt  to  find  their 
full  meaning  short  of  this  require  the  same  sort  of 
effort,  and  ingenuity,  which  must  be  employed  in 
order  to  explain  away  the  element  of  vicariousness 
from  such  Scripture  texts  as  teach  that  the  Re¬ 
deemer  was  u  made  sin,”  was  “  made  a  curse,”  and  is 
a  propitiatory  sacrifice  ?  The  silence  of  the  writer 
respecting  those  questions  which  arise  when  the 
scientific  construction  of  the  doctrine  is  attempted, — 
such  as :  How  is  the  penal  suffering  of  the  Divine 
substitute  made  efficacious  to  the  sinner  ?  How  is 
this  suffering  an  infinite  and  adequate  one? — the 
silence  upon  these  and  kindred  questions,  the  an¬ 
swer  to  which  would  involve  a  fuller  development 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  Person  of  Christ  than  had  yet 
been  made,  and  the  neglect  to  enter  into  a  system¬ 
atic  construction,  is  very  far  from  being  evidence  that 
the  writer  of  this  Epistle  rejected  the  doctrine  of 
pardon  through  expiation,  as  Baur  contends.2  For 
one  needs  only  to  ask  the  question:  Would  a  the¬ 
ologian  who  positively  and  totally  rejected  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  satisfaction  have  expressed  himself  at  all  in 
the  terms  of  this  extract  ?  to  see  that  the  faith  and 
feeling  of  an  Anselm  and  a  Luther  dwelt  in  the 
heart  of  this  writer  of  the  second  century. 

1  Epistola  ad  Diognetum.  Jus-  doubtedly  belongs  to  tbe  2d  cen- 
tinus  Martyr  :  Opera,  p.  238,  Ed.  tury. 

Par.  1742.  Though  probably  not  2  Baur  :  Versohnungslehre,  26 
the  work  of  Justin  Martyr,  it  un-  (Note). 


220 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGrY. 


Returning  again  to  Irenaeus,  we  find  in  the  very 
extract  cited  by  Baur  as  proof  that  Irenaeus  sub¬ 
stituted  the  Devil  for  the  Demiurge  in  his  soteri- 
ology,  the  evidence  that  he  too  took  his  departure 
from  the  attribute  of  divine  justice.  For  why 
could  not  the  Deity  deliver  man  from  Satan  by 
force,  by  the  mere  exercise  of  the  divine  omnipo¬ 
tence  ?  Because,  in  the  words  already  cited,  u  the 
Logos,  omnipotent  and  not  wanting  in  essential 
justice ,  proceeded  according  to  strict  justice  even 
towards  the  kingdom  of  evil  (apostasiam),  redeem¬ 
ing  from  it  that  which  was  His  own  originally,  not 
by  violence  but  by  persuasion,  as  it  became  God,  so 
that  neither  justice  should  be  infringed  ujpon,  nor 
the  original  creation  of  God  perish.”  In  this  ex¬ 
tract,  Baur  asserts  that  diabolum  is  the  elliptical 

t. 

word,  so  that  the  “  persuasion  ”  exercised  by  God 
terminates  upon  Satan.  The  Deity  persuades  the 
Devil  to  relax  his  grasp  upon  a  being  who  originally 
belonged  to  God,  and  has  come  into  the  power  of 
Satan  only  by  deception,  and  consequently  by  in¬ 
justice.  To  this  interpretation  there  are  three 
objections.1 

1.  This  mode  of  representing  the  relation  be¬ 
tween  the  Supreme  Being  and  the  Satanic  Spirit 
implies  a  dualistic  theory  of  God  and  universe ;  but 
there  is  no  dualism  in  the  system  of  Irenaeus.  In 
the  Gnostic  theory,  the  two  beings,  and  the  two 

1  “  Whether  Irenaeus  regards  sentation,  hut  Origen  teaches  this 
the  ransom  as  actually  paid  to  the  unmistakably.”  Hasse  :  Anselm, 
devil,  is  not  clear  from  his  repre-  II.  487. 


EARLY  PATRISTIC  SOTERIOLOGY. 


221 


kingdoms  of  light  and  darkness,  stand  very  nearly 
upon  an  equality.  It  would  be  in  keeping  with 
Gnostic  ideas,  to  represent  the  Holy  One  as  plying 
the  Evil  One  with  arguments  and  entreaties  to 
release  a  creature  whom  he  could  not  deliver  by  vir¬ 
tue  of  resources  within  himself.  But  there  is  no 
such  dualism  in  Irenaeus.  No  one  can  peruse  the 
five  books  against  the  Gnostic  heresies,  without  see¬ 
ing  on  every  page  evidences  of  that  exalted  idea  of 
the  Supreme  Being  which  pervades  the  Scriptures, 
and  which  utterly  forbids  that  leveling  process  by 
which  the  Infinite  Jehovah  is  degraded  to  a  mere 
rival  of  Satan,  and  by  which  the  kingdom  of  darkness 
becomes  as  eternal  and  independent  as  the  kingdom 
of  light.  If  we  do  not  find  the  Soteriology  of 
Irenaeus  as  fully  elaborated  as  that  of  the  Reform¬ 
ers,  we  do  find  that  his  Theology,  in  respect  to 
the  point  of  the  absolute  supremacy  of  God  over 
evil  as  well  as  good,  is  as  distinct  and  scriptural  as 
that  of  Calvin  himself.  We  must  therefore  refer 
the  “  persuasion,”  spoken  of  in  this  extract  from 
Irenaeus,  to  man ;  such  indeed  is  indisputably  the 
reference  in  other  passages.1  Irenaeus  means  to 

1  Compare  Ibenaetjs  :  Adver-  enim  homo  non  vicisset  inimicum 
sus  Haereses,  V.  xxv.  (Ed.  Har-  hominis,  non  juste  victus  esset 
vey).  Some  light  is  thrown  upon  inimicus.”  Here  the  word  “  jus¬ 
tice  meaning  of  the  word  “jus-  te  ”  evidently  signifies  Jitness  or 
tice  ”  in  the  extract  under  consid-  adaptation.  He  who  redeems 
eration,  by  the  following  passage  man  must  he  both  God  and  man, 
from  Adversus  Haereses,  III.  vi.  — as  Irenaeus  proceeds  to  argue 
(Ed.  Harvey):  “Haerere  itaque  in  the  context.  See,  also,  Dop.nee: 
fecit  et  adunivit  quemadmodum  Person  Christi,  I.  479  (Note), 
praediximus,  hominem  deo.  Si 


222 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


teach,  that  as  man  fell  freely ,  by  the  deception  and 
persuasion  of  the  Devil,  so  he  must  be  recovered 
from  his  fall  in  a  manner  consistent  with  moral  free¬ 
dom.  Mankind  did  not  apostatize  through  compul¬ 
sion,  but  by  persuasion  (suadendo)  ;  consequently 
their  redemption  must  take  the  same  course,  even 
though  Satan  should  derive  advantage  from  this 
renunciation  of  the  use  of  power  on  the  part  of  the 
Almighty,  and  the  consequent  possibility,  by  reason 
of  the  appeal  to  the  free  will  of  the  creature,  of 
man’s  still  remaining  his  slave. 

2.  Again,  the  “  justice  ”  spoken  of  in  this  extract, 
by  which  the  method  of  salvation  is  limited,  is  plainly 
an  attribute  in  the  Divine  Nature,  and  not  a  mere 
claim  of  the  Devil  upon  either  man  or  God  which  re¬ 
quires  satisfaction.  The  two  attributes  of  omnipo¬ 
tence  and  justice  are  exhibited  side  by  side,  and  the 
latter  limits  the  former,  by  virtue  of  its  necessary 
moral  character.  The  former  is  merely  a  natural  at¬ 
tribute,  and  unallied  with  a  moral  one  like  justice,  or 

* 

still  more  if  opposed  to  it,  would  not  be  the  attribute 
of  a  holy  and  good  Being.  Isolated  omnipotence  is 
isolated  force,  and  as  such  belongs  properly  to  the 
pantheistic  conception  of  the  Deity.  In  the  theistic 
conception,  all  the  natural  attributes  are  regulated 
by  the  moral,  and  cannot  be  regarded  as  operating 
in  isolation  from  each  other,  or  in  opposition  to  each 
other.  This  Irenaeus  clearly  teaches,  in  saying  that 
the  “  Logos  all  powerful,  and  perfectly  just,  yet  pro¬ 
ceeds  in  strict  justice  even  in  respect  to  the  apostate 


EARLY  PATRISTIC  SOTERIOLOGY. 


223 


world  itself.”  The  doctrine  taught  in  this  phrase¬ 
ology  is  the  same  that  is  contained  in  the  Protestant 
statement  of  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement,  viz. : 
that  the  work  of  Christ  preserves  the  harmony  of 
the  divine  attributes  in  the  plan  of  redemption,  so 
that  the  omnipotence  of  the  Deity  shall  not  over¬ 
throw  the  justice  of  the  Deity,  by  arbitrarily  remit¬ 
ting  the  penalty  due  to  transgression  without  any 
satisfaction  of  law. 

3.  Still  another  evidence  that  Irenaeus  contem¬ 
plated  the  “justice”  whose  claims  were  to  be  satis¬ 
fied  by  the  atonement  of  the  Son  of  God,  as  intrinsic 
in  the  Deity,  and  not  extrinsic  in  Satan,  is  found  in 
the  fact  that  he  held  to  the  absolute  and  not  merely 
relative  necessity  of  the  death  of  Christ,  in  order  to 
human  salvation.  We  shall  have  occasion  hereafter 
to  allude  to  this  point,  and  therefore  shall  touch  it 
briefly  here. 

In  discussing  the  nature  of  the  atonement,  the 
question  naturally  arises :  Does  the  necessity  of  ex¬ 
piation  in  order  to  pardon  arise  from  the  nature  of 
the  case,  or  from  an  arbitrary  arrangement?  could 
the  Deity  have  dispensed  with  any  or  all  satisfac¬ 
tion  of  justice,  or  is  justice  of  such  an  absolute  and 
necessary  character,  that  it  would  be  as  impossible 
to  save  the  guilty  without  an  antecedent  satisfaction 
of  this  attribute,  as  it  would  be  for  God  to  lie  ? 
Now,  in  answering  this  question,  Irenaeus  is  found 
among  that  class  of  the  Fathers  who  affirm  the  ab- 


224 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


solute  necessity  of  an  atonement ;  ^another  class 
inclining  to  tlie  view  of  a  relative  necessity,  or  a 
necessity  dependent  upon  tlie  optional  will  and  ap¬ 
pointment  of  God.  This  is  conclusive  evidence  that 
he  could  not  have  regarded  the  chief  and  sole  ob¬ 
stacle  in  the  way  of  human  redemption  as  consist¬ 
ing  in  Satan’s  character  and  claims.  For  nothing 
extrinsic  to  the  Deity  could  thus  inexorably  limit 
the  divine  omnipotence.  Yet,  according  to  Irenaeus, 
this  omnipotence  is  thus  limited.  The  necessity  of 
atonement  is  absolute  and  unavoidable.  The  lim¬ 
itation  must,  therefore,  be  a  self- limitation,  and  pro¬ 
ceed  from  an  immanent  attribute  in  the  Deity,  and 
this  attribute  is  eternal  justice. 

We  conclude  this  sketch  of  the  opinions  of  Ire¬ 
naeus  with  a  paraphrase  and  expansion  of  Dorner’s 
summing  up.2  u  Justice,  in  the  scheme  of  Irenaeus, 
stands  between  the  physical  attributes  of  infinity, 
omnipotence,  etc.,  and  the  ethical  attributes  of  com¬ 
passion  and  love,  as  a  protector  and  watch.  For  this 
reason,  God  will  and  can  accomplish  no  work  that 
is  spiritual  in  a  merely  physical  manner ;  he  must 
win  over  man  by  the  manifestation  of  that  which  is 
spiritual, — that  is,  by  the  highest  and  fullest  possible 
exhibition  of  his  love.  But  love  is  of  two  kinds, 
active  and  passive ;  the  former  manifests  itself  by 
doing  something  to  its  object,  the  latter  by  suffering 
something  for  it.  The  highest  and  fullest  manifes- 

1  Irenaeus  :  Adversus  Haere-  2  Dorneb  :  Person  Christi,  I. 

ses,  III.  xix.  (Ed.  Harvey).  480. 


EARLY  PATRISTIC  SOTERIOLOGY. 


225 


tation  of  love  would  consequently  include  the  pas¬ 
sive  form  of  the  affection,  as  well  as  the  active  form, 
— an  endurance  namely,  of  suffering  in  behalf  of  the 
object  of  benevolence,  if  suffering  is  necessary  from 
the  nature  of  the  case.  But  suffering  is  absolutely 
necessary,  because  now  that  sin  and  guilt  have  come 
into  the  world  divine  justice  cannot  be  satisfied 
except  by  penal  infliction.  Consequently  the  mani¬ 
festation  of  the  love  of  God  takes  on  a  passive  as 
well  as  active  form,  and  vicariously  bears  the  pen¬ 
alty  of  guilt  in  the  place  of  the  criminal.” 

For  these  reasons,  therefore,  it  is  impossible  to 
concede  the  position  of  Baur,  that  the  foundations 
of  the  Church  doctrine  of  the  atonement  were  laid 
in  the  theory  of  the  satisfaction  of  the  claims  of 
Satan,  and  not  of  divine  justice.  If  this  theory  can 
be  found  in  any  of  the  Christian  Fathers,  it  must  be 
in  Irenaeus.  But  this  writer  shows  no  traces  of  such  a 
dualism  as  is  implied  in  a  struggle  between  God  and 
Satan.  He  represents  the  limitations  in  the  method 
of  redemption  as  being  of  an  absolute  and  inexora¬ 
ble  nature,  such  as  can  proceed  only  out  of  an  im¬ 
manent  attribute  of  the  Godhead.  One  of  the  most 
important  portions  of  his  work 1  is  devoted  to  the 
proof  that  the  sufferings  of  Christ  were  real,  and 


1  Irenaetjs  :  Ad  versus  Haere- 
ses,  III.  xix.  (Ed.  Harvey).  It  is 
a  singular  assertion  of  Neander 
(Church  History,  I.  642)  that  in 
the  writings  of  Irenaeus,  “not 
the  slightest  mention  is  to  he 
vol.  n. — 15 


found  of  satisfaction  done  by  the 
sufferings  of  Christ  to  divine  jus¬ 
tice,” — especially,  as  he  finds  the 
doctrine  of  satisfaction  in  the 
comparatively  brief  and  indirect 
statements  of  Justin  Martyr. 


226 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


not,  as  tlie  Gnostic  maintained,  spectral  and  docetic ; 
and  this  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  the  satis¬ 
faction  made  for  sin  was  real  and  absolute.  It  can¬ 
not,  therefore,  be  supposed  that  this  influential 
church  Father  of  the  early  centuries  was  involved, 
without  being  aware  of  it,  in  the  errors  of  Gnos¬ 
ticism,  and  that  his  Soteriology  is  only  a  modifica¬ 
tion  of  a  scheme  which  he  spent  his  best  strength  in 
combating. 


§  5.  Alexandrine  Soteriology . 

t 

Passing  from  Irenaeus  to  the  school  of  Alexan¬ 
drine  theologians,  we  come  to  less  correct  and  dis¬ 
criminating  views  of  the  atonement.  This  school, 
of  whom  Clement  of  Alexandria  and  Origen  were 
the  founders  and  heads,  felt  the  influence  of  the 
Gnostic  systems  to  some  extent,  besides  being  it¬ 
self  animated  by  a  remarkably  strong  speculative 
spirit.  The  Alexandrine  theologian  was  unduly 
engaged  with  those  questions  respecting  the  origin 
of  the  material  universe,  and  of  moral  evil,  which 
had  so  bewildered  the  mind  of  the  Gnostic.  Men 
like  Origen  desired  to  answer  these  questions,  and 
in  the  endeavour  oftentimes  lost  sight  of  those 
more  strictly  theological  subjects  which  address 
themselves  to  the  moral  consciousness  of  man, 
and  are  connected  with  his  religious  character  and 
future  destiny.  Such  thinking  upon  such  subjects 


ALEXANDRINE  SOTERIOLOGY. 


227 


falls  more  properly  within  the  sphere  of  cosmogony 
and  theosophy,  than  of  theology. 

We  had  occasion  to  observe,  that  the  Gnostics 
all  agreed  in  denying  the  vicariousness  and  judi¬ 
cial  intent  of  Christ’s  suffering,  however  greatly 
they  differed  among  themselves  upon  other  points. 
Neander  remarks  that  Basilides  “  admitted  no  such 
thing  as  objective  justification  in  the  sight  of  God, 
or  forgiveness  of  sin  in  the  sense  of  deliverance  from 
the  guilt  and  punishment  of  sin.  Every  sin,  whether 
committed  before  or  after  faith  in  the  Redeemer,  or 
baptism,  must,  according  to  his  scheme,  be  in  like 
manner  expiated  by  the  sufferings  of  the  individual 
himself.” 1  But  though  the  word  “  expiate  ”  is  em¬ 
ployed  in  this  statement  of  the  opinions  of  Basi¬ 
lides,  it  is  plain  from  the  fact  that  a  forensic  justifi¬ 
cation  is  excluded,  that  it  can  be  employed  only  in 
the  sense  of  purification.  Suffering  is  disciplinary 
only.  The  scheme  of  Basilides  did  not  recognize  sin 
in  the  form  of  guilt,  and  thereby  related  to  law  and 
justice.  It  was  evil,  disharmony,  corruption,  and 
bondage ;  but  not  a  crime  originated  by  the  free 
will  of  a  responsible  creature,  distinct  from,  and  ac¬ 
countable  to  his  creator.  The  “expiation”  of  sin 
spoken  of  was  only  the  disciplinary  suffering  which 
the  individual  sinner  undergoes,  in  the  process  of 
purification.  It  was  not  penal,  or  satisfactory  to 
justice. 

The  school  of  Valentinus  held  the  same  general 

1  Neandee  :  Church  History,  I.  412,  413. 


228 


HISTOEY  OF  SOTEEIOLOGY. 


views  upon  this  point,  with  that  of  Basilides.  Ptole- 
maeus,  one  of  the  leading  disciples  of  Valentinus, 
writing  to  Flora,  a  Christian  woman  whom  he  en¬ 
deavoured  to  convert  to  Gnostic  views,  represents 
punitive  justice  as  something  irreconcilable  with  the 
perfect  goodness  of  the  Supreme  God,  from  whom 
he  contends  this  world  with  its  evil  and  suffering 
could  not  have  sprung.  On  the  contrary,  he  repre¬ 
sents  justice,  in  the  strict  sense,  to  be  the  peculiar 
attribute  of  the  Demiurge,  and  hence  a  sort  of 
medium  quality  lying  between  the  perfect  goodness 
of  the  supreme  Deity,  and  unmixed  evil.  In  ac¬ 
cordance  with  these  views,  he  supposed  that  that 
portion  of  the  Old  Testament  economy  which  was 
penal  and  judicial  in  its  nature  proceeded  from  the 
Demiurge ;  and,  as  contradicting  the  essential  char¬ 
acter  of  the  Supreme  God  who  is  unmixed  benevo¬ 
lence,  wras  afterwards  wholly  abolished  by  the  Sav¬ 
iour.  In  consistency  with  these  views,  he  regarded 
the  capital  punishment  of  the  murderer  as  only  a 
second  murder,  because  it  is  retributive  instead 
of  disciplinary  and  educational,  and  the  state  gen¬ 
erally  as  belonging  only  to  the  kingdom  of  the 
Demiurge,  because  it  is  founded  upon  and  repre¬ 
sents  that  retributive  justice  which  is  altogether 
foreign  from  the  Supreme  God.1 

There  is  no  need  to  quote  from  the  opinions  of 
other  schools  of  Gnosticism,  in  further  proof  that  the 
attribute  of  justice  was  subtracted  from  the  nature 

1  Neandek  :  Church  History,  I.  437-439. 


ALEXANDRINE  SOTERIOLOGY. 


229 


of  the  Supreme  Being,  and  placed  in  that  of  an  in¬ 
ferior,  and,  to  some  extent  if  not  entirely,  hostile 
one.  Justice  is  regarded  in  this  scheme  as  some¬ 
thing  'MTijust,  tyrannical,  not  founded  in  reason,  and 
therefore  not  found  in  the  Supreme  Deity.  That 
such  a  view  should  be  taken  of  an  attribute  so  fun¬ 
damental  to  all  sovereignty  and  dominion,  is  not 
strange,  when  we  consider  the  radical  error  and 
fatal  defect  of  the  system.  Gnosticism  did  not  hold 
the  doctrine  of  creation  from  nothing ;  it  held  only 
that  of  development  out  of  antecedents.  As  a  con¬ 
sequence  it  could  not  logically  hold  the  doctrine  of 
a  free  finite  will.  There  was  for  it  no  truly  and 
strictly  accountable  moral  agent.  Man,  like  nature, 
was  an  evolution  from  the  essence  of  the  Supreme 
Deity,  not  directly  indeed,  but  really,  through  a 
descending  and  a  degenerating  series  of  powers  and 
attributes.  The  successive  grades  of  this  evolution 
become  feebler  and  feebler  as  they  recede  further 
from  the  aboriginal  fountain  of  existence,  until  man 
appears,  the  last  link  and  refuse  of  the  interminable 
series,  the  feeble  vanishing  point  of  a  primarily 
tremendous  process  of  life  and  energy.  Now  where 
upon  this  scheme,  is  there  any  free  will  or  free  agency 
for  man  ?  Where,  any  finite  unit  distinct  from  the 
Deity,  capable  of  self-determination,  left  free  to  re¬ 
main  holy  as  created  or  to  fall  into  evil,  and  held 
responsible  for  the  use  of  this  high  but  hazardous 
endowment  ?  Is  it  strange  that  such  a  being  as  this, 
the  poor  remnant  and  dreg  of  a  course  of  develop- 


230 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


merit  that  has  been  degenerating  and  corrupting  for 
ages  upon  ages,  a  miserable  wreck  thrown  upon  the 
shores  of  existence  by  the  ebb  and  flow  of  tides  fluctu¬ 
ating  through  infinite  space  and  everlasting  time, — is 
it  strange  that  such  a  being  as  this,  with  no  true  cen¬ 
tre  and  starting  point  of  its  own,  should  be  affirmed 
to  sustain  no  legitimate  relations  to  such  an  awful 
attribute  as  retributive  justice  ?  Is  it  strange  that  in 
the  plan  by  which  such  a  being  was  to  be  redeemed 
from  the  evil  and  misery  which  are  inevitably  con¬ 
nected  with  such  a  descending  series  of  evolutions, 
no  provision  was  needed  or  was  made  for  guilt  or 
crime ,  and  that  only  a  purifying  process  constitutes 
the  entire  process  of  human  restoration,  according 
to  the  Gnostic? 

Now  the  school  of  Clemejit  and  Origen,  though 

■wiiitM.  ijaa****— ' — ' 

opposing  the  Gnostic  system  with  earnestness,  was 
nevertheless  influenced  and  affected  by  it  to  some 
extent.  To  how  great  an  extent,  is  a  somewhat  dis¬ 
puted  question  amongst  dogmatic  historians.  We  are 
inclined  to  regard  the  views  of  Origen  concerning  the 
doctrine  of  Atonement  and  all  the  related  topics,  as 
being  at  a  greater  remove  from  the  scriptural  data 
and  view,  than  concerning  the  other  doctrines  of 
Christianity.  This  was  the  weak  point  at  which  the 
latitudinarian  tendencies  of  this  remarkable  man 
showed  themselves  with  most  distinctness  and  en- 
ergy, — as  indeed  the  doctrine  of  Atonement  was  not 
the  strongest  side  of  the  Patristic  system  generally. 

There  were  several  opinions  in  the  scheme  of 


ALEXANDRINE  SOTERIOLOGY. 


231 


Origen  which  tended  to  confuse  and  injure  his  gen¬ 
eral  view  of  the  doctrine  whose  history  we  are  in¬ 
vestigating.  They  were  the  following  : 

1.  The  opinion  that  all  finite  spirits  were  created 
in  the  beginning  of  creation,  that  their  number  un¬ 
dergoes  no  increase,  and  that  their  history  is  that  of 
alternate  fall  and  redemption,  from  eternity  to  eter¬ 
nity.  Origen  held  that  God  could  not  create  an 
infinite  number  of  rational  beings,  because  his  prov¬ 
idence  could  not  extend  to  every  particular  of  a 
series  as  boundless  as  himself.1  Hence,  all  the  va¬ 
riety  that  is  to  be  seen  in  the  history  of  the  created 
universe  does  not  spring  from  the  continual  pro¬ 
duction  of  new  creatures,  but  from  changes  in  the 
old  and  preexisting  number.  God  did  not  create 
by  new  and  different  orders  of  beings,  as  angel  and 
man.  The  history  of  man  is  only  the  change  which 
has  resulted  from  the  apostasy  of  a  determinate 
number  of  angelic  spirits,  in  the  angelic  world,  who 
are  to  be  both  punished  and  redeemed  in  this  their 
mundane  state  of  existence. 

The  effect  of  such  a  theory  as  this  would  nat¬ 
urally  be,  to  diminish  the  degree  and  amount  of 
evil  involved  in  the  apostasy  of  a  rational  spirit. 
It  makes  the  event  too  common.  If  alternate 
fall  and  recovery  is  the  order  of  the  universe ,  then 
it  is  impossible  that  the  former  should  be  the 
most  dreadful  of  catastrophes,  or  the  latter  the 


1  Oeigenes  :  De  Principiis,  II.  8  (Tom.  I.  703,  Ed.  Basil,  1572). 


232 


HISTOEY  OF  SOTEKIOLOGY. 


most  wonderful  of  divine  interferences.  If  when 
the  responsible  creature  falls,  he  falls  for  once  and 
for  evermore,  and  there  is  from  the  nature  of  the 
case  no  salvation  except  by  a  divine  intervention, 
which  constitutes  a  remarkable  anomaly  in  the 
Divine  economy,  and  does  not  at  all  belong  to  the 
natural  order  of  the  universe,  then  sin  and  redemp¬ 
tion  have  a  stupendous  meaning  upon  both  sides. 
But  if  apostasy  is  to  be  expected  with  regular  uni¬ 
formity  as  the  cycles  roll  around,  and  redemption  is 
to  be  repeated  with  the  same  uniformity  whenever 
the  occasion  occurs,  and  the  occasion  occurs  repeat¬ 
edly,  it  is  evident  that  nothing  but  very  low  con¬ 
ceptions  can  result  of  the  nature  of  moral  evil,  and 
of  its  expiation  and  removal.1  The  doctrine  of 
the  preexistence  and  apostasy  of  a  fixed  number  of 
rational  spirits  in  one  mode  of  being,  and  their  post¬ 
existence  and  redemption  in  another  mode  of  being, 


1  Origen  held  that  the  efficacy 
of  Christ’s  death  extended  to  the 
entire  apostate  world,  quoting  in 
proof  Coloss.  i.  20  :  “  By  him  to 
reconcile  all  things  unto  himself, 
whether  they  be  things  in  earth, 
or  things  in  heaven,”  and  also 
Heb.  ii.  9  :  Christ  “tasted  death 
for  every  man,”  meaning  every 
sinful  creature.  He  remarks 
(Com.  in  Johan.  II.  6,  and  I.  40) 
fliat  Christ  is  “the  great  high 
priest  not  only  for  man  but  for 
every  rational  creature”  (rravros 
\oyUov  tt)V  ana£  Sixrtai/).  Com¬ 


pare,  also,  Com.  in  Matt.  xiii.  8. 
On  Eom.  v.  10,  he  remarks,  “  tan- 
tam  esse  vim  crucis  Christi  et 
mortis  ejus  quae  ad  sanitatem  et 
remedium  non  solum  humano 
huic  nostro  ordini,  sed  coelestibus 
virtutibus  ordinibusque  sufficiat.” 
Origen  also  taught  that  Christ’s 
redeeming  agency  still  continues 
in  his  state  of  exaltation,  and  that 
he  is  saving  the  apostate  continu¬ 
ally,  until  the  entire  apostate  uni¬ 
verse  is  restored.  See  Thoma- 
sids  :  Origenes,  p.  230,  59. 


ALEXANDRINE  SOTERIOLOGY. 


233 


and  so  onward  endlessly,  is  wholly  unfavourable  to 
just  views  of  the  awful  nature  of  moral  evil  as  crime 
before  law,  and  of  the  tremendous  nature  of  spir¬ 
itual  apostasy  as  an  event  that  can  be  remedied 
only  by  the  most  unusual  and  extraordinary  efforts 
of  the  Supreme  Being. 

2.  A  second  opinion  of  Origen  which  tended  to 
a  defective  and  erroneous  conception  of  the  doctrine 
of  Atonement  was,  that  punishment  is  not  judicial 
but  disciplinary.  In  his  Homilies  upon  Ezekiel 
he  makes  the  following  statement :  “  If  it  had  not 
been  conducive  to  the  conversion  of  sinners  to  em¬ 
ploy  suffering,  never  would  a  compassionate  and 
benevolent  God  have  inflicted  punishment  upon 
wickedness.” 1  Here,  plainly,  the  judicial  and  retrib¬ 
utive  nature  of  punishment  is  entirely  overlooked, 
and  by  implication,  denied.  In  other  places,  he 
represents  reformation  as  being  the  object  of  punish¬ 
ing  the  sinner ;  but  since  punishment  fails,  God  sends 
his  Son  to  break  the  strength  of  sin,  so  that  man’s 
suffering  may  be  spared.  The  death  and  sufferings 
of  Christ  are  represented  as  operating  in  a  mystic,  and 
somewhat  magical  way,  upon  the  world  of  demons 
and  cff  evil,  so  that  the  power  of  sin  over  mankind  is 
shaken,  and  they  are  thereby  redeemed.  The  right¬ 
eousness  of  God,  says  Origen,  is  seen  in  the  fact  that 
God  does  not  declare  sinners  to  be  righteous  and 
show  them  favour,  but  in  the  fact  that  he  first  makes 


1  Redepenning  :  Origenes,  II.  407. 


234 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOG Y . 


them  holy,  and  then  remits  their  punishment.1  Men 
are  justified  by  being  sanctified.  Such  statements 
show  that  the  judicial  relations  of  sin  are  omitted  in 
Origen’s  soteriology.  The  remission  of  sin  is  made 
to  depend  upon  arbitrary  will,  without  reference  to 
retributive  justice,  as  is  evinced  by  his  assertion  that 
God  might  have  chosen  milder  means  to  save  man, 
than  he  did ;  e.  g.,  that  he  might  by  a  sovereign  act 
of  his  will  have  made  the  sacrifices  of  the  Old  Testa¬ 
ment  to  suffice  for  an  atonement  for  man’s  sin.2 

3.  A  third  opinion  of  Origen  conducing  to  a 
defective  view  of  the  atonement  was,  that  the  pun¬ 
ishment  of  sin  is  not  endless.3  This  opinion  flows 
logically  from  the  preceding  one  that  punishment 
is  not  penal,  but  disciplinary.  For  an  eternal  suf¬ 
fering  for  sin,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  cannot 
consist  with  the  amendment  of  the  sinner.  When, 
therefore,  owing  to  the  exceeding  strength  of  hu¬ 
man  sinfulness,  punishment  has  so  lost  its  reform¬ 
ing  power  that  even  if  continued  forever  no  change 
of  character  could  be  wrought  by  it,  God  sends  the 
Redeemer  who  by  his  death  in  a*  mysterious  way 
breaks  this  power  of  sin,  and  thereby  restores  him 
to  holiness.  The  death  of  Christ  is  thus  a  manifes¬ 
tation  of  love  alone,  and  not  of  love  and  justice  in 
union.  Clement  of  Alexandria,  the  teacher  of  Ori¬ 
gen,  makes  the  following  representations,  according 

1  Okigenes  :  Com.  in  Rom.  iii.  2  Redepenning  :  Origenes.  11.409. 
See  Redepentning  :  Origenes,  II.  3  Origexes  :  Horn.  19,  in  Jerem. ; 
409.  De  Princip.  I.  6. 


ALEXANDRINE  SOTERIOLOGY. 


235 


to  Redepenning.  “  The  deep  corruption  of  mankind 
fills  God,  whose  compassion  for  man  is  as  unlimited 
as  his  hatred  towards  evil,  not  with  anger,  for  he  is 
never  angry,  but  with  the  tenderest  and  most  pitiful 
love.  Hence  he  continually  seeks  all  men,  whom  he 
loves  for  their  own  sake  and  their  resemblance  to 
God,  as  the  bird  seeks  her  young  who  have  fallen 
from  the  nest.  His  omnipotence,  to  which  nothing 
is  impossible,  knows  how  to  overcome  all  evil,  and 
convert  it  into  good.  He  threatens,  indeed,  and  pun¬ 
ishes,  but  yet  only  to  reform  and  improve ;  and 
though  in  public  discourse  the  fruitlessness  of  re¬ 
pentance  after  death  be  asserted,  yet  hereafter  not 
only  those  who  have  not  heard  of  Christ  will  receive 
forgiveness,  but  it  may  be  hoped  that  the  severer 
punishment  which  befalls  the  obstinate  unbelievers 
will  not  be  the  conclusion  of  their  history.  For 
man,  like  every  other  spiritual  being,  can  never  lose 
his  free  will.  By  means  of  this  power,  at  all  times, 
here  and  hereafter,  noble  minds,  aided  by  that 
divine  power  which  is  indispensable  to  success,  are 
lifting  themselves  up  from  ignorance  and  deep 
moral  corruption,  and  are  drawing  nearer  in  greater 
or  less  degree,  to  God  and  the  truth.” 1 

Upon  looking  carefully  at  each  of  these  three 
opinions  of  Origen,  it  is  easy  to  perceive  that  they 

1  Redepenning:  Origenes,  1. 133  are:  Cohortatio,  74,  79,82,  89; 
-135.  The  citations  from  Clem-  Stromata,  VI.  763,  764.  VII.  832, 
ent,  upon  which  Redepenning  re-  895,  860.  I.  369 ;  Paedegogus,  I. 
lies  for  the  above  representation,  102,  137,  140,  142,  149.  III.  302. 


236 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


are  incompatible  with  the  doctrine  of  a  satisfaction 
of  divine  justice.  The  repeated  fall  of  the  soul 
being  a  part  of  the  course  and  constitution  of  the 
universe,  it  is  absurd  to  put  this  event  into  any  sort 
of  relation  to  such  an  attribute  as  that  of  eternal 
justice,  except  it  be  a  figurative  one.  If  punish¬ 
ment  is  merely  corrective,  it  is  impossible  to  regard 
it  as  retributive,  and  to  provide  for  its  remission  by 
the  judicial  suffering  of  a  substituted  victim,  and 
that,  too,  an  infinite  one.  And  if  punishment  is  not 
in  its  own  nature  endless  and  absolute,  but  may  be 
stopped  at  any  point  at  the  option  of  the  sove¬ 
reign,  then  it  is  absurd  to  speak  of  any  such  claims 
of  justice  as  necessitate  an  infinite  suffering  for 
moral  evil,  such  as  can  be  endured  only  by  the  finite 
transgressor  in  an  endless  duration,  or  by  the  infi¬ 
nite  substitute  in  a  limited  period. 

Still  it  ought  to  be  added,  that  oftentimes  the 
phraseology  of  Origen,  and  many  of  his  represen¬ 
tations  taken  by  themselves,  favour  the  doctrine  of 
vicarious  atonement, — so  much  so  that  Thomasius, 
who  has  composed  a  valuable  monograph  upon 
Origen,  contends  that  this  doctrine  may  be  found 
in  this  Father,  as  well  as  in  Irenaeus.  Were  it  not 
that  the  opinions  which  have  been  specified  enter 
as  constituent  parts  into  the  theological  system  of 
the  Alexandrine  School,  it  would  not  be  difficult  to 
quote  many  passages  from  the  writings  of  Clement 
and  Origen  whose  most  natural  meaning  would  im¬ 
ply  the  strict  and  technical  doctrine  of  vicarious 


ATHANASIUS  AND  THE  GREEK  FATHERS.  237 


satisfaction.  But  these  fundamental  principles,  that 
have  been  mentioned,  are  so  contrary  to  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  Christ’s  expiation,  that  we  are  compelled 
to  give  these  passages  a  modified  meaning,  and  to 
acknowledge  that  only  a  very  defective  and  erro¬ 
neous  conception  of  this  cardinal  truth  of  Chris¬ 
tianity  is  to  be  found  in  the  Alexandrine  Soteri- 
ology.1 


§  6.  Soteriology  of  Athanasius ,  and  the  Greek 

Fathers . 

Before  proceeding  to  exhibit  the  history  of  the 
doctrine  of  Atonement  in  the  Polemic  period  (A. 
D.  254-730),  it  is  pertinent  to  make  an  intro¬ 
ductory  remark  respecting  the  general  course  of 
theologizing  in  this  age.  The  subjects  upon 
which  the  ecclesiastical  mind  expended  most  re¬ 
flection  during  these  five  centuries  were  those  of 
Theology  with  the  cognate  subject  of  Christology, 
and  Anthropology.  It  was  natural,  consequently, 
that  in  the  polemic  heat  and  energy  of  the  period, 
those  parts  of  the  Christian  system  which  were  most 
vehemently  assailed,  and  which  stood  in  greatest 
need  of  exact  definition  and  strict  phraseology, 

1  This  is  also  Mosheim’s  opin-  III.  §  27.  For  extracts  from  On¬ 
ion:  Commentaries,  II.  161  sq.  gen  respecting  the  doctrine  of 
Compare  also  the  whole  of  Mo-  atonement,  see  :  Munschee-Von 
sheim’s  criticism  of  Origen’s  the-  Colln,  I.  427. 
ologizing :  Commentaries,  Cent. 


238 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOOY. 


should  acquire  the  fullest  development,  and  some¬ 
what  at  the  expense  of  other  portions.  Hence,  the 
subtle  and  profound  statement  of  the  doctrine  of 
the  two  natures  in  the  one  Person  of  Christ  em¬ 
ployed  the  mind  of  the  theologian  of  this  period, 
more  than  the  exhibition  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
work  of  Christ.  The  anthropological  doctrine  of 
sin,  during  the  controversy  with  Pelagius,  was 
discussed  with  a  prevailing  reference  to  the  work 
of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Its  subjective  relations  to  the 
will  of  the  creature,  more  than  its  objective  relations 
to  the  justice  and  moral  government  of  the  creator, 
constituted  the  subject-matter  even  of  this  contro¬ 
versy,  which  was  yet  better  fitted  than  any  other  one 
of  this  Polemic  period  to  result  in  a  more  scientific 
construction  of  the  doctrine  of  Atonement. 

We  need  not,  therefore,  be  surprised  to  find  that 
even  in  this  age  of  great  theological  activity,  the 
cardinal  truth  of  Christianity  did  not  receive  its 
fullest  examination  and  clearest  statement.  Still, 
in  this  instance  as  in  the  previous  one,  we  are  not  to 
regard  mere  silence,  or  a  failure  to  make  a  distinct 
statement,  as  tantamount  to  the  denial  and  rejection 
of  the  truth.  This  we  found  to  be  the  error  in  the 
judgment  which  the  school  of  Baur  passes  upon  the 
soteriology  of  the  Apologetic  period  (A.  D.  1  GO- 
254)  ;  and  although  there  is  less  liability  to 
commit  it  in  reference  to  the  Polemic  period,  be¬ 
cause  an  evident  advance  in  the  mode  of  appre¬ 
hending  the  doctrine  of  vicarious  satisfaction  is  ap- 


ATHANASIUS  AND  THE  GREEK  FATHERS.  239 


parent,  still  the  same  species  of  argument,  derived 
from  the  failure  to  reduce  the  doctrine  to  a  per¬ 
fectly  scientific  form,  might  be  built  upon  the  yet 
incomplete  soteriology  of  the  Polemic  period.  The 
argument  in  this  case  is  precisely  the  same  in  kind 
with  that  which  should  seek  to  prove  that  the  un¬ 
lettered  believer,  whose  theological  knowledge  is 
mostly  in  his  heart  and  experience,  positively  rejects 
the  doctrine  of  atonement,  or  the  doctrine  of  the 
trinity,  because  he  is  unable  to  analyse  and  com¬ 
bine  its  elements,  and  place  them  in  the  unity  of  a 
comprehensive  system.  Having  made  this  prefa¬ 
tory  remark,  we  proceed  now  to  take  the  measure 
of  the  attainments  of  the  ecclesiastical  mind  of 
this  period,  respecting  the  doctrine  in  question. 
And  in  the  outset,  it  is  obvious  to  the  investigator, 
the  moment  he  passes  over  from  the  one  period  to 
the  other,  that  some  scientific  progress  has  been 
made.  The  tone  is  firmer  and  bolder,  the  discrimi¬ 
nation  is  clearer  and  truer,  and  the  dogma  stands 
out  with  greater  prominence  from  the  mass  of  heret¬ 
ical  and  opposing  theories. 

Turning  to  the  works  of  the  leading  theologians 
of  this  age,  we  are  able  to  determine  how  far  the 
catholic  mind  had  advanced  toward  a  scientific  and 
self-consistent  theory  of  the  atonement. 

Athanasius  ( f  373),  though  laying  out  the  chief 
strength  of  his  powerful  intellect  in  the  trinitarian 
controversy,  is  distinct  and  firm  in  maintaining  the 
expiatory  nature  of  the  work  of  Christ.  He  recognizes 


240 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


its  relations  to  the  attribute  of  divine  justice,  and  has 
less  to  say  than  his  predecessors  respecting  its  rela¬ 
tions  to  the  kingdom  and  claims  of  Satan.  The 
more  important  bearings  of  the  doctrine  of  vicarious 
satisfaction,  it  is  evident,  were  now  beginning  to  re¬ 
ceive  a  closer  attention,  while  less  stress  was  laid  upon 
its  secondary  aspects.  We  can  find  in  the  represen¬ 
tations  of  Athanasius,  the  substance  of  that  doctrine 
of  plenary  satisfaction  of  eternal  justice  by  the  the- 
anthropic  sufferings  of  Christ  which  acquired  its 
full  scientific  form  in  the  mind  of  Anselm,  and 
which  lies  under  the  whole  Protestant  Church  and 
theology.1 

Athanasius  composed  no  tract  or  treatise  upon 
the  Atonement,  and  we  must  consequently  deduce 
his  opinions  upon  this  subject  from  his  incidental 
statements  while  discussing  other  topics.  In  his 
Discourses  ( Orationes )  against  the  Arians,  there  are 
frequent  statements  respecting  the  work  of  Christ, 
in  connection  with  those  respecting  his  person  and 
dignity,  and  from'  these  we  select  a  few  of  the  most 
distinct  and  conclusive.  “  Christ  as  man  endured 
death  for  us,  inasmuch  as  he  offered  himself  for  that 
purpose  to  the  Father.”  Here,  the  substitutionary 
nature  of  his  work  is  indicated.  “  Christ  takes  our 


1  “  Andere  Lehrer,  wie  Athana-  ung  unter  welcher  Gott,  ohne 
sins  und  Cyrillus  Hieros.  legen  Verletzung  seiner  Wahrhaftig- 
den  Begriff  einer  Gott  abgetrage-  keit,  den  Menschen  den  ihnen  ge- 
nen  Schuld  zum  Grunde,  und  se-  drohten  Tod  erlassen  konnte.” 
hen  in  dem  Tode  Jesu  dieBeding-  Ml'nscher-Von  Collist,  I.  425. 


ATHANASIUS  AND  THE  GEEEK  EATHEES.  241 


sufferings  upon  himself,  and  presents  them  to  the 
Father,  entreating  for  us  that  they  be  satisfied  in 
him.”  Here,  the  piacular  nature  of  his  work  is 
taught,  together  with  his  intercessory  office.  “  The 
death  of  the  incarnate  Logos  is  a  ransom  for  the  sins 
of  men,  and  a  death  of  death.”1  “  Desiring  to  annul 
our  death,  he  took  on  himself  a  body  from  the 
Virgin  Mary,  that  by  offering  this  unto  the  Father 
a  sacrifice  for  all,  he  might  deliver  us  all,  who 
by  fear  of  death  were  all  our  life  through  subject 
to  bondage.” 2  “  Laden  with  guilt,  the  world  was 

condemned  of  law,  but  the  Logos  assumed  the  con¬ 
demnation  ( xql/lkx ),  and  suffering  in  the  flesh  gave 
salvation  to  all.” 3  Here,  the  obligation  of  the  guilty 
world  is  represented  not  as  relating  to  Satan  but  to 
law ;  and  the  Redeemer  assumes  a  condemnation,  or 
in  the  modern  Protestant  phraseology  becomes  a 
voluntary  substitute  for  the  guilty,  for  purposes  of 
legal  satisfaction. 

There  are  two  other  portions  of  the  writings  of 
Athanasius  which  are  very  valuable,  as  indicating 
the  opinions  that  prevailed  in  the  Church  during 
the  4th  century  respecting  the  being  of  God  and 
the  person  of  Christ,  and  incidentally  respecting 
the  doctrine  of  Atonement.  They  are  the  Aoyog 
xcitcc  rEXb]vav  ( Oratio  contra  Genies ),  and  the 

1  Athanasius  :  Contra  Arianos,  I.  60  ;  compare  Cont.  Arianos,  I. 
I.  41 ;  IY.  6  ;  I.  45.  51  ;  II.  62.  Dorner  :  Person 

8  Athanasius  :  Defensio  Fidei  Christi,  I.  955,  remarks  that  simi- 
Nicaenae,  §  14.  lar  statements  are  frequent  in  the 

3  Athanasius:  Contra  Arianos,  two  Gregories,  and  Basil. 


242 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


IIsqi  rrjg  evav&QcoTirjOscog  rov  Aoyov  (De  incarnctr 
tione  Dei),  These  tracts  exhibit  a  remarkable 
union  of  the  best  elements  of  the  Grecian  philoso¬ 
phy,  with  the  most  inward  and  cordial  reception  of 
Christianity ;  and  show  that  the  “  father  of  ortho¬ 
doxy,”  as  he  was  called,  did  not  shrink  from  a  meta¬ 
physical  construction  of  Christian  doctrines,  and 
believed  that  they  could  be  defended  and  main¬ 
tained  upon  the  necessary  grounds  of  reason.  In  his 
Oratio  contra  Genies ,  aimed  against  the  erroneous 
views  of  the  popular  skeptical  philosophy  of  the 
day,  he  endeavors  to  evince  the  absolute  independ¬ 
ence  and  self-sufficiency  of  the  Deity,  in  opposition 
to  a  theory  that  would  identify  him  with  creation, 
or  make  him  a  part  of  it.  Having  established  this 
fundamental  position  of  religion,  he  then  proceeds 
in  his  tract  De  Incarnatione  to  show  that  the  Lo¬ 
gos,  both  before  and  after  his  incarnation,  partakes 
of  this  same  self-sufficiency,  which  he  has  shown  in 
his  previous  discussion  belongs  to  the  necessary  idea 
and  definition  of  God.  This  leads  him  indirectly 
to  speak  of  the  atonement  of  Christ,  in  its  relations 
to  the  necessary  nature  and  character  of  the  God¬ 
head,  and  in  so  doing  he  gives  expression  to  views 
which  harmonize  exactly  with  the  modern  Protes¬ 
tant  view  of  the  doctrine. 

v  u  Suppose,”  he  says,  “  that  God  should  merely 
require  repentance  in  order  to  salvation?  This 
would  not  in  itself  be  improper,  did  it  not  conflict 
with  the  veracity  of  God.  God  cannot  be  un- 


ATHANASIUS  AND  THE  GEEEK  EATHEES.  243 


truthful,  even  for  our  benefit.  Repentance  does  not 
satisfy  the  demands  of  truth  and  justice.  If  the 
question  pertained  solely  to  the  corruption  of  sin, 
and  not  to  the  guilt  and  ill-desert  of  it,  repentance 
might  be  sufficient.  But  since  God  is  both  truthful 
and  just,  who  can  save,  in  this  emergency,  but  the 
Logos  who  is  above  all  created  beings  ?  He  who 
created  men  from  nothing  could  suffer  for  all,  and 
be  their  substitute.  Hence  the  Logos  appeared.  He 
who  was  incorporeal,  imperishable,  omnipresent, 
manifested  himself.  He  saw  both  our  misery  and  the 
law’s  threatening ;  he  saw  how  inadmissible  ( dronov ) 
it  would  be  for  sin  to  escape  the  law,  except  through 
a  fulfilment  and  satisfaction  of  the  law.  Thus  behold¬ 
ing  both  the  increasing  depravity  of  men,  and  their 
condemnation  to  death,  he  had  compassion  upon 
them,  and  assumed  a  body  not  from  any  necessity 
of  nature  (c pvascog  dxoXovdla),  for  his  essence  is  in¬ 
corporeal.”  1  In  another  place,  in  this  treatise  upon 
the  Incarnation,  he  makes  the  statement  that  u  the 
first  and  principal  ground  of  the  Logos’  becoming 
man  was  that  the  condemnation  of  the  law,  by 
which  we  are  burdened  with  guilt  and  eternal  pun¬ 
ishment,  might  be  removed  by  the  payment  of  the 
penalty.” 2  This  is  the  strongest  possible  statement 
of  the  doctrine  of  penal  satisfaction.  For  Athanasius 
is  by  no  means  disposed  to  overlook  or  underesti- 

1  Athanasius  :  De  Incarnatio-  3  Athanasius  :  De  Incarnatio- 
ne,  c.  vii.  SeeDoKNEn:  Person  ne,  c.  xi.-xiv.,  quoted  by  Dokner  : 
Christi,  I.  837.  Person  Christi,  I.  840. 


244 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


mate  the  fact  that  one  purpose  of  the  incarnation  was 
to  reveal  the  Godhead  to  man.  He  emphasizes  the 
truth  that  the  Word  became  the  “light  of  men.” 
And  yet  in  this  passage  he  asserts  that  the  first  and 
principal  ground  of  the  incarnation  is  not  the  illu¬ 
mination  of  the  human  soul,  but  the  expiation  of  its 
guilt.  In  this  extract,  the  prophetic  office  of  Christ 
is  set  second  to  his  priestly,  as  distinctly  as  in  the 
writings  of  the  Reformers  themselves.  Comparing 
Athanasius,  then,  with  the  theologians  of  his  cen¬ 
tury,  we  find  that  his  view  of  the  Atonement,  with 
respect  to  the  two  vital  points  of  substitution  and 
satisfaction,  was  second  to  none  in  explicitness  and 
firmness.  He  refers  the  death  of  Christ  to  the  ne¬ 
cessary  nature  and  attributes  of  God  without  any 
ambiguity,  embarrassment,  or  confusion  of  mind, 
and  joins  on  upon  the  Biblical  idea  of  a  sacrifice  to 
satisfy  offended  law  and  justice,  with  as  much 
clearness  and  energy  as  any  theologian  previous 
to  the  time  of  Anselm. 

The  historical  development  of  the  doctrine,  how¬ 
ever,  evinces  as  we  follow  it  down  the  centuries  that 
the  same  gradual  progress  in  acquiring  a  scientific 
understanding  of  the  Scripture  representations  is 
going  on,  which  we  have  found  in  other  branches  of 
dogmatic  history.  Queries  now  begin  to  be  made 
whether  the  representation  of  a  ransom  paid  to 
Satan  has  not  been  too  prominent  in  the  catholic 
soteriology,  and  whether  the  other  relations  of  the 


ATHANASIUS  AND  THE  GREEK  FATHERS.  245 


work  of  Christ  should  not  be  investigated  and  ex¬ 
hibited.  We  find,  for  example,  Gregory  Nazianzen 
( f  390)  expressing  doubts,  and  raising  inquiries, 
that  indicate  that  the  theological  mind  was  sinking 
more  profoundly  into  the  substance  of  revelation, 
and  drawing  nearer  to  a  correct  logical  construction 
of  the  great  doctrine.  “We  were,”  he  says,  “under 
the  power  of  the  Evil  One,  since  we  had  sold  our¬ 
selves  to  sin,  and  had  received  in  exchange  the  lust 
for  iniquity.  If,  now,  a  ransom  is  given  only  to  the 
one  who  has  possession  of  the  thing  to  be  ransomed, 
then  I  ask  to  whom  was  the  price  of  ransom  given  ? 
To  the  Evil  One  himself  ?  Shame  on  the  rash  thought 
(cptu  rrjg  yfigscog)  !  Then  the  robber  would  receive 
not  merely  from  God,  but  God  himself  as  a  ransom 
and  exceeding  rich  reward  for  his  tyranny.  Or  is 
the  ransom  paid  to  the  Father  ?  But  here  the  ques¬ 
tion  arises,  in  the  first  place,  why  should  it  be  ?  for 
God  is  not  the  being  who  is  forcibly  retaining  us  in 
his  power.  And,  in  the  second  place,  what  reason 
can  be  assigned  why  the  Father  should  take  delight 
in  the  blood  of  his  only-begotten  Son  ?  since  he  did 
not  even  accept  Isaac  who  was  offered  to  him  by  his 
father  Abraham,  but  changed  the  sacrifice  of  a  ra¬ 
tional  being  into  that  of  an  animal  ?  Or,  is  it  not 
plain  that  the  Father  received  the  ransom,  not  be¬ 
cause  he  himself  required  or  needed  it,  but  for  the 
sake  of  the  divine  government  of  the  universe  {pi 
obcovopiav),  and  because  man  must  be  sanctified 


246 


HISTOKY  OF  SOTEEXOLOGY. 


through,  the  incarnation  of  the  Son  of  God.” 1  Here, 
although  the  completely  adequate  statement  con¬ 
tained  in  the  Anselmic  and  Reformed  soteriology 
is  not  made,  there  is  an  approximation  to  it.  The 
\j  divine  government  requires  this  death  of  Christ, 
though  the  divine  nature  does  not.  But  it  would 
be  impossible  to  follow  out  the  position  that  the 
principles  by  which  the  administration  of  the  uni¬ 
verse  is  conducted  require  an  atonement  for  sin, 
without  coming  to  the  yet  deeper  and  more  ultimate 
position  of  the  Anselmic  theory  that  the  nature  and 
attributes  of  the  Godhead  also  require  it.  For 
what  is  God’s  moral  government  but  an  expression 
of  God’s  moral  character  ;  and  that  which  is  needed 
in  order  to  satisfy  the  objective  principles  of  the 
former  is  needed  to  satisfy  the  subjective  qualities  of 
the  latter. 

If  we  examine  the  soteriology  of  the  Greek 
Church  during  the  last  half  of  the  4th  and  the  first 
half  of  the  5th  centuries,  we  meet  with  very  clear 
conceptions  of  the  atonement  of  Christ.  The  distinct¬ 
ness  of  the  views  of  Athanasius  upon  this  subject 
undoubtedly  contributed  to  this  ;  for  this  great  mind 
exerted  as  powerful  an  influence  upon  the  Eastern 
doctrinal  system,  generally,  as  Augustine  exercised 
over  the  Western.  Athanasius,  we  have  seen,  re¬ 
ferred  back,  in  his  analysis  of  the  doctrine,  to  the 
veracity  of  God.  God  had  threatened  death  as  the 

1  Gregorius  Naz.  :  Oratio,  gorius  Naz.  p.  436.  Baur  :  Ver- 
XLII.  Compare  Ullmann  :  Gre-  sohnungslehre,  p.  88. 


ATHANASIUS  AND  THE  GREEK  FATHERS.  247 


punishment  of  sin.  If,  now,  sin  were  remitted  with¬ 
out  any  infliction  of  any  kind,  either  upon  the  sin¬ 
ner  or  his  Kedeemer,  the  truth  of  God  would  be 
turned  into  a  lie.  The  next  step,  consequently,  was 
to  the  conception  of  an  exchange  or  substitution  of 
penalty;  and  Athanasius  himself  took  this  step. 
The  substitute  (^xazccXXy'kov )  for  the  death  of  the 
sinner  was  the  death  of  the  Saviour.  This  idea  of 
substitution  runs  through  all  the  Greek  soteriology 
of  the  4th  and  5th  centuries,  and  prepared  the  way 
for  further  statements  concerning  the  nature  and 
worth  of  Christ’s  sufferings,  some  of  which  we  will 
now  specify. 

Cyril  of  Jerusalem  ( f  386),  and  Eusebius  of 
Caesarea  (  f  340),  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  4th  cen¬ 
tury,  had  already  urged  the  point  that  Christ  took 
the  penalty  of  sin  upon  himself,  and  furthermore 
that  his  sufferings  were  not  of  less  worth  than  those 
of  mankind,  because  he  was  a  theanthropic  Person 
in  whom  divinity  and  humanity  were  perfectly 
blended.  In  this  connection,  Cyril  gives  utterance 
to  a  statement  respecting  the  value  and  sufficiency 
of  Christ’s  sufferings  which  reminds  of  those  strong 
statements  of  Luther  upon  this  subject,  which  a  legal 

u 

spirit  finds  it  so  difficult  to  interpret  or  understand. 
He  thus  expresses  himself.  “  Christ  took  sin  upon 
his  own  body.  He  who  died  for  us  was  no  insig¬ 
nificant  (/ucxgog)  creature,  he  was  no  mere  animal 
victim  ( ovx  rjv  ngojarov  aiOxhtiTOv)^  he  was  no  mere 
man,  he  was  not  an  angel,  but  he  was  God  incarnate. 


248 


HISTOKY  OF  SOTERIOLOGrY. 


The  iniquity  of  us  sinners  was  not  so  great  as  the 
righteousness  of  him  who  died  for  us  ;  the  sins  we 
have  committed  are  not  equal  to  the  atonement 
tmade  by  him  who  laid  down  his  life  for  us.”1 
Eusebius  reasons  as  follows  upon  Christ’s  satis¬ 
faction:  “How  then  did  he  make  our  sins  to  be 
his  own,  and  how  did  he  bear  our  iniquities  ?  Is 
it  not  from  thence,  that  we  are  said  to  be  his 
body,  as  the  apostle  speaks,  cYe  are  the  body 
of  Christ,  and  members,  for  your  part,  or  of  one 
another.’  And  as  when  one  member  suffers  all 
the  members  suffer,  so  the  many  members  sinning 
and  suffering,  he,  according  to  the  laws  of  sym¬ 
pathy  in  the  same  body,  seeing  that  being  the 
Word  of  God  he  would  take  the  form  of  a  servant 
and  be  joined  to  the  common  habitation  of  us  all, 
took  the  sorrows  or  labours  of  the  suffering  mem¬ 
bers  on  him,  and  made  all  their  infirmities  his  own, 
and  according  to  the  laws  of  humanity,  bore  our  sor¬ 
row  and  labour  for  us.  And  the  Lamb  of  God  did 
not  only  these  things  for  us,  but  he  underwent  tor¬ 
ments,  and  was  punished  for  us  ( ccXXcc  xcu  vntq  rjjucov 
xoXccOx)  tig  xal  TL^tcoqtav  vnoa^cov^  fjv  avrog  (xsv 
ovx  ojcpuXbLv) ;  that  which  he  was  no  ways  exposed 
to  for  himself,  but  we  were  so  by  the  multitude  of 
our  sins ;  and  thereby  he  became  the  cause  of  the 
pardon  of  our  sins ;  namely,  because  he  underwent 
death,  stripes,  reproaches,  transferring  the  thing 

1  Ov  roa-avTT]  rjv  toov  dfiaprcciXcov  roy  rj  biKaioavurj.  Gykilus  HlEROS. : 
f)  dvopia ,  oar]  roil  inrepa7ro'Svr)(rKov-  Catecheses,  Lib.  XIII.  §  33. 


ATHANASIUS  AND  THE  GrKEEK  EATHEES.  249 


which  we  had  deserved  to  himself ;  and  was  made 
a  curse  for  us,  taking  to  himself  the  curse  that  was 
due  to  us  ;  for  what  was  he,  but  a  price  of  redemp¬ 
tion  for  our  souls  ?  In  our  person,  therefore,  the 
oracle  speaks, — whilst  freely  uniting  himself  to  us, 
and  us  to  himself,  and  making  our  (sins  or)  passions 
(ndd'ri)  his  own,  he  says,  1 1  have  said,  u  Lord  be 
merciful  to  me,  heal  my  soul,  for  I  have  sinned 
against  thee.”  ’  ” 1  The  conceptions  of  vicariousness 
and  infinite  worth ,  in  connection  with  the  sufferings 
of  the  Redeemer,  were  very  plainly  at  work  in  the 
mind  of  the  Eastern  theologians,  so  far  as  it  was 
represented  by  men  like  Cyril  of  Jerusalem,  and 
Eusebius  of  Caesarea. 

But  these  conceptions  were  wrought  out  into 
still  greater  clearness  in  the  Eastern  Church,  by 
those  controversies  respecting  the  Person  of 
Christ  which  commenced  soon  after  the  Trinita¬ 
rian  controversy  was  ended,  and  continued  for  more 
than  two^centuries.  The  student  of  doctrinal  histo¬ 
ry  is  generally  wearied  by  the  minuteness  and  tedi¬ 
ousness  of  those  pertinacious  analyses  which  were 
connected  with  the  Nestorian,  the  Monophysite,  and 
Monothelite  controversies.  They  were  undoubtedly 
too  much  prolonged,  and,  what  is  of  more  impor¬ 
tance,  were  too  often  prosecuted  with,  an  ambitious, 
an  envious,  or  a  malignant  temper.  But  they  were 
nevertheless  productive  of  some  good  results,  to  the 

1  Eusebius  :  Demonstratio  Ev-  by  Owen  :  On  Justification,  Oh. 
angelica,  Lib.  X.  c.  1,  quoted  Yiii. 


250 


HISTOEY  OF  SOTEKIOLOGY. 


general  system  of  Christian  doctrine.  The  Nes- 
torian  controversy,  in  particular,  had  the  effect  to 
bring  in  juster  views  of  the  nature  of  Christ’s  Per - 
son ,  and  consequently  of  the  real  nature  of  his  suf¬ 
ferings.  The  error  of  Nestorianism  was  the  exact 
opposite  to  that  of  Eutychianism,  so  far  as  concerns 
the  sufferings  of  Christ.  The  Eutychians  held  that 
the  suffering  was  purely  and  solely  of  deity,  while 
the  Nestorian  party  taught  that  it  was  purely  and 
solely  of  humanity.  For  although  Nestorianism  ac¬ 
knowledged  the  alliance  of  God  with  man  in  Jesus 
Christ,  it  so  separated  the  two  natures  from  each 
other  in  his  Person,  that  the  suffering  wdiich  the 
Redeemer  endured  derived  no  character  or  value 
from  his  divinity,  and  was  in  reality  not  different 
from  that  of  any  mere  man.  The  Church,  in  op¬ 
position  to  Nestorianism,  contended  that  the  mere 
juxtaposition  of  two  natures,  so  that  each  should 
still  remain  a  personality  by  itself,  was  inconsistent 
with  the  catholic  doctrine  of  a  peculiar  species  of 
suffering  which  must  not  be  attributed  either  to 
sole  deity  or  sole  humanity,  but  to  a  theanthropric 
Person  combining  both  species  of  being. 

In  this  controversy,  Cyril  of  Alexandria  (  f  444) 
took  a  leading  part,  and  in  his  writings  we  find 
very  exalted  conceptions  of  the  worth  and  efficacy 
of  Christ’s  atoning  death,  springing  naturally  out 
of  his  apprehension  of  the  union  of  the  two  natures 
in  one  personality.  Since,  in  the  scheme  of  Cyril 
the  two  elements,  the  divine  and  the  human,  were 


ATHANASIUS  AND  THE  GREEK  FATHERS.  251 


blended  in  the  most  thorough  manner  possible,  short 
of  a  mixture  or  confusion  which  should  change  each 
into  a  third  species  of  substance  neither  human  nor 
divine  (an  error  against  which  the  catholic  mind 
was  careful  to  guard), — since  there  was  this  thor¬ 
ough  union  and  personal  interpenetration  of  deity 
and  humanity  in  the  theory  of  Cyril, — it  is  easy 
to  see  that  the  sufferings  of  a  Personage  so  consti¬ 
tuted  could  be  regarded  as  of  strictly  infinite  value . 
Hence  a  very  common  idea,  and  one  frequently 
emphasized  in  the  writings  of  Cyril,  is,  that  Christ 
did  not  suffer  as  a  mere  ordinary  man  suffers,  that 
his  blood  was  not  the  blood  of  a  common  man, — 
for  if  it  were,  it  could  not  suffice  for  the  salvation 
of  the  whole  world,— and  that  only  a  God-Man 
could  suffer,  One  for  all,  and  once  for  all.1 

We  find  this  same  distinct  recognition  of  the 
vicarious  nature  of  Christ’s  sufferings,  and  of  their 
adequacy  for  purposes  of  atonement,  in  that  dis¬ 
tinguished  theologian  of  the  8th  century,  John  of 
Damascus  (f  750).  The  opinions  of  this  mind 
were  highly  esteemed  in  the  Greet  Church,  and 
in  the  Oriental  Church  generally.  His  'Exdhioig 
niarscog  (JExjpositio  fidei )  was  long  the  text-book 
in  systematic  theology  at  the  East,  and  exerted 

1  See  the  quotations  from  Cy-  the  general  drift  of  Cyril’s  soteri- 
ril’s  Com.  in  Johannem,  in  Batje:  ology.  Cyril  went  to  the  verge 
Versohnungslehre,  p.  102  (Note),  of  Eutychianism  at  the  time  of 
Baur’s  inferences,  however,  are  the  council  of  Ephesus,  hut  after- 
drawn  too  much  from  detached  wards  retreated  from  it,  and  ac- 
passages,  and  not  enough  from  cepted  the  decisions  at  Chalcedon. 


252 


HISTOKY  OF  SOTERIOLOGrY • 


no  little  influence  upon  tlie  Scholastic  theology  of 
the  Latin  Church.  After  the  division  of  the  two 
churches,  the  Western  theologians  devoted  less  and 
less  attention  to  the  writings  of  the  Greek  Fathers, 
but  John  Damascene,  standing  as  he  did  at  the 
opening  of  the  era  of  Scholasticism,  and  partaking 
strongly  of  the  systematic  spirit  which  prevailed  in 
it,  was  studied  with  interest  and  effect  by  the  Latin 
Schoolmen.  Upon  the  subject  of  the  atonement, 
this  writer  follows  the  general  views  of  the  preced¬ 
ing  Greek  theologians,  especially  Athanasius  and 
Gregory  Nazianzen.  We  have  already  noticed  the 
doubts  expressed  by  this  latter  writer,  whether  the 
death  of  Christ  sustained  so  much  relation  to  the 
claims  of  Satan  as  the  earlier  soteriology  had  im¬ 
plied,  and  whether  its  highest  and  principal  refer¬ 
ence  was  not  to  the  attribute  of  justice  in  the  Di¬ 
vine  Nature.  John  Damascene  does  not  merely 
raise  the  query,  but  expresses  himself  with  energy 
upon  the  point.  “He,  who  assumed  death  for  us, 
died,  and  offered  himself  a  sacrifice  to  the  Father ; 
for  we  had  committed  wrong  towards  him  ( ccvtco 
TtsTThrjjufxshrjxccjusv),  and  it  was  necessary  for  him 
to  receive  our  ransom  (Xvtqov),  and  we  thus  be  de¬ 
livered  from  condemnation.  For  God  forbid  that 
the  blood  of  the  Lord  should  be  offered  to  the 
tyrant !  ” 1 


1  Johaitnes  Damascenus:  Expositio  Fidei,  III.  xxvii. 


AUGUSTINE  AND  GREGORY  THE  GREAT.  253 


§  7.  Soteriology  of  Augustine,  and  Gregory  the 

Great . 

A 

Augustine  (f  430)  is  a  writer  whose  opinions 
upon  any  subject  deserve  examination,  and  espe¬ 
cially  upon  the  cardinal  truth  of  the  Christian  sys¬ 
tem.  He  marks  the  period  immediately  succeeding 
that  represented  by  the  Greek  theologians  of  the 
4th  century,  during  which  the  spirit  of  investigation 
and  of  science  was  passing  from  the  declining  Ori¬ 
ental,  to  the  strengthening  Western  churches.  His 
prominent  position,  moreover,  in  the  history  of  the 
Christian  system  generally,  would  lead  us  to  infer  a 
very  great  influence  from  his  writings  in  the  con¬ 
struction  of  so  fundamental  a  doctrine  as  that  of  the 
Atonement.  Upon  examination,  however,  this  ex¬ 
pectation  is  somewhat  disappointed.  The  strength 
and  energy  of  Augustine’s  intellect  were  expended 
upon  other  parts  of  the  Christian  system ;  so  that 
the  subject  of  Soteriology  did  not  receive  such  a 
profound  and  satisfactory  treatment  from  him,  as 
did  that  of  Anthropology.  Augustine’s  view  of 
the  work  of  Christ  is  essentially  that  of  the  Fathers 

o 

who  had  preceded  him ;  neither  falling  short,  nor 
making  any  marked  advance  in  scientific  respects. 
Indeed,  he  seems  to  take  very  nearly  the  view  which 
we  have  seen  to  have  been  held  by  Irenaeus  re¬ 
specting  the  judicial  aspects  of  the  doctrine.  The 
claims  of  Satan  are  sometimes  recognized  in  connec- 


254 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


tion  with  those  of  justice,  as  in  the  following  pas¬ 
sage,  which  is  very  similar  in  its  phraseology  to 
that  of  Irenaeus.  “  God  the  Son  being  clothed 
with  humanity  subjugated  even  the  devil  to  man, 
extorting  nothing  from  him  by  violence,  but  over¬ 
coming  him  by  the  law  of  justice;  for  it  wTould 
have  been  injustice  if  the  devil  had  not  had  the 
right  to  rule  over  the  being  whom  he  had  taken 
captive.”  1  In  other  passages,  as  also  in  Ignatius, 
the  claims  of  Satan  are  not  noticed,  and  only  the 
connection  between  man’s  sin  and  God’s  justice  is 
alluded  to, — the  reconciliation  between  the  two 
antagonisms  being  effected,  as  in  the  Protestant 
statement  of  the  doctrine,  by  an  expiatory  sacrifice. 
“All  men,”  he  says,  “are  separated  from  God 
by  sin.  Hence  they  can  be  reconciled  with  him, 
only  through  the  remission  of  sin,  and  this  only 
through  the  grace  of  a  most  merciful  Saviour,  and 
this  grace  through  the  one  only  victim  of  the  most 
true  and  only  priest .”  2  In  another  place,  alluding 
to  our  Lord’s  comparison  of  his  own  crucifixion 
with  the  lifting  up  of  the  serpent  by  Moses,  Augus¬ 
tine  thus  expresses  himself :  “Our  Lord  did  not  in¬ 
deed  transfer  sin  itself  into  his  flesh  as  if  it  were 
the  poison  of  the  serpent,  but  he  did  transfer  death ; 
so  that  there  might  be,  in  the  likeness  of  human 

1  Augustinus  :  I)e  libero  arbi-  gratiam  misericordissimi  salvato- 
trio,  III.  x.  (Ed.  Migne,  I.  1285).  ris,  per  unam  victimam  verissimi 

2  “  Non  ergo  reconciliari  nisi  sacerdotis.”  Augustinus  :  De 
peccatorum  remissione,  per  unam  pec.  mer.  I.  lvi. 


AUGUSTINE  ANT)  GREGORY  THE  GREAT.  255 


flesh,  the  punishment  of  sin  without  its  personal 
guilt,  whereby  both  the  personal  guilt  and  punish¬ 
ment  of  sin  might  be  abolished  (solveretur)  from 
human  flesh.”  1 

These  passages,  and  many  others  like  them  scat¬ 
tered  all  through  his  writings,  prove  indisputably 
that  Augustine  held  the  doctrine  of  vicarious  satisfac¬ 
tion,  That  he  did  not  hold  it,  however,  in  a  form 
as  perfectly  well-discriminated  as  that  in  which  it 
appears  in  the  Anselmic  theory,  and  still  more  in 
the  soteriology  of  the  Reformation,  there  is  equally 
clear  proof.  Augustine  sometimes  confuses  justifi¬ 
cation  with  sanctification ,  from  not  limiting  the 
former  term  to  its  strict  signification  as  the  antith¬ 
esis  of  sanctification.  He  sometimes  employs  “jus- 
tificatio  ”  as  equivalent  to  the  whole  work  of  re¬ 
demption.  The  difference  between  the  judicial  and 
the  renovating  side  of  redemption  was  not  always 
kept  in  view  by  that  usually  sharp  and  aquiline 
eye.  We  find  some  few  passages  in  Augustine 
which  can  be  construed,  and  are  by  the  Papal 
writers,  to  mean  that  man  is  justified  in  part  by  an 
inherent  or  subjective  righteousness.  This  inward 
righteousness  is  indeed  regarded  as  the  work  of 
God  in  the  soul,  and  not  the  product  of  the  human 
will.  This  we  should  expect,  of  course,  from  a  mind 
holding  with  such  energy  and  firmness  as  did 

1  Augustinus  :  De  pec.  mer.  I.  7  (Ed.  Migne,  IY.  592)  ;  Confes- 
lx.  Compare  Enarratio  in  Ps.  1.  siones,  p.  239. 


256 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


Augustine  to  the  doctrines  of  total  depravity,  and 
prevenient  grace.  Man  cannot,  indeed,  attribute 
this  inward  and  subjective  righteousness  to  himself 
as  the  author,  and,  so  far,  a  sense  of  merit  and  a 
legal  spirit  would  be  excluded.  But  Augustine, 
judging  from  a  few  passages  in  his  works,  was  not 
always  careful,  as  were  Luther  and  Calvin  when 
treating  of  the  grounds  of  justification,  to  direct  at¬ 
tention  to  the  fact  that  so  far  as  the  guilt  of  man 
is  concerned,  no  possible  amount  of  inward  right¬ 
eousness,  even  though  wrought  in  the  soul  by  the 
Holy  Spirit,  can  be  an  atonement ,  or  ground  of  ac¬ 
quittal  from  condemnation.  Holiness  of  heart  con¬ 
tains  nothing  of  the  nature  of  an  expiation.  This 
is  found  only  in  judicial  suffering. 

It  is  not  an  adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  there¬ 
fore,  when  justification  is  sought  to  be  accomplished 
by  sanctification.  The  “justification  of  the  ungod¬ 
ly ,”  of  which  St.  Paul  speaks, — i.  e.  the  judicial 
acquittal  from  condemnation,  of  a  soul  that  is  still 
polluted  with  indwelling  sin,  and  will  be  more  or 
less  until  it  leaves  the  body, — cannot  of  course  be 
founded  upon  any  degree  of  holiness  that  has  been 
wrought  within  it  by  the  Holy  Spirit.  It  must 
rest  altogether  upon  an  outward  and  finished  work, 
namely  the  atoning  suffering  of  the  Son  of  God. 
This  declarative  act  of  God,  whereby,  on  the  ground 
of  the  objective  satisfaction  made  to  law  by  the 
Redeemer,  he  forgives  the  past,  must  be  carefully 
distinguished  from  the  subjective  transforming  work 


AUGUSTINE  AND  GEEGOKY  THE  GEE  AT.  257 


of  God  in  the  soul,  whereby  he  secures  its  holiness 
for  the  future. 

Augustine  is  not  always  careful  to  mark  this 
distinction.  The  term  “  justification”  is  sometimes 
confused  with  that  of  “sanctification,”  by  being 
made  to  include  it.  The  following  passage  from 
his  treatise  against  Julian  is  in  point.  “  God  justi^r 
fies  the  ungodly  not  only  by  remitting  the  sins  he  / 
commits,  but  also  by  giving  him  inward  love,  which 
causes  him  to  depart  from  evil,  and  makes  him  holy 
through  the  Spirit.” 1  According  to  the  Reformed 
symbols,  justification  rests  only  upon  remission  of 
sins,  and  remission  of  sins  only  upon  the  atonement 
of  Christ.  To  implant  a  principle  of  love,  is  no  part  ^ 
of  justification.  It  is  with  reference  to  this  occasion¬ 
al  confusion  of  the  two  constituent  parts  of  redemp¬ 
tion,  and  the  attribution  to  one  of  what  belongs  to 
the  other,  that  Calvin  makes  the  following  remark: 

“  The  opinion  of  Augustine,  or  at  least  his  manner 
of  expression,  is  not  to  be  altogether  praised.  For 
though  he  excellently  despoils  man  of  all  the  praise 
of  righteousness,  and  ascribes  the  whole  to  the 
grace  of  God,  yet  he  refers  grace  to  sanctification, 
in  which  we  are  regenerated  by  the  Spirit  to  new- 

1  Augustinus  :  Opus  imperfec-  infused  righteousness  is  the 
turn  contra  Julianum,  II.  clxv.  ground  and  cause  of  justification, 
Compare  Wiggeks  :  Augustinism,  though  he  often  employs  the  term 
p.  201.  Davenant,  On  Justifica-  “  justificatio,”  sometimes  in  the 
tion,  I.  202,  and  elsewhere,  con-  sense  of  absolution  from  condem- 
tends  in  opposition  to  Bellarmin  nation,  and  sometimes  of  sanctifi- 
that  Augustine  never  teaches  that  cation. 

VOL.  it. — 17 


258 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


ness  of  life.” 1  The  implication  of  Calvin’s  criticism 
here  evidently  is  that  the  grace  which  remits  pen¬ 
alty  should  be  referred  solely  to  the  atoning  work 
of  Christ,  and  not  at  all  to  the  sanctifying  agency 
of  the  Holy  Ghost.  God  acquits  the  human  soul 
from  condemnation  because  the  Son  of  God  has  ex¬ 
piated  its  guilt,  and  not  because  a  holy  character 
has  been  produced  within  it.  This  latter  is  the 
consequent  and  not  the  antecedent.  “Whom  he 
justifies,”  upon  an  entirely  objective  ground,  him 
he  sanctifies  by  a  subjective  operation  in  the 
soul. 2 

Another  evidence  that  Augustine’s  view  of  the 
doctrine  of  Atonement  shared  in  the  imperfect 
science  of  the  Patristic  period,  is  found  in  the  fact 
that  in  some  places,  at  least,  he  teaches  only  a  velar 
tive  necessity  for  an  atonement.  They  are  fool¬ 
ish,”  he  says,  “who  say  that  the  wisdom  of  God 


1  Calvin  :  Institutes,  III.  xi. 

*  The  following  reference  to 
Augustine’s  phraseology  is  made 
in  Luther’s  Table  Talk  (Bell’s 
Trans.  Ed.  1652,  p.  208).  “  Philip 
Melanchthon  said  to  Luther,  the 
opinion  of  St.  Austin  of  justifica¬ 
tion  (as  it  seemeth)  was  more  per¬ 
tinent,  fit,  and  convenient,  when 
he  disputed  not,  than  it  was  when 
he  used  to  speak  and  dispute  ;  for 
this  he  saith  :  ‘We  ought  to  cen¬ 
sure  and  hold  that  we  are  justi¬ 
fied  by  faith,  that  is  by  our  regen¬ 
eration ,  or  being  made  new  crea¬ 
tures.’  Now  if  it  be  so,  then  we 


are  not  justified  only  by  faith,  but 
by  all  the  [inward]  gifts  and  vir¬ 
tues  of  God  given  to  us.  Now 
what  is  your  opinion,  sir?  Do 
you  hold  that  a  man  is  justified 
by  this  regeneration  as  is  St.  Aus¬ 
tin’s  opinion  ?  Luther  answered 
and  said,  I  hold  this,  and  am  cer¬ 
tain  that  the  true  meaning  of  the 
gospel  and  of  the  apostle  is,  that 
we  are  justified  before  God  gra¬ 
tis^  for  nothing,  only  by  God’s 
mere  mercy  wherewith  and  by 
reason  whereof  he  imputeth  right¬ 
eousness  unto  us  in  Christ.” 
Owen  (Justification,  Chap.  IY.) 


AUGUSTINE  AND  GREGORY  THE  GREAT.  259 


could  not  liberate  men  otherwise  than  by  God’s  as¬ 
suming  humanity,  being  born  of  a  woman,  and  suf¬ 
fering  at  the  hands  of  sinners.” 1  In  another  place, 
he  thus  expresses  himself :  “  When  the  question  is 
asked  whether  there  was  no  other  way  whereby 
God  could  liberate  man,  than  by  his  Son’s  becoming 
incarnate  and  undergoing  the  suffering  of  death,  it 
is  not  enough  merely  to  say  that  this  is  a  good  way, 
but  also  to  show,  not  that  no  other  mode  was  in  the 
power  of  him  who  can  subject  all  things  to  his  con¬ 
trol,  but  that  no  more  suitable  mode  could  have 
been  adopted.” 2  Here,  the  divine  omnipotence  is 
separated  from  the  divine  justice,  and  the  possibil- 


also  alludes  to  this  widening  out 
of  the  term  justification  so  as  to 
include  sanctification,  as  liable 
to  introduce  error  into  soteriolo- 
gy.  “The  Latin  derivation  and 
composition  of  the  word  ‘jus- 
tificatio,’  would  seem  to  denote 
an  internal  change  from  inhe¬ 
rent  unrighteousness  to  right¬ 
eousness;  by  a  physical  motion 
and  transmutation,  as  the  school¬ 
men  speak.  For  such  is  the  sig¬ 
nification  of  words  of  the  same 
composition.  So ‘sanctification,’ 
‘mortification,’  ‘  vivification,’  and 
the  like,  all  denote  a  real  internal 
work  on  the  subject  spoken  of. 
Hereon,  in  the  whole  Roman 
school,  justification  is  taken  for 
the  making  of  a  man  to  be  inhe¬ 
rently  righteous  by  the  infusion 
of  a  principle  or  habit  of  grace. 
,  .  .  And  this  appearing  [appar¬ 


ent]  sense  of  the  word  possibly 
deceived  some  of  the  ancients,  as 
Austin  in  particular,  to  declare 
the  doctrine  of  free  gratuitous 
sanctification,  without  respect  to 
any  works  of  our  own,  under  the 
name  of  justification.  For  neither 
he,  nor  any  of  them,  ever  thought 
of  a  justification  before  God,  con¬ 
sisting  in  the  pardon  of  our  sins 
and  the  acceptation  of  our  per¬ 
sons  as  righteous,  by  virtue  of 
any  inherent  habit  of  grace  in¬ 
fused  into  us,  or  acted  by  us.” 

1  Augustinus  :  De  agone  Chris- 
tiano,  c.  10. 

2  Augustinus  :  De  Trinitate, 
XIII.  x.  “I  am  truly  ashamed 
of  those  divines,  who  have  no¬ 
thing  more  commonly  in  their 
mouths,  both  in  their  disputa¬ 
tions  and  discourses  to  the  people, 
than  ‘that  God  might  by  other 


260 


HISTOEY  OF  SOTEEIOLOGY. 


ity  of  an  infringement  upon  the  moral  attribute  by 
the  arbitrary  might  of  the  natural  attribute  is  con¬ 
ceded  within  the  sphere  of  the  infinite.  But  this  is 
to  degrade  the  infinite  to  the  level  of  the  finite,  by 
subjecting  it  to  the  same  limitations  and  hazards 
with  the  finite.  The  necessity  of  an  atonement  is 
made  to  depend  ultimately  upon  the  divine  option. 
It  is  not  founded  in  the  divine  nature,  or  in  the 
attribute  of  justice.  This  theory,  if  logically  car¬ 
ried  out,  conducts  to  the  position  of  Origen,  that 
God  might  by  an  act  of  mere  will  have  constituted 
the  sacrifice  of  bulls  and  goats  a  sufficient  sacrifice 
for  human  guilt.  But  logic  could  not  stop  even  at 
this  point.  For  inasmuch  as  there  is  no  absolute  and 
metaphysical  necessity  of  an  atonement,  and  the 
whole  provision  for  satisfying  justice  is  resolved  in 
the  last  analysis  into  an  optional  act ‘on  the  part  of 
God,  it  follows  that,  so  far  as  the  Divine  Being  is 
concerned,  an  atonement  might  be  dispensed  with 
altogether.  For  the  same  arbitrary  and  almighty 
will  that  was  competent  to  declare  the  claims  of 
justice  to  be  satisfied  by  the  finite  sacrifice  of  bulls 

means  have  provided  for  the  safe-  tervening  sacrifice,  forgive  sins, 
ty  and  honor  of  his  justice,  but  not  the  least  syllable  is  mention- 
that  that  way  by  the  blood  of  his  ed  in  the  whole  sacred  writings : 
Son  was  more  proper  and  becom-  nor  am  I  afraid  to  affirm  that  a 
ing.’  So  said  Augustine  of  old :  more  convenient  device  to  weak- 
but  what  then  ?  Of  that  absolute  en  our  faith,  love,  and  gratitude 
power,  which  they  dream  of,  by  cannot  be  invented.”  Owen  :  On 
which  he  might,  without  any  in-  Divine  Justice,  Part  II.  Chap.  vii. 


AUGUSTINE  AND  GREGORY  THE  GREAT.  261 


and  goats  would  be  competent,  also,  to  declare  tliat 
those  claims  should  receive  no  satisfaction  at  all. 
Any  principle  that  is  surrendered  in  part  is  surren¬ 
dered  entirely.  But  it  would  be  unjust  to  impute 
to  Augustine,  and  those  other  Fathers  who  in  this 
period  hesitated  to  assert  the  absolute  necessity  of 
the  sufferings  of  Christ  in  order  to  the  salvation  of 
man,  the  logical  consequences  of  their  position.  They 
were  afraid  of  limiting  the  power  of  God,  and  the 
more  so,  in  contrast  with  the  claims  of  Satan,  of 
which  we  have  seen  they  made  far  too  much ;  and 
the  undiscriminating  statements  which  fall  from 
them  in  such  connections  can  be  properly  cited  only 
to  show,  that  it  was  reserved  for  an  eye  that  saw 
more  profoundly  than  did  theirs  into  the  idea  of 
eternal  justice,  and  a  mind  that  apprehended  the 
Pauline  distinction  between  justification  and  sancti¬ 
fication  more  accurately  and  adequately  than  did 
theirs,  to  make  the  final  scientific  construction  of 
the  doctrine  of  Atonement. 

This  deficiency  in  Augustine’s  soteriology  com¬ 
pared  with  the  Anselmic  and  Protestant  finds  its 
natural  explanation  in  the  fact,  that  the  energy  of 
his  mind  was  almost  entirely  absorbed  in  the  doc- 
trine  of  the  soul’s  renovation  by  divine  influence. 
In  the  first  place,  his  own  inward  experience  had 
been  eminently  that  of  spiritual  bondage,  corrup¬ 
tion,  and  pollution.  The  need  of  grace  in  the  form 
of  a  renewing,  strengthening,  and  purifying  power, 


262 


HISTOEY  OF  SOTEEIOLOGY. 


had  been  very  vividly  and  painfully  felt  by  him. 1 
In  the  second  place,  the  controversy  with  Pela- 
gius  directed  the  attention  of  Augustine  still  more 
earnestly  to  the  doctrine  of  renovation  and  sancti¬ 
fication  by  the  Holy  Ghost.  The  doctrine  of  the 
atonement,  though  consequentially  involved  and  in 
peril  if  the  views  of  Pelagius  should  be  rigorously 
run  out  to  their  ultimate,  did  not,  nevertheless, 
come  very  much  into  the  controversy.  From  these 
two  causes  then, — by  reason  of  a  peculiarity  in  his 
own  religious  experience,  and  the  polemic  interest 
which  he  felt, — the  force  and  depth  of  Augustine’s 
intellect  were  drawn  off  from  the  atonement  proper, 
and  expended  upon  that  side  of  the  general  doc¬ 
trine  of  redemption  which  relates  to  the  delivery 
of  the  soul  from  the  power  and  pollution,  as  distin¬ 
guished  from  the  guilt  and  condemnation,  of  sin. 

Following  the  history  of  the  doctrine  of  Atone- 

r* 

ment  downward  in  the  Latin?  Church,  we  find  in 
the  century  succeeding  that  in  which  Augustine 
produced  his  principal  treatises,  one  writer  whose 
tone  is  firm,  and  whose  views  are  discriminating, 
but  from  whom,  however,  such  a  tone  and  view 
would  not  have  been  expected  considering  his  eccle¬ 
siastical  position  and  circumstances.  This  writer  is 
Gregory  the  Great ,  bishop  of  Rome  (f  604).  He 

1  This,  of  course,  is  not  to  be  the  need  of  grace  in  the  form  of 
understood  in  the  sense  of  deny-  an  atonement  and  remission  of 
ing  that  Augustine  had  any  ex-  sin.  It  is  spoken  in  a  compara- 
perience  of  sin  as  guilt,  and  of  tive  sense  only. 


AUGUSTINE  AND  GREGORY  THE  GREAT.  263 


stands  at  the  opening  of  that  era  of  power  and  in¬ 
fluence  which  the  Roman  Church  was  destined  to 
pass  through,  as  the  acknowledged  head  of  Western 
Christianity.  Occupying  such  a  position,  and  being 
the  first  marked  representative  of  the  hierarchical  ^ 
spirit  which  was  now  to  mould  and  corrupt  Chris¬ 
tianity  for  a  thousand  years  to  come,  we  are  nat¬ 
urally  surprised  to  find  in  the  theological  writings 
of  one  whom  some  regard  as  the  first  pope,  repre¬ 
sentations  of  the  atoning  work  of  Christ  so  much  in 
accordance  with  the  Pauline  conception  of  it.  The 
views  of  Gregory  are  expressed  with  even  more 
clearness  and  firmness  than  those  of  some  preced¬ 
ing  theologians,  who  were  yet  less  immediately 
connected  with  that  distinctively  Roman  Church 
whose  greatest  guilt  consists  in  mutilating  and  nul¬ 
lifying  the  most  strictly  evangelical  of  all  the  Chris¬ 
tian  doctrines,  that  of  justification  solely  through 
the  atonement  of  the  Son  of  God. 

In  his  writings,  Gregory  lays  great  stress  upon 
the  idea  of  a  sacrifice  offered  in  the  death  of  Christ. 

He  starts  from  the  conception  of  guilt,  and  from 
this  derives  immediately  the  necessity  of  a  thean- 
thropic  sacrifice.  u  Guilt,”  he  says, 1  “  can  be  extin-  ^ 
guished  only  by  a  penal  offering  to  justice.  But  it 
would  contradict  the  idea  of  justice,  if  for  the  sin  of 
a  rational  being  like  man,  the  death  of  an  irrational 
animal  should  be  accepted  as  a  sufficient  atonement. 


1  Gregorius  Magnus  :  Moralia  in  Jobum,  XVII.  xlvi. 


264 


HISTOKY  OF  SOTEKIOLOGY. 


Hence,  a  man  must  be  offered  as  the  sacrifice  for 
man ;  so  that  a  rational  victim  may  be  slain  for  a 
rational  criminal.  But  how  could  a  man,  himself 
stained  with  sin,  be  an  offering  for  sin  ?  Hence  a 
'sinless  man  must  be  offered.  But  what  man  de¬ 
scending  in  the  ordinary  course  would  be  free  from 
sin?  Hence,  the  Son  of  God  must  be  born  of  a 
virgin,  and  become  man  for  us.  He  assumed  our 
nature  without  our  corruption  (culpa).  He  made 
himself  a  sacrifice  for  us,  and  set  forth  (exhibuit)  for 
sinners  his  own  body,  a  victim  without  sin,  and  able 
both  to  die  by  virtue  of  its  humanity,  and  to  cleanse 
the  guilty,  upon  grounds  of  justice.”  1 

With  regard  to  the  question :  To  whom  is  this 
sacrifice  offered  ?  in  other  words :  To  what  extent 
do  the  claims  of  Satan  come  into  view  in  Gregory’s 
scheme  ?  even  Baur,  with  all  his  determination  to 
find  the  doctrine  of  Satan’s  claims  .in  the  Catholic 
soteriology,  makes  the  following  remark  upon  the 
passage  from  the  Moralia  just  quoted:  “ It  is  not 
indeed  expressly  said  that  the  sacrifice  is  offered  to 
God,  but  this  is  implied  in  the  conception  of  a  sacri¬ 
fice.  Not  in  the  devil  consequently  (though  Greg¬ 
ory  cannot  indeed  altogether  get  rid  of  the  notion 
of  a  devil),  but  only  in  God,  does  the  cause  lie  why 
Jesus  must  die  for  the  sin  of  man.”  2 

/ 

1  “Fecit  pro  nobis  sacrificium,  qnae  et  hnmanitate  mori,  et  jus- 
corpus  suum  exhibuit  pro  pecca-  titia  mundare  potuisset.” 
toribus,  victimam  sine  peccato,  2  Batjr  :  Yersohnungslehre,  93. 


BECAPITULATOEY  SUEVEY. 


265 


§  8.  Recapitulatory  Survey . 

We  have  now  traced  the  history  of  the  doctrine 
of  Atonement  down  to  the  opening  of  the  Scholas¬ 
tic  Era,  and  before  commencing  the  account  of  the 
course  of  this  great  truth  of  Christianity  during  this, 
and  the  following  period  of  the  Reformation,  we  will 
briefly  cast  a  glance  backward  over  the  course  we 
have  travelled. 

It  was  remarked  in  the  beginning  of  this  history, 
that  the  doctrine  of  vicarious  satisfaction  acquired 
its  scientific  form  more  slowly  than  did  the  other 
great  truths  of  Christianity,  and  that  it  was  reserved 
for  the  Modern  Church  to  give  it  an  expansion  and 
definition  equal  to  that  which  the  doctrines  of  The¬ 
ology  and  Anthropology  had  received  in  the  Ancient 
Church.  The  history  thus  far  verifies  the  remark. 
We  have  seen  that  the  Apostolic  Fathers  merely 
repeated  the  Scripture  phraseology  which  contained 
the  truth  that  was  warm  and  vital  in  their  Chris¬ 
tian  experience,  but  did  not  enunciate  it  in  the 
exact  and  guarded  statements  of  a  scientific  for¬ 
mula.  Next,  we  find  the  Primitive  Fathers  of  the 
2d  and  3d  centuries  endeavouring  to  exhibit  the 
doctrine  in  a  more  speculative  form.  Their  success 
was  but  partial ;  for  secondary  elements  and  truths 
were  made  too  prominent,  while  strictly  primary 
elements  and  truths,  though  not  denied  or  rejected, 
were  yet  not  presented  with  sufficient  boldness  in 


266 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOOY. 


their  scientific  schemes.  The  claims  of  God  and  of 
the  attribute  of  justice  were  thrown  too  much  into 
the  background,  by  those  of  Satan.  And  yet  the 
judicial  aspects  of  the  subject  were  continually 
pressing  themselves  with  increasing  force  upon  the 
reflection  of  theologians.  A  more  moderate  and 
scriptural  view  of  the  kingdom  of  Evil,  and  of  its  head 
and  prince,  was  gradually  taking  the  place  of  that 
exaggerated  conception  which,  in  reality,  bordered 
too  much  upon  the  dualism  of  the  East,  to  be  en¬ 
tirely  consonant  with  that  truth  which  the  prophet 
sought  to  enforce  upon  the  Persian  monarch,  when 
he  proclaimed  that  God  “  makes  peace  and  creates 
evil.”  Satan  and  his  kingdom,  while  a  real  exist¬ 
ence  was  conceded  to  both,  were  beginning  to  be 
seen  in  their  true  relations  to  Jehovah,  who  is  as 
supreme  in  reference  to  the  kingdom  of  sin,  as  to 
the  kingdom  of  holiness.  The  sufferings  of  the 
God-Man  began  to  be  contemplated  by  the  scien¬ 
tific  mind  more  exclusively  in  their  relations  to  the 
attributes  and  government  of  God.  Though  the 
claims  of  Satan  were  still,  to  some  extent,  regarded 
as  the  ground  of  the  necessity  of  Christ’s  death,  the 
drift  of  speculation  was  steadily  towards  the  simple 
position,  that  the  atonement  was  made  for  the  satis¬ 
faction  of  justice  alone,  and  that  the  only  claims 
that  are  cancelled  by  it  are  the  claims  of  law  and 
of  God. 

It  is  necessary,  however,  to  call  attention  to  a 
new  phenomenon  which  begins  to  appear  in  the  5th 


RECAPITULATORY  SURVEY. 


267 


and  6th  centuries,  in  order  to  obtain  a  full  view  of 
the  state  of  this  doctrine  at  the  close  of  the  Patris¬ 
tic  period,  and  particularly  in  order  to  account  for 
the  great  change  that  came  over  it,  in  the  Papal 
period  which  succeeded.  The  religious  experience 
of  the  church  itself,  during  the  last  half  of  the  first 
six  centuries,  was  undergoing  a  great  change.  In 
the  first  place,  the  sense  of  sin  was  declining  gen¬ 
erally.  The  more  secular  and  temporal  aspects  of 
Christianity,  owing  partly  to  the  alliance  between 
Church  and  State,  and  still  more  to  the  corrupt 
tendencies  of  human  nature  itself,  were  eclipsing  its 
more  directly  spiritual  relations  to  the  character 
and  necessities  of  sinful  humanity.  Hence  there 
was  a  declining  sense  of  the  need  of  redemption,  in 
the  church  at  large.  Moreover,  to  aggravate  the 
evil,  the  attention  of  the  earnest  and  thoughtful 
minority  was  somewhat  drawn  away  from  the  aton¬ 
ing  work  of  Christ,  to  human  substitutes  for  it  in  the 
form  of  penances.  What  little  sense  of  guilt  there 
was  in  the  church,  was  somewhat  dissipated,  or  at 
least  made  more  shallow,  by  being  expended  upon 
those  “  sacrifices  which  can  never  take  away  sin.” 1 

In  the  second  place,  as  we  have  had  occasion  to 
observe  in  the  instance  of  Augustine,  there  was 
some  confusion  of  ideas  coming  into  the  theoretical 


1  The  tendency  to  mix  works  example,  represents  martyrdom 
with  faith  pertains  to  every  age,  as  a  cooperating  ground  of  for- 
and  is  found  very  early  in  dog-  giveness.  See  Pitsey’s  transla- 
matic  history.  Teetullian,  for  tion  of  Tertullian,  1. 106,  Note  b. 


268 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGrY. 


construction  of  the  doctrine  itself.  This  was  partly 
a  cause,  and  partly  an  effect  of  that  decline  in  the 
popular  experience  which  we  have  just  spoken  of ; 
for  we  are  reminded  at  this  point,  as  we  are  at 
every  point  in  the  internal  history  of  the  Church, 
that  the  process  of  decline  is  one  of  development, 
and  that  the  relation  of  the  corrupting  elements  to 
each  other  is  not  that  of  mere  cause  and  effect,  but 
of  action  and  reaction.  Perhaps,  if  the  feeling  of 
guilt  in  Augustine’s  mind  had  been  as  poignant  and 
penal  as  it  was  in  Luther’s,  or  if  his  eye  had  been 
as  penetrating  and  judicial  upon  this  single  topic  as 
was  that  of  Calvin;  perhaps  if  this  great  theolo¬ 
gian  of  the  Patristic  period  had  been  as  thorough 
and  profound  upon  this  side  of  the  subject  of  sin,  as 
he  was  upon  the  other,  a  statement  of  the  doctrine 
of  justification  by  faith  without  works  might  have 
been  originated  in  the  5th  century,  that  by  the 
blessing  of  God  would  have  prevented  the  Papacy, 
and  precluded  those  ten  centuries  of  “voluntary 
humility,”  worshipping  of  saints,  and  justification 
by  works.  When  the  popular  feeling  of  a  period  is 
becoming  less  correct  and  healthy,  nothing  in  the 
way  of  means  does  so  much  towards  a  change  and 
restoration,  as  strict  accuracy,  which  is  the  same  as 
strict  orthodoxy,  in  the  popular  creed.  The  creed 
may,  indeed,  in  the  outset  be  far  in  advance  of  the 
general  sentiment  and  feeling,  but  being  not  only 
the  truth  but  the  whole  truth,  and  not  only  the 
whole  truth  but  nothing  but  the  truth,  it  begins  to 


RECAPITULATORY  SURVEY. 


269 


draw  magnetically  upon  the  human  mind,  until  it 
eventually  brings  it  close  and  entirely  up  to  its  own 
height  and  vantage  ground.  In  the  period  of  which 
we  are  speaking,  or  more  properly  in  the  latter  part 
of  it,  it  was  coming  to  be  the  popular  feeling,  that 
the  pardon  of  past  sin  must  depend,  to  some  extent 
at  least,  upon  the  character  and  works  of  the  indi¬ 
vidual  ;  that  the  atonement  of  the  Son  of  God  must, 
in  some  slight  degree  at  least,  be  supplemented,  or 
strengthened,  or  perfected,  by  the  works  or  the 
feelings  of  the  believer.  Even  when  there  was  the 
strictest  orthodoxy  in  referring  the  holy  character 
or  works  to  the  influences  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  there 
was  error,  and  in  reality  the  germ  of  the  Papal 
theory,  in  referring  the  remission  of  past  transgres¬ 
sion  to  renovated  character  and  righteous  works,  as 
a  procuring  cause  in  connection  with  the  death  of 
the  Redeemer.  It  was  defective  soteriology,  to  rep¬ 
resent  sanctification  in  conjunction  with  the  atone¬ 
ment  of  Christ  as  a  ground  of  pardon.  A  keener 
vision,  that  could  see  the  distinction  between  the 
guilt  of  sin  and  its  pollution,  would  not  have  con¬ 
founded  the  work  of  the  Sanctifier  with  that  of  the 
Atoner.  A  clearer  discrimination,  which  could 
separate  the  penal  and  retributive  elements  of  sin 
from  its  blinding,  corrupting,  and  enslaving  effects 
upon  a  rational  spirit,  would  not  have  blended  and 
confused  the  two  parts  of  redemption  in  such  a  man¬ 
ner  that  one  was  liable  to  disappear  from  the  mind 
and  reflection  of  the  Church.  In  short,  a  more 


270 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


scientific  and  technical  accuracy,  a  stricter  reference 
of  each  of  the  two  elements  in  sin  to  the  tioo  corre¬ 
sponding  sides  of  redemption,  would  have  contrib¬ 
uted  greatly  to  fasten  the  eye  of  the  individual 
upon  his  relations  to  eternal  justice,  and  upon  that 
infinite  oblation  which,  alone  and  of  itself ,  sets  the 
criminal  once  more  in  right  relations  with  this  fun¬ 
damental  attribute.  In  this  way,  the  notion  that  a 
finite  sacrifice  can  expiate  guilt,  either  wholly  or  in 
part,  or  that  the  struggle  after  holiness,  even  if  suc¬ 
cessful,  can  offset  transgression  and  pacify  conscience, 
would  have  been  more  likely  to  have  been  banished 
from  the  Church. 

These  germs  of  corruption  in  the  soteriology  of 
the  Church,  which  we  have  thus  noticed  as  begin¬ 
ning  to  appear  during  the  last  half  of  the  Patris¬ 
tic  period  (a.  d.  400-600),  were  gradually  un¬ 
folded  during  the  four  centuries  that  intervened 
between  the  decline  of  the  Patristic  theology,  and 
the  breaking  forth  of  the  Scholastic.  With  the  ex¬ 
ception  of  John  of  Damascus  in  the  Greek  Church, 
and  Alcuin  and  Scotus  Erigena  in  the  Western,  this 
period  of  four  hundred  years  (a.  d.  600-1000) 
is  marked  by  no  individual  minds  of  much  historic 
character  and  power.  Of  these,  the  Greek  theolo¬ 
gian  and  the  spiritual  guide  of  Charlemagne  are  by 
far  the  most  biblical  in  their  opinions  concerning 
the  doctrine  whose  history  we  are  investigating. 
The  views  of  John  Damascene  we  have  already 
briefly  noticed,  and  those  of  Alcuin  agreed  with 


RECAPITULATORY  SURVEY. 


271 


those  of  Augustine.  The  soteriology  of  Erigena 
was  essentially  defective,  and  could  not  be  other¬ 
wise,  springing  as  it  did  from  a  pantheistic  view  of 
the  Trinity  and  of  the  Person  of  Christ.  According 
to  him,  the  incarnation  was  merely  the  immanence 
of  God  in  the  world, — a  popular  way  of  expressing 
the  philosophic  truth  that  God  acquires  distinct  self- 
consciousness  in  the  creature.  All  that  was  said,  in 
a  former  part  of  this  history,  respecting  the  incom¬ 
patibility  of  the  Gnostic  pantheism  with  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  man’s  distinct  existence,  real  freedom,  and 
amenability  to  retributive  justice,  applies  with  full 
force  to  the  pantheism  of  this  remarkable  man,  who 
seemed  to  stand  by  himself,  and  whose  pantheistic 
views,  it  ought  to  be  observed,  were  rejected  and 
opposed  by  the  church  and  the  clergy  of  his  time. 

But  the  decline  in  respect  to  true  views  of  the 
vicarious  atonement  of  Christ,  during  this  interme¬ 
diate  period,  was  owing  to  more  general  causes,  than 
merely  the  opinions  and  influence  of  leading  individ¬ 
uals.  The  masses  of  merely  nominal  Christians  who 
began  to  be  brought  into  the  Church,  after  its  tri¬ 
umph  over  Paganism  was  complete  and  its  alliance 
with  the  State  was  perfected,  constituted  a  body 
without  a  soul, — :an  aggregate  of  professing  Chris¬ 
tians  without  any  religious  experience .  That  pain¬ 
ful  process  of  self-knowledge,  of  conviction  of  guilt 
and  sense  of  need  of  divine  grace,  which  ought  to 
initiate  and  precede  all  profession  of  Christianity, 
was  too  generally  unknown  in  those  large  masses  of 


272 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


population  who  in  these  centuries  bore  the  name, 
and  enjoyed  all  the  external  rights  and  privileges 
of  church  members.  Here  and  there,  undoubtedly, 
there  were  individual  minds,  or  a  community,  in 
whom  the  experience  of  the  day  of  Pentecost  was  to 
be  found, — a  consciousness  of  sin,  a  cry  for  mercy, 
and  a  self-despairing  recumbency  upon  the  atone¬ 
ment  of  the  Redeemer,  even  though  confused  and 
beclouded  by  the  notions  of  the  time  respecting  the 
additional  need  of  personal  penances  and  ecclesiasti¬ 
cal  absolutions.  But  the  Church  as  a  whole  knew 
little  of  this  experience,  and  hence,  while  holding  in 
a  passive  and  hereditary  manner  the  Patristic  state¬ 
ments  respecting  the  Trinity  and  the  Person  of 
Christ,  it  was  coming  to  hold  a  theory  respecting 
Sin  and  Redemption  that  was  altogether  opposed 
to  that  form  of  doctrine  which  had  prevailed  during 
the  first  four  centuries,  in  both  the  Eastern  and  the 
Western  Church. 


CHAPTER  II. 


SOTERIOLOGY  OF  THE  MEDIAEVAL  CHIJRCH. 


§  1.  Anselm! s  Theory  of  Satisfaction . 

After  this  rapid  glance  at  the  condition  of  the 
doctrine  of  atonement  during  the  last  half  of  the 
first  ten  centuries,  we  pass  to  the  examination  of 
the  soterioiogy  of  the  Scholastic  age.  It  begins 
with  Anselm’s  (f  1109)  theory  of  satisfaction,  elab¬ 
orately  wrought  out  in  his  Cur  Deus  Homo  ?  It  is 
remarkable  that  the  bursting  forth  of  a  new  spirit 
of  inquiry,  the  dawning  of  a  new  era  after  five 
hundred  years  of  stagnation  and  darkness,  should 
have  commenced  with  the  sudden  appearance  of  a 
mind  of  such  remarkable  depth,  clearness,  and 
living  piety,  as  that  of  Anselm.  We  do  not  find 
the  usual  antecedents  and  gradual  preparation,  for 
the  advent  of  such  a  spirit.  The  sun  rises  without 
a  dawn,  or  a  morning  twilight.  In  the  very  open¬ 
ing  of  a  new  era  which  followed  close  upon  a  period 
of  great  superstition,  and  misapprehension  of  the 

yOL.  II. — 18 


274 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOG  Y. 


true  nature  of  sin  and  atonement,  we  find  a  view 
of  the  work  of  Christ,  decidedly  in  advance  of  the 
best  soteriology  of  the  Patristic  age,  and  agreeing 
substantially  with  that  of  the  Reformation.  ..  Such 
phenomena  as  these,  in  the  history  of  the  church, 
seem  to  conflict  with  the  doctrine  of  historical  de¬ 
velopment,  because  it  is  so  difficult  to  discover  any 
connection  between  antecedents  and  consequents. 
The  truth  is,  however,  that  we  are  not  able  to  de¬ 
tect  the  connection,  because  of  the  deficiency  in  our 
knowledge  of  the  interior  life  of  those  distant  and 
dark  ages.  God  undoubtedly,  in  this  as  in  all  other 
instances  in  which  he  does  not  employ  a  miracu¬ 
lous  agency,  conducted  the  process  upon  the  ordinary 
principles  of  his  administration,  and  made  it  a  con¬ 
tinuity,  though  marked  by  sudden  and  striking 
changes.  It  finds  its  analogy  in  those  processes  in 
the  vegetable  world,  in  which  the  one  common 
principle  of  life,  after  periods  of  long  external 
slumber,  breaks  forth  into  unusual  external  power 
and  splendour ;  as  when  the  dull  and  prickly  cac¬ 
tus  suddenly,  and  to  all  outward  appearance  with¬ 
out  any  preparation,  bursts  into  a  gorgeous  flower. 

In  this  tract,  entitled  Cur  Hens  Homo  f1,  Anselm 
begins  and  ends  with  the  idea  of  an  absolute  neces¬ 
sity  of  an  atonement,  in  order  to  the  redemption 
of  man.  Everything  is  referred  to  a  metaphysical, 
or  necessary  ground,  and  hence  we  have  in  this 


1  Translated  in  the  Bibliotheca  Sacra,  Oct.  1854,  and  Jan.  1855. 


Anselm’s  theory  of  satisfaction.  275 


i  ! 
\  / 

1  f 
\ 


theory  the  first  metaphysique  of  the  Christian  doc¬ 
trine  of  Atonement.  Not  that  the  idea  of  a  meta¬ 
physical  necessity  in  reference  to  the  atonement 
was  entirely  unknown  up  to  this  time.  We  have 
already  noticed,  that  an  Athanasius  had  distinctly 
urged  that  necessity  of  an  expiation  in  order  to  for¬ 
giveness  of  sin  which  is  founded  in  the  divine  attri¬ 
butes  of  justice  and  veracity,  and  we  have  found 
this  view,  for  substance  and  informally,  in  all  the 
better  Patristic  soteriology.  But  we  have  this 
view,  now  for  the  first  time,  in  Anselm’s  tract,  re¬ 
duced  to  a  systematic  and  scientific  form,  and 
cleared  of  those  excrescences  which  were  connected 
with  it  in  the  Ancient  Church.  Anselm  is  the  first 
instance  in  which  the  theologian  plants  himself 
upon  the  position  of  philosophy,  and  challenges  for 
the  doctrine  of  vicarious  satisfaction,  both  a  ra- 
tional  necessity,  and  a  scientific  rationality.  The 
fundamental  position  of  the  Cur  Deus  Homo  is,  that 
the  atonement  of  the  Son  of  God  is  absolutely  or 
metaphysically  necessary  in  order  to  the  remission 
of  sin.  Anselm  concedes  by  implication,  through¬ 
out  his  work,  that  if  it  cannot  be  made  out  that  the 
vicarious  satisfaction  of  divine  justice  by  the  thean- 
thropic  suffering  of  Jesus  Christ  is  required  by  a 
necessary  and  immanent  attribute  of  the  Divine 
Nature,  then  a  scientific  character  cannot  be  vindi- 

i  ^ 

cated  for  the  doctrine  ;  for  nothing  that  is  not 
metaphysically  necessary  is  scientific.  Hence,  in 
the  very  beginning  of  the  tract,  he  affirms  that  a 


276 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


mere  reference  to  the  divine  benevolence,  without 
any  regard  to  the  divine  justice,  cannot  satisfy  the 
mind  that  is  seeking  a  necessary  basis  in  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  atonement.  For  benevolence  is  inclined  to 
dispense  with  penal  suffering,  and  of  itself  does  not 
demand  it.1 

It  is  not  the  attribute  of  mercy,  but  the  attri¬ 
bute  of  justice,  which  insists  upon  legal  satisfaction, 
and  opposes  an  obstacle  to  the  salvation  of  a  sin¬ 
ner.  Setting  aside,  therefore,  the  divine  justice, 
and  taking  into  view  merely  the  divine  compassion, 
there  does  not  appear  to  be  any  reason  why  God 
should  not  by  an  act  of  bare  omnipotence  deliver 
the  sinner  from  suffering  and  make  him  happy. 
This  conducts  Anselm  to  that  higher  position  from 
which  the  full-orbed  nature  and  character  of  the 
Deity  is  beheld,  and  he  proceeds  to  show  that  com¬ 
passion  cannot  operate  in  an  isolated  and  independ¬ 
ent  manner  in  the  work  of  redemption,  and  that  if 
anything  is  done  for  the  recovery  and  weal  of  the 
transgressor,  it  cannot  be  at  the  expense  of  any 
necessary  quality  in  the  divine  nature,  through  the 
mere  exercise  of  an  arbitrary  volition,  and  an  un¬ 
bridled  omnipotence. 

The  leading  positions,  and  the  connection  of 
ideas,  in  this  exceedingly  profound,  clear,  and  logi¬ 
cal  tract  of  the  11th  century,  are  as  follows. 


1  Anselmus  :  Cur  Deus  Homo,  Proslogium,  c.  8,  9,  and  Hasse  : 
I.  6.  Compare  also  Anselmus  :  Anselm  von  Canterbury,  II.  275. 


anselm’s  theory  of  satisfaction-. 


277 


Beginning  with  the  idea  of  sin,  Anselm  defines 
this  as  the  withholding  from  God  what  is  due  to 
him  from  man.  Sin  is  debt.1  But  man  owes  to 
God  the  absolute  and  entire  subjection  of  his  will, 
at  all  times,  to  the  divine  law  and  will.  This  is 
not  given,  and  hence  the  guilt,  or  debt ,  of  man  to 
Deity.  The  extinction  of  this  guilt  does  not  con¬ 
sist  in  simply  beginning  again  to  subject  the  will 
entirely  to  its  rightful  sovereign,  but  in  giving 
satisfaction  for  the  previous  cessation  in  so  doing. 
God  has  been  robbed  of  his  honour  in  the  past,  and 
it  must  be  restored  to  him  in  some  way,  while  at 
the  same  time  the  present  and  future  honour  due  to 
him  is  being  given.  But  how  is  man,  who  is  still  a 
sinner  and  constantly  sinning,  to  render  this  double 
satisfaction,  viz. :  satisfy  the  law  in  the  future  by 
perfectly  obeying  it,  and  in  the  past  by  enduring 
its  whole  penalty?  It  is  impossible  for  him  to 
render  it ;  and  yet  this  impossibility,  argues  An¬ 
selm,  does  not  release  him  from  his  indebtedness  or 
guilt,  because  this  impossibility  is  the  effect  of  a 
free  act,  and  a  free  act  must  be  held  responsible  for 
all  its  consequences,  in  conformity  with  the  ethical 
maxim,  that  the  cause  is  answerable  for  the  effect. 
But  now  the  question  arises  :  Cannot  the  love  and 
compassion  of  God  abstracted  from  his  justice  come 
in  at  this  point,  and  remit  the  sin  of  man  without 


1  This  is  in  accordance  with  petition,  “  forgive  ns  our  debts  ” 
Christ’s  definition  of  sin,  in  the  (o^etX^ara). 


278 


HISTOEY  OF  SOTEKIOLOGY. 


any  satisfaction?  This  is  impossible,  because  it 
would  be  irregularity  (aliquid  inordinatum),  and 
injustice.  If  unrighteousness  is  punished  neither  in 
the  person  of  the  transgressor,  nor  in  that  of  a 
proper  substitute,  then  unrighteousness  is  not  sub¬ 
ject  to  any  law  or  regulation  of  any  sort ;  it  enjoys 
more  liberty  than  righteousness  itself,  which  would 
be  a  contradiction  and  a  wrong.  Furthermore,  it 
would  contradict  the  divine  justice  itself,  if  the 
creature  could  defraud  the  creator  of  that  which  is 
his  due,  without  giving  any  satisfaction  for  the  rob¬ 
bery.  Since  there  is  nothing  greater  and  better 
than  God,  there  is  no  attribute  more  just  and 
necessary  than  that  primitive  righteousness  innate 
to  deity  which  maintains  the  honour  of  God.  This 
justice,  indeed,  is  God  himself,  so  that  to  satisfy  it, 
is  to  satisfy  God  himself. 

Having  in  this  manner  carried  the  discussion 


into  the  very  heart  of  the  divine  nature ,  and  shown 

* 

that  a  necessary  and  immanent  attribute  of  the 
Deity  stands  in  the  way  of  the  non-infliction  of 
punishment  and  the  happiness  of  the  transgressor, 
Anselm  proceeds  to  consider  the  possibility  of  sat¬ 
isfying  the  claims  of  justice, — the  claims  of  Satan 
being  expressly  denied.  There  are  two  ways,  he 
says,  in  which  this  attribute  can  be  satisfied.  First, 
the  punishment  may  be  actually  inflicted  upon  the 
transgressor.  But  this,  of  course,  would  be  incom¬ 
patible  with  his  salvation  from  sin,  and  his  eternal 
happiness,  because  the  punishment  required  is  eter- 


anselm’s  theory  of  satisfaction. 


279 


nal,  in  order  to  offset  the  infinite  demerit  of  rob¬ 
bing  God  of  his  honour.  It  is  plain,  therefore,  that 
man  cannot  be  his  own  atoner,  and  render  satisfac¬ 
tion  for  his  own  sin.  A  sinner  cannot  justify  a  sin¬ 
ner,  any  more  than  a  criminal  can  pardon  his  own 
crime.  The  second,  and  only  other  way  in  which 
the  attribute  of  justice  can  be  satisfied  is  by  sub¬ 
stituted  or  vicarious  suffering.  This  requires  the 
agency  of  another  being  than  the  transgressor. 
But  here  everything  depends  upon  the  nature  and 
character  of  the  Being  who  renders  the  substituted 
satisfaction.  For  it  would  be  an  illegitimate  pro¬ 
cedure  to  defraud  justice  by  substituting  a  less  for 
a  more  valuable  satisfaction.  It  belongs,  therefore, 
to  the  conception  of  a  true  vicarious  satisfaction, 
that  something  be  offered  to  justice  for  the  sin  of 
man  that  is  greater  than  the  finite  and  created,  or, 
in  Anselm’s  phrase,  is  u  greater  than  all  that  is  not 
God.”  In  other  words,  an  infinite  value  must  per- 


tain  to  that  satisfaction  which  is  substituted  for  the 
sufferings  of  mankind.  But  he  who  can  give,  and 
has  the  right  to  give,  out  of  his  own  resources, 
something  that  is  greater  than  the  finite  universe, 
must  himself  be  greater  than  all  that  is  not  God,  or 
than  all  that  is  finite  and  created.  But  God  alone 
is  greater  than  all  that  is  not  God,  or  the  created 
universe.  Only  God  therefore  can  make  this  satis¬ 
faction.  Only  Deity  can  satisfy  the  claims  of  Deity. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  man  must  render  it,  other¬ 
wise  it  would  not  be  a  satisfaction  for  man\s  sin. 


.  280 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


Consequently,  the  required  and  adequate  satisfac¬ 
tion  must  be  theanihropic,  i.  e.,  rendered  by  a  God- 
Man.  As  God,  the  God-Man  can  give  to  deity 
more  than  the  whole  finite  creation  combined  could 
render.  Furthermore  this  theanthropic  obedience 
and  suffering  was  not  due  from  the  mere  humanity 
of  Christ.  This  was  sinless  and  innocent,  and  jus¬ 
tice  had  no  claims,  in  the  way  of  suffering,  upon  it. 
And,  moreover,  only  a  man’s  obedience,  and  not 
that  of  a  God-Man,  could  be  required  of  a  man. 
Consequently  this  Divine-Human  obedience  and 
suffering  was  a  surplusage,  in  respect  to  the  man 
Christ  Jesus,  and  might  overflow  and  inure  to  the 
benefit  of  a  third  party, — in  other  words,  to  the 
benefit  of  the  transgressor  for  whom  it  was  volun¬ 
tarily  rendered  and  endured. 

This  satisfaction  made  by  incarnate  Deity  to 
meet  the  claims  of  one  of  his  own  attributes,  An¬ 
selm  represents  as  even  more  than  an  equivalent 
for  the  sin  of  mankind.  We  meet  with  phraseol¬ 
ogy  in  the  second  book  of  the  Cur  Deus  Homo  f , 1 
upon  this  point,  that  is  strikingly  like  that  which 
we  have  noticed  in  Cyril  of  Jerusalem.2  u  You 
have  indeed  most  plainly  proved,”  says  the  pupil 
with  whom  the  dialogue  is  carried  on,  “  that  the 
life  of  this  man  is  of  so  sublime,  and  so  precious  a 
nature  as  to  suffice  for  satisfying  what  is  due  to  jus- 

1  Attselmus  :  Our  Deus  Homo, 

II.  c.  14,  17. 


*  Ante,  p.  248. 


anselm’s  theory  of  satisfaction.  281 


tice  for  the  sins  of  the  whole  world,  and  infinitely 
mover  In  another  place,  it  is  remarked  that  “  the 
life  of  the  God-Man  is  greater  incomparably  than 
those  sins  which  are  exceeded  beyond  all  power  of 
estimation  by  his  death.”  And  in  another  passage, 
the  infinite  dignity  and  worth  of  the  atoning  death 
of  the  incarnate  Deity  is  sought  to  be  exhibited,  by 
the  following  questions  and  answers.  “  If  that  God- 
Man  were  here  present  before  you,  and,  you  mean¬ 
while  having  a  full  knowledge  of  his  nature  and 
character,  it  should  be  said  :  4  Unless  you  slay  that 
Person  the  whole  world  and  the  whole  created  uni¬ 
verse  will  perish,’  would  you  put  him  to  death,  in 
order  to  preserve  the  whole  creation  ?  I  would  not, 
even  if  an  infinite  number  of  worlds  were  spread 
out  before  me.  But  suppose  again,  it  were  said  to 
you  :  4  You  must  either  slay  him,  or  the  guilt  and 
misery  of  all  the  sins  of  the  world  will  come  upon 
you’  ?  I  would  say,  in  answer,  that  I  would  sooner 
incur  the  aggregated  guilt  and  misery  of  all  the 
sins,  past  and  future,  of  this  world,  and  also  of  all 
the  sin  in  addition  that  can  possibly  be  conceived 
of,  rather  than  incur  the  guilt  of  that  one  sin  of 
killing  the  Lord  of  Glory.”1 

The  limits  of  this  work  do  not  permit  a  fuller 

i 

1  There  is  a  “  direction”  for  the  its  thorough  rejection  of  self-mer- 
visitation  of  the  sick,  composed  by  it,  and  its  vital  acceptance  of  the 
Anselm  (Opera  I.  686,  Ed.Migne),  atonement  of  Christ.  It  runs  as 
which  is  not  excelled  even  by  the  follows,  in  the  version  of  Owen 
salient  evangelism  of  Luther,  in  (On  Justification).  “  Dost  thou 


282 


HISTORY  OF  SOTEKIOLOGY, 


examination  of  this  remarkable  composition,  which 
exhibits  a  depth,  breadth,  and  rigour  of  thinking, 
that  is  not  surpassed  by  any  production  of  the  same 


believe  that  thou  canst  not  be 
saved  but  by  the  death  of  Christ  ? 
The  sick  man  answereth,  yes. 
Then  let  it  be  said  to  him:  Go 
to,  then,  and  whilst  thy  soul 
abideth  in  thee,  put  all  thy  con¬ 
fidence  in  this  death  alone,  place 
thy  trust  in  no  other  thing,  com¬ 
mit  thyself  wholly  to  this  death, 
cover  thyself  wholly  with  this 
alone,  cast  thyself  wholly  on  this 
death,  wrap  thyself  wholly  in  this 
death.  And  if  God  would  judge 
thee,  say,  Lord,  I  place  the  death 
of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  between 
me  and  thy  judgment ;  and  other¬ 
wise  I  will  not  contend,  or  enter 
into  judgment  with  thee.  And 
if  he  shall  say  unto  thee,  that 
thou  art  a  sinner,  say,  I  place 
the  death  of  our  Lord  Jesus 
Christ  between  me  and  my  sins. 
If  he  shall  say  unto  thee,  that 
thou  hast  deserved  damnation, 
say,  Lord,  I  put  the  death  of  our 
Lord  Jesus  Christ  between  thee 
and  all  my  sins ;  and  I  offer  his 
merits  instead  of  (pro)  my  own, 
which  I  ought  to  have,  but  have 
not.  If  he  shall  say  that  he  is 
angry  with  thee,  say,  Lord,  I 
place  the  death  of  our  Lord 
Jesus  Christ  between  me  and 
thy  anger.”  In  Migne’s  edition, 
after  the  self-commendation  of 
the  soul  into  the  hands  of  God, 
there  follows  an  invocation  of  the 


Virgin  which  is  manifestly  an  in¬ 
terpolation  of  some  zealous  and 
unscrupulous  Papist.  It  is  as  fol¬ 
lows  :  “  Postea  dicat ,  Maria,  ma¬ 
ter  gratiae,  mater  misericordiae, 
tu  nos  ab  lioste  protege,  et  hora 
mortis  suscipe :  per  tuum  ergo, 
Virgo,  Filium,  per  Patrem,  et 
Spiritum  Sanctum,  praesens  adsis 
ad  obitum  meum,  quia  imminet 
exitus.  Amen.”  The  difference 
between  the  Mariolatry  of  this 
passage,  and  the  Paulinism  of  the 
4 4  direction”  for  visiting  the  sick,  is 
too  great  to  have  proceeded  from 
the  same  intuition.  The  use  of 
“  nos ”  indicates  that  it  is  part  of 
an  ecclesiastical  liturgy.  In  tbe 
first  extract,  the  first  person  sin¬ 
gular  is  intense  all  the  way 
through. 

It  is  difficult  in  the  light  of 
such  an  extract  as  this,  as  well 
as  of  the  positions  of  the  Cur 
Pens  Homo  ?  to  account  for  the 
statement  of  Meander  (Church 
History,  IV.  500),  that  u  the  idea 
of  a  passive  obedience,  the  idea 
of  a  satisfaction  by  suffering,  of 
an  expiation  by  assuming  the 
punishment  of  mankind  ”  was 
“  far  from  Anselm.”  Meander 
thinks  that  Anselm  held  only  to 
the  doctrine  of  a  satisfaction  by 
obedience  of  the  law, — what  he 
calls  satisfactio  activa.  In  this 
he  agrees  with  Baur. 


anselm’s  theory  of  satisfaction.  283 

extent  in  theological  literature,  and  deserves  to  be 
studied  and  pondered  by  every  Protestant  divine. 
For  it  is  obvious  to  remark  that  such  a  view  of  the 
atonement  as  is  here  exhibited  is  thoroughly  Bibli¬ 
cal,  and  thoroughly  Protestant.  There  may  be  in¬ 
cidental  views  and  positions  in  this  tract,  with 
which  the  modern  theologian  would  not  wholly 
agree ;  but  certainly  so  far  as  the  general  theory 
of  vicarious  satisfaction  is  concerned  this  little  trea¬ 
tise  contains  the  substance  of  the  Reformed  doc¬ 
trine  ;  while  at  the  same  time,  it  enunciates  those 
philosophical  principles  which  must  enter  into  every 
scientific  construction  of  this  cardinal  truth  of  Chris¬ 
tianity.  On  both  the  theoretic  and  the  practical 
side,  it  is  one  of  the  Christian  classics. 

For  in  distinctly  denying  the  claims  of  Satan, 
and  in  distinctly  asserting  the  absolute  and  inde¬ 
feasible  claims  of  justice,  the  Anselmic  theory  im¬ 
parts  a  necessary  and  metaphysical  character  to  the 
doctrine  of  Atonement,  by  virtue  of  which  it  be¬ 
comes  scientific,  and  defensible  at  the  bar  of  first 
principles.  It  enables  the  inquirer  to  see  that  no 
other  mode  is  possible, — that  there  is  no  alternative 
for  the  divine  benevolence,  but  either  to  leave 
the  guilty  transgressor  to  the  natural  and  ordinary 
course  of  justice,  or  else  to  deliver  him  from  it  by 
satisfying  its  claims  for  him  and  in  his  stead.  Baur, 
indeed,  makes  the  objection  that  the  attribute  of 
justice  entirely  overrides  and  suppresses  that  of 
love ;  and  that  this  exact  and  absolute  satisfaction 


284 


HISTOEY  OF  SOTEKIOLOGY. 


of  all  the  claims  of  legal  justice,  though  imparting 
great  compactness  and  self-consistence  to  the  the¬ 
ory,  yet  denudes  it  of  all  its  tender  and  merciful 
features  and  aspects.  He  remarks,1  that  according 
to  the  Anselmic  theory  of  satisfaction,  the  whole 
work  of  redemption  is  carried  out  “not  for  the 
sake  of  man ,  but  solely  for  the  sake  of  God,” — for 
the  sake  of  an  inward  necessity  grounded  in  the 
essence  of  Deity.  But  this  does  not  follow  by  any 
means.  On  the  contrary,  the  compassion  of  God  is 
seen  in  its  most  tender,  because  its  only  self-sacri¬ 
ficing  form,  in  this  light  and  flame  of  justice  and 
law.  The  “inner  necessity”  of  the  divine  nature 
does,  indeed,  require  that  justice  be  maintained  by 
the  punishment  of  sin.  But  Baur  forgets  that,  in 
Anselm’s  view  there  are  two  ways  in  which  sin  can 
be  punished.  And  the  fact  that  God  chooses  the 
one  that  spares. man  and  tasks  God, — the  fact  that 
he  satisfies  his  own  justice  for  the  sinner,  instead  of 
leaving  the  sinner  to  satisfy  it  by  an  endless  misery 
in  his  own  person, — shows  in  the  most  conclusive 
and  affecting  manner  that  Redemption  has  marts 
welfare  in  view,  as  well  as  the  best  interests  of  the 
universe,  and  the  majestic  glory  of  the  divine 
nature.  With  good  right  does  Anselm  say,  at  the 
close  of  his  investigation,  “  the  compassion  of  God, 
which  appeared  to  be  lost  entirely  when  we  were 
considering  the  justice  of  God  and  the  sin  of  man, 


1  Baur  :  Yersohnungslelire,  170. 


anselm’s  theory  of  satisfaction.  285 

we  have  now  found  to  be  so  great  and  so  consistent 
with  justice,  that  nothing  greater  or  more  just  can 
be  conceived  of.  For  what  compassion  can  equal 
the  words  of  God  the  Father  addressed  to  the  sin¬ 
ner  condemned  to  eternal  punishment,  and  having 
no  means  of  redeeming  himself  :j  4  Take  my  only- 
begotten  Son,  and  make  him  an*  offering  for  thy¬ 
self’  ;  or  the  words  of  the  Son :  ‘  Take  me,  and 
ransom  thy  soul’?  For  this  is  what  both  say, 
when  they  invite  and  draw  us  to  faith  in  the  gos¬ 
pel.  And  can  anything  be  more  just  than  for  God 
to  remit  all  debt,  when  in  this  way  he  receives  a 
satisfaction  greater  than  all  the  debt,  provided  only 
it  be  offered  with  the  right  feeling  ?  ” 1 

In  closing  this  brief  sketch  of  Anselm’s  theory 
of  the  Atonement,  it  is  evident  that  if  his  views 
and  experience,  as  exhibited  in  the  Cur  Deus 
Homo  ?,  could  have  become  those  of  the  church  of 
which  he  was  a  member  and  an  ornament,  the  re¬ 
vival  of  the  doctrine  of  justification  by  faith  in  the 
Lutheran  Reformation  would  not  have  been  needed. 
Such  a  profound  and  spiritual  conception  of  sin, 
such  a  clear  and  penetrating  consciousness  of  guilt, 
such  adoring  and  humbling  views  of  the  divine 
majesty,  such  calm  and  searching  apprehensions  of 
the  divine  justice,  such  annihilation  of  human  merit 
in  the  eye  of  law,  and  such  an  evangelic  estimate  of 
the  atonement  of  the  God-Man,  if  they  could  have 


1  Anselmus  :  Cur  Deus  Homo  ?  II.  20. 


286 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


been  made  elements  and  influences  in  the  general 
religious  experience  of  the  Western  Church,  that 
eleventh  century  would  have  exhibited  a  spirit  of 
judgment  and  of  burning,  of  profound  humility 
and  self-denial,  of  purity  and  self-consecration,  that 
would  have  been  a  dazzling  contrast  to  the  actual 
religious  character  which  it  presents.  But  the  so- 
teriology  of  Anselm,  though  exerting  no  little  influ¬ 
ence  through  his  immediate  pupils,  did  not  pas3 
over  into  the  church  at  large.  The  sphere  of 
his  activity  was  the  Norman  and  Anglo-Norman 
Churches.  These  were  then  upon  the  frontiers  of 
Christendom,  and  the  metropolitan  clergy,  as  well 
as  the  imperial  church,  knew  little  or  nothing  of 
that  vigorous  and  vital  piety,  and  that  profound 
and  thorough  theologizing,  which  in  one  of  the 
darkest  centuries  in  church  history  was  radiating 
from  the  cloister  of  Bee,  and  the  see  of  Canter¬ 
bury.1 


§  2.  Soteriology  of  Abelard  and  Lombard . 

The  Roman  Catholic  Church  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  as  does  every  ecclesiastical  organization  of 
the  present  day  that  is  connected  with  the  state, 
contained  within  its  communion  a  variety  of  opin¬ 
ions  and  views,  some  of  which  were  directly  op- 

1  For  the  life  and  labors  of  Anselm,  see  the  excellent  monograph  of 
Hasse. 


ABELARD  AXD  LOMBARD. 


287 


posed  to  others.  To  the  theory  of  Anselm  which 
we  have  just  exhibited,  stands  in  the  very  sharpest 
contrast  the  theory  of  Abelard  (f  1142).  The  acute¬ 
ness  of  this  Schoolman  was  not  sufficiently  regulated 
by  moral  earnestness,  and  informed  by  a  profound 
religious  experience.  We  perceive  immediately,  in 
passing  from  the  writings  of  Anselm  to  those  of 
Abelard,  that  we  are  in  communication  with  a  very 
different  spirit.  The  lofty  heights  of  contempla¬ 
tion  and  the  abysmal  depths  of  experience  have 
vanished.  Attributes  like  that  of  justice,  and  facts 
like  that  of  sin,  are  far  less  transcendent  in  their 
meaning  and  importance.  The  atonement  is  looked 
at  from  a  much  lower  level. 


Abelard  begins  and  ends  with  the  benevolence 
oi  God.  I  his  is  divorced  from  and  not  limited  by 
His  holiness,  and  is  regarded  as  endowed  with  the 
liberty  of  indifference.  The  deity  can  pardon  upon 
repentance.  There  is  nothing  in  the  Divine  Nature 
which  necessitates  a  satisfaction  for  past  transgres¬ 
sion,  antecedently  to  remission  of  penalty.  Like 
creating  out  of  nothing,  redemption  may  and  does 
take  place  by  a  fiat ,  by  which  sin  is  abolished  by  a 
word,  and  the  sinner  is  received  into  favour.  Noth¬ 
ing  is  needed  but  penitence  in  order  to  the  remis¬ 
sion  of  sin.  The  object  of  the  incarnation  and  death 
of  Christ,  consequently,  is  to  produce  sorrow  in  the 
human  soul.  The  life  and  sufferings  of  the  God- 
Man  were  intended  to  exert  a  moral  impression 
upon  a  hard  and  impenitent  heart,  which  is  thereby 


288 


HISTOKY  OF  SOTEKIOLOGY. 


melted  into  contrition,  and  then  received  into  favour 
by  the  boundless  compassion  of  God.  Abelard  at¬ 
tributes  much  to  the  intercessory  agency  of  the  Re¬ 
deemer.  As  the  God-Man  who  has  perfectly  obeyed 
the  divine  law,  Christ  possesses  a  weight  of  influ¬ 
ence  with  the  Father  which  secures  blessings  for 
the  sinful.  In  such  connections,  he  alludes  to  the 
idea  of  justice.  Christ  was  perfectly  holy  and  just 
himself,  and  it  is  “just”  that  such  a  being  should  be 
heard  in  behalf  of  those  for  whom  he  became  incar¬ 
nate  and  suffered.  But  by  justice  is  here  meant 
merely  fitness  or  propriety.  When  it  comes  to  the 
properly  judicial  and  retributive  attribute  in  the 
Divine  Nature,  Abelard  denies  the  doctrine  of  satis¬ 
faction,  and  contends  that  God  may  remit  the  pen¬ 
alty  by  a  sovereign  act  of  will.  The  only  characteris¬ 
tic  which  the  theory  of  Abelard  possesses  in  com- 
f  mon  with  that  of  Anselm  is  its  denial  that  the 
claims  of  Satan  were  satisfied  by  the  death  of  the 
Redeemer.  “If  a  slave,”  says  Abelard,  “should  de¬ 
sert  his  master,  his  master  could  justly  demand  that 
he  be  given  up.  But  if  a  slave  should  seduce  his 
fellow-slave  from  obedience  to  the  master  of  both 
of  them,  how  absurd  it  would  be  for  this  slave  to 
set  up  a  claim  to  the  services  of  the  one  whom  he 
had  seduced.” 1 

That  very  celebrated  Schoolman  Peter  Lomba/rd 
(t  1164),  whose  influence  and  authority  in  the 

1  Abelard  :  Com.  ad  Eom.  Lib.  Colln  :  Dogmengeschichte,  II. 
II  ;  quoted  in  Munscher-Von  163. 


BERNARD  AND  ST.  VICTOR. 


289 


Roman  Church  is  hardly  second  to  that  of  Aquinas 
himself,  declared  decidedly  for  the  soteriology  of 
Abelard,  and  against  that  of  Anselm.  In  his  the¬ 
ory,  the  influence  of  the  death  of  Christ  is  spent 
upon  the  subjective  character  of  the  individual  soul, 
in  softening,  subduing,  and  sanctifying.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  Lombard’s  representation  ap¬ 
parently,  but  only  apparently,  verges  towards  the 
Anselmic  theory.  The  claims  of  justice  are  met 
to  a  limited  extent  by  the  sufferings  of  the  Re¬ 
deemer.  They  deliver  man  from  the  temporal  penal 
consequences  of  sin,  provided  baptism  be  adminis¬ 
tered  and  penance  be  performed.  Lombard’s  prin¬ 
cipal  work,  entitled  Liber  Sententiarum ,  is  a  collec¬ 
tion  of  all  the  views  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church, 
and  an  attempt  to  combine  them  into  one  system. 
But  such  an  eclecticism  as  this,  which  endeavours  to 
harmonize  the  theory  of  Anselm  with  that  of  Ab¬ 
elard,  must  necessarily  fail.  Lombard’s  real  views 
were  the  same  as  those  of  Abelard,  and  the  fact 
that  the  work  of  Christ  must  be  supplemented  by 
baptism  and  penance  accounts  for  the  remarkable 
popularity  which  the  Liber  Sententiarum  has  always 
enjoyed  in  the  Papal  Church. 


§  3.  Soteriology  of  Bernard  and  Hugh  St.  Victor. 

'  •  ■ :  ;  -  "  '  ■  ■  ■■  '  <  ■■  v 

In  the  writings  of  Bernard  of  Claim aux  (f  1153), 
we  meet  a  more  evangelical  view  of  the  atoning 


YOL.  II. — 19 


290 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


work  of  Christ.  He  combats  the  soteriology  of 
Abelard,  as  he  also  does  his  other  doctrinal  opin¬ 
ions.  First,  he  opposes  the  view  which  Abelard 
held  in  common  with  Anselm,  that  Satan  has  no 
claims  upon  man,  and  that  no  Satanic  claims  are 
met  by  the  sacrifice  of  Christ.  Bernard,  though 
not  a  mystic  proper,  had  a  mystical  tendency.  He 
belonged,  as  was  noticed  in  the  history  of  Philo¬ 
sophical  Systems,  to  the  Mystic  Scholastics.  Deep¬ 
ly  devout  in  his  spirit,  he  also  cherished  a  high 
veneration  for  the  opinions  of  the  Fathers,  especially 
Augustine.  The  rejection  of  a  theory  which  en¬ 
tered  so  extensively  into  the  soteriology  of  the 
Primitive  Fathers,  as  did  that  of  Satan’s  claims,  was 
regarded  with  disfavour  by  Bernard,  even  though 
the  pious  and  orthodox  Anselm  had  given  it  his  sanc¬ 
tion.  Connected,  moreover,  as  it  was  in  the  in¬ 
stance  of  Abelard  with  other  views  that  were  un¬ 
doubtedly  heterodox,  and  with  a  rationalistic  spirit, 
it  was  natural  that  a  mind  inclined  like  Bernard’s  to 
rest  in*  a  traditional  and  received  orthodoxy  should 
oppose  this  rejection  of  the  old  doctrine  of  Satan’s 
claims. 

Secondly,  Bernard  opposes  the  opinion  of  Abelard 
that  remission  of  sins  may  occur  by  a  sovereign  act 
of  will,  without  any  satisfaction  of  the  claims  of  law. 
His  own  religious  experience  was  too  thorough,  and 
his  respect  for  the  opinions  of  the  past  too  implicit, 
for  him  to  adopt  a  theory  that  renders  the  Old 
Testament  sacrificial  ceremony  an  inexplicable  enig- 


BERNARD  AND  ST.  VICTOR. 


291 


ma,  deprives  the  New  Testament  representations  of 
their  meaning,  and  agrees  substantially  with  the 
later  Socinian  theory  of  redemption.  At  the  same 
time,  we  do  not  find  Bernard  agreeing  with  Anselm 
respecting  the  metaphysical  necessity  of  satisfaction. 
He  hesitates  to  denominate  sin  an  infinite  evil,  and 
to  attribute  to  it  an  infinite  guilt.  As  a  conse¬ 
quence,  he  is  not  boldly  distinct  in  asserting  the  in¬ 
finite  worth  of  the  satisfaction  of  Christ.  He  is  not 
ready,  with  Anselm,  to  assert  an  absolute  necessity, 
intrinsic  to  the  divine  nature,  for  an  atonement, 
but  prefers  to  stand  with  Augustine  upon  the  ground 
of  a  relative  necessity  founded  upon  the  optional 
will  and  arrangement  of  God.  In  short,  the  differ¬ 
ence  between  these  two  theologians,  who  undoubt¬ 
edly  were  much  alike  so  far  as  concerns  their  religious 
experience  and  practical  use  of  truth,  consists  in  the 
fact  that  Anselm  was  a  metaphysician,  and  could, 
not  stop  until  he  had  traced  back  his  faith  to  the 
eternal  and  necessary  principles  of  the  divine  na¬ 
ture  and  government;  while  Bernard  could  hold 
the  doctrine  at  a  middle  position,  without  subject¬ 
ing  it  to  the  rigorous  tests  and  conclusions  of  sci¬ 
ence,  to  whose  methods  he  was  somewhat  disinclined, 
from  his  mystical  tendency. 

Of  similar  general  character  with  Bernard,  was 
that  other  interesting  Mystic  Scholastic,  Hugo  St. 
Victor  (f  1140).  His  view  pf  the  atonement,  how¬ 
ever,  approaches  somewhat  nearer,  in  technical  re¬ 
spects,  to  that  of  Anselm,  than  did  that  of  Bernard. 


292 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


While  unwilling  to  give  up  the  old  patristic  notion 
of  a  satisfaction  of  Satan’s  claims,  he  is  distinct  in 
asserting  and  exhibiting  the  relations  of  the  work 
of  Christ  to  the  divine  nature.  The  sacrificial  ele¬ 
ment,  as  distinguished  from  the  legal,  is  very  ap¬ 
parent  in  this  Schoolman.  He  speaks  often  of  the 
Deity  as  propitiated,  and  fastens  upon  those  pass¬ 
ages  of  Scripture  in  which  this  Old  Testament  idea 
is  presented.  “The  Son  of  God,”  he  says,  “by 
becoming  a  man  paid  man’s  debt  to  the  Father, 
and  by  dying  expiated  man’s  guilt.”1  Here,  both 
the  legal  and  the  sacrificial  elements  are  combined 
in  one  proposition. 


^  §  4-  Soteriology  of  Bonaventura. 

Thus  far,  we  have  been  examining  the  opinions 
prevalent  in  the  first  part  of  the  Scholastic  Age, — 
viz.,  in  the  11th  and  12th  centuries.,  The  highest  in¬ 
tensity  and  energy  of  the  systematizing  spirit  does 
not  display  itself  until  we  pass  into  the  last  half  of 
the  period.  The  Schoolmen  of  the  13th  and  14th 
centuries,  though  originating  no  views  of  more  origi¬ 
nality,  on  either  side  of  the  subject,  than  those  of 
Anselm  and  Abelard,  yet  put  the  existing  materials, 
whether  derived  from  the  Patristic  or  the  Earlier 
Scholastic  soteriology,  into  a  more  systematic  and 


1  Hugo  St.  Victor:  De  sacramentis,  c.  4. 


SOTERIOLOGY  OF  BONAVEXTUBA. 


293 


comprehensive  form.  Among  these  later  School¬ 
men,  we  shall  direct  attention  first,  and  with  some 
particularity,  to  Bona/ventura  (fl2Y2). 

This  author,  following  the  analytic  and  exhaus¬ 
tive  method  introduced  by  Peter  Lombard,  dis¬ 
cusses  the  subject  of  the  atonement  under  the  six 
following  questions.  First :  Whether  it  was  fit  in 
itself  (congruum)  that  human  nature  should  be 
restored  by  God.  Secondly  :  Whether  it  was  more 
fitting  that  human  nature  should  be  restored  by  a 
satisfaction  of  justice,  than  by  any  other  method. 
Thirdly :  Whether  any  sinless  creature  could  render 
satisfaction  for  the  whole  human  race.  Fourthly: 
Whether  any  sinful  man  assisted  by  divine  grace 
could  make  satisfaction  for  his  own  sins.  Fifthly  : 
Whether  God  was  under  obligation  to  accept  the 
method  of  satisfaction  by  the  death  of  Christ. 
Sixthly :  Whether  God  could  have  saved  the  human 
race  by  some  other  method.  We  present  the  entire 
plan  of  his  work,  not  for  the  purpose  of  following  it 
out  into  each  of  its  divisions,  but  in  order  to  show 
by  an  example  the  acute,  analytic,  and  all-compre¬ 
hending  method  of  handling  subjects  which  was  so 
peculiar  to  the  later  Schoolmen  like  Bonaventura , 
Alexander  Hades ,  ATbertus  Magnus ,  and  Thomas 
Aguinas .  When  subjected  to  the  torture  of  such 
a  scrutinizing  and  searching  analysis,  a  doctrine  or 
truth  must  necessarily  be  torn  into  pieces,  and  ex¬ 
amined  down  to  its  minutest  filaments  and  elements. 
The  invention  of  the  Scholastic  method  had  the 


294 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


same  effect  in  the  intellectual  world,  that  the  inven¬ 
tion  of  the  cotton  gin,  and  of  the  roller  with  revolv¬ 
ing  knives,  has  had  in  the  material.  Subjects  are 
reduced  to  their  fibre. 

In  order  to  give,  within  as  brief  a  space  as  pos¬ 
sible,  the  views  of  Bonaventura,  we  will  exhibit  the 
trains  of  thought  in  his  answer  to  the  second  of 
these  questions,  viz. :  “  Was  it  more  fitting  that 
human  nature  should  be  restored  by  a  satisfaction 
of  justice,  than  by  any  other  method  ?  ”  In  an¬ 
swering  this  question  in  the  affirmative,  Bonaven¬ 
tura  proves  that  the  restoration  of  human  nature 
by  a  satisfaction  is  the  most  fitting  method,  because 
most  conducive  to  the  maintenance :  1.  of  the  Di¬ 
vine  justice ;  2.  of  the  Divine  wisdom ;  3.  of  the 
Divine  omnipotence ;  4.  of  the  Divine  honour  and 
majesty.  He  comes  to  his  conclusion,  by  the  fol¬ 
lowing  train  of  reasoning.  Redemption  by  the 
method  of  legal  satisfaction  is  the  most  fitting 
method,  because  God  is  both  merciful  and  just,  and 
consequently  both  attributes  should  be  manifested 
and  maintained  together.  Hence  it  was  fitting  that 
God  should  demand  satisfaction  for  the  dishonour 
and  injury  done  to  himself  by  man’s  transgression, 
and  if  man  could  not  render  this  satisfaction,  to 
provide  a  Mediator  who  could  satisfy  for  him  and 
in  his  stead.  If  God  had  been  inherently  unwilling 
to  pardon  sin,  and  had  inexorably  insisted  upon  the 
infliction  of  penalty  upon  the  criminal,  he  could  not 
have  manifested  his  attribute  of  mercy.  If,  on  the 


SOTERIOLOGY  OF  BONA  VENTURA. 


295 


other  hand,  he  had  pardoned  sin  without  any  satis¬ 
faction  of  law,  he  could  not  have  manifested  his  at¬ 
tribute  of  justice.  Thus  the  method  of  forgiveness 
through  a  satisfaction  is  the  most  befitting,  taking 
into  view  the  entire  nature  and  character  of  God. 
But  the  same  fitness  is  apparent  if  we  take  into 
view  the  nature  and  character  of  man.  The  object 
in  restoring  the  human  race  is  to  conduct  it  from  a 
state  of  guilt  to  a  state  of  justification,  and  from  a 
state  of  misery  to  a  state  of  glory.  Inasmuch  as 
man  has  done  dishonour  to  the  majesty  of  God,  it 
is  fitting  that  he  should  do  honour  to  the  justice  of 
God  by  enduring  punishment ;  and  as  it  is  more 
praiseworthy  in  the  innocent  man  to  obtain  eternal 
life  by  merit  than  without  merit,  so  also  it  is  more 
praiseworthy  in  the  guilty  man  to  be  reconciled  to 
God  through  a  satisfaction  of  all  legal  claims,  than 
by  a  method  that  disregards  and  tramples  upon 
them. 

After  having  in  this  manner  established  the 
affirmative  of  the  question,  Bonaventura  proceeds 
to  specify  and  refute  some  objections  to  his  posi¬ 
tion.  1.  It  is  first  objected,  that  nothing  can  be  so 
fitting  and  proper  in  God  as  the  manifestation  of 
his  kindness  and  compassion,  and  that  the  forgive¬ 
ness  of  sin  without  a  penal  satisfaction  would  be  the 
greatest  proof  of  such  compassion.  To  this  it  is  re¬ 
plied,  first,  that  the  fitness  of  anything  is  founded  in 
its  necessity.  It  is  necessary  that  God  should  be 
just,  but  not  necessary  that  he  should  show  mercy. 


'296 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOOY. 


Hence,  it  follows  that  compassion  towards  a  crim¬ 
inal  is  not  more  fitting  and  proper  than  justice 
towards  him.  But,  secondly,  it  is  not  true  that  re¬ 
mission  by  a  mere  volition  that  involves  no  sacri¬ 
fice  upon  the  part  of  God  is  a  greater  evidence  of 
love,  than  remission  through  the  blood  of  his  Only- 
Begotten  Son.  There  is  no  benevolence  greater 
than  that  which  endures  suffering  and  death  for 
another’s  welfare.  2.  It  is  secondly  objected,  that 
the  Divine  independence  and  self-sufficiency  would 
appear  in  a  finer  light,  if  God  were  to  pardon  with¬ 
out  any  satisfaction.  To  this  it  is  replied,  that  the 
requirement  of  an  atonement  does  not  imply  any 
conditioning  of  the  Creator  by  the  creature,  for  it 
is  a  divine  attribute  which  demands  the  satisfaction 
of  law.  God  is  wholly  independent  of  man  in  the 
work  of  redemption,  though  not  independent  of  his 
own  nature  and  character.  As  God  requires  obe¬ 
dience  to  his  law,  not  because  he  is  dependent  upon 
his  creatures,  but  because  his  nature  and  attributes 
demand  it,  so  he  requires  an  atonement  for  the 
same  reason.  3.  It  is  thirdly  objected,  that  the 
Divine  omnipotence  would  be  more  impressively 
exhibited  in  pardoning  sin  without  a  satisfaction, 
than  with  one.  To  this  it  is  replied,  that  if  the 
Divine  omnipotence  should  abolish  the  claims  of 
the  Divine  justice  by  an  act  of  arbitrary  will,  one 
attribute  in  the  Godhead  would  destroy  another. 
But  this  would  be  suicidal ;  and  a  suicidal  exercise 
of  power  is  not  the  most  impressive  mode  of  ex- 


S  0TERI0L0  G  Y  OF  BONA  VENTURA. 


297 


hibiting  power.  Even  if  this  could  be  conceived 
as  possible,  and  the  Divine  omnipotence  were  re¬ 
garded  as  able  to  restore  the  human  race  by  a 
word,  in  the  exercise  of  a  naked  and  lawless  al- 
mightiness,  God  would  yet  be  obliged  to  prefer  the 
more  difficult  because  the  more  regular  method  of 
restoration  through  an  atonement.  4.  It  is  ob¬ 
jected,  in  the  fourth  place,  that  the  restoration  of 
man  without  a  satisfaction  of  justice  would  lay  him 
under  greater  obligation  to  love  and  praise  God. 
This  is  denied,  because  the  surrendry  of  the  Only- 
Begotten  Son  of  God  obligates  the  redeemed  far 
more  than  a  mere  remission  of  sin  without  any  sub¬ 
stituted  suffering  would.  That  God  incarnate  en¬ 
dured  the  pains  of  death  for  us  is  a  fact  of  even 
greater  impressiveness  than  the  forgiveness  of  sin 
itself.  The  foundation  of  human  salvation  is  even 
greater  than  the  salvation.  5.  Fifthly,  it  is  ob¬ 
jected  that  God  by  forgiving  sin  without  an  atone¬ 
ment  sets  an  example  that  can  be  imitated  by  man, 
while  on  the  other  scheme  he  cannot  be  imitated 
by  his  creatures.  To  this  it  is  replied,  that  man  in 
his  private  and  individual  capacity  is  not  required 
to  imitate  God  in  all  respects,  and  particularly  when 
the  judicial  attributes  of  his  character  are  involved. 
Punishment  and  retribution  belong  solely  to  the 
Godhead.  “Vengeance  is  mine,  I  will  repay,  saith 
the  Lord”  (Rom.  xii.  19).  This  attribute  cannot 
be  wielded  at  all  by  man,  except  as  delegated  to 
civil  power  and  authority.  But  in  respect  to  be- 


298 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


nevolence,  and  the  disposition  to  sacrifice  self  for 
the  good  of  another, — the  chief  attribute  which  the 
individual  man  needs  to  have  in  view  for  imita¬ 
tion, — God  in  giving  his  Son  as  a  judicial  substi¬ 
tute  for  his  rebellious  creatures  has  set  forth  the 
highest  possible  example  for  imitation.  6.  It  is  ob¬ 
jected,  in  the  sixth  place,  that  it  would  be  more 
fitting  in  God  to  restore  the  human  race  imme¬ 
diately,  and  without  any  such  intervention  of  the 
creature  as  occurs  in  the  assumption  of  human 
nature  by  the  Son.  Immediate  rather  than  instru¬ 
mental  agency  is  more  worthy  of  God.  This  is  de¬ 
nied,  because  it  is  characteristic  of  Infinite  Good¬ 
ness  to  permit  the  creature  to  co-work  with  itself, 
so  far  as  the  nature  of  the  creature  allows  of  this. 
In  the  work  of  redemption,  such  a  co-operation  is 
not  only  possible  but  necessary,  in  order  to  sympa¬ 
thy  between  the  Redeemer  and  the  redeemed.  In 
the  work  of  creation  no  such  co-operation  of  the 
Finite  with  the  Infinite  is  possible,  because  the 
energy  is  not  spent  upon  already  existing  mate¬ 
rials. 

In  answering  the  third  and  fourth  questions, 
viz. :  whether  a  sinless  created  being  could  make 
satisfaction  for  the  human  race,  and  whether  a  sin¬ 
ful  man  if  assisted  by  divine  power  could  atone  for 
his  own  sins, — Bonaventura  takes  the  negative  with 
energy  and  decision.  Any  single  individual,  how¬ 
ever  exalted  he  might  be,  is  still  finite,  and  com¬ 
pared  with  God,  whose  honour  has  been  injured,  is 


SOTERIOLOGY  OF  BONA  VENTURA. 


299 


on  a  common  level  with,  all  other  creatures.  Con¬ 
sequently,  his  suffering  would  not  be  equivalent  to 
the  sufferings  of  an  entire  race  of  beings.  More¬ 
over,  the  idea  of  a  satisfaction  requires  that  it  be 
rendered  by  the  same  species  of  being  by  whom  the 
offence  was  committed.  Consequently,  the  atone¬ 
ment  for  man’s  sin  must  be  made  in  man’s  nature, 
and  not  in  an  angelic.  It  would  not  be  fitting  that 
the  human  race  should  owe  its  salvation  to  another 
species  of  created  beings.  Hence  only  a  God-Man 
can  render  satisfaction, — man,  that  humanity  may 
suffer ;  God ,  that  the  suffering  may  be  of  infinite 
value.  In  answer  to  the  objection,  that  the  life  of 
Christ  was  of  more  value  than  his  death,  as  life  gen¬ 
erally  is  better  than  death,  and  that  consequent¬ 
ly  the  life  without  the  death  would  have  been  a 
more  adequate  satisfaction,  Bona ventura  asserts  that 
the  idea  of  satisfaction  necessarily  involves  that  of 
penal  suffering ,  thus  identifying  those  two  concep¬ 
tions,  satisfaction  and  expiation,  which  Baur,  we 
have  noticed,  mistakenly  asserts  are  not  identified 
with  each  other  in  the  Anselmic  theory. 

To  conclude  this  notice  of  Bonaventura,  we  re¬ 
mark  that  the  influence  of  Anselm  upon  him  is  very 
apparent,  and  very  great.  He  is  on  the  side  of  An¬ 
selm  St.  Victor  and  Bernard,  against  Abelard  and 
Peter  Lombard,  and  exhibits  the  truth  with  a  clear¬ 
ness  of  understanding,  an  acuteness  of  analysis,  and 
a  systematizing  talent  that  render  him  one  of  the 
most  interesting  writers  among  the  Schoolmen.  At 


300 


HISTOEY  OF  SOTEKIOLOGY. 


the  same  time,  this  writer,  like  others  of  whom  we 
have  spoken,  differed  from  Anselm  in  respect  to  the 
question  :  Is  this  conceded  necessity  of  a  satisfaction 
of  divine  justice,  absolute  or  relative  ?  Is  satisfac¬ 
tion  of  law  necessary  because  God  wills  it,  or  does 
he  will  it  because  it  is  necessary  ?  We  have  found 
Anselm  maintaining  the  absolute  and  metaphysical 
necessity  of  satisfaction  in  order  to  remission,  and 
declaring  it  to  be  impossible  from  the  very  nature 
of  God  to  dispense  with  it,  if  the  guilty  is  to  be 
saved.  As  the  necessary  nature  of  right  and  wrong 
does  not  depend  upon  the  optional  will  of  God, 
neither  does  the  necessity  of  an  atonement  rest 
upon  it.  He  was  led  to  this  because  he  regarded 
it  as  contradictory  to  the  idea  of  God ,  to  conceive 
of  a  schism  in  the  Deity,  and  an  intestine  conflict 
between  the  divine  attributes.  He  held  that  the 
philosophical  idea  of  God  excludes  that  possibility 
of  acting  contrary  to  truth  and  justice ,  by  the  exer¬ 
cise  of  bare  will ,  which  attends  a  finite  and  proba¬ 
tionary  nature  like  that  of  man .  Anselm,  conse¬ 
quently,  could  not  distinguish  as  did  Bonaventura 
and  some  of  the  later  Schoolmen,  two  kinds  of  om¬ 
nipotence  in  the  divine  nature,  one  of  which  is  regu¬ 
lated,  and  the  other  unregulated,  by  the  other  attri¬ 
butes  of  the  Godhead.  Alexander  Hales  (f  1245), 
in  answering  the  standing  question  :  Can  human 
nature  be  restored  without  a  satisfaction  ?  brings 
out  this  distinction  of  an  abstract  and  a  concrete 
omnipotence  in  the  following  manner.  u  When  it 


SOTERIOLOGY  OF  BONA  VENTURA. 


301 


is  said  that  God  cannot  restore  human  nature  with¬ 
out  a  satisfaction,  it  is  to  be  observed,  with  due 
respect  to  the  opinion  of  the  blessed  Anselm,  that 
divine  power  is  to  be  contemplated  in  two  forms, — 
absolutely,  or  by  itself  alone,  and  relatively,  or  in 
connection  with  other  attributes  (cum  ordine).  In 
contemplating  the  divine  power  as  absolute,  we 
conceive  of  a  certain  infinite  energy  (virtus)  in  the 
Deity  that  is  abstracted  from  the  rest  of  his  nature, 
and  transcends  all  limitations  ;  and  with  respect  to 
this  form,  the  divine  power  cannot  have  terms  set 
to  it  (non  est  determinare) ;  and  it  is  conceded  that 
considered  in  this  mode,  the  divine  omnipotence  is 
able  to  restore  human  nature  without  a  satisfaction. 
But  in  contemplating  the  divine  power  relatively, 
we  consider  it  in  its  references  to  justice  and  mercy, 
and  so  considered,  it  is  conceded  that  omnipotence 
can  do  nothing  except  in  accordance  with  justice 
and  mercy.” 1 

The  doctrine  that  there  is  an  abstract  omnipo¬ 
tence  in  God  by  which  he  might  have  pardoned 
sin  without  an  atonement,  if  applied  by  a  rigorous 
logic,  would  neutralize  all  that  clear  and  cogent  ar¬ 
gumentation  which  we  have  seen  Bonaventura  em¬ 
ployed  to  show,  that  it  is  “  more  fitting  that  human 
nature  should  be  restored  by  a  satisfaction  of  jus- 

1  Hales  :  Summa,  Pars  III,  Works  n.  125  (Harpers’  Ed.); 
Quaestio  i,  Merabrnm  4.  Quoted  Gfdworth  :  Intellectual  System, 
by  Haur  :  Versohnungslehre,  II.  532  (Tegg’s  Ed.). 

215.  Note.  Compare  Hallam: 


302 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


tice,  than  by  any  other  method.”  1  For  it  implies 
that  it  is  possible  for  the  natural  attributes  of  God 
to  be  at  war  with  his  moral  ones  ;  in  other  words, 
that  the  Infinite  Creator  is  subject  to  that  same  pos¬ 
sibility  of  illegitimate  action  that  pertains  to  a  finite 
and  mutable  creature.  It  implies  that  the  philoso¬ 
phical  idea  of  the  Deity  does  not  prevent  his  being 
conceived  of  as  acting  contrary  to  a  part  of  his  own 
nature. 2  The  doctrine  of  the  metaphysical  possi- 


1  Bonaventttra  sometimes 
makes  statements  respecting  the 
two  kinds  of  omnipotence  that 
are  in  flat  contradiction  to  his 
reply  to  the  objection,  that  “  the 
omnipotence  of  God  would  ap¬ 
pear  in  a  more  striking  light,  if 
sin  were  remitted  without  an 
atonement.”  He  says,  e.  g. : 
“  God  might  have  liberated  man 
by  the  method  of  mere  compas¬ 
sion,  nor  would  there  have  been 
anything  prejudicial  to  justice  in 
this,  if  God  had  so  willed  it.  For 
he  could  have  abolished  all  de¬ 
merit,  and  have  restored  man  to 
his  primitive  condition  by  his  om¬ 
nipotence  alone,  and  there  would 
have  remained  in  the  universe 
nothing  inordinate  nor  unpunish¬ 
ed.”  Baur:  Versohnungslehre, 
228. 

2  This  idea  of  an  “  abstract  ” 
omnipotence  accompanies  the 
history  of  the  doctrine  of  atone¬ 
ment  down  from  the  earliest,  to 
the  latest  times.  In  the  Ancient 
Church,  Irenaeus  (Adv.  Haer.  III. 


xx.),  Cyril  of  Jerusalem ,  Basil, 
and  Ambrose ,  contend  for  an  ab¬ 
solute  necessity  of  Christ’s  satis¬ 
faction;  while  Athanasius ,  Au¬ 
gustine,  Cyril  of  Alexandria , 
Theodoret ,  and  John  Damascene 
assert  only  a  relative  necessity. 
In  the  Mediaeval  Church,  Anselm, 
and  perhaps  Hugh  St.  Victor,  as¬ 
sert  an  absolute,  while  Abelard , 
Bernard,  Lombard,  Hales,  Bona- 
rentura,  and  Aquinas  (Cont.  Gent. 
IV.  liv.  lv.)  concede  only  a  rela¬ 
tive  necessity.  In  the  17th  cen¬ 
tury,  the  subject  was  discussed  by 
Owen,  and  Twisse  (the  prolocutor 
of  the  Westminster  Assembly) ; 
the  former  asserting,  and  the  lat¬ 
ter  denying,  the  absolute  neces¬ 
sity  of  a  satisfaction.  See  Owen’s 
tract,  On  the  Nature  of  Justice. 
Gerhard  (Loci  IV.  lxxxiv.) 
claims  that  Augustine  wavered 
between  the  two  views ;  but  he 
is  mistaken,  as  is  evident  from 
Aug.  De  Trinitate,  XIII.  x.  et 
alia.  Neander  (IV.  497)  re¬ 
marks,  that  Augustine  “started 


SOTEEIOLOGY  OF  BONAYENTURA. 


303 


bility  of  the  remission  of  sin  without  a  satisfaction 
of  justice,  furthermore,  implies  that  the  natural  at¬ 
tributes  of  God  are  more  central  and  ultimate  than 
his  moral  and  ethical, — that  might  in  the  Deity  is 
more  fundamental  and  absolute  than  right. 1  Logi¬ 
cally,  it  takes  the  key-stone  out  of  the  arch  upon 
which  the  whole  doctrine  of  an  atonement  rests. 
For  on  this  scheme,  when  the  final  centre  of  truth 
is  reached,  a  satisfaction  of  justice  can  be  dispensed 
with ;  omnipotence  in  God  “  cannot  have  terms  set  to 
it,”  and  therefore  it  can  abolish  the  claims  of  law, 
without  satisfying  them.  It  was,  however,  merely  a 
speculative  opinion  in  many  instances.  For  many 
of  its  advocates  were  equally  earnest  with  their  op¬ 
ponents,  in  contending  for  the  inexorable  necessity 
of  a  satisfaction,  when  the  attribute  of  justice  is 
taken  into  view  ;  but  they  were  not  equally  consist¬ 
ent  with  them,  in  holding  the  opinion  that  justice 


the  inquiry  whether  any  other 
way  would  have  been  possible ; 
and,  considered  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  divine  omnipo¬ 
tence,  he  believed  the  answer 
must  be  in  the  affirmative.” 
HooTcer  (Eccl.  Pol.  Y.  li.)  teaches 
a  relative  necessity. 

1  Owen  (Dissertation  on  Divine 
Justice,  Chap.  II.)  notices  the  self- 
contradiction  there  is,  in  conced¬ 
ing  that  justice  is  an  essential 
attribute  in  God,  and  yet  that  it 
can  be  set  aside  by  an  act  of  phys¬ 
ical  omnipotence,  in  the  follow¬ 
ing  terms :  “  To  me,  these  argu¬ 


ments  are  altogether  astonishing ; 
viz.,  ‘That  sin-punishing  justice 
should  be  natural  to  God,  and 
yet  that  God,  sin  being  supposed 
to  exist,  may  either  exercise  it  or 
not  exercise  it.’>  They  may  also 
say,  and  with  as  much  propriety, 
that  truth  is  natural  to  God ;  but 
upon  a  supposition  that  he  were 
to  converse  with  man,  he  might 
either  use  it ,  or  not ;  or,  that  om¬ 
nipotence  is  natural  to  God ;  but 
upon  a  supposition  that  he  were 
inclined  to  do  any  work  without 
(extra)  himself,  that  it  was  free  to 
him  to  act  omnipotently  or  not.” 


304 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


itself  might  be  abstracted,  and  the  problem  solved 
at  a  yet  more  central  point  in  the  divine  nature,  at 
which  power  is  isolated  from  all  the  ethical  attri¬ 
butes  of  Deity,  and  becomes  lawless,  and  capable 
of  doing  anything  and  everything. 1 


§  5.  Soteriology  of  Aquinas . 

Thomas  Aquinas  (f  1274)  deserves  particular 
attention,  in  the  history  of  the  doctrine  of  atone¬ 
ment.  He  is  the  strongest  systematizer  among  the 
Schoolmen,  and  on  account  of  his  important  posi¬ 
tion  in  the  Mediaeval  Church  and  theology  merits 
a  detailed  examination.  But  inasmuch  as  his  opin¬ 
ions  upon  the  atonement  resemble  so  closely  those 
of  Bonaventura,  whose  views  we  have  discussed 
somewhat  at  length,  we  are  relieved  from  the  ne¬ 
cessity  of  a  minute  investigation. 

The  dogmatic  views  of  Aquinas*  respecting  the 
atonement  are  found  in  the  third  part  of  his  Summa 
Theologiae ,  or  system  of  divinity. 2  He  employs 
the  same  analytic  method  so  common  to  the  School¬ 
men,  and  exhausts  the  subject  by  a  series  of  ques¬ 
tions  and  their  answers.  The  first  inquiry  is  con- 

*It  is  important  to  inquire,  different  from  saying  that  he 
whether  oftentimes  this  might  could  have  dispensed  with  satis* 
not  have  been  the  question  in  faction  altogether, 
the  mind :  u  Could  not  the  Deity  8  Aquinas  :  Summa  Theologiae, 
have  provided  an  atonement  in  Quaestiones,  XLYI.-XLIX. 
another  way?  ”  This  is  very 


SOTERIOLOGY  OF  AQUINAS. 


305 


cerning  the  nature  of  Christ’s  Passion.  He  en¬ 
deavours  to  exhibit  its  nature,  by  proposing  twelve 
queries,  of  which  we  give  only  the  two  following : 
1.  Was  it  necessary  that  Christ  should  suffer  in 
order  to  the  salvation  of  man  ?  2.  Was  any  other 

method  of  human  salvation  possible  ?  Aquinas 
answers  the  first  of  these  questions,  in  accordance 
with  the  metaphysics  of  Aristotle,  by  distinguishing 
the  different  modes  of  conceiving  of  u  necessity.” 
If,  by  necessity  be  meant  that  which  from  its  very 
nature  cannot  but  be,  and  whose  non-existence  can¬ 
not  be  conceived  of,  then  there  was  no  necessity  for 
the  sufferings  of  Christ.  That  the  Logos  should  be¬ 
come  incarnate,  and  die  upon  the  cross,  is  not 
founded  in  any  antecedent  and  chpriori  necessity 
in  the  constitution  of  the  Divine  Being  or  of  the 
universe.  The  necessity  is  subsequent  and  a  poste¬ 
riori , — i.  e.,  is  consequent  upon  the  origin  of  moral 
evil,  and  even  then  only  in  case  it  is  proposed  to 
save  transgressors  from  the  consequences  of  their 
transgression,  a  procedure  which  is  itself  entirely 
optional  upon  the  part  of  God,  inasmuch  as  he  is 
under  no  necessity  to  redeem  mankind  from  their 
sins.  Again,  if  by  necessity  external  compulsion  be 
meant,  then  the  sufferings  of  Christ  were  not  neces¬ 
sary.  But,  thirdly,  a  thing  is  necessary  when  it  is 
indispensable  in  order  to  the  attainment  of  some 
other  thing,  and  in  this  sense  the  death  of  Christ  is 
necessary.  It  is  not,  indeed,  a  matter  of  necessity, 
that  man’s  sin  should  be  pardoned,  but  if  it  be  par-- 


voi..  ii.-~20 


306 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


doned,  it  is  necessary  that  Christ  should  first  make 
satisfaction  to  justice  for  its  commission.  Suppos¬ 
ing  the  fact  of  sin  and  the  fact  of  a  divine  intention 
to  deliver  man  from  it  be  given,  then,  says  Aqui¬ 
nas,  the  sufferings  of  Christ  become  necessary,  both 
in  respect  to  the  attribute  of  justice,  and  the  attri¬ 
bute  of  mercy, — in  respect  to  justice,  because  Christ 
by  his  sufferings  must  completely  satisfy  its  claims ; 
in  respect  to  mercy,  because,  in  man’s  condition  of 
inability  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  law  for  him¬ 
self,  God  can  display  no  higher  compassion  than  in 
providing  a  satisfaction  for  him,  and  in  his  stead. 

In  answering  the  second  question,  viz. :  Whether 
redemption  could  have  been  accomplished  in  some 
other  method  ?  Aquinas  defines  his  position  re¬ 
specting  the  metaphysical  necessity  of  atonement. 
Even  though  it  is,  abstractly  considered,  possible  to 
save  man  in  some  other  manner,  it  becomes  impos¬ 
sible,  he  says,  when  once  God  has  determined  to 
accomplish  the  work  in  the  way  and  manner  he 
has.  Aquinas,  like  Bonaventura,  holds  only  to  a 
relative  necessity  of  the  atonement.  He,  too,  while 
contending  with  great  earnestness  and  intellectual 
acumen,  that  a  satisfaction  for  sin  must  be  made  to 
justice  before  sin  can  be  remitted,  if  and  so  long 
as ,  justice  is  taken  into  the  account ,  yet  asserts  the 
possibility  of  throwing  this  attribute  out  of  the  ac¬ 
count,  in  a  determination  of  what  the  Supreme 
Being  is  able  to  do.  His  reasoning  is  as  follows. 
“If  God  had  willed  to  liberate  man  from  sin  with- 


SOTEBIOLOGY  OF  AQUINAS. 


307 


out  any  satisfaction,  he  would  not  have  done  any¬ 
thing  contrary  to  justice.  For  he  is  not  like  a 
human  or  finite  judge.  The  human  judge  cannot, 
without  injury  to  justice,  dismiss  a  criminal  without 
punishment,  because  it  is  his  function  to  inflict  pun¬ 
ishment  upon  crime  committed  against  another  than 
himself,— say,  against  another  man,  or  against  the 
general  weal,  or  against  a  higher  officer  than  him¬ 
self.  But  God  is  the  supreme  judge  and  chief  good 
of  the  whole  universe,  and  there  is  no  other  being 
than  himself  with  whose  interests  he,  as  a  judge,  is 
intrusted.  Consequently,  if  God  sees  fit  to  remit  that 
penalty  which  has  been  affixed  to  law  only  for  his 
own  glory,  no  injustice  is  done,  more  than  when  a 
man  forgives  his  fellow-man  an  injury  done  to  him¬ 
self  alone,  without  requiring  any  satisfaction  at  his 
hands.”  This  reasoning,  it  is  evident,  is  founded 
upon  the  same  view  with  that  of  Bonaventura,  re¬ 
specting  the  relation  of  the  physical  to  the  moral 
attributes  of  God.  It  assumes  that  the  former  are 
more  central  and  fundamental  than  the  latter,  and 
asserts  the  possibility  of  their  disjunction  in  the 
Divine  administration.  It  implies  the  right  of  om¬ 
nipotence  to  abolish  justice ;  the  right  of  power  to 
nullify  law.  For  although  the  offence  of  sin  is  com¬ 
mitted  against  the  same  Being  who  is  the  judge 
and  punisher  of  sin,  yet  if  as  sovereign  he  should 
pardon  it  without  the  satisfaction  of  law,  he  would 
unquestionably  put  honour  upon  his  omnipotence 
and  dishonour  upon  his  justice.  The  physical  at* 


308 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOOY. 


tribute  would  thus  be  all-controlling,  and  the  Di¬ 
vine  nature  would  become  a  mere  unlimited  and 
characterless  force.  An  inward  schism  and  self¬ 
defection  would  take  place  in  the  Deity,  whereby 
one  part  of  his  nature,  by  a  purely  arbitrary  act  of 
his  own,  would  be  set  in  contradiction  to  another 
part ;  whereby  the  physical  attributes  w^ould  be 
arrayed  in  hostility  to  the  ethical,  in  the  very  place 
of  their  harmony  and  equilibrium. 

We  find  in  Aquinas  several  new  points  raised, 
respecting  the  work  of  Christ.  The  first  relates  to 
the  mode  in  which  the  atonement  of  the  Son  of  God 
becomes  available  to  the  believer.  Aquinas  an¬ 
swers  the  objection  that  merit  and  demerit  are  per¬ 
sonal,  and  that  therefore  vicarious  satisfaction  is 
impossible,  by  the  doctrine  of  the  unio  mystica  ex¬ 
isting  between  the  believer  and  the  Redeemer.1 
Founding  his  view  upon  the  statement  of  St.  Paul 
(Eph.  v.  30),  that  believers  are  members  of  the  body, 
the  flesh,  and  the  bones  of  the  Lord,  he  supposes, 


1  The  word  “  mystical  ”  was 
employed  in  the  sense  of  u  mys¬ 
terious,”  and  signified  that  which 
is  unique,  and  anomalous.  Christ’s 
Person  is  “  mystical  ”  ;  his  suffer¬ 
ings  are  “  mystical  ”  ;  and  the 
relation  between  him  and  the 
believer  is  “  mystical.”  Owen 
(On  Justification,  Oh.  VIII.)  re¬ 
marks  that  “  Christ  and  believers 
are  neither  one  natural  person, 
nor  a  legal  or  political  person, 
nor  any  such  person  as  the  laws, 


customs,  or  usages  of  men  know 
or  allow  of.  They  are  one  mys¬ 
tical  person,  whereof,  although 
there  may  he  some  imperfect  re¬ 
semblances  found  in  natural  or 
political  unions,  yet  the  union 
from  whence  that  denomination 
is  taken  between  him  and  us,  is 
of  that  nature,  and  arises  from 
such  reasons  and  causes,  as  no 
personal  union  among  men  (or 
the  union  of  many  persons)  has 
any  concern  in.” 


SOTEEIOLOGY  OF  AQUINAS. 


309 


that  a  peculiar  species  of  connection  exists  between 
the  Church  and  its  Head,  by  virtue  of  which  the 
common  principles  and  maxims  that  pertain  to  in¬ 
dividual  and  secular  life  cease  to  be  applicable.  The 
relation  of  the  believer  to  the  Son  of  God  is  not  the 
external  one,  of  one  individual  to  another  individ¬ 
ual,  but  an  anomalous  one,  -whereby  a  communion 
of  interest  and  moral  life  is  established,  so  that  the 
sinner  united  by  faith  to  his  Saviour  may  become  a 
ground  and  cause  of  judicial  infliction  upon  his  aton¬ 
ing  Substitute,  and  the  incarnate  Word  may  become 
the  sinner’s  sin-offering,  and  atonement.  We  do 
not  find  in  Aquinas  very  full,  or  very  clear,  repre¬ 
sentations  upon  this  difficult  point ;  but  this  idea  of 
the  mystical  oneness  between  Christ  and  the  Church 
pervades  his  soteriology  with  considerable  boldness. 
Though  allusions  are  made  to  it  in  the  earlier 
writers,  especially  in  connection  with  the  cognate 
doctrine  of  the  unity  of  Adam  and  his  posterity,  yet 
it  may  be  said  that  the  “  angelic  doctor,”  as  he  was 
termed  in  the  panegyrical  phraseology  of  the  time, 
was  the  first  to  give  it  prominence  in  the  theory  of 
Redemption. 

The  second  new  point  we  notice  in  this  writer 
is  the  distinction  between  satisf actio  and  meritum. 
In  the  Anselmic  theory,  the  work  of  Christ  was 
contemplated  in  its  relations  to  justice  solely.  The 
deliverance  of  man  from  condemnation  was  the 
great  object  in  view.  This  is  the  prevalent  mode 
of  contemplating  the  subject  in  the  Patristic,  and 


310 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


the  Earlier  Scholastic  soteriology.  But  we  find 
Aquinas  raising  that  question  which  was  afterwards 
so  earnestly  discussed  in  the  Calvinistic  and  Armi- 
nian  controversies  of  the  17th  century, — the  ques¬ 
tion,  namely,  whether  Christ  did  not  earn  for  the 
believer  a  title  to  eternal  life,  as  well  as  of  freedom 
from  condemnation  to  eternal  death.  Aquinas  an¬ 
swers  this  question  in  the  affirmative,  and  makes 
the  technical  distinction  between  the  satisfaction 
which  Christ  made  by  his  sufferings  to  justice,  and 
the  merit  of  his  obedience  to  the  law  by  virtue  of 
which  the  redeemed  are  entitled  to  the  rewards  of 
eternity.  In  other  words,  we  find  in  the  theory  of 
Aquinas  an  anticipation  of  the  later  distinction  be¬ 
tween  the  “  active  ”  and  “  passive  ”  righteousness  of 
Christ. 

A  third  new  point  observable  in  the  soteriology 
of  Aquinas  is  the  doctrine  of  a  superabundance  in 
the  merits  of  Christ.  The  Passion  of  the  Bedeemer 
was  not  merely  sufficient,  it  was  also  a  superabun¬ 
dant  satisfaction  for  the  sins  of  the  human  race. 
This  position  needs  to  be  carefully  distinguished 
from  the  statements  of  Anselm,  in  which  he  gives 
expression  to  his  view  of  the  infinite  worth  of 
Christ’s  satisfaction.  There  was  little  danger  of 
magnifying  the  value  of  the  Bedeemer’s  Passion,  in 
connection  with  the  infinite  demerit  of  sin,  and 
hence  the  Anselmic  theory  is  far  more  satisfactory 
than  that  of  Aquinas,  in  respect  to  the  point  under 
review.  This  later  Schoolman,  though  intending  to 


SOTERIOLOGY  OF  AQUINAS. 


311 


follow  the  opinions  of  the  earlier,  imperceptibly  de¬ 
parts  from  him,  by  reason  of  a  less  spiritual  and 
profound  view  of  the  nature  of  moral  evil.  Hence, 
in  regard  to  the  distinction  between  justification 
and  sanctification,  we  find  Aquinas  involved  in  the 
confusion  which  we  have  noticed  in  Augustine. 
There  is  much  less  affinity  between  the  soteriology 
of  the  Reformation  and  that  of  the  u  angelic  doctor,” 
than  between  it  and  that  of  Anselm ;  and,  to  this 
day,  the  Roman  Catholic  theologians  of  the  more 
intelligent  and  devout  class,  who  are  not  satisfied 
with  the  lowest  forms  of  the  Papal  soteriology,  and 
yet  are  not  prepared  for  the  New  Testament  theory 
in  its  purity,  appropriate  the  opinions  of  Aquinas 
rather  than  those  of  Anselm.  There  is  little  doubt 
that  the  doctrine  of  a  superabundance  in  the  satis¬ 
faction  of  Christ,  in  connection  with  a  defective  view 
of  the  degree  and  amount  of  evil  that  was  to  be 
atoned  for  by  it,  contributed  toward  the  distinctively 
Papal  theory  of  works  of  supererogation,  and  of  a 
treasury  of  merit  at  the  command  of  the  Church. 

The  distinctively  Romish  soteriology  of  Aqui¬ 
nas  is  betrayed  when  he  comes  to  treat  of  the  re¬ 
mission  of  sin,  and  particularly  when  he  specifies 
the  ground  of  it.  Anselm,  we  have  seen,  referred 
it  solely  to  the  atoning  work  of  Christ.  In  his  the¬ 
ory,  justification  is  the  simple  and  sole  act  of  God, 
whereby  he  acquits  the  guilty  on  the  ground  of  the 
infinite  satisfaction  that  has  been  made  for  sin.  So 
far  as  the  pardon  of  sin  is  concerned,  man  can  do 


312 


HISTORY  OF  SOTEEIOLOGY. 


nothing.  The  criminal  cannot  pardon  himself,  nei¬ 
ther  can  he  purchase  or  earn  a  pardon  by  satisfying 
the  claims  of  law.  He  cannot  do  this  in  part.  The 
sinner  is  totally  dependent  upon  God  for  the  re¬ 
mission  of  sin,  both  in  respect  to  the  declarative 
act  by  which  he  is  acquitted,  and  in  respect  to  all 
that  judicial  procedure  and  apparatus  of  atonement 
which  must  precede  the  declarative  or  justifying 
apt.  In  the  Anselmic  scheme,  as  in  the  Protestant, 
remission  of  sin  is  the  pure,  simple,  and  sole  act  of 
Deity,  without  any  co-operation  or  assistance  from 
humanity. 1  But  not  so  in  the  theory  of  Aquinas. 
Notwithstanding  all  that  he  has  said,  and  well  said, 
respecting  the  claims  of  justice,  and  the  vicarious 
satisfaction  of  the  Son  of  God,  Aquinas,  as  does 
the  subsequent  Tridentine  scheme,  vitiates  all  that 
he  has  hitherto  maintained  on  these  points,  by 
teaching  that  the  remission  of  sin  depends  to  a  cer¬ 
tain  extent  upon  the  character  and '  conduct  of  the 
individual,  as  a  ground ,  or  procuring  cause.  The 
confusion  of  justification  with  sanctification,  which 
we  have  observed  in  some  passages  of  Augustine, 
re-appears  in  Aquinas  in  a  more  distinct  and  settled 

1  Romans  xi.  6.  “  And  if  by  circumcised,  Christ  shall  profit 

grace,  then  it  is  no  more  of  you  nothing.  For  I  testify  again 
works:  otherwise  grace  is  no  to  every  man  that  is  circumcised, 
more  grace.  But  if  it  be  of  that  he  is  a  debtor  to  do  the  ' 
works,  then  it  is  no  more  grace,  whole  law.  Christ  is  become  of 
otherwise  work  is  no  more  work,  no  effect  unto  you,  whosoever  of 
Galatians  v.  2-5.  “  Behold  I  you  are  justified  by  the  law  :  ye 

Paul  say  unto  you,  that  if  ye  be  are  fallen  from  grace.” 


SOTERIOLOGY  OF  AQUINAS. 


313 


statement.  In  conformity  with,  this  view,  Aquinas 
represents  the  expiatory  value  of  the  atonement  as 
dependent  upon  the  believer’s  conformity  to  law. 
In  order  that  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  may  be  an 
adequate  one  for  the  sinner,  he  must  be  “config¬ 
ured  ”  to  Christ.  The  atonement  is  not  sufficient 
alone  and  by  itself.  It  must  be  supplemented  by 
personal  character  and  good  works,  and  in  some 
cases  by  penances.  This  “  configuration  ”  to  Christ, 
requisite  in  order  that  His  satisfaction  may  be  com¬ 
plete,  is  brought  about  in  a  sacramental  manner  by 

baptism.  In  case  of  sin  after  baptism,  the  believ- 

*> 

er  must  be  “  configured  ”  to  Christ  by  a  per¬ 
sonal  suffering  in  the  form  of  penance,  as  well 
as  by  the  acceptance  of  the  sufferings  of  the  Re¬ 
deemer.  Aquinas  concedes  that  the  suffering 
of  Christ  is  of  far  greater  value  than  that  of  the 
man  himself,  yet  plainly  teaches  that  the  latter 
enters  as  a  co-operating  factor  with  the  former,  in 
laying  the  foundation  for  the  remission  of  the  com¬ 
mitted  sin.  It  is  not  in  itself  sufficient  to  atone  for 
sin,  but  in  connection  with  the  sacrifice  of  Christ  it 
has  a  value  of  its  own  which  cannot  be  dispensed 
with  in  making  up  the  full  sum  of  legal  satisfaction. 
The  penance  of  the  baptized  man  is  imperfect ;  it 
has  not  the  merit  of  condignity  (condigna  peccato)  ; 
but  it  is  graciously  accepted  in  connection  with,  and 
reliance  upon,  the  satisfaction  of  Christ. 1 

1  Aquinas  (Summa,  Quaestio  requisite  that  those  who  sin  after 
xlviii.  Artie.  3)  asserts  that  “  it  is  baptism  should  be  configured  to 


314 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


We  have  in  these  views  of  Aquinas  sufficient 
reason  for  asserting,  that  notwithstanding  the  cor¬ 
rectness  of  his  soteriology  up  to  a  certain  point  and 
in  certain  relations,  the  fatal  errour  of  the  Romish 
theory  is  contained  in  it.  This  errour,  to  state  it  in 
a  word,  does  not  consist  in  denying  the  need  of  a 
satisfaction  of  justice,  or  even  the  great  value  of 
Christ’s  satisfaction  for  sin,  but  in  asserting  in  con¬ 
nection  with  this,  the  necessity  of  a  co-operating  and 
completing  satisfaction  on  the  part  of  man.  The 
amount  of  this  finite  element  varies  in  different 
writers  and  ages  of  the  Romish  Church,  but  the  pre¬ 
sence  of  the  element  itself  in  any  amount  is  what 


the  suffering  Redeemer  through 
something  of  penalty  or  passion 
which  they  endure  in  themselves, 
which  nevertheless  is  far  from 
being  a  strict  offset  for  sin  (con- 
digna  peccato),  even  though  the 
sacrifice  of  Christ  cooperate  with 
it.”  Again  (Summa,  Pars  III. 
Quaest.  i.  Art.  1),  Aquinas  distin¬ 
guishes  two  kinds  of  satisfaction, 
— that  of  the  God-man,  and  that 
of  man.  The  first  is  that  of  “  con¬ 
dign  ”  or  strict  satisfaction,  as  the 
act  of  God  incarnate.  The  sec¬ 
ond,  that  of  man,  may  be  said  to 
be  “  imperfectly  sufficient,  by  rea¬ 
son  of  the  willingness  of  the  of¬ 
fended  party  to  accept  it,  although 
it  is  not  a  strict  and  literal  satis¬ 
faction.”  The  boldest  form  of 
stating  the  doctrine  of  a  cooper¬ 


ating  satisfaction  on  the  part  of 
man  is  found  in  Gabriel  Biel, 
(Sententiae,  Lib.  III.  Distinct,  xix, 
Conclus.  5).  “  Though  Christ’s 

passion  is  thb  principal  ground  of 
merit  upon  which  grace  is  con¬ 
ferred,  nevertheless  it  is  not  the 
sole  and  total  meritorious  cause, 
because  with  the  merits  of  Christ 
there  always  concurs  some  act  of 
him  who  receives  grace,  which 
[act]  has  either  the  merit  of  con- 
dignity,  or  congruity.”  See  Baue: 
Versohnungslehre,  243,  351. 

Compare  with  Aquinas’s  distinc¬ 
tion  of  two  kinds  of  satisfaction, 
one  of  which  does  not  satisfy, 
Pascal’s  account  of  the  “prox¬ 
imate  power  ”  and  “  sufficient 
grace  ”  of  the  Jesuits,  in  the  first 
and  second  Provincial  Letters. 


SOTERIOLOGY  OF  DUNS  SCOTUS. 


315 


distinguishes  the  distinctively  Papal  from  the  dis¬ 
tinctively  Protestant  theory  of  the  atonement.1 


§  6.  Soteriology  of  Duns  Scotus . 

A  controversy  respecting  the  atonement  sprang 
up  between  Duns  Scotus  and  the  followers  of  Aqui¬ 
nas,  which  involved  fundamental  principles  in  ethics 
and  religion,  and  divided  the  Romish  Church  into 
two  great  parties  of  Thomists  and  Scotists.  Duns 
Scotus  denied  the  Anselmic  doctrine  that  sin  is  of 
infinite  demerit,  and  consequently  denied  that  the 
suffering  of  Christ  is  of  infinite  value.2  The  rela¬ 
tion  of  the  atonement  of  the  Son  of  God  to  the  sin 
of  mankind,  he  maintained,  is  merely  an  arbitrary 
and  constituted  one.  The  principle  upon  which  he 


1  The  thoroughly  Papal  idea  of 
adding  to  personal  merit  by  works 
is  expressed  with  great  naivete  by 
St.  Simon  (Memoires,Yol.  I.  Chap, 
iii,  St.  John’s  Translation).  “  The 
king  particularly  expressed  his 
regret  that  my  father  [who  had 
just  deceased]  had  not  been  able 
to  receive  the  last  sacraments. 
I  was  able  to  say  that  a  very 
short  time  before,  my  father  had 
retired  for  several  days  to  Saint 
Lazare,  where  was  his  confessor, 
and  added  something  on  the  piety 
of  his  life.”  The  idea  of  a  good 
man’s  expiating  his  own  sins  in 
part  is  continually  appearing  in 


the  lives  of  the  most  exemplary 
of  the  Roman  Catholics.  For 
example,  Tillemont,  a  Jansenist, 
and  a  very  devout  and  pure- 
minded  man,  thus  writes  to  his 
brother  who  was  sub-prior  of 
La  Trappe:  “Everybody  is  not 
obliged  to  fast  as  you  do  at  La 
Trappe,  but  everybody  is  obliged 
to  resist  the  desires  of  concupis¬ 
cence,  which  pride  and  the  re¬ 
mains  of  our  corruption  constant¬ 
ly  excite  in  us,  and  to  expiate  the 
sins  into  which  we  thus  fall.” 
Beard  :  Port  Royal  II.  182. 

2  Baur  :  Versohnungslehre, 
250  sq. 


316 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


founded  his  theory  was  :  “  Tantum  valet  omne  crea- 
tum  oblatum,  pro  quanto  acceptat  Deus  illud,  et  non 
plus.”1  There  is  no  interior  fitness  and  adaptation 
between  Christ’s  atonement  and  man’s  sin.  God  was 
pleased  to  accept  this  particular  sacrifice  as  an  offset 
and  equivalent  for  human  transgression,  not  from 
any  intrinsic  value  in  it,  but  because  he  so  pleased. 
He  might  have  accepted  any  other  substitute,'  or  he 
might  have  dispensed  with  accepting  any  substitute 
at  all. 2  In  opposition  to  this  view,  the  followers 
of  Aquinas  maintained  the  old  Anselmic  theory  of 
the  infinite  demerit  of  sin,  and  the  infinite  and  ob¬ 
jective  value  of  Christ’s  satisfaction.  In  this  con¬ 
troversy,  the  soteriology  of  the  adherents  of  Aquinas 
is  more  in  harmony  with  the  Protestant  view  and 
feeling ;  so  that  we  might  reverse  what  Melanchthon 
remarks  of  Augustine,  and  say,  that  “the  opinion 
of  Aquinas  is  more  pertinent,  fit  and  convenient 
when  he  disputed  than  it  was  when  not  disput¬ 
ing.”  And  yet  it  would  be  difficult  to  see  how 
the  followers  of  Aquinas  could  in  the  end  avoid  the 
conclusions  of  Duns  Scotus,  if  they  started  from  that 
doctrine  of  a  relative  necessity  of  satisfying  justice 
which  we  have  seen  Aquinas  held,  in  common  with 
all  the  Schoolmen  excepting  Anselm.  If  omnipo¬ 
tence  and  bare  will  are  more  ultimate  in  the  Divine 
Nature  than  justice  and  truth  are,  then  it  is  difficult 


1  Duns  Scotus  :  Dist.  xx.  lib.  3  Geehaedus  :  Loci  Theologici, 
iii.,  in  Sent.  Lombardi,  Quaest.  I.  Tom.  IY.  p.  122. 


RECAPITULATORY  SURVEY. 


31? 


to  see  how  Scotus  can  be  censured  for  holding,  that 
in  the  last  analysis  God  can  dispense  with  an  atone¬ 
ment  altogether,  and  that  whatever  value  the  exist¬ 
ing  judicial  provision  possesses  in  the  divine  plan,  it 
possesses  not  in  itself,  but  solely  by  virtue  of  its  op¬ 
tional  acceptance  by  the  Omnipotent  One  who  is 
not  limited  by  anything,  not  even  by  his  own  moral 
attributes.  The  controversy,  however,  ran  high  be¬ 
tween  the  adherents  of  Aquinas  and  Scotus, — the 
Dominican  order  generally  siding  with  the  former, 
and  the  Franciscan  with  the  latter.  The  Nominal¬ 
ists  in  philosophy  also  naturally  favoured  the  views 
of  Scotus,  as  his  theory  was  that  of  a  nominal  and 
putative  satisfaction,  in  distinction  from  a  real  and 
objective  one.  The  extravagantly  speculative  minds 
of  the  age,  those  who  have  given  the  reputation  of 
hair-splitting  and  excessive  dialectics  to  Scholasti¬ 
cism,  also  adopted  the  positions  of  Scotus. 

§  7.  Recapitulatory  Survey . 

Casting  a  swift  glance  backward  over  this  Scho¬ 
lastic  period,  we  recapitulate  the  following  facts,  as 
the  summary  of  what  we  have  found  in  the  history 
of  the  doctrine  of  Atonement. 

1.  The  doctrine  of  vicarious  satisfaction,  or  sub¬ 
stituted  penalty,  was  the  general  form  of  doctrine 
among  all  classes  of  minds  within  the  pale  of  the 
Church,  as  it  was  in  the  Patristic  period.  All  pro¬ 
fess  to  adopt  it,  and  its  explicit  denial  or  rejection 


318 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


was  deemed  heresy.  The  Socinian  position  was  not 
taken  or  defended  by  the  Mediaeval  theologians. 
2.  The  doctrine  of  vicarious  satisfaction  was  held 
in  the  purely  Biblical  form  by  Anselm,  without 
mixture  of  foreign  elements,  or  subtraction  of  intrin¬ 
sic  and  essential  characteristics.  Had  the  Anselmic 
soteriology  prevailed  in  the  theory  and  practice  of 
the  Church  generally,  the  Reformation  of  the  1 6th 
century  would  have  occurred  in  the  11th.  3.  The 

doctrine  of  vicarious  substitution  was  not  maintained 
in  this  pure  and  unqualified  form  by  the  successors 
of  Anselm.  Some  of  them,  and  those  nearest  to  him 
in  time,  did  not  adopt  his  theory  in  its  strictly  sci¬ 
entific  form,  while  yet  they  retained  in  feeling  and 
practice  its  substantial  features.  Others,  and  these 
the  later  Schoolmen,  while  retaining  the  doctrine 
nominally  and  in  phraseology,  in  reality  essentially 
altered  it ;  first,  by  confounding  sanctification  with 
justification,  and,  secondly,  by  teaching  that  an 
additional  merit  derived  either  from  the  church 
through  its  sacraments,  or  from  voluntary  penance 
on  the  part  of  the  individual,  is  requisite  in  order 
that  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  may  be  a  complete 
and  efficacious  one.  4.  In  the  departure  from  the 
Anselmic  theory  of  an  absolute  as  distinguished 
from  a  relative  satisfaction,  we  find  the  germs  of 
the  subsequent  Papal  soteriology  which  during  the 
middle  and  latter  part  of  the  Scholastic  period  shoot 
up  with  rankness  and  luxuriance. 


CHAPTER  III. 


THE  PAPAL  SOTERIOLOGY. 

I  . 

1.  Preliminary  Statements . 


The  history  of  the  doctrine  of  Atonement 
in  the  Middle  Ages  has  disclosed  two  tendencies 
within  the  Western  Church,  in  respect  to  the 
nature  of  Christ’s  work, — -the  one  strict,  and  the 
other  lax.  The  first  has  its  representative  in  An¬ 
selm,  and  its  expression  in  the  theory  of  an  infinite 
and  real  satisfaction.  The  second  has  several  repre¬ 
sentatives,  because  it  involves  a  descending  scale. 
Some  of  the  immediate  successors  of  Anselm, — 
such  as  Bernard,  the  St.  Victors,  and  Bonaven- 
tura, — retained  the  substance  of  the  Anselmic  view 
in  their  practical  representations,  yet  at  the  same 
time  in  their  theoretic  statements  made  some  modi¬ 
fications  of  the  scientific  positions  of  Anselm ;  of 
which  the  most  important  was  the  adoption  (by 
Bonaventura  for  example)  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
“  relative  ”  necessity  of  the  atonement.  The  logical 
force  and  implication  of  these  modifications  was 


320 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGrY. 


neutralized,  in  a  great  measure,  by  the  reliance  of 
the  heart  upon  the  Person  and  work  of  the  Re¬ 
deemer,  in  the  instances,  certainly,  of  the  penitent 
and  devout  Bernards  and  St.  Victors.  But  the 
tendency  itself  was  off  and  away  from  the  strict 
exactitude  of  science,  and  it  could  not  remain  sta¬ 
tionary.  We  have  already  noticed  in  Aquinas,  and 
still  more  in  Lombard,  the  theory  of  a  mixed  justi¬ 
fication,  resting  partly  upon  the  work  of  Christ,  and 
partly  upon  the  works  of  the  individual ;  while  the 
Abelards  and  Scotuses  made  statements  of  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  atonement  that  were  regarded  by  Bernard 
and  the  adherents  of  Aquinas  as  positively  hereti¬ 
cal.  The  consequence  was  that  in  process  of  time 
the  strict  tendency  was  entirely  overcome  by  the 
lax  one.  The  Anselmic  theory  disappeared  en¬ 
tirely  from  the  heart  of  the  Roman  Church,  and 
remained  concealed  in,  at  most,  a  very  narrow  cir¬ 
cle,  until  it  burst  forth  with  renewed  energy  and 
vitality  in  the  soteriology  of  the  Reformation.  The 
lax  theory  prevailed,  becoming  more  loose  and  lati- 
tudinarian  as  the  corruption  of  both  theory  and 
practice  advanced  within  the  Papal  Church,  until 
it  finally  obtained  a  distinct  expression,  and  an 
ecclesiastical  authority,  in  the  Soteriology  of  the 
Council  of  Trent} 

1  This  council  was  formally  Sept.  17,  1549  ;  was  re-convened 
opened  at  Trent,  Dec.  13,  1545 ;  at  Trent,  May  1,  1551 ;  was  sus- 
held  its  first  session,  Jan.  7, 1546 ;  pended,  April  28,  1552 ;  was  re- 
was  transferred  to  Bologna,  March  opened,  Jan.  18,  1562,  and  sat  to 
12,  1547 ;  was  there  dissolved,  Dec.  4,  1563. 


TRIDEXTIXE  SOTERIOLOGY. 


321 


§  2.  Soteriology  of  the  Council  of  Trent . 

The  Tridentine  theory  makes  inward  holiness 
in  conjunction  with  the  merits  of  Christ  the  ground 
of  justification.  It  founds  human  salvation  upon 
two  corner-stones.  The  doctors  of  Trent  construct 
their  exact  and  formal  definition  of  justification  out 
of  that  one  element  of  error  which,  we  have  seen, 
somewhat  vitiated  the  soteriology  of  Augustine. 
The  unintentional  confounding  of  the  distinction 
between  justification  and  sanctification,  which  ap¬ 
pears  occasionally  in  the  Patristic  writers,  becomes 
a  deliberate  and  emphatic  identification,  in  the 
scheme  of  the  Papal  Church. 

The  Anselmic  and  Protestant  soteriologies  mean 
by  the  term  “justification,”  that  divine  act,  instan¬ 
taneous  and  complete,  by  which  sin  is  pardoned. 
If  we  distinguish  the  entire  work  of  redemption  into 
two  parts,  a  negative  and  a  positive,  justification  in 
the  Pauline  and  in  the  Reformed  signification  would 
include  the  former  and  would  include  nothing  more. 
Justification  is  the  negative  acquittal  from  condem¬ 
nation,  and  not  in  the  least  the  positive  infusion  of 
righteousness,  or  production  of  holiness.  This  posi¬ 
tive  element,  the  Reformers  were  careful  to  teach, 
invariably  accompanies  the  negative ;  but  they  were 
equally  careful  to  teach  that  it  is  not  identical 
with  it.  The  forgiveness  of  sin  is  distinct  and  dif¬ 
ferent  from  the  sanctification  of  the  heart.  It  is  an 


YOL.  II. - 21 


322 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


antecedent  which  is  always  followed,  indeed,  by  its 
consequent ;  but  this  does  not  render  the  consequent 
a  substitute  for  the  antecedent,  or  one  and  the  same 
thing  with  it. 1  But  the  Council  of  Trent  resolved 
justification  into  sanctification,  and  in  the  place  of  a 
gratuitous  justification  and  remission  of  sins  through 
the  expiation  of  the  Redeemer,  substituted  the  most 
subtle  form  of  the  doctrine  of  justification  by  works 
that  has  yet  appeared,  or  that  can  appear.  For  the 
doctors  of  Trent  do  not  teach,  in  their  canonical 
statements,  that  man  is  justified  and  accepted  at  the 
bar  of  justice  by  his  external  acts  of  obedience  to 
the  moral  or  the  ecclesiastical  law.  This  is.  indeed, 
the  doctrine  that  prevails  in  the  common  practice 
of  the  Papal  Church,  but  it  is  not  the  form  in  which 
it  appears  in  the  Tridentine  canons.  According  to 
these,  man  is  justified  by  an  imvard  and  spiritual 
act  which  is  denominated  the  act  of  faith ;  by  a 
truly  divine  and  holy  habit  or  principle  infused  by 
the  gracious  working  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  The 
ground  of  the  sinner’s  justification  is  thus  a  divine 


1  The  Westminster  Confession 
thus  states  the  distinction  between 
justification  and  sanctification. 
“Although  sanctification  be  in¬ 
separably  joined  with  justifica¬ 
tion,  yet  they  differ,  in  that  God 
in  justification  imputeth  the  right¬ 
eousness  of  Christ ;  in  sanctifica¬ 
tion,  his  Spirit  infuseth  grace,  and 
enableth  to  the  exercise  thereof ; 
in  the  former,  sin  is  ‘pardoned  ;  in 


the  other,  it  is  subdued  ;  the  one 
doth  equally  free  all  believers 
from  the  revenging  wrath  of 
God,  and  that  perfectly  in  this 
life,  that  they  never  fall  into  con¬ 
demnation  ;  the  other  is  neither 
equal  in  all,  nor  in  this  life  per¬ 
fect  in  any,  but  growing  up  to 
perfection.”  (Larger  Catechism, 
Q.  77.) 


TRIDENTINE  SOTERIOLOGY. 


323 


and  a  gracious  one.  God  works  in  the  sinful  soul  to 
will  and  to  do,  and  by  making  it  inherently  just  jus¬ 
tifies  it.  And  all  this  is  accomplished  through  the 
merits  and  mediation  of  Jesus  Christ ;  so  that,  in 
justification  there  is  a  combination  of  the  objective 
work  of  Christ  with  the  subjective  character  of  the 
believer.  This  statement  is  the  more  subtle,  because 
it  distinctly  refers  the  infused  grace  or  holiness  to 
God  as  the  author,  and  thereby  seems  to  preclude 
the  notion  of  self-righteousness.  But  it  is  fundamen¬ 
tally  erroneous,  because  this  infused  righteousness, 
or  holiness  of  heart,  upon  which  remission  of  sins 
rests  in  part,  is  not  piacular.  It  has  in  it  nothing 
of  the  nature  of  a  satisfaction  to  justice.1  So  far 
forth,  therefore,  as  infused  grace  in  the  heart  is 
made  a  ground  and  procuring  cause  of  the  pardon 
of  sin,  the  judicial  aspects  and  relations  of  sin  are 
overlooked,  and  man  is  received  into  the  Divine 
favor  without  any  true  and  proper  expiation  of  his 
guilt.  The  Papal  theory  of  justification,  consequent¬ 
ly,  stands  upon  the  same  level  in  the  last  analysis 
with  the  Socinian,  or  with  any  theory  that  denies 
the  necessity  of  a  satisfaction  of  justice.2 


1  “  Then  what  is  the  fault  of  the  2  In  this  respect,  Romanism  and 
church  of  Rome  ?  Not  that  she  Rationalism  are  two  extremes 
requireth  works  at  their  hands  that  meet.  See  the  views  of 
which  will  he  saved :  but  that  she  Sartokius  on  “the  affinity  of 
attributeth  unto  works  a  power  Romanism  and  Rationalism,”  in 
of  satisfying  God  for  sin.v  Bibliotheca  Sacra,  Jan.  1851. 
Hooker  :  On  Justification,  Works 
II.  538 


324 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


The  following  extracts  from  the  Canones  of  the 
Council  of  Trent  enunciate  the  Roman  Catholic  so- 
teriology.  “  Justification  is  not  the  mere  remission 
of  sins,  but  also  the  sanctification  and  renovation 
of  the  inward  man  through  the  voluntary  reception 
of  grace  and  gifts  of  grace ;  whereby  an  unjust  man 
becomes  just,  the  enemy  a  friend,  so  that  he  may  be 
an  heir  according  to  the  hope  of  eternal  life.  .  .  The 
only  formal  cause  of  justification  is  the  justice  (justi- 
tia)  of  God,  not  that  by  which  he  himself  is  just, 
but  that  by  which  he  makes  us  just, — that  namely 
by  which  we  are  gratuitously  renewed  by  him  in  the 
spirit  of  our  minds,  and  are  not  only  reputed,  but 
really  are  and  are  denominated  just,  receiving  jus¬ 
tice  into  ourselves  each  one  according  to  his  own 
measure,  which  the  Holy  Spirit  imparts  to  each  as 
He  pleases,  and,  also,  according  to  each  one’s  own 
disposition  and  co-operation.  .  .  When  the  Apostle 
asserts  that  man  is  justified  by  faith  and  gratuitously, 
his  language  is  to  be  understood  in  that  sense  which 
the  constant  agreement  of  the  Catholic  Church  has 
affixed  to  it ;  in  such  a  manner,  namely,  as  that  we 
are  said  to  be  justified  by  faith,  because  faith  is  the 
beginning  of  human  salvation,  the  foundation  and 
root  of  all  justification  [i.  e.  of  all  virtue],  without 
which  it  is  impossible  to  please  God  (Heb.  xi.  6). 
And  we  are  said  to  be  justified  gratuitously,  because 
none  of  those  things  which  precede  justification, 
whether  faith  or  works,  merits  the  grace  itself  of 


TRIDEOTINE  SOTERIOLOGrY. 


325 


justification.” 1  These  citations  from  the  Canons  of 
the  Council  of  Trent  are  sufficient  to  show  that  the 
theologians  there  assembled  regarded  justification  as 
a  renewing  and  sanctifying  act  on  the  part  of  God, 
and  not  a  declarative  one.  It  is  not  that  Divine  act 
whereby  sin  is  pardoned,  but  whereby  sin  is  purged. 

But  that  the  doctrine  of  gratuitous  remission  of 
sin  upon  the  sole  ground  of  Christ’s  satisfaction  was 
thrown  out  of  the  Tridentine  theory  of  justifica¬ 
tion,  is  yet  more  apparent  from  the  anathematizing 
clauses  which  were  added  to  explain  and  guard  the 
so-called  catholic  faith.  “  If  any  one  shall  say  that 
the  sinner  is  justified  by  faith  alone ,  in  the  sense 
that  nothing  else  is  required  which  may  co-operate 
towards  the  attainment  of  the  grace  of  justification, 
and  that  the  sinner  does  not  need  to  be  prepared 
and  disposed  [for  the  reception  of  the  grace  of  justi¬ 
fication],  by  the  motion  of  his  own  will :  let  him  be 
accursed.  .  .  If  any  one  shall  say,  that  men  are  jus¬ 
tified  either  by  the  sole  imputation  of  the  righteous¬ 
ness  of  Christ ,  or  by  the  sole  remission  of  sin ,  to  the 
exclusion  of  that  grace  and  charity  which  is  shed 
abroad  in  their  hearts  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  which 
inheres  in  them,  or  shall  say  that  the  grace  whereby 
we  are  justified  is  merely  and  only  the  favor  of 
God :  let  him  be  accursed.  If  any  one  shall  say 
that  justifying  faith  is  nothing  but  confidence  in  the 
divine  mercy  remitting  sin  on  account  of  Christ ,  or 


1  Oanones  Concilii  Teidentini  :  De  Jnstific atione,  vii.  viii. 


326 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


that  this  faith  is  the  sole  thing  by  which  we  are  jus¬ 
tified  :  let  him  be  accursed .” 1  It  will  be  perceived 
from  these  extracts,  that  the  Tridentine  theologian 
regarded  “justification”  as  prospective  and  not  re¬ 
trospective,  in  its  essential  nature.  It  is  not  the  for¬ 
giveness  of  “  sins  that  are  past,”  but  the  cure  and 
prevention  of  sins  that  are  present  and  future.  The 
element  of  guilt  is  lost  sight  of,  and  the  piacular 
work  of  Christ  is  lost  sight  of  with  it;  and  the 
whole  work  of  redemption  is  interpreted  to  be 
merely  a  method  of  purification.  Thus  the  Triden¬ 
tine  theory  implies,  logically,  that  sin  is  not  guilt, 
but  only  disease  and  pollution.  Furthermore,  ac¬ 
cording  to  the  Papal  theory,  justification  is  not  in¬ 
stantaneous  but  successive.  It  is  not  a  single  and 
complete  act  upon  the  part  of  God,  but  a  gradual 
process  in  the  soul  of  man.  For  it  is  founded  upon 
that  inward  holiness  or  love  which  has  been  infused 
by  divine  grace.  But  this  advances  from  one  de¬ 
gree  to  another,  never  being  perfect  in  this  life,  and 
never  standing  still.  The  consciousness  of  being  jus¬ 
tified  before  God,  even  if  it  could  rest  upon  such  an 
imperfect  foundation  at  all,  must  fluctuate  with  all 
the  changes  in  the  internal  experience.  And  as  mat¬ 
ter  of  fact,  the  Council  of  Trent  declares  that  a  man 
cannot  be  certain  of  being  justified,  and  condemns 
those  who  affirm  such  certainty  in  the  following 
terms :  u  Although  it  is  necessary  to  believe  that  no 


1  Canones  Concilii  Teidenti:;i  :  Dc  Justificatione,  ix.  xi.  xii. 


TRIDENTIXE  SOTERIOLOGY. 


327 


sin  is,  or  ever  has  been,  remitted  except  gratuitously 
by  the  Divine  mercy  on  account  of  Christ,  yet  no 
one  who  affirms  with  confidence  and  certainty 
(jactat)  that  his  sins  are  remitted,  and  who  rests  in 
this  confidence  alone,  is  to  be  assured  of  remission.” 
According  to  the  Papal  soteriology,  the  assurance 
of  the  remission  of  sins,  and  of  acceptance  at  the  bar 
of  God,  must  rest  upon  the  degree  of  holiness  that 
has  been  infused,  and  not  simply  and  solely  upon 
Christ’s  oblation  for  sin.  Hence  it  cannot  in  this 
life  attain  to  certainty,  because  the  inward  holiness 
never  in  this  life  attains  to  perfection.  Justification 
is  not  instantaneous  and  complete,  but  gradual  and 
incomplete,  because  the  infused  righteousness  out 
of  which  it  issues  is  imperfect.  This  is  distinctly 
taught  in  the  tenth  chapter  of  the  “  decree  ”  con¬ 
cerning  Justification.  u  Therefore  being  thus  justi¬ 
fied,  and  made  friends  of  God  and  members  of  his 
household,  and  going  from  strength  to  strength, 
they  are  renewed,  as  the  Apostle  teaches,  day  by 
day:  that  is  to  say,  by  mortifying  their  fleshly 
members,  and  yielding  them  as  instruments  of  right¬ 
eousness  unto  sanctification,  through  the  observance 
of  the  commands  of  God  and  the  church,  their  right¬ 
eousness  itself  being  accepted  through  the  grace  of 
Christ,  and  their  faith  co-operating  with  their  good 
works,  they  grow  [in  holiness],  and  are  justified 
more  and  more.  This  increase  of  justification  (justi- 
tiae),  the  Holy  Church  seeks  when  she  prays: 
‘  Give  unto  us,  O  Lord,  increase  of  faith,  hope,  and 


328 


HISTOKY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


charity.’  ”  By  these  positions  of  the  Council  of 
Trent,  the  effect  of  justification  is  substituted  for  the 
cause .  That  inward  holiness  which  succeeds  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  is  made  to  take  the  place  of  the 
atoning  death  and  the  imputed  righteousness  of  the 
Redeemer.  The  ground  of  justification  is  thus  a 
personal  and  subjective  one.  It  is,  consequently, 
imperfect  and  incomplete,  and  must  be  supple¬ 
mented  by  greater  measures  of  holiness  and  attain¬ 
ments  in  piety,  and  also  by  the  external  penances 
and  good  works  required  by  the  Church.  “  If  any 
one  shall  assert,”  says  the  24th  Canon  concerning 
Justification,  “that  the  righteousness  received  [in 
justification]  is  not  preserved  and  also  increased 
before  God  by  good  works ;  but  that  good  works 
are  only  the  fruit  and  signs  of  a  justification  already 
attained,  and  not  the  cause  of  an  increase  of  justifi¬ 
cation  :  let  him  be  accursed.” 

§  3.  Soteriology  of  Bellarmin. 

The  theory  enunciated  at  Trent  received  a  fur¬ 
ther  expansion  and  defence  from  Roman  Catholic 
theologians.  Of  these,  the  most  distinguished  was 
JRobert  Bellarmin ,  whose  JDisputationes ,  published 
in  1581,  constitute  the  most  elaborate  explication 
and  defence  that  has  yet  been  made  of  the  Papal 
Dogmatics.1  The  theory  of  justification  as  stated 

1  For  sharp  and  effective  criti-  min,  see  Davenant  :  On  Justi- 
cism  of  the  positions  of  Bellar-  fication,  I.  164,  seq. 


SOTERIOLOGY  OF  BELLARMIXE. 


329 


in  detail  by  the  expounders  of  the  Decrees  and  Can¬ 
ons  of  Trent  embraces  the  following  particulars. 
Justification  is  two-fold,  and  is  denominated  the 
“first”  and  “second”  The  first  justification  is  the 
infusion  or  communication  of  an  inherent  principle 
or  habit  (habitus)  of  grace  or  charity ;  the  second 
justification  is  the  good  works,  or  right  life,  that 
results  from  this.  By  the  first  justification  original 
sin  is  extinguished,  and  the  habits  of  sin  are  ex¬ 
pelled.  This  justification  is  obtained  by  the  exer¬ 
cise  of  faith,  of  which  the  meritorious  and  procuring 
cause  is  the  obedience  and  satisfaction  of  Christ. 
But  at  this  point,  the  Romish  theory  introduces  a 
distinction  that  wholly  neutralizes  the  evangelical 
element  introduced  by  this  latter  statement.  This 
distinction  is  one  borrowed  from  the  later  Schoolmen, 
particularly  Thomas  Aquinas, — the  distinction,  viz., 
between  meritum  ex  condigno ,  and  meritum  ex  com 
gruo ,  or  merit  from  desert,  and  merit  from  fitness. 
This  distinction  is  thus  defined  by  Aquinas,  with 
his  usual  acuteness  and  clearness.  “  A  meritorious 
work  of  man  may  be  considered  in  two  aspects ; 
first,  as  proceeding  from  the  free  will  of  man,  and 
secondly,  as  proceeding  from  the  grace  of  the  Holy 
Spirit.  If  it  be  considered  from  the  first  point  of 
view,  there  can  be  in  it  no  merit  of  condignity  or 
absolute  desert;  because  of  the  inequality  between 
man  and  God,  whereby  it  is  impossible  for  the 
creature  to  bring  the  Creator  under  absolute  obliga¬ 
tions.  But  if  it  be  considered  from  the  second  point 


330 


HISTOEY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


of  view,  as  proceeding  from  the  influence  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  the  work  of  man  may  have  the  merit 
of  congruity  or  fitness ;  because  it  is  fitting  that  God 
should  reward  his  own  grace  as  a  thing  excellent  in 
itself.”1  This  distinction  between  two  species  of 
merit  is  connected,  in  the  Tridentine  theory  of  justi¬ 
fication,  with  the  doctrine  of  a  “  preparation  ”  and 
predisposition  for  justification,  in  such  a  manner 
that  although  the  name  of  merit  is  warily  avoided, 
the  thing  itself  is  not.  Man  is  prepared  for  justifb 
cation,  i.  e.  for  the  infusion  of  righteousness,  by  the 
common  operations  of  his  mind  under  common  or 
prevenient  grace.  But  this  grace  of  preparation 
merits  more  grace,  not  by  virtue  of  the  merit  of  con- 
dignity  indeed,  but  of  congruity.  And  so  onward, 
step  by  step,  to  the  very  end  of  the  process  of  justi¬ 
fication.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  this  subtle  distinction, 
when  coupled  with  the  doctrine  of  an  antecedent 
preparation,  nullifies  all  the  force  of  the  statement 
that  the  obedience  and  satisfaction  of  Christ  is  the 
meritorious  cause  of  a  sinner’s  justification.  For 
this  antecedent  preparation,  as  defined  by  the  Can¬ 
ons  of  the  Council,  amounts  to  nothing  more  than 
a  historical  faith,  or  an  assent  to  divine  revelation.2 
But  this  is  called  a  species  of  believing,  which,  upon 
the  principle  of  congruity  or  fitness,  deserves  more 

1  Aquinas  :  Summa.  Pt.  II.  i.  libere  moventur  in  Denm,  creden- 
Qu.  114.  Art.  4.  SeeMuNsoHER-  tes  vera  esse  quae  divinitus  reve- 
Von  Colln:  Dogmengeschichte  lata  et  promissa  sunt.”  Canoxes 
§133,  6.  Conoilii  Tridenteni:  De  Justi- 

2  “Fidem  ex  auditu  concipientes,  ficatione,  vi. 


SOTERIOLOGY  OF  BELLARMIHE. 


331 


grace.  And  this  increase  or  fresh  accession  of  grace 
is  a  gratia  gratum  faciens, — that  is,  an  infused  grace 
that  expels  the  habit  of  sin,  and  thus  justifies  or 
makes  acceptable  to  God.  So  that  justification  in 
the  last  analysis  takes  its  start  from  the  ordinary 
operations  of  the  human  mind,  under  the  common 
influences  of  God’s  Spirit  and  Providence,  and  ends 
with  being  an  inward  and  infused  righteousness, 
upon  the  ground  of  which  the  ungodly  is  set  in  right 
relations  to  God. 1 

The  difference  between  the  Papal  and  the  Prot¬ 
estant  soteriology  is  enunciated  by  Baur  with  his 
usual  strength  and  discrimination,  in  the  following 
terms.  “The  Protestant  doctrine  of  justification 


1  “  Salvation  by  Christ  is  the 
foundation  of  Christianity ;  as 
for  works,  they  are  a  thing  sub¬ 
ordinate  no  otherwise  than  be¬ 
cause  our  sanctification  cannot  be 
accomplished  without  them.  The 
doctrine  concerning  them  is  a 
thing  buiided  upon  the  founda¬ 
tion  ;  therefore  the  doctrine 
which  addeth  unto  them  the 
power  of  satisfying ,  or  of  merit¬ 
ing ,  addeth  unto  a  thing  subordi¬ 
nated,  buiided  upon  the  founda¬ 
tion,  not  to  the  very  foundation 
itself.  Yet  is  the  foundation  by 
this  addition  consequently  over¬ 
thrown,  forasmuch  as  out  of  this 
addition  it  may  be  negatively 
concluded,  [that]  he  which  mak- 
eth  any  work  good  and  accept¬ 
able  in  the  sight  of  God  to  pro¬ 


ceed  from  the  natural  freedom  of 
our  will,  he  which  giveth  unto 
any  good  works  of  ours  the  force 
of  satisfying  the  wrath  of  God  for 
sin,  [or]  the  power  of  meriting 
either  earthly  or  heavenly  re¬ 
wards,  he  which  holdeth  works 
going  before  our  vocation  in  con- 
gruity  to  merit  our  vocation,  [or] 
works  following  our  first  to  merit 
our  second  justification  and  by 
condignity  our  last  reward  in  the 
kingdom  of  heaven,  pulleth  up 
the  doctrine  of  faith  by  the  roots. 
For  out  of  every  one  of  these  po¬ 
sitions,  the  plain  direct  denial 
thereof  may  be  certainly  con¬ 
cluded.”  Hooker:  On  Justifica¬ 
tion  (Works,  IT.  538).  Compare 
Luther  :  On  Galatians,  129-30 
(Carter’s  Ed.). 


332 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


starts  from  the  most  profound  consciousness  of  sin 
as  guilt .  Man  is  justified,  subjectively,  through  the 
confident  assurance  that  his  sins  are  forgiven,  and 
this  assurance  is  through  the  act  of  faith,  which  is 
a  purely  receptive  act ;  and  he  is  justified,  objec¬ 
tively,  through  a  purely  declarative  act  of  God, 
which  has  reference  to  him  as  an  individual.  In 
both  its  subjective  and  its  objective  aspect,  justifi¬ 
cation  is  consequently  the  imputation,  merely,  and 
not  the  infusion,  of  the  righteousness  of  Christ,  and 
is  instantaneous  and  complete.  The  great  difference 
between  this  view  and  the  Papal  theory  of  justifi¬ 
cation  lies  in  the  fact,  that  the  Papal  theory  is  not 
occupied  with  the  negative  side  of  the  subject,  viz. : 
the  pacification  of  the  conscience  in  respect  to  a 
guilt  that  lies  in  the  past,  but  rather  with  the  posi¬ 
tive  side,  viz. :  the  imparting  of  a  new  principle  and 
habit  of  sanctification.  The  principle  of  justification, 
in  the  Tridentine  soteriology,  is  not  faith,  in  the 
carefully  discriminated  and  deep  sense  of  the  Prot¬ 
estant  doctrine  of  justifying  faith, — in  reality  it  is 
not  faith  in  any  sense,  but  is  love , — and  justification 
is  not  a  mere  instantaneous  and  complete  declara¬ 
tion  of  being  righteous,  but  a  making  righteous  by 
the  infused  grace  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  which  is  suc¬ 
cessive  and  gradual  in  its  nature.” 1 


i 


1  Baur  :  Dogmengeschichte,  ant  soteriology,  see  Rivetus  : 
§  105.  Ed.  1847.  For  a  clear  Synopsis  Pnrioris  Theologiae,  pp. 
statement  of  the  difference  be-  417-419. 
tween  the  Papal  and  the  Protest- 


CHAPTER  IV. 


SOTERIOLOGY  OF  THE  REFORMERS. 


§  1.  Forerunners  of  the  Reformation} 

In  the  age  immediately  preceding  the  century  of 
the  Reformation,  we  have  had  occasion  to  notice  a 
few  men  who  were  forerunners  of  that  great  move¬ 
ment.  They  were  minds  that  had  become  weary 
of  the  fruitless  dialectics  into  which  Scholasticism 
had  degenerated,  and  that  craved  a  warmer  and 
more  vital  Christianity  than  was  prevailing  in  the 
great  mass  of  the  Church.  We  should  naturally 
expect  to  meet  with  evangelical  views  of  the  Atone¬ 
ment  in  the  writings  of  these  men,  and  the  expecta¬ 
tion  is  not  disappointed. 

Wickliffe  (f  1404  ?)  the  English  Reformer  pre¬ 
sents  the  doctrine  of  vicarious  satisfaction  with  dis¬ 
tinctness,  though  in  connection  with  some  specula¬ 
tions  respecting  the  nature  of  sin  that  are  somewhat 
peculiar.  But  the  most  remarkable  of  these  early 


1  Compare  Ullmann  :  Reformers  before  the  Reformation. 


334 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


reformers,  so  far  as  the  doctrine  of  atonement  is 
concerned,  is  John  Wessel  (f  1489),  a  man  whom 
Hagenbach  describes  in  the  following  terms  : 
“  Trained  up  in  Scholasticism,  he  announced  the 
coming  end  of  Scholasticism,  insisted  upon  Scrip¬ 
ture  as  the  sole  foundation  of  belief,  upon  faith 
without  works  as  the  ground  of  justification,  and 
upon  an  inward  and  vital  piety  in  the  heart.” 1  So 
much  has  this  remarkable  man  in  common  with  the 
great  German  reformer,  that  Ullmann  has  entitled 
his  interesting  biography  of  him  :  u  John  Wessel,  a 
forerunner  of  Luther.”  Wessel  is  Lutheran  indeed, 
in  his  conceptions  and  statements  of  the  doctrine 
of  atonement.  “  It  is,”  he  says,  “  the  greatest  of 
wonders  that  the  very  same  divine  justice  wdiich  is 
armed  with  an  eternal  law  of  threatening  and  con¬ 
demnation  towards  the  transgressor,  should  in  the 
day  and  hour  of  judgment  not  only  hold  back  the 
sword  of  vengeance,  and  absolve  from  the  punish¬ 
ment  threatened,  but  should  raise  the  criminal  to 
heights  of  glory  and  happiness.  Who  does  not 
wonder  to  see  the  truthfulness  of  threatenings  con¬ 
verted  into  the  truthfulness  of  promises,  so  that 
strict  truth  is  kept  on  both  sides,  and  in  both  as¬ 
pects  ?  These  two  contradictions  are  reconciled  in 
the  Lamb  of  God,  the  infinite  atonement  of  Christ. 
Christ,  himself  God,  himself  the  priest,  himself  the 
sacrifice,  has  made  satisfaction  to  himself,  for  him- 


1  Hagenbaoh:  Dogmengeschichte,  336  (Note). 


PROTESTANT  AND  ANSELMIC  SOTERIOLOGIES.  335 


self,  and  of  himself. 1  In  Christ  we  behold  not 
only  a  reconciled  but  a  reconciling  deity  ;  an  incar¬ 
nate  God  who,  in  the  sinner’s  place,  and  for  the  sin¬ 
ner’s  salvation,  furnishes  what  his  own  attributes  of 
holiness  and  justice  require.” 


The  Protestant  and  Anselmie  Soteriologies 

Compared. 


The  Reformation  of  the  Church  in  the  16th 
century  begins  and  ends  in  the  doctrine  whose 
history  we  are  investigating.  So  much  has  been 
written,  and  so  much  is  known,  concerning  the 
general  aspects  of  the  doctrine  of  atonement  during 
this  era  in  Church  History,  that  we  shall  confine 
our  examination  to  what  was  special  and  peculiar 
in  the  soteriology  of  the  Reformers. 

We  have  seen  that  the  dogmatic  substance  of 
the  Protestant  theory  may  be  traced  from  the  be¬ 
ginning.  The  constituent  elements  are,  it  is  true, 
much  more  apparent  in  some  theories  and  ages, 
than  in  others ;  but  the  doctrine  itself  of  vicarious 
satisfaction  cannot  be  said  to  be  the  discovery  of 
any  one  age.  Having  a  Biblical  origin,  and  finding 
all  its  data  and  grounds  in  the  revealed  word,  we 
trace  its  onward  flow  from  this  fountain  through 
the  centuries,  sometimes  visible  in  a  broad  and 


1  “  Ipse  Dens,  ipse  sacerdos,  ipse  cit.”  Wessel  :  De  Causis  Incar 
hostia,  pro  se,  de  se,  sibi  satisfe-  nationis,  c.  17. 


336 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY . 


gleaming  current,  and  sometimes  running  like  a 
subterranean  river  silent  and  unseen  in  the  hearts 
and  minds  of  a  smaller  number  chosen  by  Provi¬ 
dence  to  keep  alive  the  apostolic  faith,  and  to  pre¬ 
serve  unbroken  the  line  of  the  invisible  and  true 
Church,  even  though  the  external  continuity  were 
interrupted  and  broken.  Men  like  Anselm  and 
Wessel  prepare  us  for  men  like  Luther  and  Cal¬ 
vin  ;  and  in  taking  up  the  thread  of  our  narrative 
we  proceed  to  a  comparison  of  the  Anselmic  with 
the  Protestant  construction  of  the  doctrine  of  atone¬ 
ment. 

1.  There  is  a  difference  between  them,  but  this 
difference  is  formal  and  not  material.  The  An¬ 
selmic  view  is  predominantly  objective  in  its  charac¬ 
ter.  Sin  is  contemplated  in  its  relations  to  the 
being  and  attributes  of  God,  and  consequently  the 
atonement  is  viewed  in  the  same  reference  chiefly. 
This  is  the  excellence  of  the  theory,  and  in  this  con¬ 
sists  its  validity  before  the  bar  of  reason  and  sci¬ 
ence.  The  eternal  and  necessary  grounds  of  Christ’s 
work,  as  they  exist  in  the  nature  of  Deity  and  in 
the  constitution  of  the  moral  universe,  are  clearly 
exhibited,  and  thus  the  whole  domain  of  soteriol- 
ogy  is  made  to  rest  upon  the  metaphysical  and  uni¬ 
versal  principles  of  reason  and  justice.  The  soteri- 
ology  of  the  Reformation,  while  adopting  with  equal 
heartiness  this  objective  view  of  the  Anselmic  the¬ 
ory,  unites  with  it  in  a  greater  degree  than  did  this 
latter,  the  subjective  element  of  faith .  The  atten- 


PROTESTANT  AND  ANSELMIC  SOTEEIOLOGIES.  337 

tion  of  the  theologian  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
Scholastic  period,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  sketch 
of  Aquinas,  had  been  directed  to  the  mode  in 
which  the  sinner  comes  into  possession  of  that 
atoning  work  by  which  sin  is  expiated ;  but  this 
point  did  not  engage  the  thoughts  of  Anselm  to 
any  very  great  extent.  Aquinas  solved  the  diffi¬ 
culty  by  the  doctrine  of  the  unio  mystica  /  but 
this,  with  him,  possessed  too  much  of  a  sacramental 
and  magical  quality,  and  was  disjoined  from  the 
principle  of  intelligent  belief.  One  of  the  first 
characteristics  of  the  Protestant  view  of  the  atone¬ 
ment  that  strikes  the  attention  is  the  part  which  the 
principle  of  faith  plays  in  all  the  discussions.  The 
attention  is  now  turned  to  that  act  in  man  by  which 
the  act  and  work  of  God  is  appropriated.  This  was 
a  natural  consequence  of  the  change  that  was  taking 
place  in  the  general  religious  views  of  Christendom. 
The  mind  was  not  satisfied  with  an  objective  and 
outward  salvation,  however  valid  and  reliable  it 
might  be.  It  desired  a  consciousness  of  being 
saved.  It  craved  an  experience  of  salvation.  The 
Protestant  mind  could  not  rest  in  the  Church ; 
neither  could  it  pretend  to  rest  in  an  atonement 
that  was  unappropriated.  ,  The  objective  work  of 
Christ  on  Calvary  must  become  the  subjective  ex¬ 
perience  and  rejoicing  of  the  soul  itself.  If  we  may, 
in  this  connection,  employ  the  simple  and  affecting 
phraseology  of  the  dying  “Young  Cottager,’1  we 
may  say  that  Protestantism  reposes  upon  a  Christ 


vol.  ii. — 22 


338 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


there  and  Christ  here ,”  Christ  on  the  mediatorial 
throne,  and  Christ  in  the  believing  heart, — that  it 
unites  in  a  living  synthesis  the  objective  atonement 
with  the  subjective  faith  in  it. 

While,  however,  the  principle  and  act  of  faith 
occupies  such  a  prominent  place  in  the  soteriology 
of  the  Reformation,  we  should  not  fail  to  notice 
that  it  is  never  represented  as  a  procuring  cause  of 
justification.  It  is  only  the  instrumental  cause. 
Protestantism  was  exceedingly  careful  to  distin¬ 
guish  justification  from  legal  righteousness  on  the 
one  hand,  and  from  sanctification  by  grace  on  the 
other.  It  could  not,  consequently,  concede  to  any 
species  of  human  agency,  however  excellent,  a  piac- 
ular  and  atoning  efficacy.  Hence,  we  find  none  of 
that  supplementing  or  perfecting  of  the  work  of 
Christ,  by  the  work  of  the  creature,  which  we  no¬ 
ticed  in  the  Papal  soteriology.  And  this  applies 
to  the  highest  of  acts,  the  act  of  faith  itself.  Faith 
itself,  though  the  gift  and  the  work  of  God,  does 
not  justify,  speaking  accurately,  but  merely  accepts 
that  which  does  justify.  A  few  extracts  from  the 
principal  symbols  of  the  Reformation  will  set  this  in 
a  clear  light.  The  Formula  Concordiae ,  a  Lutheran 
creed  drawn  up  to  explain  more  fully  the  views  of 
the  Augsburg  Confession  and  guard  them  against 
misapprehension,  thus  defines  the  term  “justifica¬ 
tion.”  u  The  word  justification  signifies  to  pro¬ 
nounce  just,  to  absolve  from  the  eternal  punish¬ 
ment  of  sin,  on  account  of  the  satisfaction  of  Christ. 


PROTESTANT  AND  ANSELMIC  SOTERIOLOGIES.  339 


.  .  .  Sometimes  tlie  word  regeneration  is  used  for 
the  word  justification ;  in  this  case,  it  is  necessary 
to  explain  carefully,  lest  the  renovation  which  fol¬ 
lows  justification  should  be  confounded  with  justi¬ 
fication.  .  .  .  The  order  and  distinction  between 
faith  and  good  works,  between  justification  and 
renovation,  or  sanctification,  should  be  carefully 
observed.  For  good  works  do  not  precede  faith, 
and  sanctification  does  not  precede  justification. 
But  in  the  instance  of  conversion  by  the  Holy 
Spirit,  faith  is  first  enkindled  by  hearing  the  gos¬ 
pel  promise  of  pardon.  This  faith  then  appre¬ 
hends  and  appropriates  the  grace  of  God  in  Christ ; 
by  which  faith,  the  man  (persona)  is  justified.  But 
when  the  man  is  justified  (i.  e.  declared  free  from 
condemnation)  then  he  is  renovated  and  sanctified 
by  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  then  from  this  renovation 
and  sanctification  the  fruits,  that  is  the  good  works, 
follow  spontaneously.  Neither,  [though  thus  dis¬ 
tinguished  from  each  other,  and  set  in  a  series]  can 
these  parts  of  salvation  be  separated  from  each 
other  in  actual  experience,  as  if,  e.  g.,  true  faith  in 
Christ’s  atonement  could  stand  for  a  while  in  con¬ 
junction  with  an  unrenewed  will ;  but  in  the  order 
of  causes  and  effects,  of  antecedents  and  conse¬ 
quents,  they  are  so  distributed.  For,  as  Luther 
says,  4  faith  and  works  are  inseparably  connected ; 
but  it  is  faith  alone  and  without  works  that  appro¬ 
priates  the  atonement,  and  thereby  justifies,  and 
yet  faith  does  not  remain  alone,  [but  acts  itself  out, 


340 


HISTOEY  OF  SOTEKIOLOGY. 


and  thus  produces  works].’”1  The  Confe-ssio  Bel- 
gica ,  a  Calvinistic  creed,  thus  defines  the  doctrine 
of  justification.  u  We  believe  that  the  Holy  Spirit 
kindles  true  faith  in  our  hearts,  which  faith  em- 
braces  Jesus  Christ  with  all  his  merits,  makes  him 
its  own,  and  peculiar  (proprium)  to  itself,  and 
seeks  nothing  further  beyond  him.  Hence  we 
rightly  say  with  Paul,  that  we  are  justified  by 
faith  alone,  or  by  faith  without  works.  At  the 
same  time,  if  we  speak  with  strict  accuracy,  we  by 
no  means  understand  that  our  act  of  faith  is  that 
which  justifies  us  [i.  e.  obtains  for  us  the  remission 
of  sin],  but  that  the  act  of  faith  is  the  instrument 
by  which  we  seize  hold  of  the  atonement  of  Christ, 
which  alone  satisfies  the  law  and  thereby  obtains 
the  remission  of  sin.” 2 

In  this  way,  the  Protestant  soteriology  was  an 
advance  upon  the  Anselmic,  by  being  more  com¬ 
prehensive  and  complete.  Agreeing  with  it  per¬ 
fectly  so  far  as  the  objective  work  of  Christ  is  con¬ 
cerned,  it  made  further  and  fuller  statements  re¬ 
specting  the  mode  in  which  the  external  becomes 
internal,  in  the  experience  of  the  individual.  It 
also  differed  from  the  Anselmic,  in  respect  to  a  sec¬ 
ondary  topic,  in  rejecting  the  notion  of  Anselm  that 
the  number  of  the  saved  exactly  equals  the  number 

1  Hase  :  Libri  Symboliei,  pp.  rately  speaking,  it  is  only  the 
685-693.  atonement  that  justifies,  i.  e. 

3  Confe&sio  Beloica  :  Art.  22.  frees  from  condemnation  ;  as  it 
— Faith  justifies  in  the  sense  in  is  the  food  that  nourishes,  and 
which  eating  nourishes.  Accu-  not  the  mere  act  of  masticating. 


PROTESTANT  AND  ANSELMIC  SOTERIOLOGIES.  341 


of  the  fallen  angels,  and  that  redemption  was  intend¬ 
ed  to  keep  the  number  of  pure  and  holy  spirits  good. 

2.  A  second  difference  between  the  Anselmic 
and  the  Protestant  soteriology  is  seen  in  the  formal 
distinction  of  Christ’s  work  into  his  active  and  his 
passive  righteousness.  By  his  passive  righteous¬ 
ness  is  meant  his  expiatory  sufferings,  by  which  he 
satisfied  the  claims  of  justice,  and  by  his  active 
righteousness  is  meant  his  obedience  to  the  law  as 
a  rule  of  life  and  conduct.  It  was  contended  by 
those  who  made  this  distinction,  that  the  purpose 
of  Christ  as  the  vicarious  substitute  was  to  meet  the 
entire  demands  of  the  law  for  the  sinner.  But  the 
law  requires  present  and  perfect  obedience,  as  well 
as  satisfaction  for  past  disobedience.  The  law  is 
not  completely  fulfilled  by  the  endurance  of  pen¬ 
alty  only.  It  must  also  be  obeyed.  Christ  both 
endured  the  penalty  due  to  man  for  disobedience, 
and  perfectly  obeyed  the  law  for  him ;  so  that  he 
was  a  vicarious  substitute  in  reference  to  both  the 
precept  and  the  penalty  of  the  law.  By  his  active 
obedience  he  obeyed  the  law ;  and  by  his  passive 
obedience  he  endured  the  penalty.  In  this  way  his 
vicarious  work  is  complete.  Some  writers  contend 
that  the  distinction  between  the  active  and  passive 
righteousness  can  be  traced  in  the  Patristic  soteri¬ 
ology,  and  would  find  it  wherever  they  find  a  sub¬ 
stantially  correct  view  of  the  atonement.1  But 

1  This  is  done  by  an  able  writer  in  the  Eyangelische  Kikohen- 
zeitung  for  1834,  p.  523  (Note). 


342 


HISTOEY  OF  SOTEEIOLOGY. 


this  is  undoubtedly  an  extreme  statement  that 
cannot  be  made  good.  The  utmost  that  can  be 
claimed  is,  that  there  are  passages  in  the  Fathers, 
in  which  the  beginnings  of  such  a  distinction  may 
perhaps  be  detected  by  logical  implication,  but  the 
distinction  itself  is  nowhere  formally  made  in  the 
Patristic  soteriology.  The  only  writer  in  whom 
it  appears  with  any  distinctness  previous  to  the 
Reformation  is  Aquinas,  whose  distinction  between 
satisf  actio  and  meritum  has  been  noticed.  Up  to 
the  time  of  the  Reformation,  the  Christian  mind 
was  engaged  with  a  prominence  that  amounted  to 
exclusiveness  with  the  question  :  “  How  is  the  soul 
to  be  delivered  from  condemnation  ?  ”  The  further 
question :  u  How  is  the  soul  to  acquire  a  title  to 
eternal  life  %  ”  was  not  answered,  and  probably  did 
not  come  much  into  the  mind.  The  earliest  sym¬ 
bol  of  the  Reformation  does  not  make  the  distinc¬ 
tion  in  question.  The  Augsburg  Confession ,  and 
the  Apology  drawn  up  in  defence  of  it  (a.  d.  1530), 
treat  only  of  the  expiation  of  guilt,  and  Christ’s 
passive  or  atoning  righteousness.  The  larger  and 
smaller  Catechisms  of  Luther  do  the  same.  The 
Formula  Concordiae ,  drawn  up  in  1516,  is  the  only 
Lutheran  symbol  in  which  the  distinction  in  ques¬ 
tion  appears.  Its  statement  is  as  follows :  “  That 
righteousness  which  is  imputed  to  faith,  or  to  the 
believer,  of  mere  grace,  is  the  obedience ,  suffering, 
and  resurrection  of  Christ,  by  which  he  satis¬ 
fied  the  law  for  us,  and  expiated  our  sins.  For 


PROTESTANT  AND  ANSELMIO  SOTERIOLOGIES.  343 


since  Christ  was  not  only  man,  but  truly  God  and 
man  in  one  undivided  person,  he  was  no  more  sub¬ 
ject  to  the  law  than  he  was  to  suffering  and  death 
[i.  e.  if  his  Person,  merely,  be  taken  into  account, 
without  any  reference  to  his  vicarious  relations], 
because  he  was  the  divine  and  eternal  Lord  of  the 
law.  Hence,  not  only  that  obedience  to  God  his 
Father  which  he  exhibited  in  his  passion  and  death, 
but  also  that  obedience  which  he  exhibited  in  volun¬ 
tarily  subjecting  himself  to  the  law  and  fulfilling  it 
for  our  sokes  is  imputed  to  us  for  righteousness,  so 
that  God,  on  account  of  the  total  obedience  which 
Christ  accomplished  (praestitit)  for  our  sake  be¬ 
fore  his  heavenly  Father,  both  in  acting  and  in 
suffering,  in  life  and  in  death,  may  remit  our  sins 
to  us,  regard  us  as  holy  and  righteous ,  and  give  us 
eternal  felicity .”  1  Here,  Christ’s  fulfilment  of  the 
law  is  represented  as  the  ground  and  procuring 
cause  of  eternal  blessedness  for  the  believer. 

In  the  Reformed  or  Calvinistic  symbols,  we  find 
the  fact  to  be  similar.  The  earlier  confessions  do 
not  make  the  distinction,  while  the  later  do.  The 
Second  Helvetic  Confession ,  drawn  up  by  Bullinger 
in  1564,  the  most  authoritative  of  the  Reformed  sym¬ 
bols,  contains  only  a  hint  of  the  doctrine  of  the  ac¬ 
tive  righteousness,  if  indeed  it  contain  one  at  all. 
The  phraseology  is  as  follows  :  “  By  his  passion  or 
death,  and  thus  by  everything  which  he  did  and  per- 


1  IIase:  Libri  Symbolici,  p.  68. 


344 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


formed  for  our  sakes  by  his  advent  in  the  flesh,  our 
Lord  reconciled  the  celestial  Father  to  all  believers, 
expiated  sin,  conquered  death,  broke  the  power  of 
condemnation  and  of  hell,  and  by  his  resurrection 
from  the  dead  brought  back  and  restored  life  and 
immortality.  For  he  is  our  righteousness,  life,  and 
resurrection,  in  fine  the  fullness  and  absolution  of 
all  believers,  as  well  as  their  most  abundant  safety 
and  sufficiency.”1  The  Heidelberg  Catechism ,  com¬ 
posed  in  1562,  by  Olevianus  and  Ursinus,  seems  to 
regard  the  holiness  and  obedience  of  Christ  as  a 
part  of  the  atonement  for  sin  which  he  made.  The 
answer  to  the  36th  question  runs  as  follows  :  u  Be¬ 
cause  he  is  our  Mediator,  and  by  his  innocence  and 
perfect  holiness  covers  my  sin,  in  which  I  was  con¬ 
ceived,  that  it  may  not  come  into  the  view  of  God.” 
The  Formula  Consensus ,  drawn  up  by  Heidegger 
and  Turretine  in  1675,  and  adopted  by  the  Swiss 
Churches,  expressly  distinguishes  between  the  ac¬ 
tive  and  passive  righteousness  of  Christ ;  and  it, 
moreover,  reckons  the  former  in  with  the  latter  as 
constituting  part  of  the  entire  work  of  satisfaction , 
in  opposition  to  the  views  of  Piscatorius,  who  con¬ 
tended  that  the  holiness  of  Christ  does  not  justify 
in  the  forensic  and  objective  sense,  but  only  as  it 
becomes  the  inward  principle  of  the  soul, — adopting 
substantially  the  Tridentine  theory  of  justification 
by  sanctification.  The  statement  of  the  Consensus 


1  Xiemeyee  :  Oollectio,  p.  486. 


I 


RECAPITULATORY  SURVEY.  345 

is  as  follows.  “  Christ  rendered  satisfaction  to  God 
the  Father,  by  the  obedience  of  his  death,  in  the 
place  of  the  elect,  in  such  sense  that  the  entire  obe¬ 
dience  which  he  rendered  to  the  law  through  the 
whole  course  of  his  life,  whether  actively  or  pas¬ 
sively,  ought  to  be  reckoned  into  the  account  of  his 
vicarious  righteousness  and  obedience 1 


§  3.  Recapitulatory  Survey . 

We  have  thus  traced  the  history  of  this  cardinal 
truth  of  Christianity  down  to  the  Reformation, — a 
point  at  which  it  received  its  fullest  expansion,  and 
became  entirely  free  from  those  foreign  elements 
which  we  have  seen  mixing  with  it  in  its  preceding 
history.  The  doctrine  was  now  that  of  pure  and 
complete  satisfaction  of  law.  The  claims  of  Satan, 
which  so  interfered  with  the  full  exhibition  of  the 
truth  in  the  Ancient  Church,  exerted  no  influence 
upon  the  Protestant  construction  of  the  doctrine. 
The  Atonement  was  referred  solely  to  the  divine 
attribute  of  justice,  and  was  held  to  be  absolutely 
necessary, — though  the  Scholastic  controversy  re¬ 
specting  relative  and  absolute  necessity  was  not  re¬ 
vived.  Again,  that  vitiating  element  in  the  Tri¬ 
dentine  soteriology, — the  combination  of  human 
works,  either  internal  or  external,  in  greater  or  in 


1  Niemeyee  :  Collectio,  p.  734. 


346 


HISTOEY  OF  SOTEEIOLOGY. 


less  degree,  with  that  of  Christ,  in  making  up  the 
sum  of  satisfaction, — was  now  entirely  purged  out. 
The  human  soul  was  delivered  from  condemnation, 
solely  by  the  obedience  and  sufferings  of  the  Son 
of  God.  Faith  itself  does  not  justify,  but  only  ac¬ 
cepts  and  appropriates  that  satisfaction  of  law  made 
by  Christ  which  completely  justifies,  alone  and  of 
itself. 


CHAPTER  V, 


THE  GROTIAN  SOTERIOLOGY. 


§  1.  Preliminary  Statements. 

We  have  seen  that  the  assertion  of  a  relative 
necessity,  only,  for  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  was 
made  in -its  most  unqualified  form,  and  drawn  out 
to  its  last  consequence,  by  Duns  Scotus  in  his  con¬ 
troversy  with  the  followers  of  Aquinas.  He  laid 
down  the  proposition  that  “  every  created  oblation 
or  offering  is  worth  what  God  is  pleased  to  accept 
it  for,  and  no  more.”  Upon  this  proposition,  he 
founded  the  theory  of  “  acceptation.”  The  term 
acceptilatio ,  or  accepti  latio ,  is  borrowed  from  the 
Roman  law.  In  the  Pandects  of  Justinian,  it  is  de¬ 
fined  to  be  u  an  acquittance  from  obligation,  by 
word  of  mouth ,  of  a  debtor  by  a  creditor ;  ”  and  in 
the  Institutes  of  Justinian,  it  is  called  “  an  imagin¬ 
ary  payment.” 1  Primarily,  the  term  does  not  be- 

luEst  autem  acceptilatio  ima-  obligation  is  also  freed  (tollitur) 
ginaria  solutio.1’  Justiniantts  :  by  acceptation.  This  is  an  im- 
Institut.  Lib.  III.  Tit.  29. — “  An  aginary  payment,  for  if  Titius 


348 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


long  to  the  province  of  criminal,  but  of  commercial 
law.  A  creditor  is  an  absolute  owner  of  bis  own 
property,  and  if  be  pleases  to  discharge  bis  debtor 
from  bis  obligation  to  pay  tbe  debt  wbicb  be  owes 
bim,  be  can  do  so  by  a  word  without  any  literal 
payment  being  made.  He  can  call  tbe  debt  paid, 
and  it  is  paid.  Or  be  can  cancel  tbe  entire  debt 
upon  tbe  payment  of  a  part  only.  This  arbitrary 
and  optional  acceptance  of  nothing  for  something, 
or  of  a  part  for  tbe  whole  of  a  debt,  is  “  acceptila- 
tion.”  Tbe  term  acceptilatio ,  when  transferred  as 
it  was  by  Scotus  to  the  doctrine  of  Christ’s  satisfac¬ 
tion,  signifies  that  God  accepts  this  satisfaction,  not 
because  a  strictly  infinite  value  belongs  to  tbe  suf¬ 
ferings  of  tbe  God-Man  (for  Scotus  denied  this), 
but  because,  in  bis  infinite  benevolence,  be  is  will¬ 
ing  to  content  himself  with  a  satisfaction  that  is 
not  strictly  infinite.  Hence,  in  Scotus’s  theory,  tbe 
atonement  of  Christ  is  sufficient  to  satisfy  tbe 
claims  of  law  because  God  is  willing  to  regard  it 


wishes  to  remit  payment  of  that 
which  is  due  to  him  by  a  verbal 
contract,  he  can  do  so  by  per¬ 
mitting  the  debtor  to  put  to  him 
the  following  question :  4  Do  you 
acknowledge  to  have  received 
that  which  I  promised  you  ?  ’ 
Titius  then  answering  4 1  do.’  The 
acknowledgment  may  also  be 
made  in  corresponding  Greek 
words,  eyet?  \a^(ov  brjvapia  rocra  ; 
eya)  Xa/Sai v.  In  this  way  verbal 
contracts  are  dissolved,  but  not 


contracts  made  in  other  ways :  it 
seemed  natural  that  an  obligation 
formed  by  words  should  be  dis¬ 
solved  by  words;  but  anything 
due  by  any  other  kind  of  contract 
maybe  made  the  subject  of  a  stip¬ 
ulation,  and  be  freed  by  accep¬ 
tation  (per  acceptilationem  dis- 
solvi).  And  as  part  only  of  a 
debt  may  be  actually  paid,  so  ac¬ 
ceptation  may  be  made  of  a  part 
only.”  Sanders  :  Institutes  of 
Justinian,  p.  493. 


PRELIMINARY  STATEMENTS. 


349 


as  such,  although  in  strict  fact  it  is  insufficient. 
This  is  justified  upon  the  principle  which  Scotus  ( 
lays  down,  that  any  oblation  is  worth  what  the  j 
Deity  is  willing  to  rate  it  at.  Its  value  is  not  in¬ 
trinsic  and  real,  but  acquired  and  nominal. 

The  controversy  between  the  Thomists  and 
Scotists,  upon  this  and  kindred  points,  was  con¬ 
tinued  down  to  the  Reformation,  and  has  never 
been  settled  to  this  day  within  the  Romish  Church. 
At  the  time  of  the  Reformation,  we  have  seen  that 
both  Lutheran  and  Calvinistic  theologians  adopted 
the  Anselmic  theory  of  a  strict  satisfaction.  This 
soteriology  enters  into  all  the  Lutheran  and  Calvin¬ 
istic  symbols  of  the  continent,  and  into  the  Episco¬ 
palian,  Presbyterian,  and  Congregational  symbols 
of  England  and  America.  So  far,  therefore,  as  the 
principal  Protestant  creeds  are  concerned,  the  the¬ 
ory  of  an  absolute  necessity  of  atonement,  and  a 
strict  satisfaction  of  justice  by  the  suffering  of 
Christ,  is  the  prevalent  one.  But  the  theory  of  a 
relative  necessity  was  revived  in  the  17th  century, 
and  stated  in  an  elaborate  manner,  by  the  distin¬ 
guished  scholar  and  jurist  Hugo  Grotius  (f  1645). 

It  was  also  adopted  and  maintained  by  the  leaders 
of  the  Arminian  party,  Episcopius ,  Limborch ,  Cur- 
cellaeus i,1  and  constituted  one  of  the  distinctive 

1  “  The  elder  Lutheran  and  Cal-  from  the  infinite  dignity  of  his 
vinistic  theologians  defended  the  Person.  The  Arminian  theolo- 
intrinsic  and  strict  equivalence  of  gians,  Episcopius,  Limborch,  Cur- 
Christ’s  satisfaction,  as  flowing  cellaeus,  and  others,  on  the  con- 


350 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


points  of  difference  between  their  soteriology,  and 
that  of  the  Reformers.  As  the  Grotian  theory  is 
the  best  form  in  which  the  doctrine  of  a  relative 
necessity  of  the  atonement  has  been  stated,  and  as 
it  has  exerted  considerable  influence  upon  the  his¬ 
tory  of  this  doctrine  during  the  last  two  centuries, 
it  merits  a  particular  examination. 


2. 


Grotian  idea  of  law  and  penalty. 


The  soteriology  of  Grotius  is  founded  upon  his 
idea  of  law  and  punishment,  and  the  relation  which 
these  sustain  to  God.  Law,  according  to  Grotius, 
is  a  positive  statute  or  enactment.  “  It  is  not,”  he 
says,  “  something  inward  in  God,  or  in  the  Divine 
will  and  nature,  but  is  only  the  effect  of  his  will  ” 
(voluntatis  quidam  effectus).1  Law,  therefore,  is  a 
mer z  product  on  the  part  of  God,  by  which  he  him- 


trary,  asserted  only  an  acceptila- 
tio,  or  accepted  value,  in  reference 
to  Christ’s  satisfaction,  and  upon 
the  express  ground  of  a  relative 
and  not  absolute  necessity  of  a 
satisfaction  of  divine  justice  by  a 
God-man.”  Ersch-Gruber  :  En¬ 
cyclopedic,  Art.  Acceptilatio.  At 
the  112th  session  of  the  Synod 
of  Dort,  “  Professor  Usselburgh, 
at  the  desire  of  the  President 
(Bogermann),  discoursed  of  the 
satisfaction  of  Christ  for  sin,  in 
opposition  to  the  Socinians  and 


Vorstius.  He  maintained,  in  the 
first  place,  that  God  could  not 
forgive  sin  without  satisfaction. 
Secondly,  that  Christ  had  given 
such  satisfaction  properly  and 
truly,  and  not  according  to  any 
previous  acceptilationV  Brandt: 
History  of  the  Reformation  in 
Netherlands.  Book  xxxix.  (Yol. 
III.  p.  256). 

1  Grotius  :  Defensio  Fidei,  Cap. 
iii.  pp.  60,  310.  Ed.  Amstelae- 
dami,  1679. 


GROTIAX  IDEA  OF  LAW. 


351 


self  is  not  bound,  because  it  is  bis  own  work.  As 
tbe  enactor  of  a  positive  statute,  be  bas  tbe  same 
power  to  alter  it,  or  to  abrogate  it,  wbicb  tbe  law¬ 
making  power  among  men  possesses.  Tbe  penalty 
of  law,  consequently,  is  likewise  a  positive,  and  not 
a  natural  and  necessary  arrangement.  It  does  not 
spring  inevitably  and  naturally  out  of  tbe  very 
nature  of  law,  and  tbe  very  being  of  God,  but  is  at¬ 
tached  to  the  statute  by  a  positive  decision  of  tbe 
Deity, — wbicb  decision  is  optional  and  mutable. 
Hence,  both  law  itself,  and  tbe  penalty  of  law,  in 
Grotius’s  view,  may  be  modified  in  part,  or  even 
abolished  altogether  by  an  act  of  tbe  Governor  of 
the  universe,  because  tbe  workman  bas  plenary 
power  over  bis  work.  The  following  extracts  from 
tbe  writings  of  Grotius  exhibit  bis  opinions  with 
sufficient  clearness,  “All  positive  laws,’1  (and  Gro¬ 
tius  bas  mentioned  tbe  law  of  Eden  as  such,)  says 
Grotius,  u  are  relaxable.  Those  who  fear  that  if  we 
concede  this  we  do  an  injury  to  God,  because  we 
thereby  represent  him  as  mutable,  are  much  de¬ 
ceived.  For  law  is  not  something  internal  in  God, 
or  in  tbe  will  itself  of  God,  but  it  is  a  particular 
effect  or  product  of  bis  will.  But  that  tbe  effects 
or  products  of  tbe  Divine  will  are  mutable  is  very 
certain.  Moreover,  in  promulgating  a  positive  law 
which  be  might  wish  to  relax  at  some  future  time, 
God  does  not  exhibit  any  fickleness  of  will.  For 
God  seriously  indicated  that  be  desired  that  his  law 
should  be  valid  and  obligatory,  while  yet  at  the  same 


352 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


time  he  reserved  the  right  of  relaxing  it,  if  he  saw 
fit,  because  this  right  pertains  to  a  positive  law  from 
the  very  nature  of  the  case,  and  cannot  be  abdicated 
by  the  Deity.  Nay  more,  the  Deity  does  not  abdi¬ 
cate  the  right  of  even  abrogating  law  altogether,  as 
is  apparent  from  the  instance  of  the  ceremonial 
law.  .  .  It  is  objected  to  this  view,  that  it  is  nat¬ 
urally  just  that  the  guilty  should  be  punished  with 
such  a  punishment  as  corresponds  to  their  crime, 
and  therefore  that  punishment  is  not  a  matter  of 
optional  choice,  neither  is  it  relaxable.  In  answer 
to  this  objection,  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  it  does  not 
always  follow  that  injustice  is  done  when  justice  is 
not  done.  For  as  it  does  not  follow  that  if  a  king 
is  to  be  called  generous  who  has  given  a  thousand 
talents  to  some  one,  he  is  therefore  to  be  called  un¬ 
generous  if  he  has  not  given  it,  so  it  is  not  a  univer¬ 
sal  truth  that  if  a  thing  may  be  done  with  justice, 
it  cannot  therefore  be  omitted  without  injustice. 
As  in  physics,  so  in  morals,  a  thing  may  be  called 
c  natural  and  necessary  ’  in  a  strict  sense  (proprie), 
and  in  a  less  strict  sense  (minus  proprie).  In  phys¬ 
ics,  that  is  strictly  natural  and  necessary  which  be¬ 
longs  to  the  very  essence  of  a  thing, — as,  for  example, 
for  a  sentient  creature  to  have  sensation ;  and 
that  is  less  strictly  natural  which  is  as  it  were  fitted 
and  accommodated  to  a  thing, — as,  for  example, 
for  a  man  to  use  his  right  hand.  In  like  manner, 
there  are  in  morals  certain  things  which  are  strictly 
natural  and  necessary,  which  follow  necessarily  from 


GROTIAN  IDEA  OF  LAW. 


353 


the  relation  of  the  things  themselves  to  rational 
natures, — as,  for  example,  that  perjury  is  unlawful ; 
and  there  are  other  things  which  are  less  strictly 
natural  and  necessary, — as,  for  example,  that  the  son 
should  succeed  the  father  [in  the  government]. 
That,  therefore,  he  who  sins  deserves  to  be  punished, 
and  is  therefore  punishable,  follows  from  the  very 
relation  of  sin  and  the  sinner  to  a  superior  power, 
and  is  strictly  natural  and  necessary.  But  that  any 
and  every  sinner  be  punished  with  such  d  punish¬ 
ment  as  corresponds  with  his  guilt  is  not  absolutely 
(simpliciter)  and  universally  necessary;  neither  is 
it  strictly  natural,  but  only  fitted  and  accommodated 
to  nature  (sed  naturae  satis  conveniens).  Whence 
it  follows,  that  nothing  prevents  the  relaxing  of  the 
law  which  orders  this  punishment.  There  is  no 
mark  or  sign  of  irrevocability  in  the  law,  in  the  case 
of  which  we  are  speaking,  neither  is  the  law  accom¬ 
panied  with  a  promise ;  therefore,  neither  of  these 
two  things  stands  in  the  way  of  a  relaxation  of  the 
law.  Furthermore,  a  threat  to  punish  is  not  like  a 
promise  to  reward.  For  from  the  promise  to  re¬ 
ward,  there  accrues  a  certain  right  or  claim  on  the 
part  of  him  to  whom  the  promise  is  made ;  but  the 
threat  of  punishment  only  declares  the  transgressor’s 
desert  of  penalty,  and  the  right  to  punish  on  the 
part  of  him  who  threatens.  Neither  is  there  any 
reason  to  fear  lest  God’s  veracity  should  suffer  in 
case  he  does  not  fulfil  all  his  threatenings.  For  all 
threatenings,  excepting  those  to  which  the  token  of 


YOL.  IT  — 23 


354 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


irrevocability  attaches,  are  to  be  understood  as  in 
their  very  nature  diminishing  nothing  from  the 
right  of  the  author  to  relax  them,  if  he  shall  think 
proper.  .  .  At  the  same  time,  there  are  reasons  that 
dissuade  from  the  exercise  of  this  right.  These 
may  arise  from  the  nature  of  law  in  the  abstract,  or 
from  the  nature  of  a  particular  law.  It  is  common 
to  all  laws,  that  in  relaxing  them  something  seems 
to  be  worn  away  from  their  authority.  It  is  pecu¬ 
liar  to  this  law  [i.  e.  the  moral  law  given  in  Eden], 
that  although  it  is  not  characterized  by  an  inflexible 
rectitude  as  we  have  remarked,  it  is  yet  very  con¬ 
sonant  to  the  nature  and  order  of  things.  From 
which  it  follows,  not  indeed  that,  this  law  is  never 
to  be  relaxed,  but  that  it  is  not  to  be  relaxed  with 
facility,  or  for  a  slight  cause.  And  the  all-wise 
Legislator  had  a  most  weighty  cause  for  relaxing 
this  law,  in  the  fact  that  the  human  race  had  lapsed 
into  sin.  For  if  all  mankind  had  been  given  over 
to  eternal  death,  as  transgressors,  two  most  beauti¬ 
ful  things  would  have  utterly  perished  out  of  the 
universe, — reverence  and  religion  towards  God,  on 
the  part  of  man,  and  the  exhibition  of  a  wonderful 
benevolence  towards  man,  on  the  part  of  God.  But 
in  relaxing  the  law,  God  not  only  followed  the  most 
weighty  reasons  for  so  doing,  but  also  adopted  a 
peculiar  and  singular  mode  of  relaxing  it,  concern¬ 
ing  which  we  shall  speak  hereafter.” 1 


1  Gkotius  :  Defensio  Fidei,  Caput  iii.  p.  310.  Ed.  Amstelaedami,  1679. 


GROTLAJST  IDEA  OF  LAW. 


355 


This  idea  of  the  Divine  law  as  a  positive  enact¬ 
ment,  Grotius  borrowed  from  the  province  of  human 
jurisprudence.  As  the  earthly  law-making  power, 
be  it  despotic  or  republican,  promulgates  a  statute, 
and  constitutes  a  certain  act,  which  is  otherwise  in¬ 
nocent,  criminal  by  a  positive  enactment  forbidding 
it,  so  does  the  heavenly  law-giver.  The  law-maker 
in  both  instances,  consequently,  is  higher  than  the 
law,  because  the  law  is  the  effect  or  product  of  his 
volition.  By  this  idea  and  definition  of  law,  Grotius 
reduces  everything  back  to  the  arbitrary  and  op¬ 
tional  will  of  God,  and  thus  differs  from  Anselm 
and  the  Reformers.  According  to  them,  the  Divine 
will  cannot  be  separated  from  the  Divine  nature,  in 
this  manner.  God’s  law  is  not  positive  and  arbi¬ 
trary  but  natural  and  necessary,  because  it  flows  out 
of  his  essential  being.  The  Divine  will  is  the  ex¬ 
ecutive  of  the  Divine  essence.  Law,  therefore,  is  not 
the  effect  or  figment  of  mere  and  isolated  will,  but 
of  will  in  immutable  harmony  with  truth  and  right. 
Both  law  and  penalty,  consequently,  in  the  theory 
of  the  Reformers  are  the  inevitable  and  inexorable 
efflux  of  the  Divine  Essence,  and  contain  nothing  of 
an  optional  or  mutable  nature.  They  can  no  more 
be  “  relaxed,”  or  waived,  than  the  attributes  of  om¬ 
nipotence  or  omniscience  can  be.  They  are  not  be¬ 
low  the  Deity,  as  a  positive  statute  respecting  bank¬ 
ing,  or  commerce,  is  below  the  law-making  power, 
but  they  are  the  pure  and  necessary  issue  of  the  j 
principles  of  justice  in  the  Divine  Mind.  Neither 


356 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


is  law  above  the  Deity.  For  it  is  the  Divine  Nature 
itself,  proclaiming  and  manifesting  itself  throughout 
the  universe.  It,  therefore,  possesses  the  same 
necessary,  natural,  and  immutable  qualities  that  the 
Divine  Essence  itself  possesses,  and  is  incapable  of 
“  relaxation.” 


§  3.  Grotian  theory  of  relaxation  and  substitution . 

Having  laid  down  this  definition  of  law  and 
penalty,  and  stated  the  relation  which  God  sustains 
to  both,  Grotius  next  proceeds  to  the  deduction 
upon  which  he  builds  his  theory  of  satisfaction,  viz. : 
that  it  is  competent  for  God  to  relax  the  claims  of 
the  law,  and  save  the  transgressor.  The  notion  of 
relaxation  (relaxatio),  and  not  satisfaction ,  of  law 
shapes  the  whole  scheme  of  Grotius.  The  principal 
points,  and  the  course  of  thought  in  it  are  as  follows. 

Man,  on  account  of  sin,  deserves  to  be  punished 
with  eternal  death,  in  accordance*  with  the  divine 
statute  and  penalty  announced  in  Gen.  ii.  1Y.  But 
this  statute,  as  matter  of  fact,  is  not  executed,  for 
believers  are  free  from  eternal  death  and  condem¬ 
nation.  At  the  same  time  there  is  no  abrogation 
of  the  law,  because  we  see  it  executed  upon  unbe¬ 
lievers.1  The  fact  then  is,  that  between  the  execu¬ 
tion  of  the  law  at  the  one  extreme,  and  the  entire 
and  formal  abrogation  of  the  law  at  the  other,  there 


Grotius:  Defensio,  Cap.  iii.  pp.  10,310.  Ed.  Amstelaed.  1679. 


GROTIAN  THEORY  OF  RELAXATION. 


357 


comes  in  a  medium  course  of  procedure  on  the  part 
of  the  Lawgiver.  This  middle  course,  Grotius  de¬ 
nominates  a  u  tempering  ”  (temperamentum)  of  the 
law,  a  “  relaxing  ”  (relaxatio)  of  its  claims,  “  so  that 
although  the  law  still  continues  to  exist,  its  rigorous 
and  exact  obligatoriness  is  dispensed  with,  in  ref¬ 
erence  to  a  certain  class  of  persons,”  viz.  believers. 
Such  a  tempering  or  relaxation  can  occur,  because 
that  statute  in  Gen.  ii.  17  belongs  to  the  class  of 
positive  laws,  which  are  relaxable  (relaxibiles)  at 
the  pleasure  of  the  legislator.1  *  And  besides  this, 
it  is  neither  necessary  nor  required  by  justice,  that 
the  sinner  should  suffer  a  punishment  exactly  cor¬ 
respondent  to  his  transgression,  but  only  that  he  be 
punished.  Relaxation  of  law  then  is  possible.  This 
relaxation  consists  in  merely  dispensing  with  the 
penalty,: — the  law  as  a  precept  or  rule  of  duty  is 
untouched  and  unrelaxed. 

But  if  these  positions  are  correct,  and  there  is 
nothing  in  the  being  and  attributes  of  God  that  ne¬ 
cessitates  the  strict  and  exact  infliction  of  a  threat¬ 
ened  penalty, — if  God  by  an  act  of  will  can  relax, 
and  even  abrogate,  a  positive  enactment  of  his  own, 
then  why  does  he  not  do  it  merely  and  simply  ? 
Why  the  sufferings  of  Jesus  Christ?  Why  the  re- 

1  Grotius  :  Defensio,  Cap.  iii.  Reward  when  promised  must  be 
p.  311. — Grotius  excepts  as  un-  paid  ;  but  punishment  when 
relaxable  those  particular  statutes  threatened  may  be  waived  by 
which  are  accompanied  with  an  the  moral  governor, 
oath,  or  a  promise  of  reward. 


358 


HISTORY  OF  SOTEEIOLOGY. 


laxation  in  and  by  an  atonement  ?  In  answering 
this  question,  Grotius  gives  the  remainder  of  his 
scheme. — Although  the  Deity  can  remit  the  en¬ 
tire  penalty  without  any  satisfaction  or  penal 
infliction  so  far  as  his  own  inward  nature  is  con¬ 
cerned,  he  cannot  prudently  do  so,  so  far  as 
the  created  universe  is  concerned.  God  does  not 
exist  in  the  solitude  of  his  own  eternity;  if  he 
did,  he  might  dispense  with  an  atonement,  and 
relax  or  abrogate  law  by  a  mere  act  of  wrill.  He 
has  called  a  creation  into  existence,  and  towards 
that  creation  he  sustains  the  relation  of  Ruler  and 
Governor.  The  necessities  and  requirements  of  the 
created  universe  render  it  unsafe  to  exercise  his 
power  and  right  to  remit  the  penalty  of  law  without 
any  satisfaction  of  any  kind.  On  the  ground,  there¬ 
fore,  that  the  interests  of  the  creature  need  it.  and 
not  on  the  ground  that  the  attributes  of  the  Creator 
require  it,  must  there  be  an  atonement  in  order  to 
remission.  God  possesses  the  right  to  relax  and 
even  to  abrogate  the  penalty  of  law;  but  this  is 
prejudicial  to  the  creature.  Hence  the  relaxation 
of  law  must  be  accompanied  with  a  provision  that 
shall  prevent  the  evil  consequences  of  such  a  proce¬ 
dure.  So  many  and  so  great  sins  cannot  be  remit¬ 
ted  with  safety  to  the  interests  of  creation,  unless 
God  at  the  same  time  give  some  kind  of  expression 
to  his  detestation  of  sin.  The  sufferings  and  death 
of  the  Son  of  God  are  an  exemplary  exhibition  of 
God’s  hatred  of  moral  evil,  in  connection  with  which 


GROTIAN  THEORY  OF  RELAXATION. 


359 


it  is  safe  and  prudent  to  remit  that  penalty,  which 
so  far  as  God  and  the  Divine  attributes  are  con¬ 
cerned,  might  have  been  remitted  without  it. 1 

The  idea  of  u  satisfaction  ”  in  the  scheme  of  Gro- 
tius  is  thus  a  very  different  one  from  that  of  Anselm 
and  the  Reformers,  and  a  comparison  of  the  two  will 
throw  light  upon  both.  According  to  Anselm,  vi¬ 
carious  satisfaction  is  the  substitution  of  a  strict 
equivalent  for  the  penalty  due  to  man.  The  suffer¬ 
ings  and  death  of  God  incarnate  are  equal  in  dignity 
and  value  to  the  endless  sufferings  of  a  race  of  crea¬ 
tures.  In  Anselm’s  view,  there  can  be  no  relaxation 
of  law,  because  it  flows  from  the  divine  nature  itself, 
and  therefore  “  one  jot  or  one  tittle  shall  in  no  wise 
pass  from  the  law  till  all  be  fulfilled.”  The  vicarious 
satisfaction  of  law  in  the  Anselmic  theory,  conse¬ 
quently,  denotes  the  substitution  of  an  exact  and  lit¬ 
eral  equivalent, — as  when  a  debt  of  one  hundred 
dollars  in  silver  is  paid  with  one  hundred  dollars  in 
gold.  That  which  is  substituted  is  of  literally  equal 
value,  though  not  identical  in  kind.  The  sufferings 

of  Christ  are  not  identical  with  those  of  the  sinner, — 

\  ' 

for  the  very  idea  of  substituted  sufferings  excludes 


1  Grotius  :  Defensio  Fidei,  cap. 
v. — In  the  Grotian  scheme,  the 
remission  of  penalty,  being  a  re¬ 
laxation  of  law,  is  attended  with 
evil  consequences ;  and  the  suf¬ 
ferings  of  Christ  are  only  an  ex¬ 
pedient  for  remedying  these  evil 
consequences  to  the  universe. 


But  in  the  Anselmic  theory,  the 
remission  of  penalty  is  a  regu¬ 
lar  and  legoA  procedure,  because 
Christ’s  atonement  satisfies  all 
legal  claims;  and  there  are,  con¬ 
sequently,  no  evil  consequences 
to  the  universe  to  be  remedied. 


\ 


360 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


identity,  even  if  it  were  possible  for  the  God-Man  to 
suffer  remorse, — but  they  are  of  strictly  equal  value, 
5  and  hence  are  a  literal  and  exact  satisfaction ;  so  that 
in  the  substitution  there  is  not  the  slightest  relaxation 
or  waiving  of  the  claims  of  justice,  any  more  than 
there  is  in  the  above-mentioned  instance  in  which  a 
loan  of  silver  is  exactly  and  literally  repaid  in  gold. 

According  to  Grotius.  on  the  other  hand,  vicarious 
satisfaction  is  not  a  strict  equivalent,  but  an  accepted 
and  nominal  equivalent.  It  is  not  a  quid  pro  quo, 
which  in  and  of  itself  extinguishes  legal  claims,  but 
an  ciliud  pro  quo,  which  prevents  the  evil  conse¬ 
quences  of  a  relaxation  of  legal  claims.  In  the  Gro- 
tian  theory,  whenever  a  guilty  person  is  released  by 
the  substituted  sufferings  of  another,  it  is  not  upon 
the  ground  of  the  intrinsic  sufficiency  of  these  suffer¬ 
ings,  but  because  of  their  being  accepted  as  sufficient 
by  the  law-making  power.  “  It  is  necessary,”  says 
Grotius,  “  that  an  act  of  the  ruler  should  come  in,  in 
order  that  the  punishment  (poena)  of  one  person 
should  obtain  the  deliverance  of  another.  For  the 
law  requires,  that  he  who  committed  the  fault 
should  receive  the  punishment.  Now,  this  act  of 
the  ruler,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  the  law,  is  relaxation, 
but  so  far  as  it  relates  to  the  criminal  is  remission.” 1 
This  “  interfering  act,”  Grotius  extends  to  the  value 
of  the  thing  substituted,  and  not  merely  to  the  prin¬ 
ciple  of  substitution.  For  the  Anselmic  theory 

1  Grotius  :  Defensio,  Cap.  vi.  See  Baur  :  Versohnungslehre,  425 
(Note). 


GROTIAN  THEORY  OE  RELAXATION. 


361 


concedes  that  the  substitution  of  penalty  must  occur 
by  an  u  interfering  act  ”  of  the  Supreme  Judge ;  but 
it  differs  from  the  Grotian,  in  that  it  maintains  that 
when  the  principle  of  vicariousness  has  been  adopted, 
it  then  becomes  necessary  that  that  which  is  substi¬ 
tuted  should  be  a  literal  and  not  a  nominal  equiva¬ 
lent.  According  to  Grotius,  the  u  interfering  act  ” 
of  the  Supreme  Judge  not  only  establishes  the  prin¬ 
ciple  of  vicariousness,  but  also  imparts  to  that  which 
is  offered  in  the  place  of  the  sinner’s  punishment  a 
nominal  and  accepted  value,  by  which,  though  in¬ 
trinsically  insufficient,  it  becomes  a  sufficient  com¬ 
pensation  or  satisfaction. 

Grotius’s  idea  of  satisfaction  appears  yet  more 
clearly  in  what  he  says  in  reply  to  an  objection  of 
Socinus.  Socinus  urged  against  the  theory  of  a 
strict  satisfaction  that  it  is  incompatible  with  com¬ 
passion, — that  if  the  claims  of  justice  are  rigorously 
and  completely  satisfied,  then  there  is  no  mercy. 
Grotius,  instead  of  giving  the  reply  which  Anselm 
and  the  Reformers  gave, — viz. :  that  it  is  God  and 
not  man  who  makes  the  satisfaction,  and  that  God’s 
mercy  consists  in  satisfying  justice  in  the  sinner’s 
place, — answers  as  follows :  “  What  Socinus  says  is, 
indeed,  not  altogether  destitute  of  truth;  but  it  is 
true  only  in  case  the  term  ‘  satisfaction  ’  is  taken, 
contrary  to  its  signification  as  a  legal  term,  to  de¬ 
note  the  strict  and  complete  payment  (solutio)  of  all 
that  is  due.  But  when  one  takes  the  place  of  the 
debtor,  and  gives  something  different  (aliud)  from 


362 


HISTOKY  OF  SOTEKIOLOGY. 


what  is  due,  then  there  is  a  relaxation  and  remis¬ 
sion.”  1  At  this  point,  the  difference  between  Grotius 
and  Anselm  is  plainly  apparent.  Anselm  maintains, 
that  that  which  is  substituted  must  be  of  strictly 
equal  value  with  that  for  which  it  is  substituted. 
The  sufferings  of  Christ  endured  in  the  place  of  the 
sinner’s  sufferings  strictly  and  completely  satisfy  the 
claims  of  law.  They  do  not  satisfy  nominally  and 
because  God  pleases  to  regard  them  as  an  equiva¬ 
lent  ;  but  they  really  are  a  full  equivalent,  and  he 
accepts  them  because  they  are.  Grotius,  on  the 
contrary,  maintains,  that  that  which  is  substituted 
need  not  be  of  strictly  equal  value  with  that  foi 
which  it  is  substituted.  God  can  “  relax”  or  waive 
the  full  demands  of  justice,  and  by  his  arbitrary 
decision  (acceptilatione)  constitute  a  partial  equiva¬ 
lent  a  full  and  complete  one.  Hence,  he  explains 
1  Cor.  vi.  20, — u  ye  are  bought  with  a  price,” — by, 
“  solutione  aliqua  liberati  sum  us ;  ”  and  defines  the 
“  ransom  ”  spoken  of  in  1  Tim.  ii.  6,  as  a  Xvtqov  or 
price  of  such  a  sort  (tale  Xvtqov  sen  pretium)  that 
the  deliverer  endures  something  similar  to  that 
which  impends  upon  the  guilty ;  and  remarks  that 
Christ  has  freed  men  from  the  penalty  of  eternal 
death,  u  aliquid  dando.”2  This  “aliquid,”  he  de¬ 
fines  to  be  such  a  suffering  of  Christ  as  is  a  remedy 
for  the  evil  consequences  of  relaxing  the  strict  claims 
of  law;  but  not  such  a  suffering  as  is  a  strict  and 

1  Gbotius  :  Defensio,  Cap.  vi.  2  Grotius  :  Defensio,  Cap.  vi. 


GROTIAN  THEORY  OF  RELAXATION. 


363 


plenary  satisfaction  of  all  the  claims  of  justice,  ren¬ 
dering  relaxation  of  law  unnecessary,  and  having  no 
evil  consequences  to  be  remedied.1  Grotius  entitles 
his  work,  a  defence  of  the  doctrine  of  “  satisfaction ;  ” 
but  it  is  rather  a  defence  of  the  doctrine  of  “  relax¬ 
ation.”  He  combats  the  theory  that  the  claims  of 
justice  are  “satisfied”  to  their  full  extent,  and  up¬ 
holds  the  theory  that  they  are  “  waived  ”  to  a  cer¬ 
tain  extent.  The  vicarious  sufferings  of  Christ  are 
a  device  by  which  to  escape  the  ill  effects  of  relax¬ 
ing  legal  claims,  and  not  a  method  of  completely 
cancelling  those  claims.  The  demands  of  law,  in 
accordance  with  Grotius’s  idea  of  law  and  of  the 
power  of  the  law-giver,  are  set  aside,  instead  of 
being  met.  There  is  nothing  in  the  Divine  nature 
that  prohibits  this.  And  this  power  and  right  to 
relax  the  exact  claims  of  justice  enables  God  to  ac¬ 
cept  a  nominal  for  a  real  satisfaction, — to  make  the 
expression  of  his  detestation  of  sin  take  the  place 
of  the  strict  infliction  of  the  penalty  of  sin.  This 
secures  the  welfare  of  the  created  universe,  which 
is  the  only  thing  to  be  provided  for. 

We  have  spoken  of  the  Grotian  theory  as  the 


1  The  following  extracts  throw 
light  upon  the  Grotian  scheme. 
“  Dare  aliquid ,  ut  per  id  ipsum 
alter  a  debito  liberetur,  es.t  sol¬ 
vere  aut  satisfacere .”  Defensio, 
ix.  The  death  of  Christ  is  not 
“  solutio  rei  ipsius  debitae ,  quae 
ipso  facto  liberet:  nostra  enim 


mors,  et  quidem  aeterna,  erat  in 
obligatione.”  Defensio,  vi.  “Pre- 
tii  natura  ea  est,  ut  sui  valore  aut 
aestimatione  alterum  moveat  ad 
concedendam  rein  aut  jus  ali- 
quod,  puta  impunitatem/’  De¬ 
fensio,  viii. 


364 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


final  statement  of  the  doctrine  of  a  relative  satisfac¬ 
tion,  and  as  the  re-appearance  of  the  Scotist  doctrine 
of  acce^tilation .  Yet  Grotius  disclaims  this.  “For 
acceptilation,”  says  Grotius,  “  denotes  the  act  by 
which  a  creditor  without  any  compensation  at  all , 
without  any  payment  of  any  sort  (citra  ullam  solu- 
tionem),  absolutely  extinguishes  an  indebtedness. 
Hence  this  conception  has  application  only  in  civil 
law,  and  not  at  all  in  criminal.  For,  first,  no  one 
ever  heard  of  any  of  the  old  writers  who  has  denom¬ 
inated  the  remitting  of  punishment  an  ‘  acceptila* 
tio.’  An  act  of  acceptilation  presupposes  something 
that  can  be  accepted.  But  in  the  case  of  punish¬ 
ment,  the  ruler  merely  executes  an  infliction,  but 
receives  nothing.  Secondly,  acceptilation  is  the 
opposite  of  every  sort  and  hind  of  satisfaction.  But 
Christ  has  offered  a  satisfaction  of  some  sort ;  con¬ 
sequently  the  idea  of  acceptilation  has  no  place  in  a 
theory  of  the  atonement.” 1  In  reply  to  this,  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  it  is  the  principle  involved  in  the 
notion  of  acceptilation,  and  not  the  mere  term  itself, 
which  is  the  matter  of  importance.  Scotus  trans¬ 
ferred  the  term  from  the  commercial  to  the  judicial 
province,  when  he  taught  that  the  Deity  could  ac¬ 
cept  a  nominal  satisfaction  as  a  real  one.  In  doing 
this,  the  Deity  acts  upon  the  same  principle  that  the 
commercial  creditor  does,  when  he  accepts  an  imag¬ 
inary  payment,  or  a  partial  payment,  in  lieu  of  a 


1  Grotius  :  Defensio,  Cap.  vii. 


GROTIAN  THEORY  OF  RELAXATION. 


365 


complete  one.  It  is  really  an  act  of  acceptilation, 
when  God  regards  as  an  equivalent  for  the  suffer¬ 
ings  of  man  that  which  is  not  a  strict  equivalent  for 
them,  as  it  is  when  a  creditor  accepts  a  part  of  the 
debt  as  a  complete  payment.  But  this  principle 
of  a  nominal  and  accepted  value  is  confessedly  the 
constituent  principle  in  the  Grotian  soteriology. 
Grotius’s  definition  of  law  as  a  positive  enactment,  j 
of  penalty  as  a  positive  and  arbitrary  matter,  of  the 
consequent  power  of  the  Divine  legislator  to  relax 
or  even  abrogate  the  law  and  the  penalty,  and 
his  denial  that  the  sufferings  of  Christ  are  a  strict 
equivalent, — all  the  elementary  parts  of  his  theory 
are  so  defined  and  put  together,  as  to  allow  of  that 
u  interfering  act  ”  by  which  a  nominal  satisfaction 
may  be  accepted  as  a^  sufficient  and  a  real  one. 
The  Grotian  theory  cannot,  therefore,  escape  the 
charge  of  adopting  Scotus’s  doctrine  of  acceptilation, 
by  the  remark  that  acceptilation  pertains  to  the  prov¬ 
ince  of  commercial  law,  while  substituted  penalty 
belongs  to  that  of  criminal  law.  The  fact  that  with¬ 
in  the  province  of  soteriology  it  is  judicial  suffering 
that  is  exchanged,  while  within  the  province  of 
trade  and  commerce  it  is  money  that  is  exchanged, 
does  not  at  all  affect  the  principle  upon  which  the 
exchange  is  made.  And  if,  in  the  former  sphere, 
a  kind  of  suffering  that  is  not  a  strict  legal  equiva¬ 
lent  is  accepted  as  such  by  an  arbitrary  act  of  will, 
it  is  ethically ,  and  in  principle ,  precisely  the  same 
kind  of  transaction  with  that  in  which  only  a  part 


366 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


of  a  pecuniary  debt  is  accepted  as  full  payment,  by 
an  act  of  will  on  the  part  of  the  creditor,  or,  in  the 
phrase  of  the  Roman  law,  “  by  word  of  mouth.'5 1 


§  4.  Critical  estimate  of  the  Grotian  Soteriology. 

The  Grotian  soteriology,  it  is  evident  from  this 
investigation,  is  a  middle  theory  which  participates 
in  the  peculiarities  of  the  two  theories  between 
which  it  endeavours  to  steer, — viz.  the  Anselmic 
and  the  Socinian.  1.  It  is  allied  with  the  soterio¬ 
logy  of  Anselm  and  the  Reformers,  by  its  assertion 
that  the  atonement  is  required  by  the  interests  of 
the  universe.  In  contemplating  God  as  a  Ruler, 
who  protects  the  welfare  of  his  creation  by  a  moral 
government,  and  who  will  not,  therefore,  relax  the 
penalty  of  transgression  without  making  an  expres¬ 
sion  of  his  abhorrence  of  sin,  Grotius  rejects  the  sys¬ 
tem  of  Socinus  which  altogether  excludes  vicarious 
suffering  and  combats  it.  This  feature  enters  into 
the  soteriology  of  the  Reformers,  also,  though  only 
as  a  secondary  and  subordinate  one.  According  to 

1  Baue  (Versohnungslehre, 428)  1834,  p.  604)  speaks  of  “the 

truly  remarks  in  reference  to  Scotist  or  Patristic  theory  of  satis- 
Grotius’s  disclaimer,  that  “there  faction”  as  being  revived  in  the 
is  no  other  theory  to  which  the  Protestant  Church  by  Grotius. 
conception  of  acceptilation  may  be  Tholuck,  however,  is  in  error  in 
applied  with  greater  right,  than  regarding  the  Patristic  and  Scotist 
that  of  Grotius.”  And  Tholuck  soteriologies  as  identical. 
(Evangelische  Kirchenzeitung, 


ESTIMATE  OF  THE  GROTIAH  SOTERIOLOGY.  367 


the  Ansel mic  view,  the  sufferings  of  Christ  are  re¬ 
quired  primarily  by  the  imperatives  of  the  Divine 
Nature,  and  this  is  the  reason  why  they  are  required 
by  the  Divine  Government.  In  adopting,  therefore, 
the  secondary  reasons  and  grounds  for  the  atone¬ 
ment,  the  Grotian  theory,  so  far,  harmonizes  with 
the  soteriology  of  the  Reformation.  2.  The  Grotian 
theory  is  allied  with  that  of  Socinus,  in  its  denial 
that  the  satisfaction  of  Christ  is  required  by  the 
nature  and  attributes  of  God.  The  departure  of 
Grotius  from  the  Church  doctrine  consists  in  what 
he  denies,  and  not  in  what  he  asserts.  The  assertion 
that  the  welfare  of  the  universe  necessitates  the  suf¬ 
ferings  of  Christ  in  order  to  the  remission  of  sin 
would  be  agreed  to  by  Anselm  and  Calvin,  but 
would  be  dissented  from  by  Socinus.  And,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  assertion  that  the  attribute  of  jus¬ 
tice  immanent  in  the  Divine  Nature,  does  not  inex¬ 
orably  require  a  strict  and  full  satisfaction  in  order 
to  the  remission  of  sin,  would  be  dissented  from  by 
Anselm  and  Calvin,  but  would  be  agreed  to  by 
Socinus.  The  assertion  that  the  moral  law  is  a  pos¬ 
itive  enactment,  the  mere  product  of  the  Divine 
will,  that  consequently  it  can  be  relaxed  or  even 
abrogated  by  the  law-maker,  and  that  consequently 
there  is  no  intrinsic  necessity  for  the  atonement  in 
the  being  and  character  of  God, — all  these  are  So- 
cinian  positions. 

From  these  positions,  there  flow  certain  logical 
conclusions  that  affiliate  the  Grotian  scheme  with 


368 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


that  of  Socinus,  and  set  it  in  antagonism  to  that  of 
the  Reformers.  They  are  the  following.  1.  The 
death  of  Christ,  according  to  Grotius,  is  exemplary 
and  not  retributive  ;  because  it  is  not  required  by 
the  Divine  nature,  but  solely  by  the  external  neces¬ 
sities  of  the  universe,  and  that  outward  relation 
which  God  sustains  to  his  creatures  as  a  protector 
of  their  welfare.  But  according  to  Anselm,  and 
the  Reformers,  the  death  of  Christ  is  both  retrib¬ 
utive  and  exemplary.  Its  primary  characteristic 
is  that  it  satisfies  judicial  claims ;  and  its  exemplary 
aspect  is  its  secondary  one.  The  Reformers  con¬ 
tended  that  the  Deity  exhibits  his  abhorrence  of 
sin  in  the  ordinary  course  of  his  administratioa. 
and  that,  therefore,  the  incarnation  and  suffering 
of  Deity  in  the  fiesh,  being  an  extraordinary  pro¬ 
cedure,  must  have,  for  its  primary  purpose,  some¬ 
thing  more  than  merely  teaching  that  God  is  dis¬ 
pleased  with  sin.  There  is  no  doubt  upon  this 
point ;  for  this  lesson  is  taught  by  the  punishment 
of  the  fallen  angels,  and  by  the  judgments  of  God 
in  the  earth, — all  of  which  are  exemplary  of  God’s 
abhorrence  of  sin,  and  have  a  direct  and  strong  ten¬ 
dency  to  prevent  sin.  The  atonement,  according 
to  Anselm,  is  expiatory  first,  and  exemplary  after¬ 
wards  ;  according  to  Grotius  it  is  exemplary  only. 
2.  In  the  Grotian  scheme,  the  sufferings  of  Christ 
occur  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  future  sin,  and 
not  for  the  purpose  of  atoning  for  past  sin.  The 
guilt  of  past  sin  may  be  abolished  without  strict 


ESTIMATE  OF  THE  GKOTIAH  SOTERIOLOGY.  369 


satisfaction,  because  there  is  no  immanent  necessity 
in  the  Divine  Nature,  inexorable  and  such  as  cannot 
be  relaxed  or  waived,  for  the  infliction  of  plenary 
penalty  for  sins  that  are  past ;  and  hence  only  an 
exemplary  expression  of  God’s  abhorrence  of  sin  is 
required  in  order  to  deter  from  sin  in  the  future. 
But  where  the  Grotian  soteriology  finds  no  diffi¬ 
culty  at  all,  there  the  Anselmic  finds  the  chief  diffi¬ 
culty  in  the  way  of  human  salvation.  According  to 
Anselm,  the  primal  necessity  of  the  incarnation  and 
theanthropic  suffering  of  the  Eternal  Son  of  God 
lies  in  the  fact  that  the  very  nature  and  attributes 
of  Deity  require  that  the  guilt  of  past  sin  be  com¬ 
pletely  expiated.  Were  the  prevention  of  sin  in 
the  future  the  sole,  or  the  chief  obstacle,  this  could 
be  secured  by  the  agency  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  in  re¬ 
newing  and  sanctifying  the  human  heart.  In  re¬ 
spect,  then,  to  the  relations  which  the  atonement 
sustains  to  the  being  and  attributes  of  God,  the 
Grotian  soteriology  adopts  substantially  Socinian 
principles  and  positions ;  while,  so  far  as  concerns 
the  relations  of  the  atonement  to  the  external 
universe  and  the  welfare  of  the  finite  creature,  it 
adopts  the  positions  of  the  Anselmic-Protestant  so¬ 
teriology. 


YOL.  II. — 24 


CHAPTER  VI. 


THE  ARMINI  AN  SOTEKIOLOGY. 


§  1.  Positive  Statements. 

The  Arminian  soteriology  was  formed  after  Gro- 
tius  had  published  his,  and  the  two  theologians  most 
concerned  in  its  construction  were  Cureellaeus  and 
Limborch.  Their  aim  was  to  avoid  what  they 
deemed  to  be  the  extremes  of  the  Socinian  doc¬ 
trine  and  that  of  the  Church.  w  Sententia  nostra,” 
they  say,  “inter  duas  hasce  extremas  media  est.” 1 

The  leading  idea  of  the  Arminian  soteriology  is 
that  of  a  sacrificial  offering.  The  death  of  Christ, 
like  the  death  of  the  animal  victim  in  the  Mosaic 
economy,  has  for  its  purpose  the  deliverance  of  the 
guilty  from  punishment.  And  at  this  point,  the 
Arminian  theologian  would  remedy  what  he  re¬ 
garded  as  a  defect  in  the  Grotian  scheme.  Accord¬ 
ing  to  Grotius,  the  death  of  Christ  was  designed  to 
^protect  the  interests  of  the  created  universe  solely, 
and  did  not  stand  in  relations  to  the  Divine  Nature. 


1  Limborchus  :  Theol.  Christ.  V.  xxii. 


POSITIVE  STATEMENTS. 


3Tl 


But  the  Arminian  divine  contended  that  Christ’s 
death,  as  that  of  a  sacrifice,  had  reference  to  God 
as  well  as  to  the  universe.  Limborch  in  criticising 
Grotius’s  Defensio  Fidei ,  which  the  latter  had  sent 
to  him,  remarks  that  the  gist  of  the  matter  in  re¬ 
spect  to  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement  lies  in  the 
question  :  “  An  Christus  morte  sua,  circa  Deum  ali- 
quid  effecerit  ?  ”  and  contends  that  he  did.  In  this 
respect,  the  Arminian  theory  looks  in  the  direction 
of  the  Anselmic  and  Reformed.  But  it  differs  from 
it,  when  it  proceeds  to  specify  what  it  is  that  the 
death  of  Christ  effects  in  reference  to  the  Divine 
Nature.  This  is  done  in  the  following  particulars. 
1.  The  death  of  Christ  is  denominated  a  sacrifice, 
but  a  sacrifice  is  not  the  payment  of  a  debt,  nor  is 
it  a  complete  satisfaction  of  justice  for  sin.  It  is 
merely  the  divinely-appointed  condition  which  pre¬ 
cedes  the  forgiveness  of  sin.  God  saw  fit  under  the 
Mosaic  economy  to  connect  the  remission  of  sin 
with  the  previous  death  of  a  lamb  or  a  goat.  If 
the  Israelite  would  offer  up  the  victim  in  the  way 
and  manner  appointed,  then  God  promised  to  for¬ 
give  him.  In  the  same  way,  God  in  the  new  dis¬ 
pensation  connects  the  pardon  of  transgression  with 
the  death  of  Jesus  Christ.  In  neither  instance,  are 
the  claims  of  justice  satisfied.  They  are  waived  by 
an  act  of  compassion  that  is  exerted  in  connection 
with  the  offering  of  the  Son  of  God  as  a  sacrifice. 
u  Christ,”  says  Curcellaeus, 1  “  did  not  make  satisfac- 

1  Cttrcellaetts  :  Institutio  Religionis  Christiana©,  Lib.  V.  Cap.  xix.  15. 


372 


HISTORY  OF  SOTEEIOLOGY. 


tion  by  enduring  the  punishment  which  we  sinners 
merited.  This  does  not  belong  to  the  nature  of  a 
sacrifice,  and  has  nothing  in  common  with  it.  For 
sacrifices  are  not  payments  of  debts,  as  is  evident 
from  those  offered  under  the  law.  The  beasts  that 
were  slain  for  transgressors  did  not  expiate  the  pen¬ 
alty  which  they  merited,  nor  was  their  blood  a  suffi¬ 
cient  'Kvtqov  for  the  soul  of  man.  But  they  were 
oblations  only,  by  which  the  transgressor  endeav¬ 
oured  to  turn  (flectere)  the  mind  of  God  to  com¬ 
passion,  and  to  obtain  remission  from  him.  Hence 
the  formula  in  the  law  applied  to  those  who  had 
expiated  their  sins  by  offering  a  sacrifice  :  c  And  it 
shall  be  forgiven  him.’  (Leviticus  iv.  26,  31,  35, 
&c .)”  2.  Respecting  the  question,  whether  the  suf¬ 

ferings  of  Christ  were  penal  and  judicial,  the  Ar- 
minian  divines  made  the  following  statements. 
Christ  as  a  real  and  true  offering  for  our  sins 
endured  the  greatest  sufferings  in  'our  stead,  and 
thereby  warded  off  the  punishment  which  we  merit. 
The  sufferings  of  Christ  may  be  regarded  as  penal, 
or  of  the  nature  of  punishment,  not  in  the  sense 
that  he  endured  the  same  thing  which  man  de¬ 
served  to  endure,  but  in  the  sense  that  by  the  will 
and  appointment  of  God  the  sufferings  which  he 
underwent  took  the  place  of  a  penalty ,  so  that  his 
sufferings  have  the  same  effect  in  reconciling  God 
to  man,  and  procuring  the  forgiveness  of  sin,  that 
the  sinner’s  endurance  of  the  punishment  due  to  his 
sins  would  have  had.  u  Jesus  Christ,”  says  Curcel- 


POSITIVE  STATEMENTS. 


373 


laeus,  u  may  be  said  to  have  been  punished  (puni- 
tus)  in  our  place,  in  so  far  as  he  endured  the 
greatest  anguish  of  soul,  and  the  accursed  death  of 
the  cross  for  us,  which  were  of  the  nature  of  a 
vicarious  punishment  in  the  place  of  our  sins 
(quae  poenae  vicariae  pro  peccatis  nostris  rationem 
habuit).  And  it  may  be  said  that  our  Lord  satis¬ 
fied  the  Father  for  us  by  his  death,  and  earned 
righteousness  for  us,  in  so  far  as  he  satisfied,  not 
the  rigor  and  exactitude  of  the  divine  justice  but, 
the  just  as  well  as  compassionate  will  of  God 
(voluntati  Dei  justae  simul  ac  misericordi),  and 
went  through  all  that  God  required  in  order  to 
our  reconciliation.” 1  According  to  these  positions, 
the  sufferings  of  Christ  were  not  a  substituted  pen¬ 
alty,  but  a  substitute  for  a  penalty.  A  substituted 
penalty  is  a  strict  equivalent,  but  a  substitute  for 
a  penalty,  may  be  of  inferior  worth,  as  when  a  par¬ 
tial  satisfaction  is  accepted  for  a  plenary  one,  by 
the  method  of  acceptilation ;  or,  as  if  the  finite  sacri¬ 
fice  of  the  lamb  and  the  goat  should  be  constituted 
by  the  will  of  God  an  offset  for  human  transgres¬ 
sion.  And  the  term  “  satisfaction,”  also,  is  wrested 
from  its  proper  signification,  in  that  the  sufferings 
of  Christ  are  asserted  to  be  a  satisfaction  of  benevo¬ 
lence.  “  Our  Lord  satisfied  .  .  .  not  the  rigor  and 
exactitude  of  divine  justice,  but  the  just  and  com¬ 
passionate  will  of  God,” — a  use  of  language  as  sole- 


1  Curcellaeus  :  Institutio,  III.  xxii.  2. 


374 


HISTOEY  OF  SOTEEIOLOGY. 


cistical  as  that  which  should  speak  of  smelling  a 
sound. 

§  2.  Arminian  Objections  to  the  Theory  of  Satis¬ 
faction. 

Having  made  these  positive  statements  respect¬ 
ing  the  vicariousness  of  Christ’s  sufferings  and  their 
penal  aspect,  the  Arminian  divines  make  the  fol¬ 
lowing  negative  statements  explanatory  of  their  use 
of  these  terms. 1 

1.  Christ  did  not  endure  the  full  penalty  due 
to  man,  because  he  did  not  endure  eternal  death, 
either  in  degree  or  in  time.  He  did  not  endure  it 
in  degree,  because  he  did  not  undergo  absolute 
despair  while  under  the  burden  of  the  wrath  of 
God.  And  he  did  not  endure  it  through  an  end¬ 
less  duration.  2.  If  Christ  has  completely  atoned 
for  our  sins  by  enduring  the  full  penalty,  then 
there  is  nothing  more  that  Divine  grace  can  do  for 
us.  The  remission  of  our  sins  is  no  longer  a  matter 
of  Divine  compassion,  but  of  the  Divine  justice, 
which  has  been  fully  satisfied.  3.  If  Christ  has 
made  plenary  satisfaction  for  us,  God  has  not  the 
right  to  demand  either  faith  or  obedience  from  us. 
Neither  has  he  the  right,  in  case  we  do  not  render 
obedience,  to  deprive  us  of  the  benefits  of  Christ’s 
death,  and  punish  us  for  our  sins,  because  it  would 

1  See  Curcellaeus  :  Institutio  Religionis  Cliristianae,  Lib.  VII.  Cap.  i. 


AKMINIAN  OBJECTIONS. 


3Y5 


be  unjust  to  exact  a  double  punishment  for  one  and 
the  same  sin. 

The  first  of  these  objections,  it  is  obvious  to  re¬ 
mark,  overlooks  the  divinity  of  the  substitute  for 
man.  An  infinite  person  suffering  in  a  finite  time 
yields  an  infinite  suffering,  with  even  more  exacti¬ 
tude  than  a  finite  person  or  race  suffering  in  an 
endless  time.  The  Person  of  Christ  in  respect  to 
his  divinity  is  strictly  infinite  ;  but  man’s  punish¬ 
ment  though  endless  is  not  strictly  infinite.  The 
woe  of  the  lost  is  eternal  only  a  parte  post.  Though 
it  has  no  ending,  it  has  a  beginning,  and  therefore  is 
not  metaphysically  infinite.  The  second  objection 
is  answered  by  the  consideration,  that  the  plenary 
satisfaction  of  Divine  justice  for  the  sinner  by  the 
Divine  Being  himself  is  the  highest  conceivable 
form  of  compassion, — because  it  is  the  compassion 
of  self-sacrifice.  And  the  fact,  that  after  the  claims 
of  law  have  been  completely  met  by  the  voluntary 
sacrifice  of  the  Son  of  God,  there  are,  of  course,  no 
further  claims  to  be  “relaxed”  or  “waived,”  does 
not  disprove  the  infinite  pity  that  vicariously  satis¬ 
fied  them.  The  third  objection  proceeds  upon  the 
baseless  assumption,  that  because  God  has  made  an 
atonement  for  human  sin,  each  and  every  man  by 
that  mere  fact  is  entitled  to  its  benefits.  After  the 
atonement  has  been  made,  it  is  still  the  property 
and  possession  of  the  Maker,  and  he  may  do  what  he 
will  with  his  own.  He  may  elect  to  whom  he  will 
apply  it,  and  to  whom  he  will  not  apply  it. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


THE  SOCINIAN  SOTERIOLOGY. 


§  1.  Socinianldea  of  Justice, 

The  theory  of  Socinus  respecting  the  work  of 
Christ  is  stated  with  great  directness  and  clearness. 
Rejecting,  as  he  did,  all  mystery,  and  reducing 
Christianity  to  the  few  first  principles  of  natural 
ethics,  it  was  comparatively  easy  for  him  to  be 
explicit  in  his  statements,  and  transparent  in  his 
style. 

The  foundation  of  his  theory  is  .seen  in  his  idea 
and  definition  of  Divine  justice.  The  doctrine  of 
atonement,  as  held  in  the  Church,  rested  upon  the 
position  that  justice  is  of  a  necessary  nature,  and  is 
an  immutable  attribute  of  God.  If  now  it  could  be 
shown  that  this  definition  of  justice  is  an  erroneous 
one,  the  main  support  of  the  theory  of  satisfaction 
falls  away.1  Hence  Socinus  bent  his  efforts  to  re- 

1  Socinus  (De  Servatore,  III.  i.)  Christ’s  satisfaction  would  be 
remarks :  “  If  we  could  but  get  thoroughly  exposed,  and  would 
rid  of  this  jus tice,  even  if  we  had  vanish.” 
no  other  proof,  that  fiction  of 


SOCmiAN  IDEA  OF  JUSTICE.  37  7 

move  this  foundation.  “ There  is  no  such  justice  in 
God,”  says  Socinus,  “  as  requires  absolutely  and  in¬ 
exorably  (omnino)  that  sin  be  punished,  and  such 
as  God  himself  cannot  repudiate.  There  is,  indeed, 
a  perpetual  and  constant  justice  in  God  ;  but  this 
is  nothing  but  his  moral  equity  and  rectitude,  by 
virtue  of  which  there  is  no  depravity  or  iniquity  in 
any  of  his  works.  This  is  the  justice  which  the 
Scriptures  speak  of,  and  which  is  as  conspicuous  in 
forgiving  sins,  as  in  punishing  them.  But  that  kind 
of  justice  which  we  are  accustomed  to  call  by  this 
name,  and  which  is  seen  only  in  the  punishment  of 
sin,  the  Scriptures  by  no  means  dignify  with  this 
name,  but  denominate  it  sometimes  the  severity  of 
God,  sometimes  vengeance,  sometimes  wrath,  fury, 
indignation,  and  by  other  terms  of  this  sort.  Hence, 
they  greatly  err  who, 'deceived  by  the  popular  use 
of  the  word  justice,  suppose  that  justice  in  this  sense 
is  a  perpetual  quality  in  God,  and  affirm  that  it  is 
infinite.  For  they  do  not  perceive  that  if  this  were 
the  fact,  God  must  eternally  be  severe  and  inflict 
retribution,  and  could  never  forgive  sin  ;  all  which 
is  contrary  to  the  Scriptures,  which  teach  that  God 
is  slow  to  anger  and  of  great  mercy.  Hence  it 
might  with  much  greater  truth  be  affirmed  that 
that  compassion  which  stands  opposed  to  justice  is 
the  appropriate  characteristic  of  God  ;  and  the  very 
opposite  doctrine  to  that  maintained  by  our  oppo¬ 
nents  might  be  asserted,  viz. :  that  God  could  not 
punish  sin,  because  his  mercy  requires  that  sin  in 


378 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


any  event  (omnino)  be  forgiven.  But  in  fact  both 
positions  are  false.  For,  as  that  justice  which  com¬ 
monly  goes  under  this  name,  and  which  is  opposed 
to  mercy,  is  not  an  immanent  characteristic  of  God, 
but  only  the  effect  or  product  of  his  volition ,  so  that 
mercy  which  is  opposed  to  justice  is  not  an  internal 
(propria)  quality  of  God,  but  only  the  effect  and 
product  of  his  volition.  Hence,  inasmuch  as  that 
mercy  which  is  often  attributed  to  God  does  not 
prevent  him  from  punishing  any  one  whom  he 
pleases  to  punish  for  sin,  still  less  does  that  puni¬ 
tive  justice  which  is  very  rarely  (raro  admodum) 
attributed  to  God  prevent  him  from  pardoning  any 
one  whom  he  pleases,  without  any  satisfaction  of  its 
claims.1  ” 

From  this  extract,  it  is  plain  that  Socinus  con¬ 
ceived  of  the  attributes  of  justice  and  mercy  as  less 
central  than  will.  By  a  volition,  God  may  punish 
a  sin,  or  he  may  let  it  go  unpunished.  He  has  as 
much  right  to  do  the  latter  as  the  former.  There 
is  no  intrinsic  right  or  wrong  in  either  case  that 
necessitates  his  action.  Justice  like  mercy  is  the 
product  of  his  optional  will.  It  is  easy  to  see  that 
by  this  definition  of  justice  Socinus  takes  away  the 
foundation  of  the  doctrine  of  atonement ;  and  that 
if  it  be  a  correct  definition,  the  Socinian  theory  of 
forgiveness  upon  repentance  is  true.  If  sin  is  pun¬ 
ishable  only  because  God  so  determines  ;  and  if  he 

1  Socinus:  Praelectiones Theologicae,  Caput  XYI.  (Bibliotheca Fra- 
trum  Polonorum,  I.  566). 


SOCmiAN  OBJECTIONS. 


379 


decides  not  to  punish  it,  then  it  is  no  longer  pun¬ 
ishable, — if  punitive  justice  is  the  product  of  mere 
will,  and  may  be  made  and  unmade  by  a  volition, 
then  it  is  absurd  to  say  that  without  the  shedding 
of  blood,  or  the  satisfaction  of  law,  there  is  no  re¬ 
mission  of  sin.1 


Socinian  Objections  to  the  Theory  of  Satis¬ 
faction. 


The  first  objection  of  Socinus  to  the  doctrine 
of  satisfaction  was,  that  it  excludes  mercy.  If  sin 
is  punished  it  is  not  forgiven,  and  conversely  if  sin 
is  forgiven  it  is  not  punished.  The  two  ideas  of 
satisfaction  and  remission  exclude  and  expel  each 


1  Priestley  (Theol.  Rep.  1. 417) 
takes  the  position,  that  “justice 
in  the  Deity  can  he  no  more  than 
a  modification  of  that  goodness  or 
benevolence  which  is  his  sole 
governing  principle,”  and  from 
this  he  draws  the  inference,  that 
“under  the  administration  of 
God,  there  can  be  no  occasion  to 
exercise  any  severity  on  penitent 
offenders.”  If  justice  is  ultimate¬ 
ly  resolvable  into  benevolence,  it 
follows  that  it  has  no  indefeasible 
claims  of  its  own.  Whether  pun¬ 
ishment  shall  be  inflicted  in  any 
given  instance  will  depend  upon 
the  decisions  of  benevolence. 
Justice  is  not  co-ordinate  with 
benevolence,  but  is  subordinate 


to  it.  Magee  (Atonement,  No. 
xxiv)  makes  the  following  crit¬ 
icism  upon  this  postulate  of  Priest¬ 
ley  :  “  Why  speak  of  justice  as  a 
‘  modification  of  the  divine  bene¬ 
volence,’  if  it  be  nothing  different 
from  that  attribute ;  and  if  it  be 
different  from  it,  how  can  benev¬ 
olence  be  the  ‘  sole  governing 
principle  ’  of  the  divine  adminis¬ 
tration  ?  The  word  justice,  then, 
is  plainly  but  a  sound  made  use  of 
to  save  appearances,  as  an  attri¬ 
bute  called  by  that  name  has  usu¬ 
ally  been  ascribed  to  the  Deity; 
but  in  reality  nothing  is  meant  by 
it,  in  Dr.  Priestley’s  application 
of  the  term,  different  from  pure 
and  absolute  benevolence.” 


380 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


other.  If  God’s  justice  is  satisfied  by  the  infliction 
of  judicial  suffering,  there  is  no  room  for  the  ex¬ 
ercise  of  his  mercy.  If  God  has  received  a  com¬ 
plete  equivalent  for  the  punishment  due  to  man, 
then  he  does  not  show  any  compassion  in  remitting 
his  sin.1  But  this  objection  overlooks  the  fact,  that 
the  equivalent  is  not  furnished  by  man,  but  by  God. 
Were  the  atonement  of  Christ  the  creature! s  obla¬ 
tion  to  justice,  Socinus’s  objection  would  have  force. 
But  it  is  God,  and  not  man  who  satisfies  the  claims 
of  justice  for  the  sinner.  According  to  the  Church 
doctrine,  therefore,  the  ideas  of  satisfaction  and 
mercy  are  combined  and  harmonized  in  a  vicarious 
atonement,  or  the  assumption  of  penalty  by  a  com¬ 
petent  person.  If  the  sinner  himself  should  pay 
the  penalty  (as  the  objection  of  Socinus  implies  if 
it  is  to  have  any  force),  there  would  be  no  vica¬ 
riousness  in  the  suffering,  and  there  would  be  the 
execution  of  justice  merely  without  any  mercy. 

But  when  the  principle  of  vicariousness,  or  substi - 

* 

tuted  penalty,  is  introduced,  and  the  incarnate  Son 
of  God  endures  the  punishment  due  to  sin,  in  the 
sinner’s  stead,  both  attributes  are  exercised  and  mani¬ 
fested  together.  For  justice  is  satisfied  by  the  suf¬ 
fering  which  is  undergone  by  the  Substitute,  and 
the  Substitute  certainly  shows  the  height  of  love 
and  compassion  in  undergoing  it.  w  Righteousness 
and  peace  meet  together.’1  The  truth  is,  that  this 

1  Socinus  :  Praelectiones  Theologicae,  Cap.  XVIII.  (Bib.  Frat.  Pol. 
Tom.  I.  570,  sq.). 


SOCINIAN  OBJECTIONS. 


381 


objection  of  Socinus,  which  is  one  of  his  most  plausi¬ 
ble,  begs  the  whole  question  in  dispute  by  de¬ 
fining  mercy  in  its  own  way.  It  assumes  that  the 
ideas  of  satisfaction  and  mercy  exclude  each  other, 
in  such  a  manner  that  they  never  can  be  harmo¬ 
nized  in  any  plan  of  redemption.  It  assumes  that 
mercy  consists  in  waiving  and  abolishing  justice  by 
an  act  of  pure  will.  From  this  premise,  it  follows 
of  course  that  where  there  is  any  satisfaction  of 
justice  by  the  endurance  of  its  demands,  there  is 
no  mercy ;  and  where  there  is  any  waiving  or  abol¬ 
ishing  of  these  demands,  there  is  mercy.  A  com¬ 
plete  atonement,  consequently,  would  exclude  mercy 
entirely ;  a  partial  atonement  would  allow  some 
room  for  mercy,  in  partially  waiving  legal  claims  ; 
and  no  atonement  at  all  would  afford  full  play  for 
the  attribute,  by  the  entire  nullification  of  all  judi¬ 
cial  demands. 

2.  The  second  objection  of  Socinus  to  the  Church 
doctrine  of  atonement  was,  that  substitution  of  pen¬ 
alty  is  impossible.  An  innocent  person  cannot  en¬ 
dure  penal  suffering,  cannot  be  punished,  because 

• 

sin  is  personal  (corporalis).  God  himself  asserts 
(Deut.  xxiv.  16 ;  Ezekiel  xviii.  20),  that  u  the 
fathers  shall  not  be  put  to  death  for  the  children, 
neither  shall  the  children  be  put  to  death  for  the 
fathers ;  every  man  shall  be  put  to  death  for  his 
own  sin.  The  soul  that  sinneth,  it  shall  die.  The 
son  shall  not  bear  the  iniquity  of  the  father,  neither 
shall  the  father  bear  the  iniquity  of  the  son ;  the 


382 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


righteousness  of  the  righteous  shall  be  upon  him,  and 
the  wickedness  of  the  wicked  shall  be  upon  him.” 
If,  then,  by  the  sentence  and  decree  of  God,  neither 
the  son  ought  to  be  punished  for  the  sins  of  the 
father,  nor  the  father  for  the  sins  of  the  son,  how 
can  it  be  possible  that  God  should  be  willing  to 
exact  the  punishment  of  man’s  sins  from  any  other 
being  (ab  alio  ullo).  Penalty  is  not  like  a  pecuni¬ 
ary  debt.  One  person  can  pay  a  sum  of  money  for 
another,  because  money  is  impersonal.  But  one 
being  cannot  satisfy  justice  for  another,  because 
punishment  is  personal.  Justice  permits  no  vica¬ 
riousness  and  no  substitution ;  but  requires  that 
the  very  identical  soul  that  has  sinned  shall  suffer. 
There  is  no  way,  therefore,  to  deliver  the  guilty 
from  penalty,  but  by  an  act  of  sovereign  will.  Jus¬ 
tice  is  made  by  will,  and  can  therefore  be  abolished 
by  will  whenever  the  Supreme  Sovereign  pleases 
to  do  so.  God  possesses  the  right,  if  he  chooses,  to 
arrest  the  stroke  of  law,  because  both  the  law  and 
its  penalty  are  his  own  product.  And  when,  and 
only  when,  he  thus  arrests  the  operation  of  law  by 
a  sovereign  volition,  and  without  any  substitution 
of  penalty,  he  shows  mercy. 1 

3.  The  third  objection  which  Socinus  made  to 
the  doctrine  of  vicarious  atonement  was,  that  even 
if  vicarious  penalty  were  allowable  and  possible, 
Christ  has  not  rendered  an  equivalent  for  the  sin  of 


1  Socinus  :  Praelectiones,  Cap.  XVTTT.  (Bib.  Frat.  Pol.  I.  570). 


SOCINIAN  OBJECTIONS. 


383 


man.  The  law  threatens  eternal  death.  Every  in¬ 
dividual  transgressor  owes  an  endless  punishment 
to  justice.  It  would  be  necessary,  therefore,  that 
there  should  be  as  many  substitutes  as  there  are 
sinners,  because  one  substitute  could  suffer  but  one 
endless  suffering.  But  that  Christ  did  not  endure 
endless  death  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  he  rose 
from  the  dead.  Moreover,  the  Scriptures  assert 
(1  Cor.  xv.  17)  that  “if  Christ  be  not  raised ,  your 
faith  is  vain  ;  ye  are  yet  in  your  sins.”  But  if  it  be 
Christ’s  death  that  saves  man,  as  the  Church  theory 
teaches,  there  is  no  need  of  his  resurrection.  Since, 
therefore,  Christ  did  not  suffer  eternal  death,  but 
rose  again  from  the  dead,  and  since  it  is  said  that 
unless  he  had  risen  from  the  dead,  sin  would  not 
have  been  forgiven,  it  follows  that  he  did  not  obtain 
the  forgiveness  of  man’s  sins  by  the  method  of  judi¬ 
cial  satisfaction  through  his  sufferings  and  death. 
It  is  indeed  said  that  the  dignity  of  Christ’s  person 
makes  his  sufferings  of  infinite  worth.  But  God  is 
no  respecter  of  persons.  Christ  simply  endured  a 
finite  pain,  which  of  course  could  not  be  an  equiva¬ 
lent  for  the  sin  of  a  whole  world.  His  suffering 
was  disciplinary,  and  not  judicial.  It  was  not  a 
penal  agony  endured  for  purposes  of  justice,  but  was 
a  natural  and  necessary  part  of  his  personal  prepa¬ 
ration  for  eternal  glory.  The  captain  of  our  salva¬ 
tion  was  made  perfect  in  his  own  character  by  suf¬ 
fering  (Heb.  ii.  10).  Being  found  in  the  fashion  of 
a  man,  he  humbled  himself,  and  became  obedient 


384 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


unto  death,  even  the  death  of  the  cross.  Wherefore 
God  also  hath  highly  exalted  him,  etc.  (Phil.  if. 

4.  Socinus  contended,  in  the  fourth  place,  that 
the  obedience  of  Christ  could  not  be  a  vicarious 
obedience.  Christ  was  obligated  to  obey  the  law 
for  himself  as  an  individual,  and  therefore  he  could 
not  obey  it  for  others.  This  is  evident  from  the 
fact  that  he  was  rewarded  for  his  obedience  and  for 
his  sufferings,  as  any  other  individual  is.  But  even 
if  his  obedience  could  avail  for  another,  it  could 
avail  for  only  a  single  individual  of  the  human  fam¬ 
ily.  The  alleged  dignity  of  his  Person  does  not  re¬ 
lieve  the  difficulty.  A  human  nature  is  incapable 
of  rendering  an  infinite  obedience;  and  that  the 
Divine  Nature  which  is  Supreme  and  receives  obe¬ 
dience  from  all  creatures  should  itself  render  obedi¬ 
ence,  is  absurd.2 

5.  A  fifth  objection  urged  by  Socinus  against 
the  Church  soteriology  is,  that  the  ideas  of  satisfac¬ 
tion  and  imputation  which  are  associated  in  it  are 
self-contradictory.  If  a  complete  satisfaction  of  the 
claims  of  justice  has  been  made,  this  settles  the  mat¬ 
ter.  To  make  this  objective  and  finished  payment 
of  a  debt  to  depend  upon  an  act  of  imputation  upon 
the  part  of  God,  and  of  faith  upon  the  part  of  man, 
is  self-contradictory.  If  Christ  has  endured  the 

1  Socinus  :  Praelectiones  Theo-  3  Socinus  :  Praelectiones  Theo- 
logicae,  Cap.  XVIII.  (Bib.  Frat.  logicae,  Cap.  XVIII.  (Bib.  Frat. 
Pol.  I.  570-573).  Pol.  I.  571-3). 


SOCINTANf  OBJECTIONS. 


385 


penalty  due  to  man  for  sin,  this  is  a  fact,  and  cannot 
be  affected  by  either  the  belief  or  the  unbelief  of 
the  creature.  An  atonement  that  cancels  the  sin  of 
the  world,  logically  frees  that  world  from  condem¬ 
nation.  But  according  to  the  Church  doctrine  none 
are  saved  from  condemnation  unless  this  satisfaction 
is  imputed  by  God,  and  received  in  the  act  of  faith 
by  man.1 

6.  Sixthly,  Socinus  contended  that  if  Christ 
made  complete  satisfaction  for  all  the  sin  of  man, 
both  past  and  future,  it  follows  that  not  only  no 
other  satisfaction  is  required,  but  that  personal  holi¬ 
ness  is  not  necessary.  Inasmuch  as  the  Scriptures 
teach  that  without  righteousness  no  one  can  enter 
the  kingdom  of  God,  the  advocates  of  the  doctrine 
of  satisfaction  betake  themselves  to  the  notion  of  an 
imputed  righteousness,  by  means  of  which  man, 
though  sinful  and  polluted,  is  accounted  or  reckoned 
to  be  holy.  Hence  it  follows  from  the  Protestant 
doctrine  of  imputed  righteousness,  that  even  with¬ 
out  true  and  actual  holiness  future  blessedness  is 
attainable.2 

The  positive  part  of  Socinus’s  soteriology  is 
found  in  the  position,  that  forgiveness  is  granted 
upon  the  ground  of  repentance  and  obedience. 
There  are  no  legal  obstacles  in  the  way  of  pardon, 
because  the  will  of  God  is  sovereign  and  supreme 

1  Socrnus  :  De  Christo  Serva-  2  Socinus  :  De  Christo  Serua- 
tore,  Pars  IV.  Cap.  iii.  (Bib.  Frat.  tore,  P.  IV.  Cap.  iii.  (Bib.  Frat. 
Pol.  II.  217).  Pol.  Tom.  II.  217). 

YOL.  II.—25 


386 


HISTORY  OF  SOTERIOLOGY. 


over  law  and  penalty.  Nothing  is  necessary,  con¬ 
sequently,  but  sorrow  for  sin,  and  an  earnest  pur¬ 
pose  to  obey  the  commandments.  Christ  has  set  an 
example  of  obedience,  and  man  is  to  follow  it  in  the 
exercise  of  his  natural  powers. 


BOOK  SIXTH. 


HISTORY 


OF 


ESCHATOLOGY. 


* 


CHAPTER  I. 


SECOND  ADVENT  OF  CHRIST. 


§  1.  Millenarianism, 

Millenarianism ,  or  CJiiliasm ,  is  tlie  doctrine  of 
two  resurrections  (Rev.  xx.), — the  first,  that  of  the 
righteous  dead  at  the  time  of  the  second  advent  of 
Christ,  and  the  second  that  of  the  righteous  and  the 
wicked  at  the  end  of  the  world,— and  a  personal 
corporeal  reign  of  Christ  between  them,  for  a  thou¬ 
sand  years,  upon  the  renovated  earth.  It  is  sub¬ 
stantially  the  same  with  the  Later- Jewish  doctrine 
of  a  Messianic  kingdom  upon  earth.  The  Jews  at 
the  time  of  the  Incarnation  were  expecting  a  per¬ 
sonal  prince,  and  a  corporeal  reign,  in  the  Messiah 
who  was  to  come ;  and  one  of  the  principal  grounds 
of  their  rejection  of  Christ  was  the  fact  that  he  re¬ 
presented  the  Messiah’s  rule  as  a  spiritual  one  in  the 
hearts  of  men,  and  gave  no  countenance  to  their  lit¬ 
eral  and  materializing  interpretation  of  the  Messi¬ 
anic  prophecies.  The  disciples  of  Christ,  being 
themselves  Jews,  were  at  first  naturally  infected 


390 


HISTORY  OF  ESCIIATOLOGY. 


with  these  views,  and  it  was  not  until  after  that 
Pentecostal  effusion  of  the  Holy  Spirit  which  so  en¬ 
larged  their  conceptions  of  the  kingdom  of  God,  and 
with  which  their  inspiration  properly  begins,  that 
they  rose  above  their  early  Jewish  education.  In 
none  of  their  inspired  writings  do  we  find  such  an 
expectation  of  Christ’s  speedy  coming  as  prompted 
the  question :  u  Lord,  wilt  thou  at  this  time  restore 
again  the  kingdom  to  Israel  ?  ”  (Acts  i.  6).  For  the 
answer  of  Christ  to  this  inquiry  had  given  them 
to  understand,  that  before  this  event  could  occur 
Christianity  must  be  preached  in  “  Jerusalem,  and 
in  all  Judea,  and  in  Samaria,  and  unto  the  uttermost 
part  of  the  earth  ”  (Acts  i.  8). 

There  being  this  affinity  between  Millenarian- 
ism  and  the  Later- Jewish  idea  of  the  Messiah  and 
his  kingdom,  it  is  not  surprising  to  find  that  Mille- 
narianism  was  a  peculiarity  of  the  Jewish-Christian, 
as  distinguished  from  the  Gentile-Christian  branch 
of  the  church,  at  the  close  of  the  first  century.  It 
appears  first  in  the  system  of  the  Judaistic-Gnostic 
Ceri/nthus ,  the  contemporary  and  opponent  of  the 
apostle  John.  Of  the  Apostolical  Fathers,  only 
Barnabas ,  Ilermas,  and  Papias  exhibit  in  their 
writings  distinct  traces  of  this  doctrine, — the  latter 
teaching  it  in  its  grossest  form,  and  the  first  two 
holding  it  in  a  less  sensuous  manner.  There  are  no 
traces  of  Chiliasm  in  the  writings  of  Clement  of 
Home ,  Ignatius ,  Poly  carp,  Tatian ,  Athengoras ,  and 


MILLEHARLANTSM. 


391 


Theophilus  of  Antioch }  The  inference  from  these 
facts,  then,  is,  that  this  tenet  was  not  the  received 
faith  of  the  chnrch  certainly  down  to  the  year  150. 
It  was  held  only  by  individuals.  These,  in  some 
instances,  as  in  that  of  Cerinthus,  were  in  hostile 
and  positively  heretical  relations  to  the  church. 
And  in  the  instance  of  those  whose  general  catho¬ 
licity  was  acknowledged — as  Barnabas,  Hennas,  and 
Papias, — there  was  by  no  means  such  a  weight  of 
character  and  influence,  as  would  entitle  them  to  be 
regarded  as  the  principal  or  sole  representatives  of 
orthodoxy.  On  the  contrary,  these  minds  were 
comparatively  uninfluential,  and  their  writings  are 
of  little  importance.  The  ecclesiastical  authority  of 
Clement  of  Rome,  Ignatius,  and  Poly  carp  is  certain¬ 
ly  much  greater  than  that  of  Barnabas,  Hernias,  and 
Papias.  So  far  as  concerns  the  Apostolic  age,  then, 
the  testimony  of  history  goes  to  show  that  the  lit¬ 
eral  and  materializing  interpretation  put  upon  the 
teachings  of  Isaiah  and  St.  John  concerning  the 
second  coming  of  Christ,  by  the  Millenarian,  was 
not  the  most  authoritative  one, — although  prevalent 
among  the  Jewish  as  distinguished  from  the  Gentile 
Christians,  and  gradually  becoming  prevalent  in  the 
church  generally,  from  a  cause  that  will  be  noticed 
hereafter.  A  further  incidental  proof  of  the  posi¬ 
tion,  that  Millenarianism  was  not  the  received  and 
authoritative  faith  of  the  church  from  the  death  of 
the  Apostles  to  the  year  150,  is  found  in  the  fact 

1  Hagenbach  :  History  of  Doctrine,  §  75,  n.  6.  (Smith’s  Ed.). 


392 


HISTORY  OF  ESCHATOLOGY. 


that  it  does  not  appear  in  the  so-called  Apostles1 
Creed.  This  symbol  was  not,  indeed,  drawn  up  by 
the  Apostles,  but  it  is  undoubtedly  the  substance 
of  the  short  confessions  of  faith  which  the  catechu¬ 
mens  of  the  Apostolic  Church  were  accustomed  to 
make  upon  entering  the  church ;  so  that  it  is  a 
full  statement  of  what  passed  for  the  substance  of 
Christianity  with  them.  But  in  this  symbol  there 
is  not  the  slightest  allusion  to  two  resurrections 
and  a  corporeal  reign  of  Christ  between  them.  The 
only  specifications  are,  that  Christ  shall  come  from 
heaven  “to  judge  the  quick  and  the  dead;”  and 
that  there  is  a  “resurrection  of  the  body,”  and  a 
“life  everlasting”  [immediately  succeeding,  is  the 
implication]. 

The  period  between  the  year  150  and  250  is  the 
blooming  age  of  Millenarianism ;  and  yet  even  in 
this  period  it  does  not  become  the  catholic  faith,  as 
embodied  in  the  catholic  creed.  Some  minds  now 
adopt  the  literal  interpretation  of  the  Old  Testa¬ 
ment  prophecies,  and  subject  them  to  a  very  sensu¬ 
ous  exegesis.  Irenaeus  and  Tertullian  give  glowing 
descriptions  of  the  Millennial  reign.1  Anti-Christ 
together  with  all  the  nations  that  side  with  him 
will  be  destroyed.  All  earthly  empires,  and  the 
Roman  in  particular,  will  be  overthrown.  Christ 
will  again  appear,  and  will  reign  a  thousand  years, 
in  corporeal  presence  on  earth,  in  Jerusalem,  which 

1  Irenaeus  :  Contra  Haereses,  V.  xxv.  36.  Teetullianus  :  Adver- 
sus  Marcionem,  iii.  24. 


MILLEXARIAXISM. 


393 


will  be  rebuilt  and  made  tbe  capital  of  bis  king¬ 
dom.  The  patriarchs,  prophets,  and  all  the  pious, 
will  be  raised  from  the  dead,  and  share  in  the  feli¬ 
city  of  this  kingdom.  The  ISTew  Jerusalem  is  de¬ 
pictured  in  the  most  splendid  colors.  The  meta¬ 
phors  of  Isaiah  (liv.  11,  12),  are  treated  as  proper 
terms.  Irenaeus1  describes  the  foundations  of  the 
rebuilt  Jerusalem  as  literally  carbuncle  and  sap¬ 
phire,  and  its  bulwarks  crystal;  and  regards  it  as 
actually  let  down  from  heaven,  according  to  Rev. 
xxi.  2.  Tertullian  puts  the  same  interpretation  with 
Irenaeus  upon  this  text,  and  for  confirmation  refers 
to  the  report,  that  in  the  Parthian  war,  in  Judea  a 
city  was  observed  to  be  lowered  down  from  the  sky 
every  morning,  and  to  disappear  as  the  day  ad¬ 
vanced.  The  earth  was  to  become  wonderfully 
fertile.  Irenaeus 2  cites  with  approbation  from  Pa 
pias  the  statement,  that  there  would  be  vines  having 
ten  thousand  branches,  and  each  branch  ten  thou¬ 
sand  boughs,  and  each  bough  ten  thousand  shoots, 
and  each  shoot  ten  thousand  clusters,  and  each  clus¬ 
ter  ten  thousand  berries,  and  each  berry  would 
yield  twenty-five  measures  of  wine. 

The  Millenarian  tendency  became  stronger  as 
the  church  began,  in  the  last  half  of  the  second 
century,  to  feel  the  persecuting  hand  of  the  govern¬ 
ment  laid  upon  it.  The  distressed  condition  of  the 
people  of  God  led  them  to  desire  and  pray  for  an 

1  Irenaeus  :  Adversus  Haere-  3  Irenaeus  :  Adversus  Haere- 
ses,  Y.  xxxiv.  ses,  V.  xxxiii. 


394 


HIST0BY  OF  ESCHATOLOGY. 


advent  of  the  Head  of  the  church  that  would  extin¬ 
guish  all  his  enemies.  It  was  natural  that  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  personal  reign  of  Christ  should  be  the 
most  prevalent  when  the  earthly  condition  of  the 
church  was  the  most  intolerable.  So  general  had 
the  tenet  become  in  the  last  half  of  the  2d  century, 
that  Justin  Martyr 1  declares  that  it  was  the  belief 
of  all  but  the  Gnostics.  But  Irenaeus,2  on  the  con¬ 
trary,  speaks  of  opposers  of  Millenarianism  who 
held  the  catholic  faith,  and  who  agreed  with  the 
Gnostics  only  in  being  Anti-Millenarians ;  although 
he  is  himself  desirous  to  make  it  appear  that  Anti- 
Millenarianism  is  of  the  nature  of  heresy.  Gains ,  a 
presbyter  of  Rome  about  the  year  200,  attacks  the 
Millenarian  views  of  the  Montanist  Proclus,  and  de¬ 
clares  Millenarianism  to  be  the  invention  of  Cerin- 
thus,  and  the  Apocalypse  a  writing  of  this  heretic. 
Cyprian  maintains  the  Millenarian  theory  with  his 
.usual  candor  and  moderation.  Yet,  Millenarianism 
does  not  appear  in  the  catholic  creed  as  an  article  of 
faith.  Both  Irenaeus  and  Tertullian,  in  their  writings 
against  heretics,  present  brief  synoptical  statements 
of  the  authorized  faith  of  the  church  ; 3  but  in  none 
of  them  do  we  find  the  Millenarian  tenet.  In  their 
synopses,  there  is  nothing  more  said  upon  eschatolog¬ 
ical  points,  than  is  contained  in  the  Apostles’  Creed. 

i 

1  Justinus  Martyr  :  Dialogue  3  Irenaeus  :  Adv.  Haer.  I.  x ; 

cum  Tryphone,  p.  306.  III.  iv.  Tertullianus  :  De  virg. 

2  Irenaeus  :  Adversus  Haere-  vel.  Cap.  i. ;  Adv.  Prax.  Cap.  ii. ; 

ses,  Y.  xxxi.  1.  De  praescr.  haer.  Cap.  xiii. 


MILLEXAEIAXTSM. 


895 


The  3d  century  witnessed  a  very  decided  opposi¬ 
tion  to  Millenarianism, — a  fact  which  evinces  that  its 
blooming  period  was  a  brief  one  of  about  a  hundred 
years.  The  Alexandrine  School,  under  the  lead  of 
Clement  and  Origen ,  made  a  vigorous  attack ;  and 
in  the  last  part  of  the  3d  century,  Dionysius ,  bishop 
of  Alexandria,  succeeded  by  dint  of  argument  in  re* 
pressing  a  very  gross  form  of  Millenarianism  that 
was  spreading  in  his  diocese,  under  the  advocacy  of 
Nepos  and  Coracion.  After  the  3d  century,  the 
tenet  disappears  very  generally.  Lactantius  (f  330) 
is  the  only  man  of  any  note  in  the  4th  century  who 
defends  the  system.  Augustine  adopted  the  theory 
in  his  earlier  days,  but  rejected  it  afterwards.  That 
Chiliasm  could  not  have  been  generally  current  in 
the  beginning  of  the  4th  century,  is  proved  by  the 
manner  in  which  Eusebius  speaks  of  it.  Describing 
the  writings  of  Papias,  he  remarks  that  they  contain 
“  matters  rather  too  fabulous.”  Among  these  “  mat¬ 
ters,”  he  enumerates  the  opinion  of  Papias,  that 
a  there  would  be  a  certain  millennium  after  the 
resurrection,  and  that  there  would  be  a  corporeal 
reign  of  Christ  on  this  very  earth  ;  which  things  he 
appears  to  have  imagined,  as  if  they  were  author¬ 
ized  by  the  apostolic  narrations,  not  understand¬ 
ing  correctly  those  matters  which  they  propounded 
mystically,  in  their  representations.  For  he  was 
very  limited  in  his  comprehension,  as  is  evident 
from  his  discourses,  yet  he  was  the  cause  why  most 
of  the  ecclesiastical  writers,  urging  the  antiquity  of 


396 


HISTOKY  OF  ESCHATOLOGY. 


the  man,  were  carried  away  by  a  similar  opinion, — 
as,  for  instance,  Irenaeus,  or  any  other  that  adopted 
similar  sentiments.”1  Had  Millenarianism,  in  the 
first  quarter  of  the  4th  century,  been  the  received 
belief  of  any  considerable  portion  of  the  catholic 
church,  a  writer  like  Eusebius,  whose  respect  for 
everything  catholic  and  ecclesiastical  was  very  high, 
would  not  have  spoken  of  it  as  u  fabulous.” 

The  history  of  Millenarianism  after  the  year  400 
is  reduceable  to  a  very  short  compass.  During  the 
Middle  Ages,  it  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  had  any 
existence  as  a  doctrine ;  though  at  the  close  of  the 
tenth  century,  there  was  an  undefined  fear  and  ex¬ 
pectation  among  the  masses  that  the  year  1000 
would  witness  the  advent  of  the  Lord.  In  the 
period  of  the  Reformation,  Millenarianism  made  its 
appearance  in  connection  with  the  fanatical  and 
hetorodox  tendencies  that  sprang  up  along  with 
the  great  religious  awakening.  Hence,  the  symbols 
when  they  notice  the  doctrine  at  all  do  so  in  terms 
of  condemnation.  The  Augsburg  Confession  con¬ 
demns  Chiliasm  in  conjunction  with  the  doctrine  of 
a  limited  future  punishment ;  both  tenets  being 
held  by  the  Anabaptists  of  that  day.  u  Damnant 
Anabaptistas,  qui  sentiunt  hominibus  damnatis  ac 
diabolis  finem  poenarum  futurum  esse.  Damnant 
et  alios,  qui  spargunt  Judiacos  opiniones,  quod  ante 
resurrectionem  mortuorum  pii  regnum  mundi  occa- 


1  Eusebius  :  Eccl.  Hist.  III.  xxxix. 


MILLENARIANISM. 


397 


paturi  sint,  ubique  oppressis  impiis.”  1  The  English 
Confession  of  Edward  VI,  from  which  the  Thirty 
Nine  Articles  were  afterwards  condensed,  condemns 
it  in  nearly  the  same  terms  as  the  Augsburg.  a  Qui 
millenariorum  fabulam  revocare  conantur,  sacris  lite- 
ris  adversantur,  et  in  Judaica  deliramenta  sese  prae- 
cipitant.” 2  The  Belgic  Confession  guards  the  state¬ 
ment  respecting  the  second  advent  of  Christ,  by 
teaching  that  the  time  of  its  occurrence  is  unknown 
to  all  created  beings,  and  that  it  will  not  take  place 
until  the  number  of  the  elect  is  complete.  u  Credimus 
Dominum  nostrum  Jesum  Christum,  quando  tempus 
a  Deo  praestitum,  quod  omnibus  creaturis  est  igno- 
tum,  advenerit,  et  numerus  electorum  completus 
fuerit,  e  caelo  rursus  venturum,  etc.” 3 

The  history  of  Chiliasm  since  the  Reformation 
presents  few  points  of  importance.  During  the 
present  century,  individual  minds  in  England  and 
America,  and  upon  the  Continent  of  Europe,  have 
attempted  to  revive  the  theory, — in  some  instances, 
in  union  with  an  intelligent  and  earnest  orthodoxy  ; 
in  others,  in  connection  with  an  uneducated  and 
somewhat  fanatical  pietism.  The  first  class  is  re¬ 
presented  by  Delitzsch  and  Auberlen  in  Germany, 
and  by  Cumming ,  Elliott ,  and  Bonar  in  Great 
Britain;  the  second  class  by  the  .so-called  Adventr 
ists  and  Millerites  in  the  United  States. 

The  facts,  then,  established  by  this  account  of 

1  Hase  :  Libri  Symbolici,  p.  14.  2  Niemeyer  :  Collectio,  p.  600. 

3bTiEMEYER:  Collectio,  p.  387. 


398 


HISTORY  OF  ESCHATOLOGY. 


Millenarianism  in  the  Ancient,  Mediaeval,  and  Mod¬ 
ern  Churches,  are  the  following :  1.  That  Millena- 
rianism  was  never  the  oecumenical  faith  of  the 
church,  and  never  entered  as  an  article  into  any 
of  the  creeds.  2.  That  Millenarianism  has  been  the 
opinion  of  individuals  and  parties  only, — some  of 
whom  have  stood  in  agreement  with  the  catholic 
faith,  and  some  in  opposition  to  it. 


§  2.  Catholic  Iheory  of  the  Second  Advent . 

The  pressure  of  persecution  being  lifted  off,  the 
church  returned  to  its  earlier  and  first  exegesis  of  the 
Scripture  data  concerning  the  end  of  the  world,  and 
the  second  coming  of  Christ.  The  representations 
in  Rev.  xx.  were  once  more  interpreted  by  those  in 
Matt,  xxv.,  which  speak  only  of  an  advent  at  the 
day  of  judgment ;  and  by  the  instructions  given  by 
St.  Paul,  in  2  Thess.  ii.,  to  correct  the  erroneous  in¬ 
ference  which  the  Thessalonian  Church  had  drawn 
from  his  first  Epistle  to  them,  “  that  the  day  of 
Christ  is  at  hand.”  The  personal  coming  of  Christ, 
it  was  now  held,  is  not  to  take  place  until  the  final 
day  of  doom  ;  until  the  gospel  has  been  preached 
“  unto  the  uttermost  part  of  the  earth  ”  (Acts  i.  8)  ; 
until  the  Jews  have  been  converted  to  Christianity, 
after  “  the  fulness  of  the  Gentiles  be  brought  in  ” 
(Rom.  xi.) ;  and  until  that  great  apostasy  has  oc¬ 
curred  which  is  mentioned  by  St.  Paul  (1  Thess.  ii. 


CATHOLIC  THEORY. 


399 


3).  The  eschatology  of  the  oldest  symbol  became 
the  oecumenical  doctrine,  and  the  Church  in  all  its 
ages,  without  even  a  hint  of  any  other  appearance 
of  the  risen  Redeemer,  has  confessed  in  the  phrase¬ 
ology  of  the  Apostles  Creed  its  belief,  that  u  He 
ascended  into  heaven,  and  sitteth  on  the  right  hand 
of  God  the  Father  Almighty;  from  thence  he  shall 
come  to  judge  the  quick  and  the  dead.” 


CHAPTER  II. 


THE  RESURRECTION.1 


§  1.  The  Intermediate  State . 

The  opinions  of  the  Early  Fathers  concerning 
the  residence  of  the  soul  in  its  disembodied  state, 
between  death  and  the  resurrection,  were  somewhat 
fluctuating.  The  idea  of  a  Hades,  or  under-world, 
where  departed  spirits  dwell,  was  familiar  to  the 
Hebrew  mind  as  it  was  to  the  Greek,  and  so  far  as 
this  idea  passed  over  to  Christianity  it  tended  to 
the  doctrine  of  a  state  intermediate  between  this 
earthly  life,  and  the  everlasting  abode  of  the  soul 
assigned  to  it  in  the  day  of  judgment.  Justin 
Martyr  represents  the  souls  of  the  righteous  as 
taking  up  a  temporary  abode  in  a  happy,  and 
those  of  the  wicked  in  a  wretched  place  ;  and  stig¬ 
matizes  as  heretical  the  doctrine  that  souls  are  im¬ 
mediately  received  into  heaven  at  death.2  Tertulr 

1  The  materials  in  this  and  the  Hagenbach  :  History  of  Doctrine 
succeeding  chapter  are  derived  (Smith’s  Ed.), 
mostly  from  Baumgaeten-Ceu-  2Justinus  Maetye:  Dialogus 
sius  :  Dogmengeschichte,  and  cum  Tryphone,  §§  5.  80. 


THE  INTERMEDIATE  STATE. 


401 


Man  held  that  the  martyrs  went  at  once  to  the 
abode  of  the  blessed,  but  that  this  was  a  privilege 
peculiar  to  them,  and  not  granted  to  other  Chris¬ 
tians.1  Cyprian ,  on  the  other  hand,  says  nothing  of 
an  intermediate  state,  and  expresses  the  confident 
belief  that  those  who  die  in  the  Lord,  by  pestilence 
or  by  any  other  mode,  will  be  at  once  taken  to 
him.2  In  the  Alexandrine  School ,  the  idea  of  an 
intermediate  state  passed  into  that  of  a  gradual 
purification  of  the  soul,  and  paved  the  way  for  the 
later  Papal  doctrine  of  purgatory.3 

The  doctrine  of  an  intermediate  state  not  only 
maintained  itself,  but  gained  in  authority  and  influ¬ 
ence  during  the  Polemic  period  (250-730).  Am - 
brose  taught  that  u  the  soul  is  separated  from  the 
body  at  death,  and  after  the  cessation  of  the  earth¬ 
ly  life  is  held  in  an  ambiguous  condition  (ambiguo 
suspenditur),  awaiting  the  final  judgment.”4  Au¬ 
gustine  remarks  that  “  the  period  (tempus)  which 
intervenes  between  the  death  and  the  final  resur¬ 
rection  of  man,  contains  souls  in  secret  receptacles, 
who  are  treated  according  to  their  character  and 
conduct  in  the  flesh.” 5  u  The  majority  of  ecclesias¬ 
tical  writers  of  this  period,”  Hagenbach  remarks, 
“  believed  that  men  do  not  receive  their  full  re- 

1  Tertullianus  :  De  anima,  lv;  4Ambrosius:  De  Cain  et  Abel, 

De  resurrectione,  sliii.  II.  ii. 

2  Cyprianus  :  Adv.  Demetrinm ;  6  Augustinus  :  Enchiridion, 

De  mortalitate.  cix. 

3  Redepenning  :  Origenes,  235. 


402 


HISTORY  OF  ESCHATOLOGY. 


ward  till  after  the  resurrection  of  the  body.”  Here 
and  there,  however,  there  was  a  dissenting  voice. 
Gregory  Nazianzen  supposed  that  the  souls  of  the 
righteous,  prior  to  the  resurrection  of  the  body,  are 
at  once  admitted  into  the  presence  of  God ;  in 
which  opinion  he  seems  to  be  supported  by  Genna- 
dius ,  and  Gregory  the  Great.  Eusebius  also  de¬ 
clares  that  Helena,  the  mother  of  Constantine,  went 
immediately  to  God,  and  was  transformed  into  an 
angelic  substance. 

In  the  Middle  Ages  and  the  Papal  Church,  the 
doctrine  of  an  intermediate  state  was,  of  course,  re¬ 
tained  and  defended  in  connection  with  that  of 
purgatory.  In  the  Protestant  Church,  the  doctrine 
of  purgatory  was  rejected ;  but  some  difference  of 
sentiment  appears  respecting  the  intermediate  state. 
Calvin  combatted  the  theory  of  a  sleep  of  the  soul 
between  death  and  the  resurrection  (Psychopan- 
nychy),  which  had  been  revived  by  some  of  the 
Swiss  Anabaptists,  and  argues  for  the  full  con¬ 
sciousness  of  the  disembodied  spirit.  The  Second 
Helvetic  Confession  expressly  rejects  the  notion 
that  departed  spirits  reappear  on  earth.  Some 
theologians  endeavored  to  establish  a  distinction 
between  the  happiness  which  the  disembodied 
spirit  enjoys,  and  that  which  it  will  experience 
after  the  resurrection  of  the  body.  They  also  dis¬ 
tinguished  between  the  judgment  which  takes  place 
at  the  death  of  each  individual,  by  which  his  des¬ 
tiny  is  immediately  decided,  and  the  general  judg- 


THE  INTERMEDIATE  STATE. 


403 


ment  at  the  end  of  the  world.  Speaking  generally, 
the  doctrine  of  an  intermediate  state  has  found 
most  favour  in  the  Lutheran  division  of  Protestants. 
In  the  English  Church,  since  the  time  of  Laud,  the 
doctrine  has  found  some  advocates,  chiefly  in  that 
portion  of  it  characterized  by  high  church  views, 
and  a  Romanizing  tendency.  The  followers  of 
Swedenborg  adopt  the  tenet,  in  a  highly  gross  and 
materializing  form. 


§  2.  The  Resurrection  Body . 

The  doctrine  of  the  resurrection  of  the  body  was 
from  the  beginning  a  cardinal  and  striking  tenet  of 
the  Christian  Church.  The  announcement  of  it  by 
Paul  at  Athens  awakened  more  interest,  and  pro¬ 
voked  more  criticism,  than  any  other  of  the  truths 
which  he  taught  (Acts  xvii.  32).  All  the  early 
Fathers  maintain  this  dogma  with  great  earnestness 
and  unanimity,  against  the  objections  and  denial  of 
the  skeptics, — of  whom  Oelsus  is  the  most  acute  and 
scoffing  in  his  attacks.  Most  of  them  believed  in 
the  resuscitation  of  the  very  same  body  that  lived 
on  earth.  Only  the  Alexandrine  School  dissented 
upon  this  point.  Justin  Martyr  affirms  that  the 
body  will  rise  again  with  all  its  members.  Even 
cripples  will  rise  as  such,  but  at  the  moment  of 
resurrection  will  be  made  physically  perfect.  Ire - 
naeus  asserts  the  identity  of  the  future  with  the 


404 


HISTOEY  OF  ESCHATOLOGY. 


present  body.  Tertullian  wrote  a  tract  upon  the 
resurrection,  maintaining  that  the  very  same  body 
will  be  raised  that  was  laid  in  the  grave.  He  an¬ 
swers  the  objection  that  certain  members  of  the 
body  will  be  of  no  use  in  the  future  life,  by  the  re¬ 
mark  that  the  bodily  member  is  capable  of  both  a 
lower  and  a  higher  service.  Even  upon  earth,  the 
mouth  serves  not  only  for  the  purpose  of  eating, 
but  also  of  speaking  and  praising  God.  Cyprian 
follows  Tertullian  in  his  representations.  Clement 
of  Alexandria,  and  Origen ,  on  the  other  hand,  adopt 
a  spiritualizing  theory  of  the  resurrection.  Origen 
teaches  that  a  belief  in  the  doctrine  of  the  resurrec¬ 
tion  of  the  body  is  not  absolutely  essential  to  the 
profession  of  Christianity,  provided  the  immortality 
of  the  soul  be  maintained.  Yet  he  defended  the 
church  dogma  against  the  objections  of  Celsus,  re¬ 
jecting,  however,  the  doctrine  of  the  identity  of  the 
bodies,  as  giving  a  handle  to  scoffers.  These  ideal¬ 
izing  views  of  the  Alexandrine  School  were  adopted 
by  several  of  the  Eastern  theologians ;  for  example, 
Gregory  Nazianzen ,  Gregory  Nyssa ,  and  perhaps 
Basil }  But  they  were  combatted  at  both  the 
East  and  the  West,  with  great  vehemence.  Jerome 
maintained  the  identity  of  the  resurrection-body 
with  that  laid  in  the  grave,  in  respect  to  the  very 

1  Synesitts  of  Cyrene  acknowl-  was  interpreted,  by  some,  as  an 
edged  that  he  could  not  adopt  the  entire  denial  of  the  doctrine  of 
current  view  in  the  church  re-  the  resurrection, 
specting  the  resurrection,  which 


THE  RESURRECTION  BODY. 


405 


hairs  and  teeth.  This  last  he  proves  by  the  “  gnash¬ 
ing  of  teeth  ”  in  the  world  of  woe.  Augustine ,  in 
the  earlier  part  of  his  Christian  life,  was  somewhat 
inclined  to  the  spiritualizing  view  of  the  Alexandrine 
School ;  but  afterwards  defended  the  more  sen¬ 
suous  theory,  though  being  careful  to  clear  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  gross  and  carnal  additions.  Chrysostom  as¬ 
serted  the  identity  of  the  two  bodies,  but  directs 
particular  attention  to  the  Pauline  distinction  of  a 
“  natural  body  ”  and  a  “  spiritual  body.”  Gregory 
the  Great  maintained  substantially  the  same  views 
with  Augustine. 

The  doctrine  of  the  Ancient  Church,  that  the  hu¬ 
man  body  will  be  raised  with  ail  its  component  parts, 
passed  into  the  Middle  Ages,  and  was  regarded  as  the 
orthodox  doctrine.  Thomas  Aquinas ,  founding  upon 
the  Patristic  theory,  goes  into  details.  “The  resur¬ 
rection  will  probably  take  place  toward  evening,  for 
the  heavenly  bodies  wdiich  rule  over  all  earthly  mat¬ 
ter  must  first  cease  to  move.  Sun  and  moon  will 
meet  again  at  that  point  where  they  were  probably 
created.  No  other  matter  will  rise  from  the  grave 
than  what  existed  at  the  moment  of  death.  If  all 
that  substance  were  to  rise  again  which  has  been 
consumed  during  the  present  life,  it  would  form  a 
most  unshapely  mass.  The  sexual  difference  will 
exist,  but  without  sensual  appetites.  All  the  organs 
of  sense  will  still  be  active,  with  the  exception  of 
the  sense  of  taste.  It  is,  however,  possible  that 
even  this  latter  may  be  rendered  more  perfect,  and 


406 


HISTORY  OF  ESCHATOLOGY. 


fitted  for  adequate  functions  and  enjoyments.  Hair 
and  nails  are  one  of  the  ornaments  of  man,  and  are 
therefore  quite  as  necessary  as  blood  and  other 
fluids.  The  resurrection  bodies  will  be  exceedingly 
fine,  and  be  delivered  from  the  corpulence  and 
heavy  weight  which  is  now  so  burdensome  to  them  ; 
nevertheless,  they  will  be  tangible,  as  the  body  of 
Christ  was  touched  after  his  resurrection.  Their 
size  will  not  increase  after  the  resurrection,  nor  will 
they  grow  either  thicker  or  thinner.  To  some  ex¬ 
tent  they  will  still  be  dependent  on  space  and  time  ; 
yet  the  resurrection  bodies  will  move  much  faster, 
and  more  easily,  from  one  place  to  another,  than  our 
present  bodies ;  they  will  be  at  liberty  to  follow 
the  tendencies  and  impulses  of  the  soul.  They  are 
glorified,  bright,  and  shining,  and  can  be  perceived 
by  glorified  eyes  alone.  But  this  is  true  only  in 
reference  to  the  bodies  of  the  blessed.  The  bodies 
of  the  damned  are  to  be  ugly  and  deformed,  incor¬ 
ruptible,  but  capable  of  suffering,  which  is  not  the 
case  with  the  bodies  of  the  saints.” 1  These  repre¬ 
sentations  afterwards  found  their  vivid  embodiment 
in  the  poetry  of  Dante,  and  the  painting  of  Raffaelle 
and  Michael  Angelo.  Scotus  Erigena  endeavoured 
to  revive  the  ideas  of  Origin,  but  his  opinions  found 
no  favour. 

The  Patristic  theory  of  the  resurrection  body 
was  transmitted,  also,  to  the  Protestant  churches, 

1  Aquinas  :  Summa,  P.  iii.  Qn.  75 ;  quoted  by  Hagenbach  ;  His¬ 
tory  of  Doctrine,  §  201. 


THE  EESUEEECTION  BODY. 


407 


and  the  history  of  the  dogma  in  modern  times  ex¬ 
hibits  comparatively  few  variations  from  the  tradi¬ 
tional  belief, — and  these,  mostly  in  the  line  of  Ori- 
gen’s  speculations. 


CHAPTEE  III. 

THE  FINAL  STATE. 


§  1.  Day  of  Judgment. 

The  doctrine  of  a  general  judgment  was,  from 
tlie  first,  immediately  connected  with  that  of  the 
resurrection  of  the  body.  Mankind  are  raised  from 
the  dead,  in  order  to  be  judged  according  to  the 
deeds  done  in  the  body.  The  Fathers  founded 
their  views  of  the  day  of  doom  upon  the  represen¬ 
tations  and  imagery  of  Scripture.  They  believed 
that  a  general  conflagration  would,  accompany  the 
last  judgment,  which  would  destroy  the  world; 
though  some  ascribed  a  purifying  agency  to  it. 
Some  of  them,  like  Tertullian  and  the  more  rhetori¬ 
cal  of  the  Greek  Fathers,  enter  into  minute  details, 
while  others,  like  Augustine ,  endeavour  dogmat¬ 
ically  to  define  the  facts  couched  in  the  figurative 
language  of  Scripture.  These  two  classes  also  per¬ 
petuate  themselves  in  the  Mediaeval  Church.  In 
the  Middle  Ages,  it  was  a  popular  opinion  that  the 
judgment  would  take  place  in  the  valley  of  Jehos- 
aphat.  But  it  was  found  difficult  to  unite  in  a 


PUGrATORY. 


409 


single  scene  all  the  various  imagery  of  Scripture, — 
such  for  example,  as  the  darkening  of  the  sun  and 
moon,  and  yet  the  effulgence  of  light  accompanying 
the  advent  of  the  judge.  Hence  theologians  like 
Aquinas  (Qu.  88,  Art.  2.)  maintained  that  the 
judgment  would  take  place  mentaliter ,  because  the 
oral  trial  and  defence  of  each  individual  would  re¬ 
quire  too  much  time.  In  the  Modern  Church,  the 
course  of  thought  upon  this  doctrine  has  been  sim¬ 
ilar  to  that  in  the  Ancient  and  Mediaeval.  The 
symbols  of  the  different  Protestant  communions  ex¬ 
plicitly  affirm  a  day  of  judgment  at  the  end  of  the 
world,  but  enter  into  no  details.  Individual  specu¬ 
lations,  as  of  old,  vibrate  between  the  extremes  of 
materialism  and  hyper-spiritualism. 

§  2.  Purgatory . 

The  doctrine  of  purgatory  was  intimately  con¬ 
nected  with  that  of  an  intermediate  state,  and  was 
developed  along  with  it.  In  proportion  as  the  con¬ 
dition  of  the  soul  between  death  and  the  resurrec¬ 
tion  was  regarded  as  very  different  from  its  con¬ 
dition  after  the  final  judgment,  it  was  natural  that 
the  intermediate  state  should  be  looked  upon  as  one 
in  which  the  everlasting  destiny  is  not  irrevocably 
fixed,  and  in  which  there  might  possibly  be  a  de¬ 
liverance  from  evil  and  peril.  Those  of  the  early 
Fathers  who  held  the  doctrine  of  an  intermediate 


410 


HISTORY  OF  ESCHATOLOGY. 


place,  made  no  practical  distinction  between  the 
condition  of  the  soul  previous  to  the  resurrection, 
and  its  condition  after  it.  The  wicked  were  misera¬ 
ble,  and  the  good  were  happy, — and  that  eternally. 
The  chief  difference  between  the  intermediate  state, 
and  the  final  state,  for  either  the  sinner  or  the  saint 
was,  that  in  the  former  the  soul  is  disembodied,  and 
in  the  latter  it  is  u  clothed  upon  ”  (2  Cor.  v.  2).  But 
in  course  of  time,  the  difference  between  the  inter¬ 
mediate  and  the  final  state  of  the  soul  became 
greatly  magnified.  The  Scripture  doctrine  that 
there  are  degrees  of  reward  and  punishment  in  the 
future  world  was  construed  by  some  of  the  later 
Fathers  in  such  a  manner,  as  to  bring  the  lowest 
grade  of  reward  into  contact  with  the  lowest  grade 
of  punishment,  and  thereby  to  annihilate  the  differ¬ 
ence  in  Mud  between  heaven  and  hell.  Thus,  the 
intermediate  state  gradually  came  to  be  regarded  as 
the  region  in  which  the  spirit  is  in  a  vague  and  un¬ 
decided  position  in  respect  to  endless  bliss  and  woe, 
and  consequently  as  one  in  which  the  escape  from 
everlasting  misery  is  still  possible. 

The  doctrine  of  a  purification  of  believers ,  only, 
in  the  intermediate  state,  shows  itself  as  early  as  the 
4th  century.  The  cleansing  was  confined  to  those 
who  had  become  partially  sanctified  in  this  life. 
Augustine  supposes  that  the  teachings  of  St.  Paul 
in  1  Cor.  iii.  11-15  imply,  that  the  remainders  of 
corruption  in  the  renewed  soul  may  be  purged  away 
in  the  period  between  death  and  the  final  judgment. 


REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENTS.  411 

The  idea  of  a  purifying  fire  is  distinctly  presented 
by  Gregory  Nazianzen.  But  the  Papal  doctrine  of 
purgatory  does  not  yet  appear.  It  is  not  until  the 
time  of  Gregory  the  Great  (f  604),  that  the  doc¬ 
trine  attains  its  full  form.  He  lays  it  down  as  an 
article  of  faith,  and  is  the  first  writer  who  clearly 
propounded  the  idea  of  a  deliverance  from  purga¬ 
tory  by  intercessory  prayer,  and  masses  for  the  dead 
(sacra  oblatio  hostiae  salutaris).  “  Comparing,”  says 
Hagenbach,1  u  Gregory’s  doctrine  with  the  earlier, 
and  more  spiritual  notions  concerning  the  efficacy 
of  the  purifying  fire  of  the  intermediate  state,  we 
may  adopt  the  statement  of  Schmidt,  that L  the  be¬ 
lief  in  a  lasting  desire  after  a  higher  degree  of  per¬ 
fection,  which  death  itself  cannot  quench,  degenerated 
into  a  belief  in  purgatory?  ” 

The  dogma  of  purgatory,  thus  gradually  formed, 
passed  into  the  Middle  Ages,  and  was  embodied 
firmly  in  the  Papal  system  by  the  decisions  of  the 
Council  of  Trent.  Its  place  and  influence  in  the 
Papal  Church  are  well  known. 


§  3.  Eternal  Rewards  and  Punishment 

That  the  blessedness  of  the  good  is  unchanging 
and  eternal,  has  been  the  uniform  faith  of  the  Church 
in  all  ages.  Representations  concerning  the  nature 
of  this  happiness  vary  with  the  culture,  and  intellee- 


1  Hagenbach  :  History  of  Doctrine,  §  141. 


412 


HISTOEY  OF  ESCHATOLOGY. 


tual  spirit,  of  the  time  or  the  individual.  Justin 
Martyr  regards  the  blessedness  of  heaven  as  con¬ 
sisting  mainly  in  the  continuation  of  the  happiness 
of  the  millennial  reign,  heightened  by  the  enjoy¬ 
ment  of  immediate  intercourse  with  God.  Origen 
holds  that  the  blessed  dwell  in  the  aerial  regions, 
passing  from  one  heaven  to  another  as  they  progress 
in  holiness.  At  the  same  time,  he  condemns  those 
who  expect  sensuous  enjoyment  in  the  heavenly 
state.  The  soul  will  “  have  a  clear  insight  into  the 
destinies  of  men,  and  the  dealings  of  Providence. 
Among  the  teachings  of  God  in  that  higher  state, 
will  also  be  instruction  about  the  stars,  1  why  a  star 
is  in  such  and  such  a  position,  why  it  stands  at  such 
and  such  a  distance  from  another,’  etc.  But  the 
highest  and  last  degree  is  the  intuitive  vision  of 
God  himself,  the  complete  elevation  of  the  spirit 
above  the  region  of  sense.”  The  Greek  theolo¬ 
gians,  like  Gregory  Nazianzen  and  Gregory  Nyssa , 
adopted  the  views  of  Origen,  and  taught  that  the 
blessedness  of  heaven  consists  in  enlarged  knowl¬ 
edge  of  divine  things,  intercourse  with  the  saints 
and  angels,  and  deliverance  from  the  fetters  of  the 
earthly  body.  Augustine  believed  that  the  heavenly 
happiness  consists  in  the  enjoyment  of  peace  which 
passes  knowledge,  and  the  vision  of  God  which  can¬ 
not  be  compared  with  bodily  vision.  One  important 

1  element  in  the  happiness  of  the  redeemed,  according 
to  him,  is  deliverance  from  all  hazards  of  apostasy, 
sin,  and  death, — the  non  posse  jpeccare  et  mori. 


ETEENAL  EEWAEDS  AND  PUOTSHMENT.  413 


The  Schoolmen,  while  holding  the  essential  fea¬ 
tures  in  the  Patristic  theory,  endeavoured  to  system¬ 
atize  this  subject,  as  they  did  every  other  one.  They 
divided  heaven  into  three  parts, — the  visible  heaven, 
or  the  firmament ;  the  spiritual  heaven,  where  saints 
and  angels  dwell ;  and  the  intellectual  heaven,  where 
the  blessed  enjoy  the  beatific  vision  of  the  Trinity. 
Degrees  of  happiness  are  bestowed  according  to  the 
grade  of  perfection.  Aquinas  supposed  different 
gifts  of  blessedness,  denoted  by  the  corona  aurea 
which  is  bestowed  upon  all  the  blessed,  and  the 
particular  aureolae  for  martyrs  and  saints,  for  monks 
and  nuns.  Some  of  the  Mystics,  as  Suso,  describe 
the  heavenly  happiness  under  imagery  derived  from 
lovely  Alpine  valleys,  and  bright  meadows,  and  the 
joyful  abandonment  of  heart  incident  to  the  open¬ 
ing  of  the  vernal  season.  But  they  are  careful  to 
remark,  that  all  such  descriptions  are  only  an  image 
of  an  ineffable  reality. 

The  Modern  Church  maintains  the  doctrine  of 
everlasting  blessedness  in  essentially  the  same  form 
with  the  Ancient  and  Mediaeval.  The  tendencies  to 
materialize,  or  to  spiritualize  it,  vary  with  the  grades 
of  culture  and  modes  of  thinking.  The  popular  mind 
still  instinctively  betakes  itself  to  the  sensuous  image¬ 
ry  and  representations,  with  Justin  Martyr  and  Ter- 
tullian ;  while  the  educated  intellect  seeks,  with  Ori- 
gen,  the  substance  of  heaven  in  the  state  of  the  soul. 
“  Most  certainly,”  says  one  of  this  class,  “  there  is  per¬ 
fect  happiness  beyond  the  grave,  for  those  who  have  in 


414 


HISTORY  OF  ESCHATOLOGY. 


this  world  begun  to  enjoy  it,  and  this  is  by  no  means 
different  from  that  which  we  may  here  at  any  time 
begin  to  possess.  We  do  not  enter  into  this  state 
of  happiness,  merely  by  being  buried.  Many  will 
seek  happiness  in  the  future  life,  and  in  the  infinite 
series  of  future  worlds,  as  much  in  vain,  as  in  the 
present  life,  if  they  think  it  can  be  found  in  any 
thing  but  that  which  is  now  so  near  to  them,  that  it 
can  never  be  brought  nearer, — viz.,  the  Eternal.” 

The  punishment  inflicted  upon  the  lost  was  re¬ 
garded  by  the  Fathers  of  the  Ancient  Church,  with 
very  few  exceptions,  as  endless.  Clement  of  Rome 
(Ep.  ii.  8)  affirms,  that  “  after  we  leave  this  world, 
we  are  no  longer  able  to  confess  sin,  and  to  turn 
from  it  ”  ( ovx  ere  Svva/ut&cc  ixel  ego/uohoyrjGaO&cu 
i]  /uccrccvosiv  hi).  Justin  Martyr  (anteff  ol.  i.  p.  128) 
asserts  the  eternity  of  future  punishments,  in  oppo¬ 
sition  to  Plato’s  doctrine,  that  they  would  last  a 
thousand  years.  Minucius  Felix  (Cap.  35)  remarks 
of  the  damned :  11  Nec  tormentis,  aiit  modus  ullus 
aut  terminus.”  Cyprian  (Ad.  Demetr.),  in  similar 
terms,  says  of  the  lost :  “  Cremabit  addictos  ardens 
semper  gehenna,  et  vivacibus  flammis  vorax  poena, 
nec  erit,  unde  habere  tormenta  vel  requiem  possint 
aliquando,  vel  finem.  Servabantur  cum  corporibus 
suis  animae  infinitis  cruciatibus  ad  dolorem.  .  .  . 
Quando  istinc  excessum  fuerit,  nullus  jam  poeni - 
tentiae  locus  est ,  nullus  satisfactionis  effectus :  hie 
vita  aut  amittitur,  aut  tenetur ;  hie  saluti  aeternae 
cultu  Dei,  et  fructu  fidei,  providetur.”  Augustine 


ETERNAL  REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENT.  415 


argues  that  the  misery  of  the  lost  will  be  endless, 
from  the  use  of  the  word  aicoviog  in  Matt.  xxv.  41, 
46,  which,  he  maintains,  must  have  the  same  signi¬ 
fication  when  applied  to  the  punishment  of  the  evil, 
as  to  the  recompense  of  the  good.  44  If  both  things 
are  alike  aidvcog,  then  the  term  must  be  interpreted 
to  mean  either  that  both  are  transitory,  or  that  both 
are  everlasting.  4  Eternal  ’  punishment  and  4  eter¬ 
nal’  life  are  contrasted  with  each  other.  To  say 
that  4  eternal  ’  life  will  have  no  end,  but  that  4  eter¬ 
nal  ’  punishment  will  have  an  end,  is  absurd.”  Re¬ 
specting  the  nature  of  the  punishment,  Augustine 
considers  that  separation  from  God  constitutes  the 
severity  and  dreadfulness  of  it ;  but  leaves  it  to  the 
individual  to  choose  between  the  more  sensuous,  or 
the  more  spiritual  mode  of  interpretation, — adding, 
that  it  is  better  to  unite  them  together.1  Chrysos¬ 
tom  employs  his  powerful  eloquence  in  depicting  the 
everlasting  torments  of  the  lost ;  but  remarks  that 
it  is  of  more  consequence  to  know  how  to  escape 
hell,  than  to  know  its  locality  or  its  nature. 

The  only  exception  to  the  belief  in  the  eternity 
of  future  punishment,  in  the  Ancient  Church,  ap¬ 
pears  in  the  Alexandrian  School.  Their  denial  of 
the  doctrine  sprang  logically  out  of  their  anthropo- 
logy-  Clement  of  Alexandria ,  and  Origen ,  we  have 
seen,  asserted  with  great  earnestness  the  tenet  of  a 
plenary  and  inalienable  power  in  the  human  will  to 

1  Augustinus  :  Enchiridion,  §  112;  De  monbus  ecclesiae,  c.  11 ;  De 
civitate,  XXI.  lx.  10. 


416  HISTOKY  OF  ESCHATOLOGY. 

overcome  sin.  The  destiny  of  the  soul  is  thus  placed 
in  the  soul  itself.  The  power  of  free  will  ( avrs^ov - 
clov)  cannot  be  lost,  and  if  not  exerted  in  this 
world,  it  still  can  be  in  the  next ;  and  under  the  full 
light  of  the  eternal  world,  and  the  stimulus  of  suf¬ 
fering  there  experienced,  nothing  is  more  probable 
than  that  it  will  be  exerted.1  Hence,  in  opposition 
to  the  catholic  faith,  Origen  maintained  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  final  restoration  of  all  human  souls. 
At  the  same  time,  he  acknowledged  that  this  doc¬ 
trine  might  easily  become  dangerous  to  the  uncon¬ 
verted,  and  sometimes  speaks  of  an  eternal  condem¬ 
nation,  and  the  impossibility  of  conversion  in  the 
world  to  come.  Yet,  in  close  connection  with  this 
very  statement,  he  calls  the  fear  of  eternal  punish¬ 
ment  a  beneficial  u  deception  ”  appointed  by  God. 
a  For  many  wise  men,”  he  says,  “  or  such  as  thought 
themselves  wise,  after  having  apprehended  the  real 
and  absolute  truth  respecting  endless  punishment, 
and  rejected  the  delusion,  have  given  themselves 
up  to  a  vicious  life.  So  that  it  would  have  been 
much  better  for  them  to  have  continued  in  the  de¬ 
lusion,  and  believed  in  the  eternity  of  future  punish¬ 
ment.”2  The  views  of  Origen  concerning  future 
retribution  were  almost  wholly  confined  to  his 
school.  Faint  traces  of  a  belief  in  the  remission  of 

1  Clement  and  Origen  both  tracts  in  Baumgaeten-Ceusitts  : 
found  the  final  recovery  of  Satan  Dogmengeschichte,  II.  218. 
and  his  angels,  upon  this  abiding  3  Baumgaeten-Ceusius  :  Dog- 
existence  of  free  will  to  good  in  mengeschichte,  II.  390 ;  Hagen- 
the  rational  spirit.  See  the  ex-  baoh  :  History  of  Doctrine,  §  78. 


ETEENAL  EEWAEDS  AND  PUNISHMENT.  417 


punishments  in  tlie  future  world  are  visible  in  the 
writings  of  Didymus  of  Alexandria,  and  in  Gregory 
Nyssa.  The  annihilation  of  the  wicked  was  taught 
by  Arnobius .  With  these  exceptions,  the  Ancient 
Church  held  that  the  everlasting  destiny  of  the 
human  soul  is  decided  in  this  earthly  state. 

The  Mediaeval  Church  received  the  traditional 
doctrine  respecting  endless  retribution.  Heaven 
and  hell  were  separated  by  an  absolute  and  impas¬ 
sable  gulf,  but  the  intermediate  space  between  them 
was  subdivided  into  purgatory,  which  lies  nearest 
to  hell ;  the  limbus  infantum,  where  all  unbap¬ 
tized  children  remain ;  and  the  limbus  patrum, 
which  is  the  abode  of  the  Old  Testament  saints,  and 
the  place  to  which  Christ  went  to  preach  redemp¬ 
tion  to  the  spirits  in  prison.  This  last  limbus  was 
also  called  Abraham’s  bosom.  Aquinas  considers 
the  torments  of  the  damned  to  consist  in  useless  re¬ 
pining  and  murmuring.  They  can  change  neither 
for  the  better,  nor  for  the  worse.  They  hate  God, 
and  curse  the  state  of  the  blessed.  Mystics  like 
Suso  describe  the  misery  of  the  lost,  in  the  same 
vivid  and  sensuous  phrase  in  which  they  depict 
the  happiness  of  the  saints.  u  O  !  separation,  ever¬ 
lasting  separation,  how  painful  art  thou  !  O  !  the 
wringing  of  hands  !  O  !  sobbing,  sighing,  and  weep¬ 
ing,  unceasing  howling  and  lamenting,  and  yet  never 
to  be  heard.  .  .  Give  us  a  millstone,  say  the  damned, 
as  large  as  the  whole  earth,  and  so  wide  in  circum¬ 
ference,  as  to  touch  the  sky  all  around,  and  let  a 
YOL.  II. — 27 


418 


HISTORY  OF  ESCHATOLOGY. 


little  bird  come  once  in  a  hundred  thousand  years, 
and  pick  off  a  small  particle  of  the  stone,  not  larger 
than  the  tenth  part  of  a  grain  of  millet,  after  another 
hundred  thousand  years  let  him  come  again,  so  that 
in  ten  hundred  thousand  years  he  would  pick  off  as 
much  as  a  grain  of  millet,  we  wretched  sinners 
would  ask  nothing  but  that  when  this  stone  has  an 
end,  our  pains  might  also  cease  ;  yet  even  that  can¬ 
not  be  !  ”  The  Inferno  of  Dante  delineates  the  Me¬ 
diaeval  ideas  of  final  retribution  in  letters  of  fire. 
The  Dantean  inscription  upon  the  infernal  gate : 
u  Leave  all  hope  behind,  ye  who  enter  here,”  ex¬ 
presses  the  sentiment  of  the  Mediaeval  Church, 
with  scarcely  an  exception.  Even  the  adventurous 
Scotus  JErigena ,  though  suggesting  a  revival  of 
Origen’s  theory  of  the  restitution  of  all  things,  did 
not  deny  the  eternity  of  the  punishments  of  hell. 
He  attempted  to  combine  both  doctrines,  by  assert¬ 
ing  the  abolishment  of  evil  considered  as  a  kingdom, 
or  a  system,  while  yet  it  might  continue  to  exist  for¬ 
ever  in  certain  incorrigible  individuals. 

The  Modern  Church  has  accepted  the  traditional 
faith  upon  this  subject.  In  proportion  as  the  inspi¬ 
ration  and  infallibility  of  Revelation  have  been  con¬ 
ceded,  the  doctrine  of  an  absolute  and  therefore 
endless  punishment  of  sin  has  maintained  itself, — it 
being  impossible  to  eliminate  the  tenet  from  the 
Christian  Scriptures,  except  by  a  mutilation  of  the 
canon,  or  a  violently  capricious  exegesis.  The  de¬ 
nial  of  the  eternity  of  future  punishments,  in  modern 


ETERNAL  REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENT.  419 


times,  has  consequently  been  a  characteristic  of  those 
parties  and  individuals  who  have  rejected,  either 
partially  or  entirely,  the  dogma  of  infallible  inspi¬ 
ration. 


BOOK  SEVENTH. 


-m- 


HISTORY 


OF 


SYMBOLS. 


LITERATURE. 


Guericke  :  Allgemeine  Christliche  Symbolik. 

Winer:  Comparative  Darstellung  des  Lehrbegriffs  der  verschie- 
denen  Christliche  Kircbenparteien. 

Walch:  Introductio  in  libros  Ecclesiae  Lutheranae  symbolicos. 

Calotius  :  Synopsis  Controversiarum. 

Hase  :  Libri  Symbolici  Ecclesiae  Evangelicae  (Lutheran  Symbols). 

Meyer  :  Libri  Symbolici  Ecclesiae  Lutheranae. 

Niemeyer  :  Collectio  Confessionum  in  Ecclesiis  Reformatis  publi- 
catorum  (Calvinistic  Symbols). 

Augusti  :  Corpus  Librorum  Symbolicorum  (Calvinistic  Symbols). 

Streitwolf  :  Libri  Symbolici  Ecclesiae  Catholicae  (Roman  Cath¬ 
olic  Symbols). 

Kimmel  :  Libri  Symbolici  Ecclesiae  Orientalis  (Greek  Symbols). 


CHAPTEK  I. 


ANCIENT  AND  MEDIAEVAL  SYMBOLS. 


§  1.  Preliminary  Statements . 

The  subject  of  Symbolism  naturally  follows  that 
of  Special  Dogmatic  History.  The  construction  of 
single  doctrines  by  the  thinking  of  the  Church  is  suc¬ 
ceeded  by  their  combination  into  creeds  and  confes¬ 
sions  of  faith ;  and,  therefore,  the  history  of  the  first 
process  should  be  completed  by  that  of  the  second. 
The  importance  of  this  topic  is  apparent,  in  the  first 
place,  from  its  very  close  connection  wTith  that  of 
systematic  theology.  It  differs  from  it,  as  the  pro¬ 
cess  differs  from  the  product;  as  the  history  of  a 
science  differs  from  the  science  itself.  Theology  con¬ 
structs  the  compact  and  solid  creed,  while  Symbolism 
gives  an  account  of  its  plastic  and  flowing  construc¬ 
tion.  The  two  subjects  are  therefore  reciprocally 
related,  and  connected,  by  that  great  law  of  action 
and  re-action  which  prevails  in  the  mental  world,  as 
that  of  cause  and  effect  does  in  the  material.  Hence, 
one  serves  to  explain,  verify,  or  modify,  the  other. 

Again,  the  history  of  Creeds  is  important,  be- 


424 


HISTOKY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


cause  it  imparts  clear  and  precise  conceptions 
of  the  differences  between  ecclesiastical  denom¬ 
inations.  Each  particular  branch  of  the  Chris¬ 
tian  Church  possesses  its  peculiarities,  by  virtue  of 
which  it  is  denominational  and  particular.  It  is 
sometimes  difficult  to  specify  this  point  of  differ¬ 
ence  ;  so  much  so,  that  the  hasty  observer  often¬ 
times  concludes,  from  the  general  similarity  in  their 
religious  experience,  that  there  is  really  no  differ¬ 
ence  between  the  doctrinal  bases  of  all  those  de¬ 
nominations  who  “  hold  the  head,”  and  are  properly 
called  evangelical.  The  peculiarities  of  evangelical 
churches  appear  with  more  distinctness  in  their 
creeds,  than  in  their  religious  experience ;  and  hence 
the  scientific  observer  must  leave  the  sphere  of  feel¬ 
ing  and  practice,  and  pass  over  into  that  of  theory 
and  dogmatic  statement,  in  order  to  reach  the  real 
difference  between  the  varieties  of  Christians.  For 
there  is  a  difference.  Organizations  cannot  be 
founded,  and,  still  less,  maintained  from  age  to  age, 
upon  mere  fictions  and  imaginary  differences.  Tried 
by  the  test  of  exact  dogmatic  statement,  there  is  a 
plain  difference  between  the  symbol  of  the  Armin- 
ian,  and  that  of  the  Calvinist ;  but  tried  by  the 
test  of  practical  piety  and  devout  feeling,  there  is 
but  little  difference  between  the  character  of  John 
Wesley  and  that  of  John  Calvin.  And  this  for  two 
reasons.  In  the  first  place,  the  practical  religious  life 
is  much  more  directly  a  product  of  the  Holy  Spirit, 
than  is  the  speculative  construction  of  Scripture 


PRELIMINARY  STATEMENTS. 


425 


-truth.  Piety  is  certainly  the  product  of  divine 
grace  ;  but  the  creed  is  not  so  certainly  formed  un¬ 
der  a  divine  illumination.  Two  Christians,  being 
regenerated  by  one  and  the  same  Spirit,  possess  one 
and  the  same  Christian  character,  and  therefore, 
upon  abstract  principles,  ought  to  adopt  one  and 
the  same  statement  of  Christian  belief.  On  attempt¬ 
ing  its  construction,  however,  they  pass  into  the 
sphere  of  the  human  understanding,  and  of  human 
science,  and  it  is  within  this  sphere  that  the  diver¬ 
gence  begins,  and  the  foundation  for  denominational 
existence  is  laid.  In  the  second  place,  the  diver¬ 
gence  is  seen  in  the  creed  rather  than  in  the  charac¬ 
ter,  because  one  mind  is  more  successful  in  un¬ 
derstanding  and  interpreting  the  Christian  experi¬ 
ence  itself,  than  another  is.  Unquestionably,  evan¬ 
gelical  denominations  would  be  much  more  nearly 
agreed  in  their  dogmatic  theology,  if  the  power  of 
accurate  statement  were  equally  possessed  by  all. 
But  one  individual  Christian  comprehends  the  Chris¬ 
tian  experience  more  clearly  and  profoundly  than 
another,  who  yet,  by  virtue  of  his  regeneration,  is 
equally  a  subject  of  it ;  and,  as  a  consequence,  he 
comprehends  the  Scriptures  more  profoundly,  and 
is  better  qualified  than  his  fellow  Christian  to  con¬ 
struct  a  clear,  comprehensive,  and  self-consistent 
creed.  All  doctrinal  history  evinces,  that  just  in 
proportion  as  evangelical  believers  come  to  possess 
a  common  scientific  talent  for  expressing  their  com¬ 
mon  faith  and  feeling,  they  draw  nearer  together 


426 


HIST0EY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


so  far  as  regards  tlieir  symbolic  literature.  While, 
on  the  contrary,  a  slender  power  of  self-reflection 
and  analysis,  together  with  a  loose  use  of  terms, 
drives  minds  far  apart  within  the  sphere  of  scientific 
theology  who  often  melt  and  flow  together  within 
the  sphere  of  Christian  feeling  and  effort.  Science 
unites  and  unifies  wherever  it  prevails ;  for  science 
is  accuracy  in  terms,  definitions,  and  statements. 

In  the  third  place,  the  history  of  Symbols  is  im¬ 
portant,  because  it  contributes  to  produce  this  talent 
of  clear  apprehension,  and  power  of  accurate  state¬ 
ment.  Symbolism  affords  a  comparative  view  of 
creeds.  It  is  therefore  to  theology,  what  compara¬ 
tive  anatomy  is  to  physical  science,  or  comparative 
philology  is  to  linguistic.  When  languages  began 
to  be  compared  with  languages,  many  obscurities 
were  cleared  up  which  overhung  the  old  method  of 
investigating  them,  and  the  whole  subject  of  defini¬ 
tions  underwent  a  great  improvement.  The  mean¬ 
ing  of  language  became  much  more  precise  and  full, 
than  it  had  been,  under  this  light  thrown  back¬ 
wards  and  forwards,  and  in  every  direction,  from  a 
great  number  of  languages  investigated  together. 
The  same  effect  is  produced  by  the  comparative 
study  of  confessions  of  faith.  Probably  nothing  in 
the  way  of  means  would  do  more  to  bring  about 
that  universal  unity  in  doctrinal  statement  which 
has  been  floating  as  an  ideal  before  the  minds  of 
men  amidst  the  denominational  distractions  of  Pro¬ 
testantism,  than  a  more  thorough  and  general  ac- 


/ 


PRELIMINARY  STATEMENTS. 


427 


quaintance  with  the  symbols  of  the  various  denomi¬ 
nations,  and  the  history  of  their  origin  and  forma¬ 
tion.  There  would  be  less  misapprehension  and 
misrepresentation  of  the  views  of  other  parties, 
which  is  one  of  the  chief  obstacles  to  uniformity  in 
confessions  of  faith.  The  honest  objections  that 
trouble  the  minds  of  those  who  refuse  to  adopt  a 
particular  form  of  statement  would  be  seen,  and, 
thus,  would  be  more  likely  to  be  answered,  instead 
of  overlooked  or  perhaps  ridiculed.  On  all  sides, 
and  for  all  minds,  more  light  would  be  poured  upon 
the  profound  mysteries  of  a  common  Evangelical 
Christianity,  if  theologians  were  in  the  habit  of 
looking  over  the  whole  held  of  symbolic  literature, 
instead  of  merely  confining  themselves  to  the  exam¬ 
ination  of  a  single  system.  Such  study  would  by 
no  means  result  in  destroying  confidence  in  any  one 
system,  and  induce  that  eclecticism  which  results  in 
a  mere  aggregation  that  possesses  no  fundamental 
unity,  and  no  self-subsistent  force  of  its  own.  On 
the  contrary,  the  theological  mind  would  become 
immoveably  settled  in  its  conviction,  that  this  or 
that  confession  of  faith  is  the  closest  to  Scripture 
data,  and  when  asked  for  its  symbol  would  exhibit 
it,  and  defend  it.  But,  at  the  same  time,  this  very 
confidence  would  beget  calmness  and  moderation  in 
dealing  with  a  mind  of  different  doctrinal  views ; 
and  calmness  and  moderation  do  much  toward 
bringing  controversialists  to  that  point  of  view 
where  they  see  eye  to  eye. 


428 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


§  2.  Apostles'  Creed . 

The  Apostle  Peter,  in  his  answer  to  the  inquiry 
of  Christ :  “  But  whom  say  ye  that  I  am  ?”,  made 
the  first  formal  confession  of  faith  under  the  Chris¬ 
tian  dispensation.  The  answer :  “  Thou  art  Christ, 
the  Son  of  the  living  God”  (Matt.  xvi.  16),  was  re¬ 
garded  by  the  Redeemer  as  the  doctrinal  basis  of 
his  kingdom  upon  earth;  for  “upon  this  rock,” — 
this  cordial  acknowledgment  of  his  character  and 
redeeming  work, — he  informed  his  disciples  he 
would  found  his  church. 1 

A  short  and  simple  confession  similar  to  this 
was  made  by  the  early  converts  to  Christianity. 
The  candidate  for  admission  to  the  church,  at  his 
baptism,  professed  his  faith  in  Christ  as  the  Re¬ 
deemer  of  the  world.  The  eunuch  baptized  by 
Philip  said  solemnly,  in  connection  with  the  admin¬ 
istration  of  the  rite :  “  I  believe  that  Jesus  Christ  is 
the  Son  of  God.”  (Acts,  viii.  87.)  Along  with 
this  recognition  of  the  deity  of  Christ  and  his  me¬ 
diatorial  work,  admission  into  the  church  was  also 
connected  with  a  confession  of  belief  in  the  doctrine 
of  the  trinity.  The  baptismal  formula,  which  was 
invariably  used,  in  accordance  with  the  solemn  and 
explicit  command  of  Christ,  naturally  led  to  the 


1  The  Protestant  understands  that  by  it  is  meant  the  person  of 
the  “  rock  ”  to  he  the  confession  Peter, 
of  Peter ;  the  Papist  contends 


apostles’  creed.  429 

*» 

adoption  of  this  doctrine  into  the  confession  made 
by  the  new  convert  from  Paganism  or  Judaism. 
And  it  would  have  been  the  deepest  hypocrisy  and 
dishonesty  in  the  candidate  for  baptism,  to  reject  a 
doctrine  that  was  taught  and  commended  to  him  by 
the  officiating  minister,  at  the  very  moment  of  his 
reception  into  the  church,  and  in  the  very  phrase¬ 
ology  of  his  initiation.  In  this  way,  the  confession 
of  faith  made  in  the  Apostolic  age,  by  the  neophyte, 
combined  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  with  that  of 
the  deity  of  Christ,  and  his  mediatorial  Person  and 
work.  This  confession,  at  first,  was  exceedingly 
brief  and  simple,  and  not  adopted  by  any  formal 
action  of  the  church  in  its  public  capacity, — for,  as 
yet,  general  councils,  or  even  local  ones,  were  un¬ 
known.  There  is  every  reason,  nevertheless,  for  be¬ 
lieving  that  the  practice  of  confessing  one’s  faith 
was  general  and  uniform  among  the  churches.  Paul 
reminds  Timothy  of  the  “  good  profession  ”  which 
he  had  made  before  many  witnesses  (1  Tim.  vi. 
12) ;  and  in  1  Tim.  iii.  16,  there  seems  to  be  a 
summary  that  indicates  a  current  creed-form.  The 
concurrent  testimony  of  the  primitive  .Fathers  goes 
to  show  that  from  the  first,  admission  into  the 
church  was  connected  with  the  public  acknowledg¬ 
ment  of  certain  truths. 

Out  of  these  confessions,  which  each  church 
adopted  and  used  in  the  reception  of  its  members, 
there  was  formed,  at  a  very  early  date,  what  is  call¬ 
ed  the  Symbolum  Apostolicum.  The  term  6v/Li/3ohov, 


430 


HISTOEY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


from  av^/SdllsLv  (confer re),  denotes  that  the  for¬ 
mula  was  a  collocation  and  combination.  Rufinus, 
at  the  end  of  the  4th  century,  would  find  in  this 
etymology  the  proof  of  the  apostolic  authorship  of 
this  creed.  It  was  constructed,  he  maintained,  out 
of  matter  which  each  one  of  the  Apostles  brought 
in,  and  threw  into  a  common  stock ;  6v/u/3ohov  otl 
sxccCtoq  ows/Sals. 

The  objections  to  this  view  of  Rufinus,  which 
maintained  itself  down  to  the  Reformation,1  that 
the  Apostles  formally  and  verbally  drew  up  the 
creed  which  goes  under  their  name,  are  the  follow¬ 
ing.  1.  No  mention  is  made  in  the  Acts  of  the 
Apostles,  of  any  synod  of  the  Apostles  in  which 
they  composed  a  creed  for  the  Christian  Church, — a 
synod  far  too  important  to  be  unnoticed.  2.  The 
Fathers  of  the  first  three  centuries,  in  disputing  with 
the  heretics,  while  endeavoring  to  'prove  that  the 
doctrine  of  this  creed  is  apostolic  in  the  sense  of 
scriptural  and  true,  never  assert  that  the  Apostles 
personally  composed  it.  Eusebius,  for  example, 
would  certainly  have  cited  it  as  the  Apostles’  work, 
if  he  had  known  or  believed  it  to  be  theirs.  3. 
This  creed  is  cited  by  the  Primitive  Fathers  with 
minor  variations.  Some  of  them  omit  the  clause 
relating  to  the  “  descent  into  hell ;  ”  others,  those 
concerning  the  “  communion  of  saints,”  and  the  “life 
everlasting.”  This  they  would  not  have  ventured 

1  Laukenttus  Valla  (f  1546)  was  the  first  to  dispute  the  apostolic 
authorship  of  it. 


APOSTLES7  CKEED. 


431 


to  do,  had  they  known  the  creed  to  be  an  inspired 
document. 

But  that  this  symbol  is  of  the  very  earliest  an¬ 
tiquity  cannot  be  doubted ;  and  that  it  is  apostolic 
in  the  sense  of  harmonizing  with  the  Apostles’  doc¬ 
trine  in  Scripture,  is  equally  clear.  The  words  of 
Luther  respecting  it  are  lively.  “  This  confession 
of  faith  we  did  not  make  or  invent,  nor  did  the 
Fathers  before  us;  but  as  a  bee  collects  honey  from 
the  beautiful  and  fragrant  flowers  of  all  sorts,  so  is 
this  symbol  briefly  and  accurately  put  together  out 
of  the  books  of  the  prophets  and  apostles,  i.  e.  out 
of  the  whole  sacred  Scripture,  for  children  and  sim¬ 
ple  hearted^  Christians.  It  is  called  the  Apostles’ 
symbol  or  confession,  because  Christian  truth  could 
not  possibly  be  put  into  a  shorter  and  clearer  state¬ 
ment  than  this.  And  it  has  been  in  the  church 
from  the  beginning ;  since  it  was  either  composed 
by  the  Apostles  themselves,  or  else  brought  togeth¬ 
er  from  their  writings  or  preaching,  by  some  of 
their  best  pupils.” 1 

The  Apostles’  Creed  runs  as  follows  :  u  I  believe 
in  God  the  Father  Almighty,  Maker  of  heaven  and 
earth  ;  and  in  Jesus  Christ  his  only  Son  our  Lord  ; 
who  was  conceived  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  born  of  the 
Virgin  Mary,  suffered  under  Pontius  Pilate,  was  cru¬ 
cified,  dead,  and  buried  ;  He  descended  into  hell ;  the 
third  day  He  rose  again  from  the  dead  ;  He  ascend- 


1  Luther:  Kirehenpostille,  Th.  xiv.  11.  (Lpz.  Ed.). 


432 


HISTOEY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


ed  into  heaven,  and  sitteth  at  the  right  hand  of  God 
the  Father  Almighty ;  from  thence  He  shall  come 
to  judge  the  quick  and  the  dead.  I  believe  in  the 
Holy  Ghost ;  the  Holy  Catholic  Church ;  the  com¬ 
munion  of  saints ;  the  forgiveness  of  sins ;  the  res¬ 
urrection  of  the  body ;  and  the  life  everlasting.’5 1 


1We  append  here  the  summa¬ 
ries  of  the  Christian  faith  given 
by  Ieenaeus  and  Tertullian. 
Their  coincidence  with  the  Apos¬ 
tles’  Creed  is  apparent ;  while 
yet  their  variations  from  it  show 
that  they  are  not  mere  copies  of 
it.  “The  Church,  though  scat¬ 
tered  through  the  whole  habita¬ 
ble  globe  to  its  utmost  bounds, 
has  received  from  the  apostles 
and  their  pupils  the  belief,  in  one 
God,  Father  almighty,  the  maker 
of  heaven  and  earth  and  the  sea, 
and  all  that  is  in  them ;  and  in 
one  Christ  Jesus,  the  Son  of  God, 
who  was  made  flesh  for  our  sal¬ 
vation  ;  and  in  the  Holy  Ghost, 
who  through  the  prophets  an¬ 
nounced  the  dispensations,  and 
the  advents,  and  the  birth  from  a 
virgin,  and  the  passion,  and  the 
resurrection  from  the  dead,  and 
the  incarnate  ascension  into  hea¬ 
ven  of  the  beloved  Christ  Jesus 
our  Lord,  and  his  re-appearance 
(napovalav)  from  the  heavens 
with  the  glory  of  the  Father,  in 
order  to  gather  together  into  one 
{dvaKe(pa\aioiaaa^ai.  Eph.  i.  .10) 
all  things,  and  raise  every  man 
from  the  grave,  that  to  Christ  Je¬ 
sus  our  Lord  and  God  and  Saviour 


and  King,  according  to  the  good 
pleasure  of  the  invisible  Father, 
every  knee  should  bow,  of  things 
in  heaven,  of  things  in  earth,  and 
of  things  under  the  earth,  and 
that  every  tongue  should  confess 
him,  and  that  he  should  adminis¬ 
ter  a  just  judgment  upon  all,  that 
he  should  send  into  eternal  fire 
evil  spirits  (ra  irveypaTiKd  rrj y  no- 
vrjnias ,  Eph.  vi.  12),  and  the  an¬ 
gels  who  transgressed  and  apos¬ 
tatized,  and  the  ungodly,  unjust, 
and  lawless,  and  blasphemous 
among  men,  but  should  give  im¬ 
mortality,  and  minister  abundant¬ 
ly  of  eternal  glory,  to  the  just  and 
holy  and  those  who  have  kept  his 
commandments,  and  have  contin¬ 
ued  in  his  love,  graciously  giving 
life  to  those  vrho  have  been  such 
from  the  beginning,  and  to  those 
who  have  been  such  after  re¬ 
pentance.”  Ieenaeus  :  Adversus 
Haereses,  I.  x. — “The  rule  of 
faith  is  one  only,  unchangeable, 
and  not  to  be  amended,  namely, 
the  belief  in  one  sole  omnipotent 
God,  the  maker  of  the  world  ; 
and  in  his  Son  Jesus  Christ,  born 
of  the  Virgin  Mary,  crucified  un¬ 
der  Pontius  Pilate,  raised  from 
the  dead  on  the  third  day,  re- 


apostles’  creed. 


433 


Several  facts  of  great  importance,  in  connection 
with  the  Apostles’  Creed,  are  worthy  of  notice.  1. 
In  the  churches  founded  by  the  Apostles  and 
their  pupils,  a  confession  of  faith,  and  therefore  the 
formal  adoption  of  a  creed,  was  required  of  the  can¬ 
didate  for  admission  to  the  church.  2.  Although 
the  department  of  scientific  theology  can  hardly 
be  said  to  have  been  formed,  yet  this  oldest  creed 
is  very  distinct  concerning  the  essential  doctrines 
of  Christianity.  The  Apostles’  Creed  teaches  the 
doctrine  of  the  existence  of  God  as  Father,  Son, 
and  Holy  Ghost ;  of  the  incarnation  of  the  Son ;  of 
his  atoning  death;  of  his  mediatorial  power  and 
kingdom  ;  of  the  resurrection  ;  and  of  the  final 
judgment.  3.  The  Apostles’  Creed  is  the  earliest 
attempt  of  the  Christian  mind  to  systematize  the 
teachings  of  Scripture,  and  is,  consequently,  the  un¬ 
inspired  foundation  upon  which  the  whole  after¬ 
structure  of  symbolic  literature  rests.  All  creed- 
development  proceeds  from  this  germ.  Being  little 
more  than  a  collection  of  Scripture  phraseology,  it 
contains  fewer  speculative  elements  than  the  later 
creeds  which  the  church  was  compelled  to  form  by 
the  counter-speculation  of  the  human  mind;  and 

ceived  into  heaven,  seated  now  substance,  is  to  be  found  in  Do 
on  the  right  hand  of  the  Father,  praescriptionibus  adversus  haere- 
and  to  come  hereafter  to  judge  ticos,  c.  13,  and  Adversus  Praxe- 
the  living  and  dead,  through  the  am,  c.  2.  See  Peaesotst  :  On  the 
resurrection  of  the  flesh.”  Tee-  Creed  (Appendix),  for  these  and. 
tullianus  :  De  virginibus  velan-  other  patristic  symbols, 
dis,  c.  1.  The  same  creed,  for 


vol.  it. — 28 


434 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


yet,  because  it  is  composed  wholly  of  Scripture  data, 
it  is  capable  of  an  indefinite  expansion  by  the 
scientific  mind  in  all  ages.  4.  This  symbol  con¬ 
tributed  indirectly  to  the  collection  and  fixing  of 
the  Canon.  In  the  1st  and  2d  centuries,  but  very 
few  copies  of  the  gospels  and  epistles  were  in  exist¬ 
ence.  The  Ancient  Church  had  no  opportunity  to  pe¬ 
ruse  them  as  the  Modern  has,  and,  consequently,  the 
entire  Biblical  knowledge  of  the  common  Christian 
of  that  period  was  obtained  from  the  public  reading 
and  explanation  of  the  religious  assembly.  It  is 
easy  to  see  that  in  such  a  condition  of  things,  a 
brief  compendium,  or  summary  statement  of  the  es¬ 
sential  truths  of  Christianity,  that  could  be  commit¬ 
ted  to  memory  and  repeated  by  all,  would  be  the 
best  substitute  for  the  lack  of  manuscripts.  Hence, 
the  confession  of  faith  that  might  pass  from  mouth  to 
mouth,  like  the  sacr amentum  of  the  ancient  soldier. 
But  in  course  of  time,  the  heretical  or  schismati- 
cal  parties  who  advanced  doctrines  contrary  to  those 
embodied  in  these  brief  creeds,  and  who  appealed 
to  the  Scriptures  for  justification,  compelled  the 
catholic  defenders  of  the  simple  original  creed,  to 
collect  and  fix  the  Canon,  and  to  multiply  copies  of 
it.  For,  in  order  to  make  out  his  case,  the  heretical 
or  schismatical  opponent  of  the  creed  cited  mutila¬ 
ted  or  garbled  portions  of  the  Scripture,  or  writings 
which  like  the  apocryphal  gospels  and  epistles 
could  lay  no  claim  to  inspiration.  In  this  way,  the 
defence  of  the  Apostolic  Creed  contributed  to  the 


NIC  AEN O-CONSTANTIN OPOLIT AN  SYMBOL.  435 


spread  and  authority  of  the  inspired  writings  them¬ 
selves.  5.  This  earliest  creed  has  been  honoured 
and  adopted  more  generally  than  any  other  single 
confession  of  faith,  by  all  Christian  denominations. 
It  makes  part  of  the  liturgies  of  the  various 
churches,  and  its  doctrinal  matter  enters  as  a 
component  into  all  the  scientific  creeds  of  Christen¬ 
dom. 


§  3.  Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan  Symbol . 

The  history  already  given  of  the  formation  of  the 
doctrine  of  the  Trinity  renders  a  detailed  account 
of  this  creed  superfluous.  This  confession  is  closely 
confined  to  theology,  or  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity 
and  the  Person  of  Christ ;  while  the  Apostles’  Creed, 
though  devoting  more  attention  to  this  subject  than 
to  any  other,  yet  makes  statements  respecting  topics 
in  Soteriology  and  Eschatology.  There  is  no  funda¬ 
mental  variance  between  the  trinitarian  statements 
of  these  two  creeds.  The  Mcene  symbol  contains 
a  fuller  expansion  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Apostles’ 
Creed,  that  God  exists  as  Father,  Son,  and  Holy 
Ghost.  This  was  necessitated,  as  was  evinced  in  the 
history  of  Trinitarianism,  by  the  defective  or  con¬ 
tradictory  explanations  given  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
trinity.  For  it  should  be  remembered,  that  men 
like  Praxeas,  Noetus,  Beryl,  and  Sabellius,  and  even 
men  like  Arius,  did  not  reject  the  doctrine  of  the 


436 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


trinity  altogether  and  in  flat  terms,  like  the  ancient 
Tlieodotian  and  the  modern  Socinian.  They  held  to 
a  trinity,  and  contended  that  their  mode  of  appre¬ 
hending  the  subject  was  both  scriptural  and  ecclesi¬ 
astical.  They  claimed  that  they  themselves,  and 
not  their  opponents,  were  putting  the  right  con¬ 
struction  upon  the  teachings  of  Scripture,  and  also 
upon  those  of  the  Apostles’  Creed.  They  could  do 
this  last  the  more  readily,  because  the  Apostles’ 
Creed  does  not  employ  explanatory  and  technical 
terms.  The  biblical  terms,  Father,  Son,  and  Holy 
Ghost,  were  freely  used  by  the  Sabellian  and  Arian 
of  early  times,  because  they  put  a  Monarchian  or 
Arian  construction  upon  them.  Sabellius  and  Arius 
maintained  that  the  Apostles’  Creed  was  intended 
to  be  understood  in  their  sense,  and  hence  did  not 
object  to  it  as  a  confession  of  faith ;  just  as  the 
modern  Socinian  interprets  the  doxologies  of  the 
New  Testament  and  the  baptismal  formula,  in  ac¬ 
cordance  with  his  anti-trinitarian  views,  and  does 
not  altogether  reject  them  as  spurious  portions  of 
revelation.  It  became  necessary,  consequently,  to 
define  the  doctrine  with  scientific  precision,  and  to 
employ  terms  that  could  not  by  any  possibility  be 
taken  in  two  senses.  Here  was  the  great  power  of 
the  term  ojuoovowr.  Arians  and  Semi-Arians,  alike, 
confessed  their  belief  in  “  God  the  Father  Almighty, 
and  in  Jesus  Christ  his  Son,  and  in  the  Holy  Ghost 
holding,  however,  that  only  to  the  first  was  the 
word  deity  properly  applicable.  But  no  honest 


NICAENO-CONSTANTINOPOLITAN  SYMBOL.  437 


Arian  or  Semi-Arian  could  confess  his  belief  in  God 
the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghost,  accompanied  with 
the  explanatory  definition  of  the  Nicene  symbol, 
that  these  three  terms  denote  three  distinct  persons 
in  one  essence,  each  consubstantial  with  the  others. 
An  Arian  could  assent  to  the  Scripture  phraseology 
of  the  Apostolic  Symbol  as  he  understood  it,  but 
not  as  it  was  interpreted  by  the  Nicene  Council,  as 
teaching  that  the  Son  is  “  very  God  of  very  God, 
begotten,  not  made,  being  of  one  substance  with  the 
Father.” 

Hence  the  Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan  Symbol 
introduces  scientific  conceptions,  and  technical 
terms,  in  order  to  preclude  that  possibility  of  two 
interpretations  of  language  which  was  connected 
with  the  earlier  symbol.  And  this  is  the  principal 
difference  between  the  earlier  and  the  later  creed. 
The  Primitive  Church,  not  yet  troubled  with  heresy 
upon  this  subject,  found  in  the  simple  untechnical 
creed  all  that  its  religious  necessities  required.  The 
Later  Church  required,  both  for  its  scientific  wants 
and  its  defensive  and  polemic  purposes,  a  more 
elaborate  and  explanatory  statement,  in  which  the 
terms  u  essence,”  and  “  substance,”  and  “  hypostasis,” 
and  “personal  subsistence,”  and  the  like,  were  used 
to  define  beyond  possibility  of  misapprehension,  or 
equivocation,  or  evasion,  the  terms  Father,  Son,  and 
Spirit. 

The  TsTicaeno-Constantinopolitan  Symbol  was  the 
work  of  two  oecumenical  councils  in  325  and  381, 


438 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


and  had  oecumenical  authority  in  both  the  Greek 
and  Latin  Churches,  and  in  modern  times  is  the  re¬ 
ceived  creed-statement  among  all  trinitarian  church¬ 
es.  For  although  doubts  have  been  expressed  by 
individual  writers,  respecting  the  tenet  of  “  eternal 
generation,”  contained  in  the  Nicene  Symbol,  this 
tenet  has  never  been  formally  rejected  by  any  trin¬ 
itarian  denomination. 


§  4.  The  Chalcedon  Symbol . 

It  will  be  remembered,  that  the  doctrine  of  the 
Person  of  Christ  began  to  engage  the  speculative 
inquiry  of  the  church,  so  soon  as  the  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity  had  been  established.  Two  councils,  one 
at  Ephesus  in  431,  and  one  at  Chalcedon  in  451, 
formed  dogmatic  statements  upon  this  subject  which 
have  been  regarded  as  biblical  and  authoritative  by 
the  church  since  that  time,  both  Ancient,  Mediae¬ 
val,  and  Modern.  The  Ephesian  creed  condemned 
the  Nestorian  theory  of  two  distinct  persons  in 
Christ,  and  re-affirmed  in  the  place  of  it  the  old 
theory  of  one  Person  consisting  of  two  natures. 
The  Chalcedon  creed  condemned  the  Euty chian  or 
Monophysite  theory  of  but  one  nature  in  Christ, 
and  re-affirmed  the  old  theory  of  two  natures  in  the 
unity  of  one  Person.  The  results  to  which  these 
two  councils  came  are  to  this  day  regarded  as  cor¬ 
rect,  and  the  theological  mind  has  not  ventured  be- 


ATHANASIAN  CREED. 


439 


yond  the  positions  established  at  this  time,  respect¬ 
ing  the  structure  and  composition  of  Christ’s  most 
mysterious  Person, — a  subject  in  some  respects  more 
baffling  to  speculation  than  that  of  the  Trinity 
proper. 


§  5.  Athanasian  Creed  (Symbolum  Quicumque ). 

The  authorship  of  this  creed  is  uncertain. 
Though  Athanasian  in  its  trinitarianism,  it  is  gener¬ 
ally  conceded  that  Athanasius  is  not  its  author.  It 
does  not  contain  the  word  opoovOiov,  though  it 
teaches  the  truth  intended  by  this  term.  It  also 
teaches  the  doctrine  of  the  procession  of  the  Spirit 
from  both  the  Father  and  Son.  These  two  pecu¬ 
liarities  are  evidence  of  a  later  origin  than  the  time 
of  Athanasius.  For  it  is  improbable  that  this  the¬ 
ologian,  in  drawing  up  a  creed,  would  have  omitted 
the  term  upon  which  the  whole  controversy  in  his 
day  turned,  or  that  he  would  have  expressed  him¬ 
self  so  positively  as  does  this  symbol,  in  regard  to 
the  question  of  the  procession  of  the  Spirit,  still 
mooted  at  that  time  even  among  the  orthodox.  The 
structure  of  the  creed  would  indicate  that  it  was 
drawn  up  at  a  later  date,  in  order  to  furnish  a  sym¬ 
bol  that  would  be  received  by  both  the  Eastern  and 
Western  Churches.  Hence  it  omits  the  term  ojuo - 
ovacov ,  while  it  retains  the  thing,  in  order  to  propi¬ 
tiate  the  Eastern  bishops  who  feared  Sabellianism, 


440 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


and  teaches  the  procession  of  the  Spirit  from  both 
Father  and  Son,  to  meet  the  views  of  the  Western 
Church.  This  creed  also  contains  the  results  of  the 
Ephesian  and  Chalcedonian  councils  respecting  the 
Person  of  Christ, — a  fact  which  goes  to  prove  an 
origin  later  than  the  time  of  Athanasius.  It  is  most 
probable  that  it  originated  in  the  Western  Church, 
and  in  the  school  of  Augustine  and  Hilary,  whose 
trinit arianism  it  embodies.  The  Athanasian  creed 
was  current  among  the  French  churches  in  the  9th 
century,  and  in  the  10th  century  was  somewhat  used 
in  Italy,  and  in  those  churches  which  were  under 
the  influence  of  Pome,  particularly  the  English.  It 
never  prevailed  to  much  extent  among  the  Greek 
and  Oriental  Churches. 


§  6.  Recapitulatory  Survey . 

Casting  a  glance  backward  over  the  history  of 
Symbols  anterior  to  the  Reformation,  we  find  that 
the  confessions  of  faith  constructed  by  the  Church 
are  few  in  number,  considering  the  length  of  the 
period  included,  and  are  inferior  as  to  comprehen¬ 
siveness.  Only  four  symbols,  (perhaps  we  might 
say  three,  for  the  Athanasian  creed  is  substantially 
the  same  with  the  Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan,)  were 
the  product  of  fifteen  hundred  years.  Of  these,  only 
the  first  one  covers  the  whole  field  of  systematic 
divinity, — the  others  being  confined  to  the  depart- 


RECAPITULATORY  SURVEY. 


441 


merits  of  trinitarianism  and  christology.  And  even 
the  Apostles’  Creed  makes  the  doctrine  of  the  trin¬ 
ity  by  far  the  most  prominent  of  Christian  doc¬ 
trines  ;  presenting  less  distinct,  and  to  some  degree, 
only  implied  statements  respecting  the  topics  of  sin 
and  redemption.  The  history  of  Symbols,  then, 
previous  to  the  Reformation,  shows  that  while  the 
Church  was  diligent  and  careful  in  constructing  the 
doctrine  of  the  trinity,  and  its  cognate  truths,  it 
was  comparatively  negligent  in  regard  to  the  doc¬ 
trines  of  anthropology  and  soteriology.  The  re¬ 
sults  to  which  the  catholic  mind  came  in  investiga¬ 
ting  the  doctrines  of  theology  and  christology  were 
carefully  and  fully  expressed  in  a  creed  form,  and 
as  a  consequence  we  find  that  the  trinitarian  here¬ 
sies  of  Sabellianism  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  Arian- 
ism  on  the  other,  did  not  trouble  the  Church,  even 
though  it  grew  more  and  more  corrupt  in  faith  and 
practice.  The  Papal  Church  is  orthodox  to  this  day, 
upon  the  doctrine  of  the  trinity  and  the  Person  of 
Christ.  But  the  results  to  which  the  catholic  mind 
came,  during  the  first  four  centuries,  in  investigating 
the  doctrines  of  anthropology  and  soteriology, 
were  not  thus  carefully  enunciated  and  fixed  in  a 
creed-form.  The  controversy  between  Augustine 
and  Pelagius,  though  it  resulted  in  a  body  of  clear 
and  profound  discussion  of  the  very  first  impor¬ 
tance  to  theological  science  in  all  time,  did  not  re¬ 
sult  in  the  announcement  of  any  distinct  and  defi¬ 
nite  symbol.  Hence,  there  was  no  barrier,  of  a  the- 


442 


HISTOKY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


oretical  kind,  to  the  entrance  of  the  Pelagian  theory 
of  sin,  and  the  legalistic  theory  of  justification, 
which  are  characteristic  of  the  Papal  as  distinguish¬ 
ed  from  the  Primitive  and  Patristic  Churches.  It 
is  indeed  true,  that  a  creed  enunciating  the  Augus- 
tinian  anthropology  as  distinctly  and  unequivocally 
as  the  Nicene  Symbol  does  the  Athanasian  theology 
would  not  necessarily  have  prevented  the  Church 
from  lapsing  into  that  defective  view  of  human  na¬ 
ture  which  appears  in  the  Tridentine  system.  The 
doctrine  of  sin  is  more  immediately  practical  than 
that  of  the  trinity,  though  not  more  so  ultimately. 
Deterioration  in  doctrine  is  more  likely  to  com¬ 
mence  in  anthropology  than  in  theology,  and  is 
more  difficult  of  prevention,  because  of  certain  well- 
known  tendencies  of  human  nature.  Still,  it  is  plain 
that  a  theoretical  barrier  to  error  is  better  than 
none  at  all,  and  is  certainly  better  than  a  theoret¬ 
ical  barrier  to  truth.  If  those  few  advocates  of  the 
true  Scripture  doctrine,  who  appear  here  and  there 
in  those  darkening  centuries  which  intervene  be¬ 
tween  John  of  Damascus  and  the  forerunners  of  the 
Reformation,  could  have  fortified  themselves  by  an 
appeal  to  a  symbol  of  authority  and  antiquity,  in 
which  the  moral  state  and  condition  of  man  were 
distinctly  represented  in  opposition  to  the  Pelagian 
views  that  were  becoming  dominant  in  the  Latin 
Church,  their  protest  against  error  would  have  been 
much  more  effective  than  it  was.  And  the  same  is 
true  in  reference  to  the  doctrine  of  justification  by 


RECAPITULATORY  SURVEY. 


443 


faith.  It  would  have  been  more  difficult  to  have 
constructed  a  satisfactory  symbol  concerning  this 
doctrine  than  that  of  sin,  owing  to  that  confusion 
of  justification  and  sanctification  which,  we  have 
seen,  vitiates  to  some  extent  the  soteriology  of  Au¬ 
gustine  himself.  But  if  a  clear  evangelical  state¬ 
ment  of  this  great  truth,  such  as  meets  us  in  the 
symbolic  literature  of  the  Reformation,  could  have 
been  made  and  authorized  in  the  4th  century,  it  is 
certain  that  it  would  have  exerted  a  great  influence 
upon  minds  so  disposed  as  were  those  of  the  Middle 
Ages  to  respect  authority.  It  is  not  to  be  asserted, 
that  of  itself  it  would  have  prevented  the  corrup¬ 
tion  and  heresy  of  the  Papal  Church  upon  this  sub¬ 
ject.  A  higher  Power,  alone,  working  in  the  heart, 
could  have  prevented  this,  and  preserved  the  prim¬ 
itive  faith.  But  the  symbol  would  have  been  a  nu¬ 
cleus  and  support  for  those  few  who  stood  firm,  and 
at  any  rate  a  standing  witness  of  decline  and  cor¬ 
ruption  in  doctrine,  and  a  loud  protest  against  it. 
It  is  to  this  day,  an  advantage  to  the  Romish  polem¬ 
ic,  and  a  disadvantage  to  the  Protestant,  that  the 
latter  cannot  point  his  adversary  to  a  symbol  of  the 
first  four  centuries  which  is  as  distinct  and  Scriptur¬ 
al  upon  the  subjects  of  sin  and  justification,  as  the 
Nicene  Symbol  is  upon  that  of  the  trinity. 


CHAPTER  II. 


MODERN  SYMBOLS. 


§  1.  Lutheran  Confessions . 

The  period  of  the  Reformation  is  richer  in  its 
symbolic  literature,  than  any  other  one  in  the  histo¬ 
ry  of  the  Church.  After  the  first  conflict  and  fer¬ 
mentation  of  the  religious  elements  was  over,  the 
ecclesiastical  mind,  being  now  purified  from  the 
false  and  anti-Christian  doctrines  of  the  Papacy,  felt 
the  need  of  a  clear  and  scientific  statement  of  the 
results  to  which  it  had  arrived.  And  inasmuch  as 
the  Protestants  became  divided  among  themselves 
upon  minor  and  unessential  points,  though  agreeing 
perfectly  in  their  estimate  of  the  Roman  Church 
and  system,  a  great  number  of  creeds  and  symbols 
was  called  into  existence,  by  the  endeavor  of  each 
party  to  explain  its  own  sentiments,  and  to  justify  its 
own  position.  It  is  for  this  reason,  that  the  inquirer 
will  find  in  this  age  by  far  the  most  massive  and  solid 
part  of  Christian  Symbolism.  The  denominations 
of  Modern  Protestantism  derive  their  creed-forms, 
either  directly  or  indirectly,  from  this  fertile  period. 


LUTHERAN  CONFESSIONS. 


445 


The  Lutheran  Church  adopted  with  decision,  the 
results  to  which  the  Patristic  Church  had  come  in 
the  departments  of  theology  and  christology.  The 
Apostles’  Creed,  together  with  the  Nicene  and  Atha- 
nasian,  were  laid  down  as  the  foundation  of  the  sym¬ 
bol  which  was  to  consolidate  the  new  evangelical 
church  into  one  external  unity,  in  opposition  to  that 
of  Rome.  But  the  doctrines  of  sin  and  redemption 
had  been  left,  to  some  extent,  undeveloped  by  the 
Patristic  mind,  and  entirely  without  definite  symbolic 
statement,  and  had  been  misstated  by  the  Papal 
mind  at  Trent ;  and  hence  the  principal  part  of  the 
new  and  original  work  of  the  Lutheran  divine  was 
connected  with  these. 

Of  all  the  confessional  writings  of  the  Lutheran 
Church,  the  most  important,  as  well  as  the  first  in 
time,  is  the  Augsburg  Confession ,  sometimes  denomi¬ 
nated  the  Confessio  Augusta ,  from  the  term  augusta , 
or  augustissima  applied  to  it  because  it  was  drawn 
up  under  the  sanction  and  authority  of  the  imperial 
diet. 

Nearly  fifteen  years  had  elapsed  since  Luther 
had  made  his  first  public  appearance  as  a  reformer, 
by  nailing  up  his  ninety-five  theses  upon  the  door 
of  the  church  at  Wittenberg  (a.  d.  1517),  and  yet 
the  Protestant  Church  had  no  public  and  received 
confession  of  its  common  faith.  This  was  first 
made  at  the  diet  at  Augsburg  in  1530.  There 
had,  however,  been  some  preparation  made  for  the 
construction  and  adoption  of  this  important  symbol. 


446 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


The  steps  that  were  previously  taken  are  interest¬ 
ing,  and  evince  the  wise  and  prudent  manner  in 
which  the  leading  minds  of  that  stormy  and  excita¬ 
ble  period  of  reform  proceeded,  when  laying  the 
dogmatic  foundations  of  the  future  church. 

The  process  began  with  a  commission  from 
John,  Prince  of  Saxony,  given  in  March,  1530,  to 
his  favourite  theologians,  Luther,  Justus  Jonas, 
Bugenhagen,  and  Melanchthon,  to  prepare  a  series 
of  succinct  and  comprehensive  articles  to  be  discuss¬ 
ed  and  defended  as  the  Protestant  form  of  doctrine. 
These  theologians  joined  on  upon  work  that  had  al¬ 
ready  been  performed  by  one  of  their  number.  In 
the  preceding  year  (1529),  Luther,  at  a  convention, 
of  Protestants  at  Schwabach,  had  proposed  1Y  arti¬ 
cles  to  be  adopted  as  the  doctrinal  bond  of  union. 
These  articles,  this  body  of  commissioners  appointed 
by  Prince  John  adopted,  and  having  added  to  their 
number  some  new  ones  that  had  respect  to  certain 
ecclesiastical  abuses,  presented  the  whole  to  the 
crown  prince  in  Torgau,  in  March,  1530.  Hence, 
they  are  sometimes  denominated  the  Articles  of 
Torgau .  This  draft  of  a  confession  was  then 
brought  before  the  imperial  diet  at  Augsburg,  for 
examination  and  adoption.  Here,  it  received  revi¬ 
sion,  and  some  slight  modifications,  under  the  leader¬ 
ship  of  Melanchthon,  who  was  present  at  the  dis¬ 
cussions  before  the  diet,  and  who  was  aided  during 
the  progress  of  the  debate  by  the  advice  and  con¬ 
currence  of  Luther,  then  in  Coburg,  in  a  free  and 


LUTHERAN  CONFESSIONS. 


447 


full  correspondence.  The  symbol  having  been 
formed  in  this  manner  was  subscribed  by  the 
princes  and  authorities  of  the  Protestant  interest, 
and  in  their  name  publicly  read  in  German  before 
the  imperial  assembly,  and  a  copy  in  both  German 
and  Latin  presented  to  the  emperor.  The  Augs¬ 
burg  Confession  thus  became  the  authorized  doc¬ 
trinal  basis  of  Protestantism  in  Germany. 

The  general  tone  and  spirit  of  this  first  creed  of 
the  Reformation  is  a  union  of  firmness  and  mildness. 
The  characteristics  of  Luther  and  Melanchthon,  the 
two  minds  most  concerned  in  its  formation,  are  har¬ 
moniously  blended  in  it.  It  is  divided  into  two 
parts  ;  the  one,  positive  and  didactic  in  its  contents, 
the  other  negative  and  polemic.  The  first  division 
is  composed  of  21  articles,  in  which  the  positive 
doctrines  of  Scripture  are  enunciated  as  the  Luther¬ 
ans  understood  and  confessed  them,  in  connection, 
moreover,  with  an  express  condemnation  of  those 
unevangelical  and  heretical  views  and  tendencies 
which  were  already  beginning  to  appear  within 
Protestantism  itself.  The  second  division  is  com¬ 
posed  of  7  articles,  directed  against  those  errors  of 
the  Romish  ritual  and  worship  which  the  Luther¬ 
ans  rejected, — viz.,  the  refusal  of  the  cup  to  the 
laity ;  the  prohibition  of  the  marriage  of  priests ; 
the  superstitious  use  of  the  mass ;  auricular  confes¬ 
sion  ;  meritorious  fasts ;  monastic  vows ;  and  the 
union  of  ecclesiastical  with  secular  power  in  the  of¬ 
fice  of  bishop. 


448 


HISTOKT  OF  SYMBOLS. 


An  analysis  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Augsburg 
Confession  yields  the  following  particulars.  In  the¬ 
ology,  this  symbol  enunciates  the  Nicaeno-Con- 
stantinopolitan  trinitarianism,  and  the  Chalcedon 
christology.  In  anthropology,  it  adopts  the  Au- 
gustinian  theory,  as  the  following  extracts  show. 
“  The  churches  teach  that  after  the  fall  of  Adam  all 
men  propagated  according  to  ordinary  generation 
are  born  with  sin,  that  is,  without  the  fear  of  God, 
without  trust  in  God,  and  writh  concupiscence,  and 
that  this  disease  (morbus)  or  original  vitiosity  is 
truly  sin,  damning,  and  bringing  eternal  death  upon 
those  who  are  not  regenerated  by  baptism  and  the 
Holy  Spirit.  The  churches  also  condemn  the  Pela¬ 
gians  and  others  who  deny  this  original  vitiosity 
(vitium  originis)  to  be  sin.”  1 

Respecting  the  degree  and  intensity  of  sin,  and 
its  effect  upon  the  human  will,  the  Augsburg  Con¬ 
fession  teaches  the  following.  “  The  churches  teach 
that  the  human  will  has  some  liberty'  sufficient  for 
attaining  morality  and  choosing  things  that  appear 
reasonable  (ad  efficiendam  civilem  justitiam  et  deli- 
gendas  res  rationi  subjectas).  But  it  has  not  the 
power,  without  the  Spirit  of  God,  of  attaining  holi¬ 
ness  or  spiritual  excellence  (efficiandae  justitiae  dei, 
seu  justitiae  spiritualis),  because  the  carnal  man 
does  not  perceive  those  things  that  are  spiritual  (1 
Cor.  ii.  14).  This  Augustine  says  in  the  same 


^ase:  Libri  Symbolici,  9,  10. 


LUTHEKAN  CONFESSIONS. 


449 


words,  ‘We  acknowledge  that  free  will  is  in  all 
men ;  that  it  has,  indeed,  a  rational  judgment,  by 
means  of  which  it  is  able  to  begin  and  to  finish 
without  God’s  grace  not  those  things  which  pertain 
to  God,  but  only  those  works  which  pertain  to  this 
present  life,  the  good  as  well  as  the  bad, — the  good 
I  say,  meaning  those  which  are  in  their  place  right 
and  proper ;  e.  g.  to  will  to  work  in  the  field,  to 
will  to  eat  and  drink,  to  will  to  have  a  friend,  to 
will  to  have  clothes,  to  will  to  build  a  house,  to  will 
to  marry  a  wife,  to  will  to  raise  cattle,  to  learn  an 
art,  or  whatever  good  it  may  be  that  pertains  to 
this  present  life.’  The  churches  also  condemn  the 
Pelagians  and  others  who  teach,  that  without  the 
Holy  Spirit,  by  natural  powers  alone,  we  are  able 
to  love  God  supremely.” 1  This  Confession,  then,  ex¬ 
hibits  the  Latin  in  distinction  from  the  Greek  an¬ 
thropology,  and  favours  the  monergistic  theory  of 
regeneration. 

In  its  soteriology,  the  Augsburg  Confession, 
as  would  be  expected,  is  eminently  evangelical. 
“  The  churches  teach  that  men  cannot  be  justified 
before  God  by  their  own  power,  merit,  or  works, 
but  are  justified  on  account  of  Christ,  through  faith, 
when  they  believe  that  they  are  received  into  fa¬ 
vour  and  their  sins  are  remitted  for  Christ’s  sake, 
who  made  satisfaction  for  our  sins  by  his  death. 
This  faith  God  imputes  for  righteousness  before 

.  1  Hase  :  Libri  Symbolici,  14. 


TOL.  IT. — 29 


450 


HISTOBY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


Him  (Rom.  iii.  and  iv.).” 1  After  alluding  to  the 
alteration  made  by  the  Papists  in  their  statement 
of  the  doctrine  of  good  works, — viz.,  that  man  is 
justified  not  by  works  alone,  nor  by  faith  alone,  but 
by  faith  and  works  together ,  which  is  the  Tridentine 
theory, — the  Confession  proceeds  to  speak  thus  con¬ 
cerning  good  works  :  “  Our  good  works  cannot 
reconcile  God,  or  merit  remission  of  sins,  grace,  and 
justification,  but  we  obtain  all  these  by  faith  alone  ; 
by  believing  that  we  are  received  into  favour  for 
the  sake  of  Christ,  who  alone  is  the  mediator  and 
propitiation  by  which  the  Father  is  reconciled. 
This  doctrine  respecting  faith  is  everywhere  taught 
by  Paul  4  By  grace  are  ye  saved  through  faith, 
and  that  not  of  yourselves,  it  is  the  gift  of  God. 
Not  of  works,  &c.’  .  .  .  Our  churches  also  teach 
that  it  is  necessary  to  perform  good  works,  not 
however  in  order  to  merit  pardon  and  remis¬ 
sion  of  sins,  but  because  God  wills  and  commands 
them.” 2 

In  its  eschatology,  the  Augsburg  Confession 
enunciates  the  catholic  doctrine  concerning  future 
retribution  and  the  second  advent  of  Christ.  “  The 
churches  condemn  the  Anabaptists,  who  are  of  opin¬ 
ion  that  there  will  be  an  end  to  the  punishment  of 
lost  men  and  devils.  They  likewise  condemn  those 
who  are  disseminating  Jewish  opinions,  that  prior 
to  the  resurrection  of  the  dead  the  saints  are  to  pos- 


1  Ease  :  Libri  Symbolic!,  10. 


3  Habe  ;  Libri  Symbolici,  17,  18. 


LUTHERAN  CONFESSIONS. 


451 


sess  the  kingdoms  of  the  world,  the  wicked  being 
everywhere  overcome  ”  (oppressis). 1 

Though  decidedly  Protestant  upon  the  cardinal 
doctrines,  the  Augsburg  Confession  contains  some 
remnants  of  that  unscriptural  system  against  which 
it  was  such  a  powerful  and  earnest  protest.  These 
Popish  elements  are  found  in  those  portions  partic¬ 
ularly  which  treat  of  the  sacraments ;  and  more 
particularly  in  that  article  which  defines  the  sa¬ 
crament  of  the  Supper.  In  Article  XIII.,  the 
Augsburg  Confession  is  careful  to  condemn  the 
popish  theory,  that  the  sacraments  are  efficacious 
u  ex  ojoere  operato ,” — that  is,  by  their  intrinsic  effica¬ 
cy,  without  regard  to  faith  in  the  recipient,  or  to 
the  operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit, — but  when  in  Ar¬ 
ticle  X.  it  treats  of  the  Lord’s  Supper,  it  teaches 
that  u  the  body  and  blood  of  Christ  are  truly  pres¬ 
ent,  and  are  distributed  to  those  who  partake  of 
the  Supper.’1 2  This  doctrine  of  Con-substantiation , 
according  to  which  there  are  two  factors, — viz.,  the 
material  bread  and  wine,  and  the  immaterial  or 
spiritual  body  of  Christ, — united  or  consubstantia- 
ted  in  the  consecrated  sacramental  symbols,  does  not 
differ  in  kind  from  the  Papist  doctrine  of  Tran- 
substantiation,  according  to  which  there  is  indeed 
but  one  element  in  the  consecrated  symbol,  but  that 
is  the  very  body  and  blood  of  Christ  into  which  the 
bread  and  wine  have  been  transmuted.  The  Lu- 


1  Hase  :  Libri  Symbolici,  14. 


2  Hase  :  Libri  Symbolici,  12. 


452 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


theran  theory,  like  the  Popish,  promotes  a  supersti¬ 
tious  feeling  in  reference  to  the  Eucharist,  and  does 
much  towards  nullifying  the  meaning  and  effect  of 
Article  XIII.,  in  which  a  magical  effect  ex  opere  ope¬ 
rate)  is  denied  to  the  sacraments. 

Another  feature  in  this  symbol  evincing  that 
the  riddance  of  Papal  errors  was  not  complete,  is 
the  point  of  Absolution .  Article  XII.  thus  defines 
it.  u  Repentance  properly  consists  of  these  two  parts ; 
the  first  is  contrition,  or  the  terrors  of  an  awakei}- 
ed  conscience,  together  with  the  acknowledgment 
of  sin ;  the  second  is  faith,  which  is  conceived  by 
an  apprehension  of  the  gospel  promise,  or  by  abso¬ 
lution ,  and  which  believes  that  the  individual’s  sin 
is  remitted  on  account  of  Christ,  consoles  the  con¬ 
science,  and  delivers  from  fear.”  By  “  absolution  ” 
is  meant  the  official  declaration  of  the  clergyman 
to  the  penitent  that  his  sins  are  forgiven  him, 
upon  finding  or  believing  that  he  is  exercising  a 
godly  sorrow,  and  is  trusting  in  *the  blood  of 
Christ.  The  creed  adopts  this  practice  from  the 
custom  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  and  like 
this  finds  its  warrant  for  it  in  the  words  of 
Christ :  “  Whosesoever  sins  ye  remit,  they  are  re¬ 
mitted  unto  them,  and  whosesoever  sins  ye  retain, 
they  are  retained”  (John  xx.  28).  In  their  explana¬ 
tion  and  defense  of  the  Augsburg  Confession,  enti¬ 
tled  Apologia  Confessionis ,  the  Lutheran  divines, 
speaking  of  this  power  of  the  keys,  say:  “And 
since  God  really  renews  the  soul  by  his  word,  the 


LUTHERAN  CONFESSIONS. 


453 


keys  really  remit  sin,  according  to  Luke  x.  16  :  ‘  He 
that  heareth  you  heareth  me.’  Wherefore  the  voice 
of  him  who  gives  absolution  is  to  be  believed  not 
otherwise  than  as  a  voice  sounding  from  heaven.”  1 
Now,  although  this  act  of  absolution  is  merely  de¬ 
clarative,  and  the  most  thoroughly  evangelical 
view  is  taken  of  the  ground  and  cause  of  the  re¬ 
mission  of  sins,  it  is  evident  that  this  act  and 
practice  puts  the  penitent  into  wrong  relations  to 
the  church  and  the  clergy,  and  paves  the  way  for 
the  distinctively  Papal  theory  upon  these  points.  It 
is  true,  indeed,  that  if  there  be  godly  sorrow  for  sin 
and  a  hearty  faith  in  the  work  of  Christ,  the  soul  is 
forgiven  ;  but  no  human  authority  can  pronounce  a 
person  to  be  actually  pardoned,  and  absolve  him  as 
such,  without  pronouncing  at  the  same  time,  by  im¬ 
plication,  that  the  said  person  is  truly  penitent  and 
believing, — a  fact  that  cannot  be  unqualifiedly  as¬ 
serted  by  any  but  the  Searcher  of  hearts.  In  re¬ 
taining  this  power  of  absolution,  and  in  exercising 
it,  the  Lutheran  Church  unintentionally  tempted  its 
members  to  an  undue  reliance  upon  a  human  deci¬ 
sion,  and  drew  them  away  from  a  simple  trust  upon 
the  work  of  Christ,  contrary  to  its  own  theory  and 
faith. 

In  the  year  1540,  ten  years  after  the  adoption 
of  the  Augsburg  Confession,  Melanchthon  put  forth 
an  edition  of  the  symbol,  in  Latin,  which  goes  un- 


1  Hase:  Libri  Symbolic,  p.  167. 


454 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


der  the  name  of  the  variata , — the  original  edition 
being  denominated  the  invariata.  The  changes  in¬ 
troduced  into  it  by  Melanchthon  relate  to  the  sub¬ 
jects  of  regeneration  and  the  sacraments.  Me¬ 
lanchthon,  as  the  controversy  went  on  between  the 
Lutherans  and  the  Calvinists,  became  more  and 
more  inclined  to  synergism.  The  original  Confes¬ 
sion,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  history  of  anthropolo¬ 
gy,  was  decidedly  monergistic,  but  the  altered  edi¬ 
tion  leans  to  the  theory  of  co-operation  in  regenera¬ 
tion.  With  respect  to  the  sacraments,  it  inclines 
to  the  Calvinistic  theory,  showing  the  reaction 
against  the  Semi-Popish  theory  of  consubstantiation. 
The  original  unaltered  Confession,  alone,  has  sym¬ 
bolical  authority  in  the  Lutheran  Church  ;  but  par¬ 
ties  and  individuals  within  it  have  received  the  Con- 
fessio  variata  with  favour.  The  influence  of  Me- 
lanchthon’s  synergism  is  very  apparent  in  some  of 
the  Lutheran  theologians  of  Germany  of  the  present 
generation,  in  the  assertion  of  the  existence  of  a  re¬ 
cipiency ,  or  preparation  for  the  grace  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  which  is  referred  to  the  instinctive  strivings 
of  the  human  soul  by  virtue  of  its  divine  origin. 
The  adoption  of  this  view  shows  itself  in  decided 
opposition  to  the  Augustino-Calvinistic  doctrines  of 
election  and  predestination,  and  a  strongly  polemic 
attitude  towards  the  Calvinistic  system. 

The  next  document  possessing  symbolical  au¬ 
thority  in  the  Lutheran  Church  is  the  Apologia 
Confessionis. 


LUTHERAN  CONFESSIONS. 


455 


The  Protestants  having  thus  put  forth  the  Augs¬ 
burg  Confession  as  the  summary  of  their  belief, 
the  Papal  theologians  who  were  present  at  the  diet 
were  summoned  by  the  emperor  Charles  V.  to  pre¬ 
pare  a  critical  examination  and  refutation  of  it. 
This  they  did  in  a  document  entitled  Confutatio 
Confessionis  Augnstanae ,  which  was  read  in  the 
imperial  assembly  on  the  3d  of  August,  1530.  The 
emperor  approved  it,  and  demanded  that  the  Pro¬ 
testants  should  return  to  the  doctrinal  basis  of  the 
Catholic  Church.  They  asked  for  a  copy  of  the 
Confutation,  for  examination,  which  was  refused. 
Melanchthon  then  entered  upon  a  detailed  refuta¬ 
tion  of  the  Conf  utatio ,  so  far  as  he  could  reconstruct 
the  document  from  his  own  recollection  on  hearing 
it  read,  and  from  notes  that  had  been  taken  by  oth¬ 
ers  who  were  present  at  the  reading, — afterwards 
revising  and  perfecting  his  work,  by  the  aid  of  an 
authentic  copy  of  the  Papal  treatise  that  finally 
came  into  his  possession.  This  defence  of  the  Augs¬ 
burg  Confession  contains  an  expansion  of  the  dog¬ 
matic  positions  of  this  document,  together  with 
some  attacks  upon  the  Papal  system ;  although  the 
work,  as  a  whole,  breathes  the  mildness  and  mode¬ 
ration  of  the  peace-loving  theologian  who  composed 
it.  In  doctrinal  respects,  it  is  even  more  decided 
than  the  original  Confession,  particularly  upon  the 
two  points  most  at  issue  between  Protestants  and 
Papists,  viz. :  sin  and  justification. 

The  Protestants  proposed  to  present  this  Apolo- 


456 


HISTOEY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


gy  at  the  diet  held  on  Sept.  22d,  1530  ;  but  the  em¬ 
peror  declared  that  he  would  neither  hear,  nor  re¬ 
ceive,  any  more  documents  from  the  Protestants. 
Thus,  the  Apology  received  no  public  adoption  at 
that  time.  It  was  from  the  first,  however,  regarded 
by  the  Protestant  theologians  as  a  symbolical  docu¬ 
ment,  and  in  1537  was  subscribed  as  such  by  them 
at  Smalcald.  In  connection  with  the  Augsburg 
Confession,  it  constitutes  the  sum  and  substance  of 
the  Lutheran  theology,  and  both  together  constitute 
the  doctrinal  basis  of  the  Lutheran  Church. 

The  results  to  which  the  Protestants  had  come 
in  these  two  productions  were  wrought  over,  and 
presented  at  other  times,  before  other  bodies,  and  in 
other  forms,  according  as  the  interests  of  the  Pro¬ 
testants  required.  In  this  way,  a  series  of  symbol¬ 
ical  writings  resulted  which  constitute  a  part  of  Lu¬ 
theran  Symbolism.  The  following  are  the  most 
important  of  these.  1.  The  Confessio  Saxonica ,  or 
Repetitio  Confessionis  Augustanae ,  was  drawn  up 
by  Melanchthon  for  the  use  of  the  Council  of  Trent, 
in  1551,  and  is  a  repetition  of  the  Augsburg  Con¬ 
fession,  as  the  title  indicates.  2.  The  Confessio 
Wurtemburgica  was  composed  by  Brenz  for  the  use 
of  the  same  council,  in  1552.  3.  The  Articles  of 

Smalcald  were  drawn  up  by  Luther  in  1536,  and 
subscribed  by  the  evangelical  theologians,  in  Febru¬ 
ary,  1537.  They  contain,  in  substance,  the  doc¬ 
trines  of  the  Augsburg  Confession  and  the  Apolo¬ 
gy,  presented  in  a  decidedly  polemic  form.  For 


LUTHERAN  CONFESSIONS. 


457 


their  purpose  was  both  defensive  and  aggressive. 
By  this  time,  the  Protestant  cause  had  become 
strong  politically  as  well  as  morally,  and  when  the 
pope,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  emperor,  sought  to 
call  a  general  council  at  Mantua,  in  1537,  these  Ar¬ 
ticles  served  to  consolidate  the  Protestant  opposition, 
and  to  prevent  the  Protestant  churches  from  taking 
any  part  in  an  ecclesiastical  assembly  in  which  their 
own  opinions  were  already  condemned  beforehand. 
In  the  second  part  of  these  Articles,  Luther,  with 
his  characteristic  energy,  attacks  the  claims  of  the 
pope  to  be  a  universal  bishop,  as  contrary  to  the 
nature  and  spirit  of  the  true  evangelical  church. 
Melanchthon  signed  the  articles  with  the  conciliato¬ 
ry  remark,  that  he  for  himself  should  be  willing  to 
concede  to  the  pope  the  bishopric  of  bishops  jure 
Tiumano ,  and  on  the  ground  of  past  usage  and  for 
the  sake  of  peace,  if  the  pope  would  concede  evan¬ 
gelical  doctrine  to  the  Protestants.  This  disturbed 
the  mind  of  the  earnest  reformer,  who  saw  that  re¬ 
conciliation  with  Rome  was  now  impossible  and  un¬ 
desirable,  and  on  parting  with  Melanchthon,  after 
the  convention  at  Smalcald,  Luther  left  him  the 
blessing :  u  May  God  fill  you  with  hatred  of  the 
pope.”  4.  Luther’s  two  Catechisms ,  Major  and  Mir 
nor ,  were  published  in  1529, — the  first  for  the  use 
of  preachers  and  teachers,  the  last  a  guide  in  the 
instruction  of  youth.  These,  it  will  be  noticed, 
were  published  before  the  Augsburg  Confession.  5. 
The  Formula  Concordiae  was  drawn  up  by  Andrea 


458 


HISTOEY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


and  others,  in  1577,  and  presented  to  the  imperial 
diet,  which  sought  to  secure  its  adoption  by  the  en¬ 
tire  Lutheran  Church.  In  this  they  were  unsuccess¬ 
ful.  It  is  a  polemic  document,  constructed  by  that 
portion  of  the  Lutheran  Church  that  was  hostile  to 
the  Calvinistic  theory  of  the  sacraments.  It  carries 
out  the  doctrine  of  consubstantiation  into  a  tech¬ 
nical  statement, — teaching  the  ubiquity  of  Christ’s 
body,  and  the  communicatio  idiomatum ,  or  the 
presence  of  the  Divine  nature  of  Christ  in  the  sacra¬ 
mental  elements.  The  Lutheran  Church  is  still 
divided  upon  this  symbol.  The  so-called  High  Lu¬ 
therans  insist  that  the  Formula  Concordiae  is  the 
scientific  completion  of  the  preceding  Lutheran 
symbolism ;  while  the  moderate  party  are  content 
to  stand  by  the  Augsburg  Confession,  the  Apolo¬ 
gy,  and  the  Smalcald  Articles. 


§  2.  Reformed  ( Calvinistic )  Confessions . 

The  Reformed,  or  Calvinistic,  Churches  were  less 
successful  than  the  Lutheran  in  maintaining  an  out¬ 
ward  and  visible  unity,  and  one  consequence  is  a 
much  more  varied  symbolical  literature. 

The  oldest  Confession  of  that  branch  of  Protest¬ 
antism  which  was  not  satisfied  with  the  Lutheran 
tendency  and  symbol  is  the  Confessio  Tetrapolitana , 
— so  called,  because  the  theologians  of  four  cities  of 
upper  Germany,  Strasburg,  Costnitz,  Memmingen, 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


459 


and  Lindau,  drew  it  up,  and  presented  it  to  the  em¬ 
peror  at  the  same  diet  of  Augsburg,  in  1530,  at 
which  the  first  Lutheran  symbol  was  presented.  The 
principal  theologian  concerned  in  its  construction 
was  Martin  Bucer,  of  Strasburgh.  It  consists  of  22 
articles,  and  agrees  generally  with  the  Augsburg 
Confession.  The  points  of  difference  pertain  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  sacraments.  Upon  this  subject  it  is 
Zuinglian.  These  four  cities,  however,  in  1532 
adopted  the  Augsburg  Confession,  so  that  the 
Confessio  Tetrapolitana  ceased  to  be  the  formally 
adopted  symbol  of  any  branch  of  the  church,  al¬ 
though  it  was  always  held  in  high  repute  among  the 
Swiss  churches,  particularly  on  account  of  its  Zuin¬ 
glian  attitude  upon  the  sacramental  controversy. 
And  this  brings  us  to  the  views  of  Zuingle  himself, 
who  exerted  a  great  influence  upon  the  Reformed 
Churches,  in  the  opening  period  of  Protestantism. 

Zuingle  sent  a  confession  of  faith,  entitled  Fidei 
Ratio ,  embodying  his  own  individual  opinions,  to 
that  notable  diet  at  Augsburg  in  1530,  where  so 
many  religious  parties  and  interests  were  repre¬ 
sented.  '  Previously  to  this,  Zuingle  had  exhibited 
his  views  in  sixty-seven  articles  drawn  up  in  1523, 
but  almost  wholly  upon  points  pertaining  to  the  ex¬ 
ternals  of  Christianity,  and  particularly  the  sacra¬ 
ments.  But  in  this  document  he  discussed  the  car¬ 
dinal  subjects  of  religion,  and  laid  the  foundation  of 
that  peculiar  aspect  of  Protestantism  which  goes 
under  his  name. 


460  HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 

\ 

On  examination,  this  creed  is  found  to  differ 
from  the  Augsburg  Symbol.  1.  Upon  the  sub¬ 
ject  of  original  sin,  the  language  of  Zuingle  is  as 
follows.  “I  think  this  in  regard  to  original  sin. 
That  is  properly  sin  which  is  a  transgression  of  the 
law ;  for  where  there  is  no  law,  there  is  no  trans¬ 
gression  ;  and  where  there  is  no  transgression,  there 
is  no  sin  properly  so  called, — that  is  to  say,  so  far 
as  by  sin  is  meant  wickedness,  crime,  villainy,  or 
guilt.  I  acknowledge,  therefore,  that  our  father 
sinned  a  sin  that  is  truly  sin,  i.  e.,  wickedness,  crime, 
and  turpitude.  But  those  who  are  generated  from 
that  person  did  not  sin  in  this  manner ;  for  what 
one  of  us  bit  with  his  teeth  the  forbidden  apple  in 
Paradise  ?  Hence,  whether  we  will  or  not,  we  are 
compelled  to  admit  that  original  sin,  as  it  is  in  the 
sons  of  Adam,  is  not  truly  sin,  in  the  sense  already 
spoken  of,  for  it  is  not  a  crime  committed  against 
lawr.  Consequently,  it  is,  properly  speaking,  a  dis¬ 
ease  and  a  condition.  A  disease,  because,  as  he 
lapsed  from  love  of  himself,  so  also  do  we  lapse ;  a 
condition,  because,  as  he  became  a  slave  and  obnox¬ 
ious  to  death,  so  also  we  are  born  slaves  and  child¬ 
ren  of  wrath,  and  obnoxious  to  death.  .  .  . 

Adam  died  on  account  of  sin,  and  being  thus  dead, 
that  is  sentenced  to  death,  in  this  condition  he  gen¬ 
erated  us.  Therefore  we  also  die, — so  far  as  he  is 
concerned,  by  his  fault  and  criminality ;  but  so  far 
as  we  are  concerned,  by  our  condition  and  disease, 
or,  if  you  prefer,  sin,  but  sin  improperly  so  called. 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


461 


Let  us  illustrate  by  an  example.  A  man  is  taken 
captive  in  war.  On  the  ground  of  his  own  hostility  to 
his  captors,  and  treachery  towards  them,  he  deserves 
to  be  made  a  slave,  and  is  so  held.  JNTow,  they  who 
are  born  of  him  in  this  condition  are  slaves,  not  by 
virtue  of  their  own  fault,  guilt,  or  crime,  but  by 
virtue  of  their  condition,  which  condition  is  the  conse¬ 
quence  of  the  guilt  of  their  father,  who  had  deserved 
to  come  into  it  by  his  fault.  The  children  in  this  in¬ 
stance  are  not  laden  with  crime,  but  with  the  punish¬ 
ment,  fine,  loss,  or  danger  of  crime, — i.  e.,  with  a 
wretched  condition,  a  servitude.”1  The  difference 
between  Zuingle’s  theory  of  original  sin,  and  that  of 
Luther  and  his  associates  as  exhibited  in  the  extracts 
given  from  the  Augsburg  Confession,  is  apparent. 
It  is  the  reappearance  of  the  old  difference  between 
the  Greek  and  Latin  anthropologies,  upon  this  sub¬ 
ject.  2.  The  second  principal  point  of  difference 
between  Zuingle’s  Fidei  Ratio ,  and  the  Augsburg 
Confession,  relates  to  the  sacrament  of  the  Supper. 
Zuingle’s  mind  was  a  remarkably  clear  one,  and 
made  distinctions  with  great  luminousness.  Respect¬ 
ing  the  Romish  theory,  that  there  is  an  intrinsic 
efficacy  in  the  sensible  sign  and  material  symbol,  he 
makes  the  same  general  statement  with  the  Lutheran 
confession,  only  in  a  more  vivid  and  keen  style.  “  I 
believe,”  he  says,  u  nay  I  know,  that  all  sacraments, 
so  far  from  conferring  grace,  do  not  even  bring  or 


^iemeyer:  Collectio,  20,  sq. 


462 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


dispense  it.  In  this,  O  Caesar,  I  may  perhaps  seem 
to  you  to  be  too  bold  and  confident.  But  this  is  my 
opinion.  For  inasmuch  as  grace  comes,  or  is  given, 
by  the  Divine  Spirit,  the  entire  gift  of  grace  in  the 
end  is  resolved  into  the  influence  of  the  Holy  Ghost 
alone.  For  a  vehicle  or  guide  is  not  necessary  to 
the  Spirit ;  for  that  is  the  real  virtue  and  power  in 
any  instance  which  conveys  or  moves  other  things, 
and  not  that  which  needs  to  be  conveyed  or  moved. 
We  never  read  in  the  Scriptures  that  sensible  and 
material  things,  such  as  the  sacraments  are,  certainly 
and  in  every  instance  convey  the  Holy  Spirit ;  but 
if  sensible  things,  are  themselves  ever  conveyed  and 
made  operative  by  the  Spirit,  then  it  is  this  Spirit, 
and  not  the  sensible  thing,  that  is  the  ultimate  effi¬ 
cient  energy.  If,  when  the  mighty  wind  rushed 
onward,  the  tongues  of  flame  were  borne  onward 
by  the  wind,  then  the  wind  was  not  lifted  and 

conveyed  by  the  tongues  of  flame.  So,  likewise, 

* 

it  was  the  wind  that  brought  the  quails  and  blew 
away  the  locusts ;  but  no  quails  or  locusts  ever  pos¬ 
sessed  such  wings  as  to  bear  onward  the  winds.”  1 
To  the  sacrament  of  the  Supper,  Zuingle  applies 
the  principle  thus  stated  and  illustrated,  with  great 
energy  and  decision,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  ex¬ 
clude  both  the  theory  of  consubstantiation  and 
transubstantiation.  His  reasoning  is  full  and  de¬ 
tailed.  He  argues  from  scripture,  from  reason,  and 


1  Niemeyer  :  Collectio,  24,  sq. 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


463 


from  history  ;  and  maintains  that  view  of  the 
eucharist  which  is  now  widely  prevalent  in  the 
Protestant  churches.  u  I  believe,”  he  says,  “  that  in 
the  eucharist  the  body  of  Christ  is  truly  present  to 
the  eye  of  faith, — that  is,  that  those  who  thank  God 
for  the  benefits  conferred  in  Christ  do  acknowledge 
that  he  assumed  real  human  flesh,  really  suffered  in 
it,  really  washed  away  our  sins  by  his  blood,  and 
thus  all  that  was  done  by  Christ  becomes,  as  it  were, 
a  present  reality  to  those  who  behold  these  sym¬ 
bols  with  the  eye  of  faith.  But  that  the  body 
of  Christ  is  present  in  essence  and  real  substance, — 
in  other  words,  that  the  natural  body  of  Christ  is 
present  in  the  Supper,  and  is  masticated  by  our 
teeth,  as  the  Papists  and  certain  persons  who  look 
back  to  the  flesh  pots  of  Egypt  assert, — we  not 
only  deny,  but  affirm  to  be  contrary  to  the  word 
of  God.”1  Zuingle  concludes  with  specifying  the 
particulars  in  respect  to  which  the  bread  and  wine 
are  symbolical,  and  his  whole  theory  may  be  sum¬ 
med  up  in  the  statement,  that  the  sacrament  is  com - 
memorative  by  means  of  emblems. 

The  Fidei  Ratio  of  Zuingle  was  the  work  of  an 
individual  mind,  and  as  such  bears  a  private  and  not 
a  public  character.  Though  not  adopted  by  any 
secular  or  ecclesiastical  body,  it  nevertheless  exerted 
great  influence  among  the  Swiss  churches,  and  upon 
one  branch  of  the  Reformed  doctrine.  In  this 


1  Niemeyee  :  Collectio,  26. 


464 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


same  year,  1530,  Zuingle  also  drew  up,  for  the  use 
of  the  Swiss,  a  briefer  statement  of  doctrine,  sub¬ 
stantially  the  same  with  the  Fidei  Ratio ,  under  the 
title  of  Fidei  brevis  et  dam  Fxpositio. 

The  Zuinglian  system  prevailed  in  the  Swiss 
cantons,  and  especially  in  the  city  of  Basle  and  its 
neighbouring  ally  Miihlhausen.  Oswald  Myconius 
drew  up,  as  early  as  1532,  a  Confession  in  twelve 
articles,  after  a  sketch  which  Oecolampadius  had 
made,  which  goes  under  the  name  of  the  First 
Basle  Confession  ( Basiliensis  prior  Confessio Fidei). 
The  cities  of  Basle  and  Miihlhausen  adopted  it,  but 
it  never  obtained  general  currency.  It  is  a  brief 
and  simple  creed  in  its  structure,  presenting  with 
distinctness  the  evangelical  view  of  justification 
and  the  sacraments,  and  is  considerably  reserved  re¬ 
specting  the  more  speculative  aspects  of  Christian 
doctrine.  Concerning  the  character  of  man,  it 
speaks  as  follows:  “We  confess  that  man  in  the 
beginning  was  made  upright,  after  the  image  of 
God’s  righteousness  and  holiness,  but  that  he  has 
fallen  wilfully  into  sin,  by  which  the  whole  human 
race  has  become  corrupt  and  subject  to  condemna¬ 
tion,  our  nature  has  been  weakened,  and  has  ac¬ 
quired  such  an  inclination  to  sin,  that  whenever  it 
is  not  restored  by  the  Spirit  of  God,  the  man  of 
himself  never  will  do  anything  good.” 1 

The  most  important  of  all  the  Reformed  Con- 


1  Niemeyee  :  Collectio,  79. 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


465 


fessions  that  were  constructed  previous  to  the  pub¬ 
lic  appearance  of  Calvin,  is  the  First  Helvetic  Con¬ 
fession  (  Confessio  Helvetica  Prior  f  sometimes  de¬ 
nominated  the  Second  Basle  Confession.  It  origin¬ 
ated  as  follows.  In  the  year  1535,  the  most  distin¬ 
guished  Reformed  theologians  of  Switzerland  assem¬ 
bled  at  Aarau,  to  counsel  with  reference  to  a  union 
with  the  Lutherans  of  Germany.  The  first  step  to  be 
taken  in  order  to  this  was,  of  course,  to  draw  up  a 
creed  expressive  of  their  own  views,  and  indicating 
how  far  they  could  go  towards  meeting  the  Luther¬ 
ans  upon  controverted  points.  In  1536,  deputies 
were  sent  for  this  purpose,  from  Basle,  Zurich,  Berne, 
Schafhaiisen,  St.  Gall,  Muhlhausen,  and  Biel.  They 
met  in  Basle,  and  appointed  three  theologians  of 
their  number  to  draft  a  confession  of  faith.  These 
three  were  Bullinger  of  Zurich,  Oswald  Myconius 
and  Simon  Grynaeus  of  Basle,  with  whom  were  after¬ 
wards  associated  Juda  of  Zurich,  and  Groszman  of 
Berne.  This  confession  was  subscribed  March  26, 
1536,  by  the  authorities  secular  and  ecclesiastical  of 
the  seven  above-named  cantons,  and  was  adopted  by 
all  the  Reformed  cantons  of  Switzerland  as  their 
symbol.  In  1537,  it  was  sent  to  the  Lutheran  theo¬ 
logians  at  Wurtemberg,  and  at  Smalcald,  without 
effect,  however,  so  far  as  the  union  of  the  two  par¬ 
ties  was  concerned. 

The  First  Helvetic  Confession  is  pacific  in  its 
tone.  When  compared  with  the  views  of  Zuingle, 
it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  Swiss  theologians  advanced 


vol.  n. — 30 


466 


HISTOEY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


toward  the  Augsburg  Confession  in  no  inconsidera¬ 
ble  degree,  without,  however,  taking  exactly  the 
same  position  respecting  the  controverted  points. 
Its  language  upon  the  subject  of  original  sin  is  as 
follows.  “  Man,  the  most  perfect  image  of  God  on 
the  earth,  and  having  the  primacy  of  all  visible 
creatures,  consisting  of  soul  and  body,  of  which  the 
last  is  mortal  and  the  first  immortal,  having  been 
created  holy  by  God,  lapsing  into  sin  (vitium)  by  his 
own  fault,  drew  the  whole  human  race  into  the  same 
with  himself,  and  rendered  it  obnoxious  to  the  same 
calamity.  And  this  disease  (lues)  which  is  termed 
4  original,’  so  pervaded  the  whole  human  race,  that 
the  child  of  wrath  and  enemy  of  God  can  be  cured 
by  no  power  except  the  divine  granted  through 
Christ.  We  attribute  free  will  to  man  in  this  sense, 
viz. :  that  when  in  the  use  of  our  faculties  of  knowing 
and  willing  we  attempt  to  perform  good  and  evil 
actions,  we  are  able  to  perform  the  evil  of  our  own 
accord  and  by  our  own  power,  but  to  embrace  and 
follow  out  the  good  we  are  not  able,  unless  illumin¬ 
ated  by  the  grace  of  Christ,  and  impelled  by  his 
Spirit,  for  it  is  God  who  works  in  us  to  will  and  to 
do  according  to  his  good  pleasure  ;  and  from  God  is 
salvation,  from  ourselves  perdition.” 1 

In  its  anthropology,  then,  the  First  Helvetic 
Confession  agrees  with  the  Augsburg  in  recognizing 
the  Adamic  connection.  It  differs  from  the  Augs- 


1  Niemeyer  :  Collectio,  116,  sq. 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


467 


burg  Symbol,  in  asserting  by  implication  instead  of 
directly,  that  original  sin  is  guilt,  and  agrees  with  it 
in  denying  a  recuperative  power  in  the  fallen  will, — 
a  point  upon  which  Zuingle’s  Fidei  Ratio  is  silent, 
neither  affirming  nor  denying.  The  approximation 
of  this  principal  Swiss  Confession  to  the  Lutheran  is 
not  so  near  upon  the  doctrine  of  the  Lord’s  Supper, 
though  it  is  easy  to  see  some  slight  modification  of 
the  Zuinglian  theory.  The  phraseology  is  as  follows. 
“  In  the  mystic  supper,  the  Lord  offers  his  body  and 
blood,  that  is,  himself,  to  those  that  are  truly  his, 
that  they  may  live  more  and  more  in  him  and  he  in 
them.  Not  that  the  bread  and  wine  are,  in  their  own 
substance,  united  with  the  substance  of  the  body  and 
blood  of  the  Lord ;  but  the  bread  and  wine,  by  the 
institution  of  our  Lord,  are  symbols  through  which 
is  exhibited  a  true  communication  by  the  Lord 
himself,  through  the  ministers  of  the  church,  of  his 
own  body  and  blood,  not  as  the  perishing  food  of 
the  flesh,  but  as  the  nourishment  of  eternal  life.” 1 

The  Reformed  Confessions  thus  far  examined 
were  constructed  previously  to  the  public  appear- 
ance  of  Calvin,  and  without  any  direct  influence 
from  him.  We  come  now  to  those  which  were 
drawn  up,  more  or  less,  under  his  influence.  The 
Consensus  Tigurinus  was  composed  by  Calvin 
himself,  in  1549,  and  was  adopted  by  the  Zurich 
theologians.  It  comprises  twenty-six  articles,  which 


1  Niemeyer  :  Collectio,  120,  sq. 


468 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


treat  only  of  the  sacrament  of  the  Supper.  It  grew 
out  of  a  desire  upon  the  part  of  Calvin,  to  effect  a 
union  among  the  Reformed  upon  the  doctrine  of  the 
Eucharist.  The  attitude  of  Calvin  respecting  the 
Sacramentarian  question  was  regarded  by  the  Luther¬ 
ans,  as  favourable  rather  than  otherwise  to  their  pecu¬ 
liar  views.  His  close  and  cordial  agreement  with 
Luther  upon  the  fundamental  points  in  theology, 
together  with  the  strength  of  his  phraseology  when 
speaking  of  the  nature  of  the  Eucharist,  led  the 
Swiss  Zuinglians  to  deem  him  as  on  the  whole  fur¬ 
ther  from  them  than  from  their  opponents.  In  this 
Consensus  Tigurinus,  he  defines  his  statements  more 
distinctly,  and  left  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the 
Zurichers  that  he  adopted  heartily  the  spiritual  and 
symbolical  theory  of  the  Lord’s  Supper.  The  course 
of  events  afterwards  showed  that  Calvin’s  theory 
really  harmonized  with  Zuingle’s ;  for  as  the  Luther¬ 
an  scheme  of  consubstantiation  expanded,  the  two 
parties  became  less  and  less  cordial,  so  that  the 
High  Lutheran  of  the  present  day  exhibits  a  tem¬ 
per  towards  the  Calvinistic  theory  of  the  sacraments 
hardly  less  inimical  than  that  which  the  early  Lu¬ 
theran  manifested  towards  the  Papacy. 

Calvin,  in  1551,  drew  up  a  confession  entitled 
the  Consensus  Cenevensis ,  which  contains  a  very 
full  exhibition  of  his  theory  of  Predestination,  to 
which  topic  it  is  confined.  Its  purpose  was,  to  unite 
the  Swiss  churches  in  the  reception  of  his  own  views, 
upon  a  topic  far  more  difficult  of  comprehension 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


469 


than  the  sacraments,  and  respecting  which  there 
was  some  difference  of  opinion  among  the  Swiss  the¬ 
ologians.  Zningle  had  taught  the  doctrine  of  abso¬ 
lute  predestination,  and  so  far  as  his  views  had  pre¬ 
vailed  in  Switzerland  there  was  a  readiness  to  re¬ 
ceive  those  of  Calvin.  In  this  Consensus,  which  the 
Genevan  theologians  adopted,-  and  which  acquired 
almost  universal  authority  among  the  Reformed 
churches  of  Switzerland,  the  Calvinistic  theory  of 
Predestination  is  presented  with  great  clearness  and 
comprehensiveness. 

The  Second  Helvetic  Confession  ( Confessio  Hel¬ 
vetica  Posterior)  is  one  of  the  principal  symbols 
of  the  Reformed  Church.  It  was  constructed  by 
Bullinger,  in  1564,  who  was  intrusted  with  this  la¬ 
bour  by  a  body  of  Swiss  theologians,  mostly  from 
the  cantons  of  Zurich,  Berne,  and  Geneva.  It  was 
adopted  by  all  the  Reformed  churches  in  Switzer-  . 
land,  with  the  exception  of  Basle  (which  was  con¬ 
tent  with  its  old  symbol,  the  First  Helvetic ),  and 
by  the  Reformed  churches  in  Poland,  Hungary, 
Scotland,  and  France.  It  enunciates  the  strictly 
Calvinistic  view  of  the  sacraments  in  opposition  to 
the  Lutheran  view,  and  maintains  the  Calvinistic 
theory  of  predestination.  As  this  creed  represents 
the  theology  of  that  great  division  of  Protestantism 
which  received  its  first  formation  under  the  guid¬ 
ance  of  Zuingle  and  the  Swiss  theologians,  and  was 
completed  under  that  of  Calvin  and  his  coadjutors, 
it  merits  some  detailed  examination. 


470 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


1.  Upon  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  its  teaching 
is  as  follows.  “We  believe  that  God,  one  and  indi¬ 
visible  in  essence,  is,  without  division  or  confusion, 
distinct  in  three  persons:  Father,  Son,  and  Holy 
Spirit,  so  that  the  Father  generates  the  Son  from 
eternity,  the  Son  is  begotten  by  an  ineffable  genera¬ 
tion,  but  the  Holy  Spirit  proceeds  from  each,  and 
that  from  eternity,  and  is  to  be  adored  together 
with  each,  so  that  there  are  not  three  Gods,  but 
three  persons,  consubstantial,  co-eternal,  and  co¬ 
equal,  distinct  as  hypostases,  and  one  having  prece¬ 
dence  of  another  as  to  order,  but  with  no  inequality 
as  to  essence.’5 1  2.  Respecting  the  doctrines  of  Pre¬ 

destination  and  Election,  the  Helvetic  statement  is 
as  follows.  “  God,  from  eternity,  predestinated  or 
elected,  freely  and  of  his  own  mere  grace,  with  no 
respect  of  men’s  character,  the  saints  whom  he  would 
save  in  Christ,  according  to  that  saying  of  the  apos¬ 
tle  :  c  God  chose  us  in  himself  before  the  foundation 
of  the  world.’  Hot  without  a  medium,  though  not 
on  account  of  any  merit  of  ours.  In  Christ,  and  on 
account  of  Christ,  God  elected  us,  so  that  they  who 
are  engrafted  in  Christ  by  faith  are  the  elect,  but 
those  out  of  Christ  are  the  reprobate.” 2  3.  Upon 

the  topics  of  Sin,  Free  Will,  and  Justification,  the 
Helvetic  Confession  makes  the  following  statements. 
“  Sin  we  understand  to  be  that  native  corruption  of 
man,  derived  or  propagated  to  us  all  from  our  first 


1  Niemeyek  :  Collectio,  470,  471. 


3  Niemeyek  :  Collectio,  481. 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


471 


parents,  by  which,  immersed  in  evil  concupiscence 
and  averse  from  good,  but  prone  to  all  evil,  full  of 
all  wickedness,  unbelief,  contempt  and  hatred  of 
God,  we  are  unable  to  do  or  even  to  think  anything 
good  of  ourselves.  In  the  unrenewed  man  there  is 
no  free  will  to  do  good,  no  power  for  performing 
good.  The  Lord  in  the  gospel  says,  ‘Whosoever 
committeth  sin  is  the  servant  of  sin.’  The  apostle 
Paul  says,  ‘  The  carnal  mind  is  enmity  against  God, 
for  it  is  not  subject  to  the  law  of  God,  neither  in¬ 
deed  can  be.’  ” 1  “  Justification,  in  the  meaning  of 

the  apostle,  signifies  remission  of  sins,  absolution 
from  guilt  and  punishment,  reception  into  favour, 
and  pronouncing  just,” — all  upon  the  ground  of  the 
fact,  that  u  Christ  took  the  sins  of  the  world  upon 
himself,  endured  their  punishment,  and  satisfied  di¬ 
vine  justice.” 2  Concerning  the  Eucharist,  this  sym¬ 
bol  is  Zuinglian.  It  teaches  that  the  elements  are 
signs, — not  vulgar  or  common,  but  “  sacred  ”  u  con¬ 
secrated  ”  emblems.  “  He  who  instituted  the  Sup¬ 
per,  and  commanded  us  to  eat  bread  and  drink 
wine,  willed  that  believers  should  not  perceive  the 
bread  and  wine  only,  without  any  sense  of  the  mys¬ 
tery  (sine  mysterio),  as  they  eat  bread  at  home,  but 
they  should  partake  spiritually  of  the  things  signi¬ 
fied,  i.  e.  be  washed  from  their  sins  through  faith  in 
Christ’s  blood  and  sacrifice.” 3 

The  Second  Helvetic  Confession,  besides  having 

1  Niemeyer  :  Collectio,  477,  480.  3  Niemeyer  :  Collectio,  494. 

3  Niemeyer  :  Collectio,  514,  515. 


472 


HISTOEY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


great  currency  among  the  Reformed  churches  with¬ 
in  and  without  Switzerland,  was  recast  and  condens¬ 
ed  into  two  other  symbols  :  1.  The  Confessio  P  ala - 
tina  /  2.  The  Fepetitio  Anhaltina.  These  were  lo¬ 
cal  confessions,  drawn  up  for  the  use  of  provincial 
churches  only. 

The  Formula  Consensus  Helvetici ,  one  of  the 
most  scientific  of  Calvinistic  symbols,  was  composed 
at  Zurich,  in  1675,  by  Heidegger,  assisted  by  Fran¬ 
cis  Turretin  of  Geneva,  and  Gereler  of  Basle.  It 
was  adopted  as  their  symbol  by  nearly  all  the  Swiss 
churches,  though  with  hesitation  on  the  part  of  some 
of  them.  Controversies,  however,  continued  with¬ 
out  abatement  among  them,  so  that  this  symbol  did 
not  prove  to  be  the  bond  of  union  which  it  was  de¬ 
signed  to  be,  and  since  1722  it  has  ceased  to  have 
authority  as  an  authorized  symbol,  though  much  es¬ 
teemed  by  the  High  Calvinistic  party.  t 

This  Confession  was  called  out  by  that  modified 
form  of  Calvinism  which,  in  the  17th  century,  emanat¬ 
ed  from  the  school  at  Saumur ,  represented  by  Amy- 
rault,  Placaeus,  and  Daille.  Concerning  the  Atone¬ 
ment,  its  language  is  as  follows.  44  We  do  not  agree 
with  the  opinion  of  those  who  teach  that  God  pur¬ 
poses  the  salvation  of  all  men  individually,  provided 
only  they  believe,  by  reason  of  his  philanthropic  be¬ 
nevolence,  or  because  he  is  moved  by  a  certain  love 
of  the  fallen  race  of  mankind  that  is  prior  to  his 
purpose  of  election ;  by  a  certain  4  conditional  will,’ 
or  4  primal  compassion,’  as  they  term  it, — that  is,  by 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


473 


a  wish  or  desire  on  his  part  that  is  inefficacious.”1 
Upon  this,  follows  a  statement  of  the  doctrine  of 
atonement  that  limits  its  application  to  the  individ¬ 
ual  by  the  electing  purpose  of  God,  which  purpose 
infallibly  secures  the  saving  acceptance  of  the  atone¬ 
ment  by  the  operation  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Respect¬ 
ing  the  doctrine  of  Original  Sin,  the  Formula  Con¬ 
sensus  teaches,  that  the  ground  of  the  imputation  of 
Adam’s  sin  to  his  posterity  as  guilt,  is  a  real  and  not 
a  nominal  one ;  in  other  words,  that  the  charge  of 
original  sin  upon  the  individual,  as  true  and  proper 
sin,  is  founded  upon  its  commission  by  the  race  in 
the  person  of  the  progenitor,  and  not  upon  its  ficti¬ 
tious  imputation  to  the  individual  by  an  arbitrary 
act  of  God.  The  phraseology  is  as  follows.  uWe 
are  of  opinion,  that  the  sin  of  Adam  is  imputed  to 
all  his  posterity  by  the  secret  and  just  judgment  of 
God.  For  the  apostle  testifies  that  all  sinned  in 
Adam ;  that  by  the  disobedience  of  one  man  many 
were  made  sinners ;  and  that  in  the  same  man  all 
die.  But  it  does  not  appear  how  hereditary  corrup¬ 
tion,  as  spiritual  death,  could  fall  upon  the  entire 
human  race,  by  the  just  judgment  of  God,  unless 
some  fault  (delictum)  of  this  same  human  race, 
bringing  in  (inducens)  the  penalty  of  that  death, 
had  preceded.  For  the  most  just  God,  the  judge 
of  all  the  earth,  punishes  none  but  the  guilty.” 2 

The  Heidelberg  Catechism  ( Qatechismus  Palati- 


^iemeyer:  Collectio,  732. 


2Niemeyek:  Collectio,  733. 


474 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


nus ) 1  possesses  the  double  character  of  a  symbol, 
and  a  book  for  systematic  instruction.  In  connection 
with  the  Second  Helvetic  Confession,  it  is  the  most 
generally  adopted  of  the  Reformed  Confessions,  and  > 
has  great  authority  outside  of  the  particular  com¬ 
munions  that  adopt  it. 

As  early  as  the  middle  of  the  16th  century,  the 
Palatinate  of  the  Rhine,  a  large  and  important 
division  of  Germany  lying  upon  both  banks  of  the 
river,  had  adopted  the  Augsburg  Confession,  chief¬ 
ly  under  the  influence  of  its  crown  princes.  In  the 
year  1560,  the  crown  prince  Frederick  III.  intro¬ 
duced  the  Swiss  doctrine  and  worship.  His  succes¬ 
sor,  Lewis  VI.,  in  1576  carried  the  Palatinate  back 
again  to  a  Lutheran  symbol,  the  Formula  Concor- 
diae.  John  Casimir,  the  successor  of  Lewis,  restored 
the  Reformed  doctrine,  which  after  that  time  became 
the  prevalent  one  in  the  Palatinate.  In  order  to 
give  the  Reformed  party  a  definite  and*  established 
organization,  Frederick  III.  commissioned  two  Hei¬ 
delberg  theologians  to  compose  a  catechism.  These 
were  Ursinus,  a  student  of  Melanchthon’s,  and  Ole- 
vianus, — the  first  of  whom  performed  the  principal 
labour.  The  catechism  was  laid  before  the  superin¬ 
tendents  or  bishops,  and  preachers,  in  1562,  for  their 
acceptance ;  and  in  the  following  year  it  was  pub- 

1  See  the  excellent  Monograph  man  Reformed  Church  in  Amer- 
commemorative  of  the  tercente-  ica,  by  Scribner,  New  York, 
nary  of  this  symbol,  published  1863. 
under  the  auspices  of  the  Ger- 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


475 


lished,  in  tlie  name  of  the  crown  prince,  as  the  doc¬ 
trine  of  the  Palatinate,  and  was  introduced  into  the 
churches  and  schools  of  the  land. 

The  Heidelberg  Catechism  is  one  of  the  best  of 
the  many  systems  of  Christian  doctrine  that  were 
constructed  in  the  prolific  period  of  the  Reforma¬ 
tion.  Though  not  composed  directly  for  such  a 
purpose,  as  were  the  Lutheran  Formula  Concordiae 
and  the  Calvinistic  Formula  Consensus,  it  is  better 
fitted  than  either  of  them  to  unite  both  branches 
and  tendencies  of  Protestantism.  It  consists  of  three 
parts.  The  first  treats  of  the  misery  of  man ;  the 
second  of  his  redemption ;  the  third  of  his  happy 
condition  under  the  gospel.  It  contains  129  ques¬ 
tions  and  answers,  arranged  for  the  52  Sabbaths  of 
the  year.  In  doctrine,  it  teaches  justification  with 
the  Lutheran  glow  and  vitality,  predestination  and 
election  with  Calvinistic  firmness  and  self-consisten¬ 
cy,  and  the  Zuinglian  theory  of  the  sacraments  with 
decision.  It  was  originally  composed  in  German ; 
has  been  translated  into  Latin,  Greek,  and  Hebrew, 
as  well  as  into  nearly  all  the  languages  of  modern 
Europe;  was  approved  by  the  highly  Calvinistic 
synod  of  Dort,  and  is  regarded  with  great  favour  by 
the  High  Lutheran  party  of  the  present  day. 

The  Confessio  Belgica  was  first  drawn  up  as  a 
private  confession  by  Von  Bres,  in  1561.  It  con¬ 
tains  37  articles,  and  is  thoroughly  Calvinistic.  It 
was  composed  in  French,  and  was  first  printed  in 
Walloon  French  and  Dutch  in  1562.  In  1571,  it 


476 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


was  revised,  and  adopted  by  the  entire  Holland 
Church  in  the  16th  century.  After  another  revis¬ 
ion  of  the  text,  it  was  publicly  approved  by  the 
synod  of  Dort  in  1618. 

The  Confessio  Gallicana ,  a  Calvinistic  symbol, 
was  composed  by  a  synod  of  the  Reformed  party 
convened  at  Paris  in  1559.  Theodore  Beza  sent  a 
copy  of  it  to  Charles  IX.  It  was  subscribed  by  a 
synod  at  Rochelle  in  1571,  and  is  the  adopted  con¬ 
fession  of  the  French  Protestant  Church.  The 
French  Reformed  churches  in  Holland  also  receive 
this  as  their  symbol. 

The  Confessio  Scoticana  was  constructed  in 
1560,  by  the  Scottish  preachers, — principally  by 
John  Knox.  It  is  Calvinistic  in  substance  and  spir¬ 
it,  and  was  introduced  throughout  Scotland  by  state 
enactment. 

The  Canons  of  the  Synod  of  Dortt  constitute  a 
highly  important  portion  of  the  Calvinistic  symbol¬ 
ism.  In  the  beginning  of  the  17th  century,  Armin- 
ianism  had  arisen  in  Holland,  and  to  oppose  it  this 
synod  was  convened.  Besides  the  Holland  theolo¬ 
gians,  there  were  representatives  from  many  of  the 
foreign  Reformed  or  Calvinistic  churches, — though 
the  former  had  the  preponderating  influence.1  The 

1  The  synod  was  composed  of  61  East  Friesland,  and  Bremen.  The 
Hollanders, — viz.  :  5  professors,  States  General  levied  one  hun- 
86  preachers,  and  20  elders, —  dred  thousand  guilders  upon  the 
and  28  foreign  theologians,  from  provinces,  to  defray  the  expenses 
England,  Scotland,  the  Palati-  of  the  deputies  to  the  synod, 
nate,  Hesse,  Switzerland,  Nassau, 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


477 


synod  met  Nov.  13,  1618,  and  continued  in  session 
until  May  9,  1619  ;  held  discussions  with  the  Re¬ 
monstrants,  or  Arminians,  who  appeared  in  synod 
by  13  deputies  headed  by  Episcopius ;  and  drew 
up,  during  the  154  sessions,  93  Canones  which  com¬ 
bat  the  principal  tenets  of  the  Arminians,  and  de- 
velope  the  Calvinistic  system.  The  Reformed 
churches  in  the  Netherlands,  France,  the  Palatinate, 
the  greater  part  of  Switzerland,  and  the  Puritans  in 
Great  Britain  received  these  canons  as  the  scientific 
and  precise  statement  of  Christianity.  The  English 
Episcopal  Church,  in  which  at  that  time  the  Armin- 
ian  party  was  dominant,  rejected  the  decisions  of 
this  synod,  and  a  royal  mandate  of  James  I.,  in  1620, 
forbade  the  preaching  of  the  doctrine  of  predestina¬ 
tion. 

The  Dort  Canons  are  composed  in  a  positive,  and 
a  negative  form.  After  the  statement  of  the  true 
doctrine  according  to  Calvinism,  there  follows  a  re¬ 
jection  of  the  opposing  Arminian  errors.  The  fol¬ 
lowing  extracts  from  the  Rejectio  errorum  indicate 
the  views  of  the  Synod  upon  the  doctrines  of  Origi¬ 
nal  Sin,  Free  Will,  and  Atonement.  “  The  synod 
rejects  the  error  of  those  who  teach  that  it  is  not 
true  that  original  sin  of  itself  is  sufficient  to  con¬ 
demn  the  whole  human  race,  and  merits  temporal 

and  eternal  punishment . The  synod  rejects 

the  error  of  those  who  teach  that  spiritual  gifts, 
that  is  good  dispositions  and  virtues,  such  as  holi¬ 
ness  and  justice,  could  have  had  no  place  in  the  will 


478  HISTOEY  OF  SYMBOLS. 

of  man  when  first  created,  and  consequently  could 
not  be  separated  from  it  in  the  fall . The  sy¬ 

nod  rejects  the  error  of  those  who  teach  that 
spiritual  gifts  are  not  lost  from  the  will  of  man  in 
spiritual  death,  because  the  will  was  not  corrupted , 
but  is  only  impeded  by  the  darkness  of  the  mind, 
and  the  inordinate  appetites  of  the  flesh, — which 
impediments  being  removed,  the  will  is  able  to  ex¬ 
ert  its  innate  freedom,  i.  e.  of  itself  either  to  will  or 
to  choose,  or  not  to  will  or  not  to  choose,  whatever 

good  is  set  before  it . The  synod  condemns 

the  error  of  those  who  teach  that  grace  and  free 
will  are  each  partial  and  concurrent  causes  at  the 
commencement  of  conversion  ;  that  grace  does  not 
precede  the  efficiency  of  the  will,  in  the  order  of 
causality, — i.  e.,  that  God  does  not  efficiently  aid  the 
will  of  man  to  conversion,  before  the  will  itself 
moves  and  determines  itself.  ....  The  synod  re¬ 
jects  the  error  of  those  that  teach  that  Christ  by 
his  satisfaction  has  not  strictly  merited  faith  and  sal¬ 
vation  for  those  to  whom  this  satisfaction  is  effectu¬ 
ally  applied,  but  that  he  has  only  acquired  for  the 
Father  the  authority  or  plenary  power  of  treating 
de  novo  with  mankind,  and  of  prescribing  whatever 
new  conditions  he  pleases,  the  performance  of  which 
depends  upon  the  free  will  of  man,  so  that  it  may 
be  that  no  man  will  fulfil  them,  or  that  all  men 
will.” 1 


1  Niemeyer  :  Collectio,  in  locis. 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


479 


The  Thirty -Nine  Articles  of  the  English  Church, 
like  the  constitution  of  the  English  State,  were  a 
gradual  formation.  Under  King  Edward  VI.,  arch¬ 
bishop  Cranmer  and  bishop  Ridley  drew  up  a  sym¬ 
bol,  in  1551,  for  the  Reformed  Church  in  England, 
which  was  entirely  Calvinistic  in  substance  and 
spirit.  This  was  adopted  by  a  synod  at  London,  in 
1552,  and  thereby  received  public  sanction.  It 
goes  under  the  name  of  “The  Forty-Two  Articles 
of  Edward  Sixth.”  This  symbol  was  revised  by  the 
bishops  of  the  English  Church  under  Queen  Eliza¬ 
beth,  in  1562.  The  revision  comprised  a  creed  of 
thirty-nine  articles,  which  was  sanctioned  by  a  synod 
in  London  in  1562,  and  by  act  of  Parliament  in 
1571.  It  is  a  Calvinistic  creed  upon  all  points  of 
doctrine  with  the  exception  of  the  sacraments. 
With  respect  to  this  subject,  it  was  intended  to  be 
a  mean  between  the  Lutheran  and  Calvinistic  theo¬ 
ries.  Its  polity  is  prelatical  episcopacy,  the  reigning 
sovereign  being  the  earthly  head  of  the  church. 

The  Westminster  Confession  is  the  result  of  the 
deliberations  of  the  Westminster  Assembly,  a  synod 
of  divines  called  by  Parliament,  in  opposition,  how¬ 
ever,  to  the  will  of  Charles  I.,  for  the  purpose  of 
settling  the  government,  liturgy,  and  doctrine  of  the 
Church  of  England.  It  met  July  1,  1643,  and  sat 
till  February  22,  1648,  four  years  six  months  and 
twenty-two  days,  in  which  time  it  held  1163  ses¬ 
sions.  The  members  were  chosen  from  the  several 
counties  of  England,  and  thus  the  council  contained 


480 


HISTOEY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


representatives  of  the  Presbyterian,  the  Episcopa¬ 
lian,  and  the  Independent  parties.  The  great  pre¬ 
ponderance,  however,  was  on  the  part  of  the  Pres¬ 
byterians,  since  many  of  the  Episcopal  divines, 
though  elected,  refused  to  attend,  upon  the  ground 
that  as  the  king  had  declared  against  the  convoca¬ 
tion  it  was  not  a  legal  assembly ;  and  the  Indepen¬ 
dents  were  a  far  smaller  body  than  either  of  the 
other  two.  The  system  of  doctrine  constructed  by 
this  Assembly  is  thoroughly  Calvinistic,  and  bears  a 
close  resemblance  to  the  canons  of  the  synod  of 
Dort.  The  Westminster  Confession  was  adopted  as 
their  doctrinal  basis  by  the  Presbyterians  of  England, 
and  took  the  place  of  the  Confessio  Scoticana  in 
Scotland.  It  is  also  the  symbol  of  the  Presbyterian 
Church  in  America.1 

The  Savoy  Confession  is  a  symbol  adopted  by 
the  Puritan  Independents  in  England,  who  were 
not  satisfied  with  the  Westminster  Confession  so  far 
as  the  polity  and  discipline  of  the  churches  was  con¬ 
cerned.  As  yet  they  had  formally  adopted  no  com¬ 
mon  creed.  The  Presbyterian  assembly  had  urged 
them  to  this,  reminding  them  that  their  brethren  in 
New  England  had  already  done  it.  Under  the  au¬ 
thority  of  Cromwell,  an  assembly  was  convened  at 
the  Savoy,  in  London,  October  12,  1658,  composed 
of  above  one  hundred  ministers  and  delegates  from 

1  See  Neal  :  History  of  the  Pu-  bly,  for  an  account  of  the  West- 
ritans,  and  Hetheeington  :  His-  minster  Confession, 
tory  of  the  Westminster  Assem- 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


481 


the  Independent  churches,  among  whom  were  John 
Howe,  then  Cromwell’s  chaplain,  John  Owen,  Joseph 
Caryl,  and  Thomas  Goodwin,  who  is  styled  by 
Anthony  Wood  “  the  very  Atlas  and  patriarch  of 
Independency.”  A  committee  was  chosen,  of  whom 
Goodwin  and  Owen  were  at  the  head,  to  draw  up  a 
new  confession,  with  the  instruction  to  keep  as  close 
to  the  Westminster  upon  doctrinal  points  as  possible. 
This  they  did,  saying  in  their  preface  that  they  fully 
consent  to  the  Westminster  Confession,  for  the  sub¬ 
stance  of  it.1 

The  Savoy  Confession  differs  from  the  West¬ 
minster  upon  the  subject  of  polity.  It  teaches 
u  that  every  particular  society  of  visible  professors 
agreeing  to  walk  together  in  the  faith  and  order  of 
the  gospel  is  a  complete  church,  and  has  full  power 
within  itself  to  elect  and  ordain  all  church  officers, 
to  exclude  all  offenders,  and  to  do  all  other  acts  re¬ 
lating  to  the  edification  and  well-being  of  the 
church.  .  .  .  The  way  of  ordaining  officers,  that  is, 
pastors,  teachers  or  elders,  is,  after  their  election  by 
the  suffrage  of  the  church,  to  set  them  apart  with 
fasting  and  prayer,  and  imposition  of  the  hands  of 
the  eldership  of  the  church,  though  if  there  be  no 
imposition  of  hands,  they  are  nevertheless  rightly 


The  difference  between  these  agreed  with  the  Presbyterians  in 
two  confessions  is  so  very  small,  the  nse  of  the  Assembly’s  cate- 
that  the  modern  Independents  chism.”  Neal:  Puritans,  II.  178- 
have  in  a  manner  laid  aside  the  (Harper’s  Ed.), 
use  of  it  in  their  families,  and 


VOL.  II. — 31 


482 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


constituted  ministers  of  Christ ;  for  it  is  not  allowed 
that  ordination  to  the  work  of  the  ministry,  though 
it  be  by  persons  rightly  ordained,  does  convey  any 
office-power,  without  a  previous  election  of  the 
church.  No  ministers  may  administer  the  sacra¬ 
ments  but  such  as  are  ordained  and  appointed  there¬ 
unto.  The  power  of  all  stated  synods,  presbyteries, 
convocations,  and  assemblies  of  divines,  over  partic¬ 
ular  churches  is  denied ;  but  in  cases  of  difficulty, 
or  difference  relating  to  doctrine  or  order,  churches 
may  meet  together  by  their  messengers,  in  synods  or 
councils,  to  consider  and  give  advice,  but  without 
exercising  any  jurisdiction.” 1 

The  connection  between  the  Calvinism  of  the 
Continent  and  the  Puritanism  of  England,  we  have 
seen,  is  very  close  and  intimate ;  that  between  the 
Puritanism  of  Old  England  and  of  New  England 
is  equally  close,  so  that  this  is  a  proper,  place  in  this 
history  of  Symbols  to  introduce  the  creeds  of  the 
New  England  churches.  The  oldest  of  them,  and 
one  of  the  most  important,  is  the  Cambridge  Plat¬ 
form.  In  1646,  a  bill  was  presented  to  the  Gen¬ 
eral  Court  of  Massachusetts,  for  calling  a  synod  of 
the  churches  to  draw  up  some  platform  of  disci¬ 
pline  and  church  government.2  The  bill  was  passed, 
but  owing  to  scruples  of  some  of  the  deputies  the 
law  did  not  take  effect.  The  matter  was  then  pro- 

1  Neal  :  Puritans,  II.  178,  179  was  the  only  directory  in  use  up 

(Harper’s  Ed.).  to  this  time. 

2  Cotton’s  “  Book  of  the  Keys  ” 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


483 


pounded  to  the  churches,  and  by  them  a  synod  was 
convened.  It  met,  sat  fourteen  days,  and  then  ad¬ 
journed  to  June  8, 1647.  Owing  to  epidemical  sick¬ 
ness  it  soon  adjourned,  and  met  again  August  15, 
1648.  At  this  session,  the  Platform  was  constructed 
and  adopted.  The  synod  consisted  of  the  clergy  of 
Massachusetts,  with  as  many  others  as  could  be  col¬ 
lected  from  the  other  New  England  colonies.  Hub¬ 
bard  and  Higginson,  who  personally  remembered 
them,  describe  them  as  “  men  of  great  renown  in 
the  nation  from  whence  the  Laudian  persecution 
exiled  them.  Their  learning,  their  holiness,  their 
gravity,  struck  all  men  that  knew  them,  with  admi¬ 
ration.  They  were  Timothies  in  their  houses,  Chry¬ 
sostoms  in  their  pulpits,  and  Augustines  in  their 
disputations.” 

The  Platform  prepared  by  this  synod,  which  sat 
fourteen  days,  was  presented  in  October,  1648,  to 
the  churches  and  the  general  government,  for  their 
consideration  and  acceptance.  It  was  adopted  by 
the  churches,  and  after  some  discussion  by  the  gen¬ 
eral  court, — the  latter  declaring  “  their  approbation 
of  the  said  form  of  discipline,  as  being,  for  the  sub¬ 
stance  thereof,  what  they  had  hitherto  practised  in 
their  churches,  and  did  believe  to  be  according  to 
the  word  of  God  ”  Thus,  the  document  received  in 
Massachusetts  the  sanction  of  law,  and  was  adopted 
and  in  force  in  all  the  New  England  colonies,  until 
superseded  in  Connecticut  by  the  Saybrook  Plat¬ 
form,  in  1708. 


484 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


The  Cambridge  Platform  is  wholly  confined  to 
polity.  It  makes  no  statements  of  doctrine  whatever. 
Like  the  Savoy  Confession,  it  refers  to  the  Westmin¬ 
ster  Symbol  for  a  dogmatic  statement.  In  their 
preface,  the  authors  of  the  Cambridge  Platform  say : 
“  Having  perused  the  public  confession  of  faith 
agreed  upon  by  the  reverend  assembly  of  divines  at 
Westminster,  and  finding  the  sum  and  substance 
thereof,  in  matters  of  doctrine,  to  express  not  their 
own  judgment  only,  but  ours  also  ;  and  being  like¬ 
wise  called  upon  by  our  godly  magistrates,  to  draw 
up  a  public  confession  of  that  faith  which  is  con¬ 
stantly  taught  and  generally  professed  amongst  us ; 
we  thought  good  to  present  unto  them,  and  with 
them  to  our  churches,  and  with  them  to  all  the 
churches  of  Christ  abroad,  our  professed  and  hearty 
assent  and  attestation  to  the  whole  confession  of 
faith,  for  substance  of  doctrine,  which  the  reverend 
assembly  presented  to  the  religious  and  honourable 
parliament  of  England,  excepting  only  some  sections 
in  the  25th,  80th,  and  81st  chapters  of  their  confes¬ 
sion,  which  concern  points  of  controversy  in  church 
discipline,  touching  which  we  refer  ourselves  to  the 
draft  of  church  discipline  in  the  ensuing  treatise.” 
Respecting  the  subject  of  church  government  and 
discipline,  this  Platform  agrees  with  the  polity  of  the 
Savoy  Confession, — teaching  as  that  does,  that  the  in¬ 
dividual  church  possesses  all  political  power  within 
itself,  even  to  the  ordination  of  its  minister, and  that 
•councils  or  synods  have  nothing  but  advisory  powers. 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


485 


The  second  New  England  symbol,  both  in  time 
and  importance,  is  the  Boston  Confession.  A  synod 
of  the  churches  in  the  province  of  Massachusetts, 
called  by  the  General  Court,  assembled  in  Boston 
September  10,  1679,  in  which  the  Cambridge  Plat¬ 
form  was  re-adopted  as  the  form  of  church  polity. 
This  synod  then  held  a  second  session,  May  12, 
1680,  for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  confession  of 
faith.  On  the  19th  of  May,  1680,  the  result  of  the 
deliberations  of  this  synod  was  presented  to  the 
General  Court  for  acceptance,  whereupon  the  fol¬ 
lowing  order  was  passed  :  “  This  court  having 
taken  into  serious  consideration  the  request  that 
hath  been  presented  by  several  of  the  reverend 
elders,  in  the  name  of  the  late  synod,  do  approve 
thereof,  and  accordingly  order  the  confession  of 
faith  agreed  upon  at  their  second  session,  and  the 
platform  of  discipline  consented  unto  by  the  synod 
at  Cambridge  anno  1648.  to  be  printed  for  the 
benefit  of  the  churches  in  present  and  after  times.” 
This  is  the  only  dogmatic  confession  that  has  been 
drawn  up  in  the  New  England  churches  and  by  the 
New  England  divines,  and  for  this  reason  it  deserves 
some  particular  notice  and  examination. 

The  Cambridge  Synod  of  1648  adopted  the 
Westminster  Symbol,  in  place  of  forming  a  new  one 
for  themselves.  This  Boston  Synod  of  1680  both 
adopt  an  antecedent  symbol,  and  construct  another 
of  their  own.  In  their  preface  to  their  Confession, 
the  Boston  Synod  employ  the  following  language. 


486 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


“  It  hath  pleased  the  only  wise  God  so  to  dispose  in 
his  providence,  as  that  the  elders  and  messengers 
of  the  churches  in  the  colony  of  Massachusetts  in 
New  England,  did,  by  the  call  and  encouragement 
of  the  honoured  general  court,  meet  together  Sep¬ 
tember  10,  1679.  This  synod  at  their  second  ses¬ 
sion,  which  was  May  12,  1680,  consulted  and  con¬ 
sidered  of  a  confession  of  faith.  That  which  was 
consented  unto  by  the  elders  and  messengers  of  the 
Congregational  churches  in  England  who  met  at  the 
Savoy  (being  for  the  most  part,  some  small  varia¬ 
tions  excepted,  the  same  with  that  which  was  agreed 
upon  first  by  the  assembly  at  Westminster,  and  was 
approved  of  by  the  synod  at  Cambridge  in  New 
England,  anno  1648,  as  also  by  a  general  assembly 
in  Scotland),  was  twice  publicly  read,  examined, 
and  approved  of, — that  little  variation  which  we 
have  made  from  the  one,  in  compliance  with  the 
other,  may  be  seen  by  those  who  please  to  compare 
them.  But  we  have,  for  the  main,  chosen  to  express 
ourselves  in  the  words  of  those  reverend  assemblies, 
that  so  we  might  not  only  with  one  heart,  but  with 
one  mouth,  glorify  God  and  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ. 
As  to  what  concerns  church  government,  we  refer  to 
the  platform  of  discipline  agreed  upon  by  the  mes¬ 
sengers  of  these  churches  anno  1648.” 

Having  thus  re-affirmed  the  Calvinism  of  the 
Westminster  and  Savoy  Confessions,  this  synod 
proceed  to  the  formation  of  a  confession  of  faith  in 
their  own  language  and  terms ;  from  which  the  fol- 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


487 


lowing  citations  exhibit  the  views  of  the  New 
England  churches  and  divines  of  that  period.  “  In 
the  unity  of  the  God-head,  there  be  three  persons, 
of  one  substance,  power,  and  eternity,  God  the 
Father,  God  the  Son,  and  God  the  Holy  Ghost ;  the 
Father  is  of  none,  neither  begotten,  nor  proceeding  ; 
the  Son  is  eternally  begotten  of  the  Father ;  the 
Holy  Ghost  eternally  proceeding  from  the  Father 
and  the  Son.”  This  confession,  it  is  obvious,  like 
the  Calvinistic  confessions  generally,  adopts  the 
Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan  Trinitarianism.  The 
Anthropology  of  the  Boston  Confession  is  indicated 
in  the  following  extracts,  “  God  having  made  a  cov¬ 
enant  of  works  and  life  thereupon,  with  our  first 
parents,  and  all  their  posterity  in  them,  they  being 
seduced  by  the  subtilty  and  temptation  of  Satan 
did  wilfully  transgress  the  law  of  their  creation, 
and  break  the  covenant  in  eating  the  forbidden 
fruit.  By  this  sin,  they  and  we  in  them  fell  from 
original  righteousness  and  communion  with  God, 
and  so  became  dead  in  sin,  and  wholly  defiled  in 
all  the  faculties  and  parts  of  soul  and  body.  They 
being  the  root,  and  by  God’s  appointment  standing 
in  the  room  and  stead,  of  all  mankind,  the  guilt  of 
this  sin  was  imputed,  and  corrupted  nature  conveyed 
to  all  their  posterity  descending  from  them  by  or¬ 
dinary  generation.  From  this  original  corruption, 
whereby  we  are  utterly  indisposed,  disabled,  and 
made  opposite  to  all  good,  and  wholly  inclined  to 
all  evil,  do  proceed  all  actual  transgressions.  Every 


488 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


sin,  both  original  and  actual,  being  a  transgression 
of  the  righteous  law  of  God,  and  contrary  there¬ 
unto,  doth  in  its  own  nature  bring  guilt  upon  the 
sinner,  whereby  he  is  bound  over  to  the  wrath  of 
.God  and  curse  of  the  law,  and  so  made  subject  to 
death,  with  all  miseries,  spiritual,  temporal,  and 

eternal . God  hath  endued  the  will  of  man 

with  that  natural  liberty  and  power  of  acting  upon 
choice,  that  is  neither  forced,  nor  by  any  absolute 
necessity  of  nature  determined,  to  do  good  or  evil. 
Man  in  his  state  of  innocency  had  freedom  and 
power  to  will  and  do  that  which  is  good  and  well 
pleasing  to  God  ;  but  yet  mutably,  so  that  he  might 
fall  from  it.  Man  by  his  fall  into  a  state  of  sin 
hath  wholly  lost  all  ability  of  will  to  any  spiritual 
good  accompanying  salvation,  so  as  a  natural  man 
being  altogether  averse  from  that  good,  and  dead  in 
sin,  is  not  able  by  his  own  strength  to  convert  himself, 
or  to  prepare  himself  thereunto.  The  will  of  man 
is  made  perfectly  and  immutably  free  to  good  alone, 
in  the  state  of  glory  only.’7  The  Boston  Confession 
agrees,  then,  with  the  Latin  in  distinction  from  the 
Greek  anthropology,  in  maintaining  the  two  posi¬ 
tions  that  original  sin,  equally  with  actual,  is  guilty 
transgression  of  law,  and  deserves  the  punishment 
of  eternal  death ;  and  that  the  will  of  man  after  the 
fall  does  not  possess  that  power  to  good  which  it  had 
by  creation  and  anterior  to  its  apostasy.1 

1  This  doctrine  of  the  impo-  endorsed  by  the  most  important 
tence  of  the  apostate  will,  thus  of  the  New  England  synods,  was 


CALVINISTIC  CONFESSIONS. 


489 


The  Soteriology  of  this  confession  is  seen  in  the 
following  extract.  “  Christ  by  his  obedience  and 
death  did  fully  discharge  the  debt  of  all  those  that 
are  justified,  and  did  by  the  sacrifice  of  himself,  in 
the  blood  of  his  cross,  undergoing  in  their  stead  the 
penalty  due  unto  them,  make  a  proper  real  and  full 
satisfaction  to  God’s  justice  in  their  behalf;  yet  in¬ 
asmuch  as  he  was  given  by  the  Father  for  them, 
and  his  obedience  and  satisfaction  accepted  in  their 
stead,  and  both  freely,  not  for  anything  in  them, 
their  justification  is  only  of  free  grace,  that  both 


re-affirmed  by  the  two  most  dis¬ 
tinguished  of  New  England  the¬ 
ologians.  The  elder  Edwards 
(On  the  Will,  Pt.  III.  §  iv.)  com¬ 
bats  the  power  of  contrary 
choice,  without  which  self-con¬ 
version  is  impossible,  in  the  fol¬ 
lowing  terms :  “  The  will,  in  the 
time  of  a  leading  act  or  inclina¬ 
tion  that  is  diverse  from  or  op¬ 
posite  to  the  command  of  God, 
and  when  actually  under  the  in¬ 
fluence  of  it,  is  not  able  to  exert 
itself  to  the  contrary ,  to  make  an 
alteration  in  order  to  a  compli¬ 
ance.  The  inclination  is  unable 
to  change  itself;  and  that  for  this 
plain  reason,  that  it  is  unable  to 
incline  to  change  itself.”  Hop¬ 
kins  (Works,  I.  233-235)  remarks, 
that  “  every  degree  of  inclination 
contrary  to  duty,  which  is  and 
must  be  sinful,  necessarily  implies 
and  involves  an  equal  degree  of 
difficulty  and  inability  to  obey. 
For,  indeed,  such  inclination  of 


the  heart  to  disobey,  and  the  dif¬ 
ficulty  or  inability  to  obey,  are 
precisely  one  and  the  same.  This 
hind  of  difficulty ,  or  inability , 
therefore ,  always  is  great  accord¬ 
ing  to  the  strength  and  fixedness 
of  the  inclination  to  disobey  ;  and 
it  becomes  total  and  absolute  when 
the  heart  is  totally  corrupt ,  and 
wholly  opposed  to  obedience.  .  .  . 
St.  Paul  says :  ‘  The  carnal  mind 
is  enmity  against  God,  for  it  is  not 
subject  to  the  law  of  God,  nei¬ 
ther  indeed  can  be.’  None  can 
think  the  apostle  means  to  ex¬ 
cuse  man’s  enmity  against  God, 
because  it  renders  him  unable  to 
obey  the  law  of  God,  and  cannot 
be  subject  to  it.  The  contrary  is 
strongly  expressed,  viz.,  that  this 
enmity  against  God  is  exceeding 
criminal,  in  that  it  is  directly  op¬ 
posed  to  God  and  his  law,  and  in¬ 
volves  in  its  nature  an  utter  ina¬ 
bility  to  obey  the  law  of  God , — yea , 
an  absolute  impossibility .” 


490 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


the  exact  justice  and  rich  grace  of  God  might  be 
glorified  in  the  justification  of  sinners.” 

Upon  the  topics,  then,  of  trinitarianism,  anthro¬ 
pology,  and  soteriology,  the  Boston  Confession  of 
1680  is  in  harmony  with  the  Protestant  confessions 
of  the  Old  World.  And  what  is  especially  worthy 
of  notice,  with  regard  to  those  shades  and  differen¬ 
ces  of  doctrinal  statement  which  prevailed  within 
the  wide  and  active  mind  of  Protestantism,  the 
New  England  churches,  as  represented  by  this  syn¬ 
od,  adopted  the  more  strict  and  not  the  more  latitudi- 
narian  statements  of  doctrine.  Respecting  the  more 
difficult  and  disputed  points  in  dogmatic  theology, 
the  Boston  Confession  gives  the  same  definitions, 
and  takes  the  same  positions,  with  the  Augsburg 
Confession  of  the  German  Lutherans,  the  Second 
Helvetic  of  the  Swiss  Calvinists,  the  Dort  Canons 
of  the  Dutch  Calvinists,  and  the  Westminster  Con- 
fession  of  the  English  Puritans. 

A  synod  of  the  churches  in  the  Connecticut 
colony  met  in  1703,  which  adopted  the  Westminster 
and  Savoy  Confessions,  and  drew  up  certain  rules  of 
ecclesiastical  discipline.  This  synod  was  only  pre¬ 
paratory,  however,  to  another  more  general  one 
which  they  had  in  contemplation.  In  1708,  a  synod 
was  convened  by  the  legislature,  and  met  at  Say- 
brook.  This  body  adopted  for  a  doctrinal  confes¬ 
sion  the  Boston  Confession  of  1680,  and  drew  up 
the  Saybrook  Platform  of  government  and  disci¬ 
pline  which  approximates  to  the  Presbyterian,  in 


PAPAL  CONFESSIONS. 


491 


delegating  judicial  powers  to  churches  organized 
into  a  “  Consociation.”  The  confession  of  faith  and 
platform  were  approved  and  adopted  by  the  legis¬ 
lature  of  Connecticut,  in  October,  1708. 


§  3.  Papal  Confessions . 

The  fountain-head  of  the  modern  Papal  theology 
is  the  Canones  et  Decreta  Concilii  Tridentini .  The 
need  of  a  general  synod  to  counteract  the  progress 
of  the  Protestant  churches  had  long  been  felt  by 
the  Papal  body,  and  after  considerable  delay  pope 
Paul  III.  convened  one  at  Trent,  on  the  13th  of 
December,  1545,  which  with  intermissions  continued 
to  hold  its  sessions  until  the  year  1563.  A  papal 
bull  of  Pius  IV.,  issued  on  the  26th  of  January, 
1564,  confirmed  the  decisions  of  the  synod ;  for¬ 
bade,  under  the  severest  penalties,  all  clergymen 
and  laymen  from  making  explanations  or  commen¬ 
taries  upon  them ;  and  reserved  to  the  pope  the 
further  explication,  as  need  might  be,  of  the  more 
obscure  points  of  doctrine  contained  in  them.  The 
Tridentine  Symbol  did  not  immediately  acquire 
equal  authority  in  all  Roman  Catholic  countries.  In 
the  greater  part  of  Italy,  in  Portugal,  in  Poland,  and 
by  the  German  emperor,  the  council  of  Trent  was 
formally  declared  to  be  oecumenical.  But  in  Catho¬ 
lic  Germany  its  decisions  were  only  tacitly  accepted ; 
in  Spain,  Naples,  and  Belgium,  they  were  adopted 


492 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


with  a  special  reservation  of  royal  rights ;  and  in 
France,  where  the  council  met  with  strong  opposi¬ 
tion,  they  were  received  only  by  degrees,  and  with 
respect  to  strictly  dogmatic  points.  The  decisions 
of  the  Tridentine  Council,  which  were  passed  not 
unanimously  but  by  a  majority  vote,  fell  into  two 
classes.  The  first,  entitled  Decreta,  contain  detailed 
statements,  in  positive  propositions,  of  the  Papal  doc¬ 
trine;  the  second,  entitled  Canones,  explain  in  a 
brief  manner  the  meaning  of  the  Decreta,  and  con¬ 
demn  the  opposite  tenets  of  the  Protestant  church, — 
ending,  always,  with  the  words  “  anathema  sit.” 
Their  teachings  in  theology,  anthropology,  soterio- 
logy,  and  eschatology,  have  been  indicated  in  the 
several  divisions  of  this  history. 

A  second  document  possessing  symbolical  author¬ 
ity  in  the  Papal  Church  is  the  Professio  fidei  Tri - 
dentina ,  which  pope  Pius  IV.,  in  a  bull  issued  in 
1564,  required  all  public  teachers  in  the  Romish 
Church,  all  candidates  for  clerical  or  academical 
honours,  and  all  converts  from  other  churches,  to 
subscribe.  It  is  composed  of  the  Nicaeno-Constan- 
tinopolitan  symbol,  together  with  extracts  from  the 
Tridentine  Canons.  It  obligates  the  subscriber  to 
belief  in  the  Nicene  doctrine ;  in  the  entire  body 
of  ecclesiastical  tradition  ;  in  the  interpretation 
which  the  Church  has  given  to  the  Scriptures ;  in 
the  seven  sacraments  and  their  Catholic  adminis¬ 
tration  ;  in  the  statements  of  the  Council  of  Trent 
concerning  original  sin  and  justification ;  in  the 


PAPAL  CONFESSIONS. 


493 


mass,  transubstantiation,  purgatory,  invocation  of 
saints,  and  worship  of  images ;  in  the  authority  of 
the  church  to  give  absolution ;  in  the  Roman  Church 
as  the  mother  and  teacher  of  all  other  churches ; 
and  in  the  pope  as  the  vicegerent  of  Christ  to 
whom  obedience  is  due. 

A  third  document  of  a  symbolical  character  in 
the  Papal  Church  is  the  Catechismus  Homanus , 
drawn  up  at  the  command  of  the  pope  by  three 
distinguished  Papal  theologians,  under  the  supervi¬ 
sion  of  three  cardinals.  It  wTas  published  in  Latin, 
under  the  authority  of  Pius  IV.,  in  1556,  and  intro¬ 
duced  into  Italy,  Prance,  Germany,  and  Poland,  by 
the  votes  of  provincial  synods.  It  adheres  closely 
to  the  Tridentine  Canons;  though  it  enters  into 
details  upon  some  points  respecting  which  the  Tri¬ 
dentine  Canons  are  silent,  such  as  the  sovereignty  of 
the  pope  and  the  limbus  patrum.  Although  this 
catechism  was  published  by  papal  authority,  several 
other  catechisms  have  attempted  to  supplant  it. 
The  Jesuits,  toward  the  close  of  the  16th  century, 
during  the  controversies  that  arose  respecting  pre¬ 
destination,  endeavored  to  weaken  the  influence  of 
the  Roman  Catechism,  by  the  two  Catechisms  of  Ca- 
nisius ,  a  member  of  their  body.  One  of  these  was 
intended  to  be  a  dogmatic  manual  for  clergymen, 
and  the  other  a  book  of  instruction  for  children 
and  youth.  They  were  translated  into  many  lan¬ 
guages,  and  exerted  a  great  influence  in  connection 
with  the  educational  system  of  the  Jesuits.  The 


494 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


pope,  however,  refused  to  give  them  papal  authority, 
though  strongly  urged  to  do  so  by  the  Jesuit  party. 
The  Catechism  of  Bellarmin ,  published  in  1603,  also 
the  work  of  a  Jesuit,  was  authorized  by  pope  Clement 
VIII.  as  a  true  exposition  of  the  Roman  Catechism, 
and  obtained  a  wide  circulation.  Besides  these 
documents,  the  Confutatio  Confessionis  Augustanae 
or  answer  to  the  Augsburg  Confession,  the  bull 
Unigenitus  of  Clement  XI.  issued  in  1711,  and  the 
liturgical  books  of  the  Roman  Church,  particularly 
the  Missale  Romanum  and  the  Breviarium  Boma- 
num ,  are  important  auxiliary  sources  of  the  Papal 
doctrine. 


§  4.  Confessions  of  the  Greek  Church. 

The  Greek  Church  lays  at  the  foundation  of  its 
dogmatic  system  the  Apostles’  Creed,  and  the  de¬ 
cisions  of  the  seven  oecumenical  councils  which  were 
held  previous  to  the  schism  between  the  East  and 
the  West, — viz.,  the  first  and  second  Nicene,  in  325 
and  787  ;  the  first,  second,  and  third  Constantino- 
politan,  in  381,  533,  and  680  ;  the  Ephesian  in  431, 
and  the  Chalcedon  in  451.  It  differs  from  the 
Roman  Church,  in  rejecting  the  decisions  of  all 
councils  held  at  the  West  since  the  division  of  the 
two  churches. 

Besides  these,  there  are  several  symbolical  docu¬ 
ments  which  the  Greek  Church  adopts  as  the  ex¬ 
pression  of  its  faith.  The  most  important  of  them 


ARMENIAN  CONFESSIONS. 


495 


is  the  Confessio  Orthodoxa ,  drawn  up  in  1642,  by 
Peter  Mogilas,  the  metropolitan  bishop  of  Kiew,  to 
counteract  a  tendency  towards  Protestantism  that 
was  showing  itself  in  the  Russian  Church.  It 
was  published  first  in  Russian,  then  in  Modern 
Greek,  and  afterwards  in  Latin  and  German.  An¬ 
other  creed  is  the  Confessio  Dosithei ,  composed  by 
a  Greek  patriarch  of  Jerusalem,  in  opposition  to  the 
Calvinistic  system.  Still  another  is  the  Confessio 
Gennadii ,  which  the  patriarch  Gennadius  of  Con¬ 
stantinople  composed  and  presented  to  the  sultan 
Mohammed  II.,  on  his  conquest  of  Constantinople  in 
1453,  as  the  statement  of  the  Christian  faith.  It 
does  not  enter  into  the  differences  between  the 
Greek  and  Latin  systems,  but  is  an  expression  of 
the  general  truths  of  the  Christian  religion. 


§  5.  Arminian  Confessions . 

The  Arminians  take  their  name  from  Arminius 
(fl609),  first  a  pastor  at  Amsterdam,  afterwards 
professor  of  divinity  at  Leyden.  He  had  been  ed¬ 
ucated  by  Beza  in  the  opinions  of  Calvin,  but  as 
early  as  1591  began  to  express  his  dissent  from 
Calvinism,  upon  the  points  of  free-will,  predestina¬ 
tion,  and  grace,  as  being  too  rigid  and  severe.  The 
Arminians  were  also  called  Remonstrants,  because 
in  1611  they  presented  a  remonstrance  to  the  States- 
General  of  Holland,  praying  for  relief  from  the 
harsh  treatment  of  their  opponents. 


496 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


The  Arminians  formally  adopted  no  symbol. 
One  of  their  characteristics  was  a  lower  estimate 
than  the  Reformed  churches  cherished,  of  the  value 
of  confessions  generally.  Hence,  their  opinions 
must  be  sought  in  the  writings  of  their  leading 
minds.  The  principal  sources  are  the  following :  1. 
The  writings  of  Arminius  ;  particularly  his  contro¬ 
versy  with  Francis  Gomar,  his  colleague.  2.  The 
Confessio  Pastorum  qui  Remonstr antes  vocantur , 
drawn  up  by  Episcopius  (f  1643).  3.  The  Remon- 

sti'antia  of  Peter  Bertius, — a  specification  of  the  five 
articles  (  Quinque  articular es)  held  by  the  Arminians, 
in  opposition  to  the  Calvinistic  five  points.  4.  The 
writings  of  Grotius  (apologetical  and  exegetical)  ; 
of  Limborch  (dogmatical)  ;  of  Curcellaeus,  Wetstein, 
and  Le  Clerc  (exegetical). 

The  controversy  between  the  Arminians  and  Cal¬ 
vinists  turned  chiefly  upon  three  Calvinistic  points, 
viz. :  the  absolute  decree  of  election  ;  the  irresisti- 
bleness  of  special  grace  ;  and  the  limitation,  in  the 
divine  intention,  of  the  merit  of  Christ’s  death  to 
the  elect.  1.  The  Arminians  held  that  the  decree 
of  election  is  conditional,  or  dependent  upon  the 
divine  foreknowledge  that  grace  will  be  rightly  used 
in  the  instance  of  the  elect.  The  Dort  Canons  main¬ 
tain  that  the  electing  decree  secures  the  right  use  of 
grace  itself,  as  well  as  bestows  grace.  2.  The  Ar¬ 
minians  held  that  the  atonement  of  Christ  is  in¬ 
tended  for  all  men  alike  and  indiscriminately.  As 
matter  of  fact,  however,  it  saves  only  a  part  of 


AEMINIAN  CONFESSIONS. 


497 


mankind.  The  reason  why  the  atonement  does  not 
save  all  men  alike  and  indiscriminately  lies  in  the 
fact,  that  the  will  of  the  finally  lost  sinner  defeats 
the  divine  intention.  There  is  no  such  degree  o.f 
grace  as  is  irresistible  to  the  sinful  will.  The  effect¬ 
ual  application  of  the  atonement,  therefore,  depends 
ultimately  upon  the  decision  of  the  sinner’s  will,  and 
this  decision  in  the  case  of  the  lost  defeats  the  divine 
purpose.  In  opposition  to  this  view,  the  Dort  Sy¬ 
nod  held  that  the  atonement,  though  sufficient  in 
value  for  the  salvation  of  all  men,  was  intended  only 
for  those  to  whom  it  is  effectually  applied,  viz. :  the 
elect.  The  Holy  Spirit  possesses  a  power  that  is  ir¬ 
resistible,  in  the  sense  that  it  can  subdue  the  obsti¬ 
nacy  of  any  human  will  however  opposed  to  God. 
Hence,  the  application  of  the  atonement  depends,  ul¬ 
timately,  not  upon  the  sinner’s  decision  but  the  divine 
determination  to  exert  special  grace.  There  is,  there¬ 
fore,  no  defeat  of  the  divine  intention,  and  the  atone¬ 
ment  saves  all  for  whom  it  was  intended.  3.  The 
Arminians  held  that  grace  is  necessary  in  order  to 
salvation,  but  that  regenerating  grace  may  be  both 
resisted  and  lost.  The  Dort  Synod,  on  the  contrary, 
held  that  regenerating  as  distinct  from  common 
grace  is  able  to  subdue  all  opposition  of  the  sinful 
will,  and  therefore  cannot  be  resisted  in  the  sense 
of  being  defeated  or  overcome,  and  therefore  can¬ 
not  be  lost. 


498 


HISTORY  OF  SYMBOLS. 


§  6.  Socinian  Confessions. 

The  Socinians  laid  still  less  stress  upon  symbols 
than  the  Arminians.  The  principal  writings  having 
a  confessional  character  among  them  are  the  fol¬ 
lowing  :  1.  The  Cracovian  Catechism , — composed 

mostly  of  passages  of  Scripture.  It  was  drawn  up 
by  Schomann,  and  published  in  1574,  for  the  use  of 
the  Polish  churches.  2.  The  Catechism  of  Faustus 
Socinus , — published  at  Paco  via,  1618,  in  an  un¬ 
finished  form,  owing  to  the  death  of  Socinus.  3. 
The  JEtacovian  Catechisms , — the  larger  composed  by 
Schmalz  and  Moscorovius,  and  published  in  1605  ; 
the  smaller  by  Schmalz,  in  1605.  These  are  the 
principal  symbolical  product  of  Socinianism,  and  are 
drawn  very  much  from  the  writings  of  the  Socini. 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX. 


ABELARD,  i.  46,  163 ;  his  view  of 
faith  and  reason,  i.  186  ;  his  trini- 
tarianism,  i.  337  ;  his  soteriology,  ii. 
287. 

Absolution  (Lutheran),  ii.  452. 
Acceptilation,  ii.  347,  sq. 

Advent  (second)  of  Christ,  ii.  398,  450. 
Adventists,  ii.  397. 

Agassiz,  i.  1. 

Ahriman,  i.  245. 

Albertus  Magnus,  i.  .82,  ii.  293. 

Alogi,  i.  259. 

Alcuin,  i.  177,  ii.  Ill ;  his  statement 
of  the  relation  of  the  person  to  the 
essence,  i.  347 ;  soteriology  of,  ii.  270. 
Alexander,  bishop  of  Alexandria,  his 
opposition  to  Arius,  i.  307. 
Alexandrine  School,  i.  67,  159  ;  anthro¬ 
pology  of,  ii.  31 ;  soteriology  of,  ii. 
226. 

Ambrose,  i.  12,  343,  ii.  34,  49;  anthro¬ 
pology  of,  ii.  4S,  sq. ;  eschatology  of, 
ii.  401. 

Ammon,  i.  218. 

Amalrich,  of  Bena,  i.  179,  227. 
Anti-Judaizing  Gnostics,  i.  116. 
Anti-Trinitarians,  i.  253. 

Angelo,  i.  5. 

Anselm,  i.  11,  46,  164,  177,  179,  ii.  218 ; 
his  view  of  reason  and  faith,  i.  179  ; 
argument  for  Divine  existence,  i.  231, 
sq. ;  his  use  of  substantia  and  essen¬ 
tia,  i.  370 ;  his  trinitarianism,  i.  376 ; 
anthropology  of,  ii.  114-139  ;  defini¬ 
tion  of  original  sin,  ii.  115,  sq. ;  rela¬ 
tion  of  the  individual  to  the  species, 


ii.  120,  sq. ;  realism  of,  ii.  117 ;  idea 
of  the  will  and  freedom,  ii.  127,  sq. ; 
inability  of  the  creature  to  originate 
holiness,  ii.  132 ;  impossibility  of 
God’s  originating  sin,  ii.  136  ;  soteri¬ 
ology  of,  ii.  273,  sq. ;  maintains  the 
absolute  necessity  of  atonement,  ii. 
274;  definition  of  sin  as  debt,  ii.  277 ; 
strict  satisfaction  required,  ii.  279; 
his  evangelical  “  direction  ”  for  the 
visitation  of  the  sick,  ii.  282  ;  influ¬ 
ence  of  his  system,  ii.  286,  318 ;  his 
soteriology  compared  with  the  Pro¬ 
testant,  ii.  336,  sq.,  355 ;  his  idea  of 
law,  ii.  355. 

Antiochian  School,  anthropology  of,  ii. 
39 ;  attitude  of  towards  Pelagianism, 
ii.  101. 

Anhalt,  confession  of,  ii.  471. 

Anabaptists,  ii.  450. 

A  priori  argument  for  the  divine  exist¬ 
ence,  i.  238. 

A  posteriori  argument  for  the  divine 
existence,  i.  230. 

Apollinarism,  i.  394. 

Apologia  confessionis  Augustanae,  ii. 
455. 

Apologies,  i.  30,  103  ;  defect  in  mediae¬ 
val,  i.  188, 

Aquinas,  i.  12,  46,  82,  179,  ii.  293;  his 
view  of  faith  and  reason,  i.  181 ;  his 
trinitarianism,  i.  376;  relation  of  the 
individual  to  the  species,  ii.  121 ; 
soteriology  of,  ii.  304,  sq. ;  relative 
necessity  of  atonement,  ii.  306  ;  doc¬ 
trine  of  unio  mystica,  ii.  308,  337 ; 


500 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX. 


distinction  between  satisfactio  and 
meritum,  ii.  309  ;  doctrine  of  supera¬ 
bundance  of  merit,  ii.  310;  confu¬ 
sion  of  justification  with  sanctifica¬ 
tion,  ii.  312;  his  notion  of  ‘configu¬ 
ration,’  ii.  313;  distinction  of  merit 
of  condignity  and  cougruity,  ii.  329 ; 
his  eschatology,  ii.  405,  409,  413, 
417. 

Aristotle,  on  the  enslaved  will,  i.  54, 
55 ;  on  immortality,  i.  55 ;  his  defini¬ 
tion  of  faith,  i.  54. 

Aristotelianism,  influence  of,  i.  52 ;  er¬ 
rors  of,  i.  53,  sq. ;  agreement  with 
Platonism,  i.  57  ;  prevalence  of,  i.  66, 
76,  81. 

Arius,  i.  307,  ii.  435. 

Arianism,  relation  of  to  Origenism,  i. 
307  ;  christology  of,  i.  393. 

Arminians,  confessions  of,  ii.  495,  sq. 

Arminianism,  anthropology  of,  ii.  178- 
196;  definition  of  original  sin,  ii. 
179;  original  sin  not  guilt,  ii.  1S2, 
477,  sq. ;  impotence  of  the  sinful  will, 
ii.  186  ;  God  cannot  require  faith  ir¬ 
respective  of  grace,  ii.  189  ;  doctrine 
of  the  Adamic  unity,  ii.  190 ;  doctrine 
of  conditional  election,  ii.  193,486; 
soteriology  of,  ii.  370,  sq. ;  Christ’s 
death  not  a  substituted  penalty,  but 
a  substitute  for  a  penalty,  ii.  373  ; 
not  a  complete  satisfaction,  ii.  374. 

Arnobios,  i.  229. 

Arnobius,  the  younger,  ii.  103. 

Artemonites,  i.  68,  259. 

Athanasius,  i.  46,  70,  229,  280 ;  his  de¬ 
finition  of  Sabellianism,  i.  2G0;  his 
opinion  of  Origen,  i.  291 ;  of  the 
Semi-Arians,  i.  313 ;  of  Eusebius,  i. 
313;  his  doctrine  of  eternal  genera¬ 
tion,  i.  321,  sq.,  327,  332,  sq. ;  his 
doctrine  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  i.  356, 
861 ;  his  definition  of  hypostasis,  i. 
369  ;  his  anthropology,  ii.  37  ;  his  so¬ 
teriology,  ii.  239,  sq. 

Athenagoras,  i.  119,  127. 

Atonement,  defined,  ii.  204;  relative 
and  absolute  necessity  of,  ii.  223,  258, 
300,  302,  316. 

Auberlin,  ii.  397. 


Augsburg  Confession,  trinitarianism 
of,  i.  379;  anthropology  of,  ii.  152, 
sq.,  166,  sq.  ;  soteriology  of,  ii.  342 ; 
condemns  chiliasm,  ii.  596 ;  account 
of,  ii.  445,  sq. 

Augustine,  i.  46,  230 ;  Platonic  studies 
of,  i.  69  ;  acquaintance  with  Aristo¬ 
tle’s  writings,  i.  74,  152;  his  idea  of 
revelation,  i.  143 ;  of  the  church,  i. 
144;  his  De  civitate  Dei,  i.  154;  his 
definition  of  faith,  i.  155, 158 ;  view  of 
relation  of  faith  to  reason,  i.  161 ;  of 
miracles,  i.  167 ;  of  eternal  genera¬ 
tion,  i.  344 ;  specimens  of  his  trinita¬ 
rian  exegesis,  i.  351 ;  combats  pre¬ 
existence,  ii.  9 ;  attitude  towards  tra- 
ducianism,  ii.  15,  sq.,  77  ;  his  anthro¬ 
pology,  ii.  50-91 ;  his  earlier  syner¬ 
gism,  ii.  51 ;  his  conception  of  the 
power  of  contrary  choice,  ii.  55,  65  ; 
his  distinction  between  relative  and 
absolute  perfection,  ii.  55;  his  con¬ 
ception  of  voluntariness,  ii.  58 ;  his 
idea  of  will  and  freedom,  ii.  60,  sq. ; 
view  of  freedom  and  necessity,  ii.  64; 
of  the  bondage  of  the  will,  ii.  66 ; 
his  theory  of  regeneration,  ii.  66  ;  de¬ 
grees  of  grace,  ii.  68  ;  his  doctrine  of 
predestination,  ii.  70;  of  irresistible 
grace,  ii.  73  ;  concerning  the  salva¬ 
tion  of  pagans,  ii.  74;  doctrine  of  the 
Adamic  unity,  ii.’  76-79,  90;  of  the 
voluntariness  of  sin,  ii.  79-91 ;  im¬ 
possibility  of  God’s  sinning,  ii.  84; 
his  soteriology,  ii.  253,  sq. ;  occasion¬ 
al  confusion  of  justification  with  sanc¬ 
tification,  ii.  255  ;  maintains  a  relative 
necessity  of  atonement,  ii.  258  ;  his 
eschatology,  ii.  401,  405,  408,  410, 
412,  414. 

Avitus,  of  Vienne,  ii.  105. 

Bacon,  i.  3, 65. 

Barnabas,  i.  267 ;  soteriology  of, 
ii.  209  ;  chiliasm  of,  ii.  390. 

Basil,  the  Great,  his  doctrine  of  the 
Holy  Ghost,  i.  357  ;  his  eschatology, 
ii.  404. 

Basle,  confession  of,  ii.  464. 

Basilides,  ii.  205,  227. 


ALPHABETICAL  I A  LEX. 


501 


Baumgarten-Cp.usius,  method  of,  i.  36 ; 
extracts  from,  i.  130,  153. 

Baur,  i.  231,  261 ;  his  statement  of 
Origen’s  trinitarianism,  i.  297,  300 ; 
of  Irenaeus’s  soteriology,  ii.  213,  sq. ; 
his  objection  to  Anselm’s  doctrine 
of  satisfaction,  ii.  284  ;  his  statement 
of  the  difference  between  the  Protes¬ 
tant  and  Papal  soteriologies,  ii.  331 ; 
his  criticism  on  the  Grotian  theory 
of  satisfaction,  ii.  366. 

Baxter,  i.  92,  204. 

Bede,  ii.  111. 

Begotten,  eternally.  See  Generation. 

Belgic  Confession,  ii,  475 ;  its  definition 
of  justification,  ii.  340;  notice  of  chi- 
liasm,  ii.  397. 

Bellarmin,  ii.  144, 151 ;  his  soteriology, 
ii.  328 ;  twofold  justification  defined, 
ii.  329. 

Bentley,  i.  207,  216. 

Bernard,  i.  46,  179  ;  his  view  of  faith 
and  reason,  i.  183 ;  his  trinitarianism, 
i.  376  ;  his  soteriology,  ii.  289. 

Bertius,  ii.  496. 

Beryl,  i.  255,  ii.  435. 

Biel,  i.  82 ;  his  soteriology,  ii.  314. 

Boccaccio,  i.  87. 

Boethius,  i.  73. 

Bolingbroke,  system  of,  i.  200  ;  its  in¬ 
fluence  in  France,  i.  216. 

Bonar,  ii,  397. 

Bonaventura,  his  creationism,  ii.  23  ; 
soteriology  of,  ii.  293,  sq. 

Boston  Confession,  ii.  484,  sq. 

Boyle,  i.  207. 

Breviarium  Romanum,  ii.  494. 

Bucer,  i.  444. 

Bugenhagen,  ii.  446. 

Bull,  i.  290,  312,  338;  his  view  of  Ori¬ 
gen’s  trinitarianism,  i.  301 ;  opinion 
concerning  the  Nicene  use  of  ovcr'ia 
and  vTro<TTa<ns ,  i.  369;  concerning 
the  Nicene  idea  of  subordination,  i. 
339. 

Bullinger,  ii.  465. 

Bunsen,  i.  255,  263. 

Burnet,  i.  404. 

Burton,  i.  270. 

Buthos,  i.  240. 


Butler  (Bishop),  his  Analogy,  i.  212. 

Butler  (Archer),  i.  249. 

J3SARIUS  of  Arles,  ii.  105. 

Calvin,  i.  46,  91,  144,  158,  311,  ii. 
30;  his  trinitarianism,  i.  320,  321, 
380,  sq. ;  his  creationism,  ii.  24  ;  con¬ 
ception  of  human  bondage,  ii.  66 ;  his 
anthropology,  ii.  155 ;  his  criticism 
upon  Augustine’s  soteriology,  ii. 
257. 

Cambridge  platform,  ii.  482,  sq. 

Cassiodorus,  i.  73. 

Catechism,  ofLuther,  ii.  457  ;  Romanus, 
ii.  493  ;  of  Canisius,  ii.  493  ;  of  Bel¬ 
larmin,  ii.  493;  Sociuian,  ii.  498. 

Celsus,  i.  63,  118,  133  ;  ii.  403. 

Cerinthus,  ii.  390. 

Chalcedon,  council  of,  i.  398  ;  christo- 
logy  of,  i.  399,  sq. 

Chaucer,  i.  88. 

Christ,  person  of,  i.  392,  sq.,  399.  See 
Person. 

Chrysostom,  anthropology  of,  ii.  39; 
eschatology  of,  ii.  405,415. 

Chubb,  i.  200. 

Church  (universal),  defined,  i.  32. 

Circumincession,  i.  347. 

Clarke  (Samuel),  i.  207, 215 ;  his  trini¬ 
tarianism,  i.  386,  sq. 

Clement  of  Alexandria,  i.  117,  119, 
124,  129,  130,  147,  229  ;  trinitarian¬ 
ism  of,  i.  274,  sq.  ;  anthropology  of, 
ii.  31  ;  soteriology  of,  ii.  280,  sq.  ; 
his  idea  of  future  punishment,  ii. 
235  ;  attacks  chiliasm,  ii.  395  ;  escha¬ 
tology  of,  ii.  404,  415. 

Clement  of  Rome,  i.  265,  267 ;  sote¬ 
riology  of,  ii.  209;  eschatology  of, 
ii.  414 

Coleridge,  i.  1,  66,  159. 

Collins,  i.  199,  215. 

Condillac,  i.  216,  217. 

Congregational  churches,  trinitarian¬ 
ism  of,  i.  493,  ii.  484. 

Consensus  Tigurinus,  ii.  467 ;  Gene- 
vensis,  ii.  468. 

Consubstantiation,  ii.  451. 

Conybeare  (John),  his  reply  to  Tindal, 
i.  203. 


502 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX. 


Cowper,  i.  8,  168,  226. 

Creation  de  nihilo,  i.  11,  sq. 
Creationism,  defined,  ii.  10  ;  prevalence 
of,  ii.  11 ;  critical  estimate  of,  ii.  11. 
Creuzer,  i.  207. 

Cudworth,  i.  11,  59,  63,  129,  204,  205, 
243,  326,  347,  349. 

Curcellaeus,  ii.  349,  370. 

Cuvier,  i.  4. 

Cyril  of  Jerusalem,  anthropology  of, 
ii.  38;  soteriology  of,  ii.  247. 

Cyril  of  Alexandria,  i.  338,  398,  ii.  8 ; 

soteriology  of,  ii.  250. 

Cyprian,  anthropology  of,  ii.  47 ;  chi- 
liasm  of,  ii.  394;  eschatology  of,  ii. 
401,  404,  414. 

D’ALEMBERT,  i.  217. 

Damian  of  Alexandria,  i.  377. 
Dante,  i.  87. 

Des  Cartes,  i.  1,  95. 

Deism,  i.  97,  98. 

Delitzsch,  ii.  397. 

Developement,  defined,  i.  8  ;  discrimi¬ 
nated  from  creation,  i.  11 ;  discrimi¬ 
nated  from  improvement,  i.  15. 
Didymus,  of  Alexandria,  ii.  417. 
Diderot,  i.  217. 

Dinanto,  David  of,  i.  179,  190,  227. 
Dionysius  of  Rome,  his  statement  of 
trinitarian  theories,  i.  304. 
Dominicans,  ii.  317. 

Dorner,  i.  281 ;  ii.  210  ;  his  opinion 
regarding  Origen’s  trinitariani-sm,  i. 
300  ;  regarding  Irenaeus’s  soteriol¬ 
ogy,  ii.  224. 

Dort,  synod  of,  ii.  194,  195  ;  canons  of, 
ii.  476,  sq.,  496. 

Dositheus,  confession  of,  ii.  495. 
Dualism,  i.  225,  22S. 

EBIONITISM,  i.  106,  259  ;  its  denial 
of  atonement,  ii.  206. 

Eckart,  i.  227. 

Edwards,  Jonathan,  trinitarianism  of, 
i.  383 ;  traducianism  of,  ii.  25 ;  his 
theory  of  imputation,  ii.  163 ;  his 
anthropology,  ii.  488. 

Elliott,  ii.  397. 

Enclyclopaedism,  i.  216,  217. 


Engelhardt,  method  of,  i.  57.  . 

Epicureanism,  i.  60,  63. 

Epiphanius,  i.  106,  152,  361. 
Episcopius,  ii.  181,  349. 

Ephesus,  council  of,  i.  398. 

Erasmus,  i.  83. 

Essence,  distinguished  from  Person,  i. 
363,  364. 

Eusebius,  of  Caesarea,  i.  106, 263 ;  trini¬ 
tarianism  of,  i.  310 ;  anthropology  of, 
ii.  247;  his  opposition  to  chiliasm, 
ii.  395. 

Eusebius,  of  Nicomedia,  i.  310. 
Eutychianism,  i.  397,  ii.  250. 

FATHERS  (Primitive),  attitude  of 
towards  philosophy,  i.  121-123,  126, 
153  ;  anthropology  of,  ii.  29  ;  soteriol¬ 
ogy  of,  ii.  265. 

Faith,  pagan  idea  of,  i.  154;  patristic 
definition  of,  i.  155,  sq. ;  relations  of 
to  reasou,  i.  184;  not  the  procuring 
cause  of  justification,  ii.  338,  340. 
Faustus,  of  Rhegium,  ii.  103. 

Ficinus,  i.  86. 

Fleury,  i.  343. 

Formula  Concordiae,  anthropology  of, 
ii.  154,  sq.,  168  ;  its  definition  of  jus¬ 
tification,  ii.  338 ;  its  distinction  of 
active  and  passive  righteousness,  ii. 
342  ;  its  origin,  ii.  458. 

Formula  Consensus  Helvetici,  anthro¬ 
pology  of,  ii.  157,  sq. ;  origin  of,  ii. 
472. 

Franciscans,  ii.  317. 

French  philosophers,  their  interpreta¬ 
tion  of  Locke,  i.  94. 

Fuseli,  i.  12. 

AIUS,  ii.  394. 

Gale,  i.  129  ;  his  Court  of  the  Gen¬ 
tiles,  i.  205. 

Gallican  confession,  ii.  476. 

Gangauf,  ii.  5,  54. 

Gaunilo,  i.  235. 

Generation  (Eternal),  distinguished 
from  creation,  i.  317,  sq. ;  from  ema¬ 
nation,  i.  318 ;  necessity  of,  i.  323,  sq. ; 
distinguished  from  human  genera¬ 
tion,  i.  334,  343  ;  confined  to  the  hy- 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX. 


503 


postatical  character,  i.  339,  sq.,  343  ; 
metaphysical  definition  of,  i.  347  sq. 

Gennadius,'  ii.  103. 

Gereler,  ii.  159. 

Gibbon,  i.  120. 

Gieseler,  i.  149. 

Gilbert  of  Poictiers,  i.  377. 

Gill,  on  eternal  generation,  i.  344. 

Gladstone,  i.  57. 

Gnosticism,  i.  114,  252  ;  its  theory  of 
creation,  ii.  28  ;  of  evil,  ii.  28  ;  of 
atonement,  ii.  205;  its  idea  of  just¬ 
ice,  ii.  229. 

God,  in  history,  i.  25  ;  name  of,  i.  223  ; 
proofs  of  his  existence,  i.  229,  sq. ; 
impossible  that  he  should  sin,  ii.  55. 

Gomar,  ii.  496. 

Gottschalk,  anthropology  of,  ii.  113, 
114. 

Greek  anthropology,  ii.  27,  41 ;  its  idea 
of  will,  ii.  60,  sq. ;  its  prevalence,  ii. 
198. 

Greek  Church,  i.  40,  361 ;  confessions 
of,  ii.  294. 

Gregory  Nazianzen,  i.  71,  358  ;  h\s 
anthropology,  ii.  39  ;  his  eschatology, 
ii.  404,  411,  412. 

Gregory  Nyssa,  i.  71,  152,  358,  361  ; 
anthropology  of,  ii.  39 ;  eschatology 
of,  ii.  404,  412,  417. 

Gregory  the  Great,  ii.  74 ;  soteriology 
of,  ii.  262  ;  eschatology  of,  ii.  405, 411. 

Grotius,  i.  57,  ii.  496  ;  soteriology  of, 
ii.  347,  sq.  ;  law  a  positive  enact¬ 
ment,  ii.  350  ;  strict  punishment  de¬ 
pendent  upon  the  divine  will,  ii.  353  * 
law  capable  of  relaxation,  ii.  354  ; 
his  theory  of  relaxation,  ii.  356  ;  the 
death  of  Christ  required  to  prevent 
the  evil  consequences  of  relaxation 
of  law,  ii.  358  ;  his  theory  of  substi¬ 
tution,  ii.  360  ;  the  sufferings  of 
Christ  not  a  strict,  but  an  accepted 
satisfaction,  ii.  362  ;  his  disclaimer 
of  acceptilation,  ii.  364;  alliance  of 
his  theory  with  the  Anselmic,  ii. 
366  ;  with  the  Socinian,  ii.  367. 

Grynaeus,  ii.  465. 

Guericke,  i.  255,  262,  268,  294,  310, 
392,  ii.  26,  51,  114. 


HAGENBACH,  method  of,  i.  35  ;  ex¬ 
tracts  from,  i.  146,  161,  354,  ii.  44, 
400,  sq. 

Hales,  i.  82,  ii.  293. 

Hallam,  i.  202,  ii.  27. 

Halyburton,  reply  to  Herbert  of  Cher- 
bury,  i.  204. 

Harvey,  i.  57. 

Hefele,  i.  267. 

Hegel,  i.  96,  227,  240. 

Heidegger,  ii.  158. 

Heidelberg  catechism,  soteriology  of, 
ii.  344 ;  origin  and  account  of,  ii. 
473,  sq. 

Helfferich,  i.  81,  ii.  39. 

Helvetius,  i.  216. 

Helvetic  (First)  Confession,  anthropol¬ 
ogy  of,  ii.  169,  465. 

Helvetic  (Second)  Confession,  trinitari- 
anism  of,  i.  379  ;  anthropology  of,  ii. 
169  ;  soteriology  of,  ii.  343 ;  origin 
and  account  of,  ii.  469. 

Herbert  of  Cherbury,  i.  97 ;  system 
of,  i.  192. 

Hermas,  chiliasm  of,  ii.  390. 

Hierocles,  i.  118. 

Hilary,  i.  225,  ii.  103,  440  ;  trinitari- 
amsm  of,  i.  377  ;  creationism  of,  ii. 
11  ;  anthropology  of,  ii.  49,  50. 
Hildebert,  i.  182. 

Hindoo  trinity,  i.  244. 

Hippolytus,  i.  225;  trinitarianism  of, 
i.  285  ;  anthropology  of,  ii.  43. 
History,  definition  of,  i.  7  ;  sacred  and 
secular,  i.  18,  24;  profane,  i.  19;  re¬ 
lation  of  dogmatic  to  external,  i.  25 ; 
general  dogmatic,  i.  33  ;  special  dog¬ 
matic,  i.  34,  39 ;  biographic,  i.  43. 
Hobbs,  system  of,  i.  197. 

Hooker,  i.  83,  253,  264,  318,  392,  396, 
ii.  30  ;  soteriology  of,  ii.  323, 331 ;  defi¬ 
nition  of  a  trinitarian  person,  i.  34, 
346 ;  of  Christ’s  person,  i.  397,  404, 
407. 

Hopkins  (Samuel),  trinitarianism  of,  i. 
383 ;  christology  of,  i.  408  ;  tradu- 
cianism  of,  ii.  25 ;  original  and  actual 
sin,  ii.  81 ;  anthropology  of,  ii.  489. . 
Horsley,  i.  57,  386. 

Howe,  i.  232,  317,  343,  365,  ii.  74. 


504 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX 


Humanitarians,  i.  259. 

Hume,  i.  138,  202. 

Hypostasis,  i.  363,  364. 

IGNATIUS,  i.  265;  soteriology  of, 
ii.  208 ;  epistles  of,  i.  266,  267. 
Imputation,  mediate,  ii.  158,  sq.,  472; 

immediate,  ii.  159,  sq.,  472. 

Infinite,  positive  conception  of,  i  185. 
Infralapsarianism,  ii.  192. 

Intermediate  state,  ii.  400  sq. 

Irenaeus,  i.  11,  106, 117, 147, 174 ;  trin- 
itarianism  of,  i.  282 ;  soteriology  of, 
ii.  213,  sq. ;  chiliasm  of,  ii.  392  ;  doc¬ 
trine  of  resurrection,  ii.  403  ;  symbol 
of,  ii.  432. 

JACOBI,  i.  159. 

Jansenists,  i.  191. 

Jehovah,  translation  of  the  word  in  the 
Septuagint,  i.  224. 

Jerome,  i.  332 ;  eschatology  of,  ii.  404. 
John  Damascene,  i.  177 ;  soteriology 
ii.  251. 

Johnson  (Samuel),  i.  168. 

Judaism,  i.  105. 

Judaizing  Gnostics,  i.  115. 

Justice,  as  related  to  omnipotence,  ii. 

222. 

Justin  Martyr,  i.  119,  121,  127,  128, 
136,  174  ;  trinitarianism  of,  268,  sq. ; 
anthropology  of,  ii.  28,  33  ;  soteriol¬ 
ogy  of,  ii.  218  ;  eschatology  of,  ii.  400, 
403,  412,  413,  414. 

KANT,  theism  of,  i.  95  ;  deism  of,  i. 
97,  218 ;  moral  argument  for  di¬ 
vine  existence,  i.  239  ;  his  idea  of  the 
will  as  a  power  of  causation  and  not 
of  alternative  choice,  ii.  62. 
Kliefoth,  method  of,  i.  38. 

LACTANTIUS,  i.  55,  127 ;  chiliasm 
of,  ii.  395. 

Latin  anthropology,  ii.  27,  45,  91;  its 
idea  of  will,  ii.  60,  sq. ;  its  preva¬ 
lence,  ii.  198. 

Lardner,  i.  215. 

Lechler,  i.  203. 

Leibnitz,  i.  71,  95,  ii.  1. 


Leland,  i.  173,  198,  201. 

Leo,  the  Great,  ii.  111. 

Liebner,  i.  81. 

Limborch,  ii.  188,  349,  370,  496 ;  sote¬ 
riology  of,  ii.  371,  sq. 

Locke,  philosophy  of,  i.  93. 

Logic,  function  of,  i.  2. 

Logos-idea,  i.  230;  derived  from  the 
Old  Testament  and  not  from  Plato,  i. 
130. 

Lombard,  soteriology  of,  ii.  288. 
LuciAN,  i.  63. 

Luther,  i.  46,  90,  145,  166  ;  traducian- 
ism  of,  ii.  24;  anthropology  of,  ii. 
152,  sq. ;  criticism  of  upon  Augus¬ 
tine’s  soteriology,  ii.  258 ;  on  the 
Apostles’  creed,  ii.  431 ;  catechisms 
of,  ii.  457. 

Lutheran  church,  symbols  of,  ii.  444, 
sq. 

Macaulay,  i.  198. 

Mackintosh,  ii.  27. 

Macedonians,  i.  358. 

Magee,  criticism  of  upon  Socinus,  ii. 
379. 

Mandeville,  i.  203. 

Manichaeans,  i.  146. 

Marcellus  of  Ancyra,  i.  361. 

Meier,  i.  300,  303,  304. 

Melanchthon,  i.  47,  91 ;  synergism  of, 
ii.  173,  454. 

Method,  importance  of  in  history,  i.  1. 
Methodology,  aim  of,  i.  4. 
Millenarianism,  relation  of  to  the  Later- 
Jewish  doctrine  of  the  Messianic  king¬ 
dom,  ii.  389 ;  never  the  Catholic  doc¬ 
trine,  ii.  391,  394. 

Milman,  i.  79,  82,  154,  173,  245,  396. 
Minucius  Felix,  i.  129;  eschatology  of, 
ii.  414. 

Miracles,  i.  165 ;  not  magical,  i.  166; 

not  unnatural,  i.  167. 

Mirandola,  i.  86. 

Missal  (Roman),  ii.  493. 
Mohammedanism,  i.  178. 

Mohler,  ii.  151. 

Monarchians,  i.  254,  260,  309  ;  christol- 
ogy  of,  i.  394. 

Monergism,  ii.  44. 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX. 


505 


Monographs  (Biographic),  i.  45. 

Monotheism,  in  the  pagan  world,  i.  55, 
56,  126. 

Monophysitism,  i.  397, 

More  (Henry),  reply  of  to  Hobbs,  i. 

205. 

Morgan,  attack  of  upon  the  Old  Testa¬ 
ment,  i.  200. 

Morgan,  on  the  trinity  of  Plato,  i.  57. 

Mosheim,  his  opinion  respecting  Qri- 
gen’s  theological  system,  ii.  237. 

Mother  of  God,  i.  399. 

Munscher-Von  Colln,  i.  292;  ii.  93. 

Myconius,  ii.  464,  465. 

Mysticism,  two  species  of,  i.  79. 

Mystics,  Platonism  of,  i.  77 ;  scholasti¬ 
cism  of,  i.  77,  182 ;  latitudinarian,  i. 
81,  S5  ;  heretical,  i.  80. 

AGELSBACH,  i.  57. 

Nature.  See  Essence  and  Person. 

Natural  religion,  contrasted  with  re¬ 
vealed,  i.  137. 

Neander,  i.  27,  63,  230,  258,  298,  299, 
ii.  114;  opinion  of  concerning  the 
Logos-idea,  i.  130;  concerning  Sa- 
bellianism,  i.  259;  concerning  Ori- 
gen’s  trinitarianism,  i.  299, 302 ;  con¬ 
cerning  Irenaeus’s  soteriology,  ii. 
225;  concerning  Anselm’s  soteriolo¬ 
gy,  ii.  282. 

Nestorianism,  i.  395,  399,  ii  250. 

New  Nicenes,  i.  371. 

New  Platonism,  i.  60,  61,  64. 

Nicene  Council,  problem  before,  i.  308  ; 
its  idea  of  sonship,  i.  320,  sq. ;  criti¬ 
cal  estimate  of  its  results,  i.  372,  sq. 

Niebuhr,  i.  65,  ii.  31. 

Niedner,  i.  27. 

Noetus,  i.  255,  ii.  435. 

Nominalists,  ii.  317. 

Nominal  Trinitarians,  i.  256  ;  christolo- 
gy  of,  i.  393. 

Nonconforming  divines,  philosophy  of, 
i.  92. 

CCAM,  i.  82,  90,  227. 
Oecolampadius,  ii.  464. 

Old  Nicenes,  i.  371. 

Omnipotence,  scholastic  doctrine  of  an 
abstract,  ii.  301. 


'0/xolov(tios,  i.  310,  311,  374. 

' Oijt-oovcrios ,  i-  309-312,  314,  374,  ii.  436. 
Orange,  council  of,  its  decision  against 
Semi-Pelagianism,  ii.  105. 

Origen,  i.  46,  106,  117,  130,  133,  157, 
172  ;  his  idea  of  faith  and  science,  i, 
159, 164 ;  trinitarianism  of,  i.  288,  sq. ; 
distinction  between  &ebs  and  6 

i.  293 ;  theological  aim  of,  i.  289 ; 
view  respecting  the  Holy  Spirit,  i. 
303  ;  his  idea  of  eternal  generation,  i. 
307,  326;  his  theory  of  pre-existence, 

ii.  5,  sq. ;  anthropology  of,  ii.  33 ; 
soteriology  of,  ii.  230  sq. ;  opposition 
to  chiliasm,  ii.  395;  eschatology  of, 
ii.  404,  412,  415. 

Original  sin,  discriminated  from  actual, 
ii.  81  ;  is  guilt,  ii.  17,  48,  76,  79-91, 
117-127,  153,  155-163,  448,  466,  471, 
473,  477,  478,  488 ;  is  not  guilt,  ii.  35, 
37,  sq.,  94,  100,  146,  147-149,  175, 
181-185,  460. 

Ormusd,  i.  245. 

Oiarta,  i.  363,  364. 

Owen,  i.  92,  ii.  480;  on  confounding 
justification  with  sanctification,  ii. 
259  ;  on  a  relative  necessity  of  atone¬ 
ment,  ii.  260 ;  on  divine  justice,  ii. 

303. 

AGANISM,  i.  105. 

Palatine  confession,  ii.  471. 
Pantheism,  i.  13,  97,  225. 

Papal  system,  i.  378;  confessions,  ii. 
491,  sq. 

Papias,  chiliasm  of,  ii.  390. 

Pascal,  i.  159. 

Patripassians,  i.  254,  261 ;  Christology 
of,  i.  394. 

Paulus,  i.  218. 

Paul,  of  Samosata,  i.  257. 

Pearson,  his  definition  of  eternal  gen¬ 
eration  and  procession,  i.  319. 
Person,  meaning  of  the  term  in  trinita¬ 
rianism,  i.  343,  345,  363,  364,  371 ; 
meaning  of  the  term  in  anthropology, 
i.  343;  ii.  117, 118,  120,  123-126. 
Person  of  Christ,  four  factors  in  the 
conception  of,  L  392 ;  two  natures 
in,  not  confused,  i.  400;  not  diri- 


506 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX. 


ded,  i.  401 ;  illustrated  by  reference  to 
man’s  personality,  i.  402  ;  properties 
of  both  natures  attributable  to  the 
person,  i.  403 ;  suffering  of  the  per¬ 
son  truly  infinite,  i.  404 ;  the  divin¬ 
ity,  and  not  the  humanity,  the  basis 
of  Christ’s  personality,  i.  406;  the 
Logos  united  himself  with  human 
nature,  and  not  with  a  human  indi¬ 
vidual,  i.  407. 

Pelagius,  fundamental  positions  of,  ii. 
93,  sq. ;  his  view  of  the  difference  be¬ 
tween  Adam  and  his  posterity,  ii.  94; 
his  idea  of  grace,  ii.  96  ;  of  regenera¬ 
tion,  ii.  96  ;  explanation  of  e</>’  £  in 
Rom.  v.  12,  ii.  95 ;  his  ecclesiastical 
trials,  ii.  98,  sq. ;  prevalence  of  his 
views,  ii.  199. 

Petavius,  ii.  203 ;  opinion  of  respect¬ 
ing  the  Nicene  use  of  ovala  and 
virocTTcuris,  i.  369 ;  Semi-Pelagian- 
ism  of,  ii.  113. 

Petrarch,  i.  87. 

Philosophy,  influence  of  upon  dogma¬ 
tics,  i.  28. 

Philosophia  prima,  Bacon’s  estimate  of, 
i.  3 ;  Plato’s  and  Aristotle’s  estimate 
of,  i.  2. 

Philo,  i.  61. 

Pietists,  i.  191. 

Placaeus,  his  theory  of  mediate  impu¬ 
tation,  ii.  158,  sq.,  472. 

Plato,  views  of,  respecting  the  popular 
religion,  i.  56  ;  respecting  God,  i. 
138  ;  respecting  immortality,  1.  139  ; 
trinity  of,  i.  243  ;  his  doctrine  of  pre¬ 
existence,  ii.  5. 

Platonism,  errors  of,  i.  53,  sq. ;  influ¬ 
ence  of,  i.  52,  62,  70,  76,  86,  229  ; 
agreement  with  Aristotelianism,  i. 
59. 

Platform,  Cambridge,  ii.  482;  Say- 
brook,  ii.  490. 

Pliny,  i.  61,  262. 

Plutarch,  i.  61, 194. 

Pclonorum  Fratres,  i.  384. 

Polycarp,  i.  157 ;  soteriology  of,  ii. 
208. 

Pope  (Alexander),  i.  201. 

Porphyry,  i.  63,  118. 


Praxeas,  i.  255,  ii.  435. 

Pre-existence,  definition  of,  ii.  4;  Ori- 
gen  its  chief  advocate,  ii.  5.,  sq. ; 
prevalence  of,  ii.  8  ;  critical  estimate 
of,  ii.  9. 

Presbyterian  Church,  trinitarianism  of, 
i.  383. 

Priestley,  i.  386,  ii.  379. 

Procession  (Eternal),  i.  340,  344. 
Professio  Fidei  Tridentina,  ii.  492. 
Prosper,  ii.  103. 

Protestantism,  soteriology  of,  ii.  321, 
335 ;  anthropology  of,  ii.  448. 
Pyrrho,  i.  202. 

QUINQUE  articulares,  ii.  496. 

Quicumque  Symbolum,  i.  71,  351, 
ii.  439. 

ACOYIAN  creed,  i.  384. 
Rationalism,  i.  218. 

Redepenning,  i.  294,  300,  301,  ii.  33, 
234,  sq. 

Reformers,  philosophy  of,  i.  89. 
Remonstrants.  See  Arminians. 
Resurrection,  ii.  403,  sq. 

Revelation,  relation  of  to  dogmas,  i. 
23  ;  relation  of  to  reason,  i.  129,  130, 
135,  sq.,  151  ;  an  infallible  authority, 
i.  142  ;  vague  idea  of,  i.  171. 
Righteousness,  active^  and  passive,  ii. 
341. 

Ritter,  i.  231  ;  statement  of  coinci¬ 
dences  between  Plato  and  Aristotle,  i. 
58  ;  opinion  respecting  Origen’s  trin¬ 
itarianism,  i.  300. 

Rivetus,  ii.  332. 

Rohr,  i.  218. 

Roscellin,  i.  377. 

Rosenkranz,  method  of,  i.  37. 
Rousseau,  i.  217. 

SABELLIUS,  i.  257,  sq.,  ii.  435. 

Sabellians.  See  Monarchians. 
Sacraments,  ii.  451. 

Satan,  claims  of,  as  related  to  redemp¬ 
tion,  ii.  213,  sq. 

Saumur,  school  of,  ii.  158,  472. 

Savoy  confession,  ii.  480. 

Saybrook  platform,  ii.  490. 


4 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX. 


507 


Schaff,  i.  268. 

Schelling,  i.  96,  240,  862  ;  opinion  o * 
respecting  tlie  Hebrew  archives,  i. 
206  ;  system  of,  i.  227. 

Schiller,  i.  219. 

Schleiermacher,  i.  226,  890;  system 
of,  i.  99. 

Scholasticism,  i.  73,  84. 

Scotus  (Duns),  i.  82,  90,  227  ;  soteriol- 
ogy  of,  ii.  315,  347. 

Scotus  (Erigena),  i.  46,  177,  226 ;  trin- 
itarianism  of,  i.  377 ;  soteriology  of, 
ii.  271 ;  eschatology  of,  ii.  406,  418. 

Scotch  philosophers,  their  interpreta¬ 
tion  of  Locke,  i.  94. 

Scoticana  confessio,  ii.  476. 

Scriptures,  mutilations  of  by  heretics, 

i.  146. 

Self-existence  distinguished  from  ne¬ 
cessary  existence  in  the  trinitarian 
controversy,  i.  388. 

Semi-Arians,  i.  313,  356,  358,  ii.  437. 

Semi-Pelagianism,  ii.  102,  sq. ;  relation 
of  to  the  Greek  anthropology,  ii.  108  ; 
its  principal  positions,  ii.  109  ;  pre¬ 
valence  of,  ii.  199. 

Servetus,  i.  384. 

Shaftsbury,  opinions  of,  i.  198. 

Sherlock,  i.  214,  347. 

Silesius,  i.  227. 

Sin,  originated  de  nihilo,  i.  16,  86,  ii. 
54,  57,  63 ;  original,  ii.  37,  42.  See 
Original  Sin. 

Scepticism,  Judaistic,  i.  105;  Pagan,  i. 
105,  117 ;  Gnostic,  i.  113 ;  in  the 
Church,  i.  179;  modern,  i.  192. 

Smalcald,  articles  of,  ii.  456. 

Socinus,  i.  383,  384  ;  his  idea  of  justice, 

ii.  376;  justice  the  product  of  option¬ 
al  will,  ii.  377  ;  his  objections  to  the 
doctrine  of  satisfaction,  ii.  379,  sq. 

Socinian  confessions,  ii.  498. 

Sonship  (Eternal).  See  Generation. 

Soteriology,  of  the  Gnostics,  ii.  205;  of 
the  Ebionite,  ii.  206  ;  of  the  Apostolic 
Fathers,  ii.  207-212  ;  of  the  Primitive 
Fathers,  ii.  212-226  ;  of  the  Alexan¬ 
drine  school,  ii.  226-237 ;  of  the 
Greek  Fathers,  ii.  237-253;  of  Au¬ 
gustine,  ii.  253-260;  of  the  school¬ 


men,  ii.  273-318  ;  of  Trent,  ii.  319- 
332;  of  the  Reformers,  ii.  333-346  ; 
of  Grotius,  ii.  347-370 ;  of  the  Armin- 
ians,  ii.  370-375;  of  Socinus,  ii.  376- 
386. 

Sozomen,  i.  358. 

Spinoza,  i.  95,  138,  227. 

Spirit  (Holy),  Nicene  doctrine  of,  i. 

355. 

Stapfer,  his  theory  of  imputation,  ii. 
163,  sq. 

Stillingfleet,  i.  57,  145. 

Stoicism,  i.  61. 

Subordination,  of  the  Son  to  the  Father, 
i.  320. 

Substance,  ambiguity  of  the  term  in  the 
Latin  trinitarianism,  i.  370.  See  Es¬ 
sence  and  Person. 

Supernatural,  as  related  to  the  natural, 

i.  165. 

Supralapsarianism,  ii.  192. 

Suso,  i.  85 ;  eschatology  of,  ii.  413,  417. 
Swedenborg,  ii.  403. 

Swift  (Jonathan),  i.  201. 

Symbol,  Athanasian,  (Quicumque),  i. 
71,  351,  sq.,  ii.  439 ;  Nicene,  i.  314, 

ii.  435  ;  its  relations  to  the  Apostles’ 
Creed,  ii.  435  ;  Constantinopolitan, 
i.  359,  ii.  435  ;  Apostles’,  ii.  428  ,  not 
composed  by  the  Apostles,  ii.  430  ; 
importance  of,  ii.  433 ;  relation  of  to 
the  Nicene,  ii.  436 ;  Chalcedon,  ii. 
438. 

Symbols,  history  of,  i.  41 ;  importance 
of  the  study  of,  ii.  423,  426. 
Synergism,  ii.  40. 

Synesius,  i.  225 ;  eschatology  of,  ii. 
404. 

TATIAN,  i.  119,  127,  225. 

Tauler,  i.  85. 

Taylor  (Jeremy),  his  idea  of  freedom, 
ii.  64. 

Terms  (technical),  use  of,  i.  362 ;  trin¬ 
itarian,  i.  363,  sq. 

Tertullian,  i.  46,  67,  117, 122, 123,  sq., 
143, 146, 174,  229,  282 ;  trinitarianism 
of,  i.  277,  sq. ;  traducianism  of,  ii.  14, 
sq.,  43,  sq. ;  alleged  materialism  of, 
ii.  19 ;  his  synergism,  ii.  46 ;  defective 


508 


ALPHABETICAL  INDEX. 


* 


soteriology  of,  ii.  267  ;  chiliasm  of,  ii. 
392 ;  eschatology  of,  ii.  401,  404,  408, 
413  ;  his  symbol,  ii.  432. 
Tetratheism,  i.  377. 

Theism  (Greek),  i.  55,  61,  64,  100. 
Theodoret,  i.  358. 

Theodotians,  i.  259,  ii.  436. 
Theophilus  of  Antioch,  i.  12. 
Thirty-Nine  Articles,  trinitarianism  of, 

i.  382  ;  origin  of,  ii.  478. 

Thomasius,  i.  294,  298,  302. 

Thomists  and  Scotists,  controversy 

between,  ii.  815,  349. 

Tigurinus,  consensus,  ii.  467. 

Tindal,  i.  199,  203,  215. 

Toland,  i.  199. 

Toledo,  synod  of,  i.  361. 

Torgau,  articles  of,  ii.  446. 
Traduciamsm,  definition  of,  ii.  13  ;  pre¬ 
valence  of,  ii.  14  sq.,  23,  sq.,  44,  sq. 
Transubstantiation,  ii.  451. 

Trent,  council  of,  ii.  491 ;  its  ambiguous 
statements,  ii.  140  ;  definition  of  orig¬ 
inal  sin,  ii.  141 ;  of  original  righteous¬ 
ness,  ii.  142 ;  idea  of  creation,  ii.  144; 
of  apostasy,  ii.  146 ;  guiltlessness  of 
original  sin,  ii.  147 ;  relation  of  the 
flesh  to  the  spirit,  ii.  148  ;  theory  of 
regeneration,  ii.  149  ;  its  soteriology, 

ii.  321,  sq. ;  justification  resolved  into 
sanctification,  ii.  322 ;  denial  of  justi¬ 
fication  by  faith  alone,  ii.  325  ;  justi¬ 
fication  is  progressive  and  not  in¬ 
stantaneous,  ii.  327;  its  mixture  of 
human  with  the  divine  satisfaction, 
ii.  329,  345. 

Trinity,  pagan,  i.  243  ;  Platonic,  i.  243; 
Hindoo,  i.  244;  inadequate  illustra¬ 
tions  of,  i.  276;  finite  analogue  of,  i. 
366,  sq. 

Trypho,  Justin  Martyr’s  dialogue  with, 

i.  112. 

Turretine,  his  doctrine  of  imputation, 

ii.  159,  sq. 

Twesten,  i.  187,  166  ;  his  statement  of 
the  relation  of  the  Person  to  the  Es¬ 
sence,  i.  345. 

LLMANN,  i.  81,  407. 

Unigentius  (Bull),  ii.  494. 
Unitarianism,  i.  383;  relation  of  to 


the  ancient  Anti-Trinitarianism,  i. 
385. 

Unity  of  God,  taught  by  pagan  sages, 
i.  55,  56,  126 ;  distinguished  from 
singleness,  i.  348. 

Usher,  ii.  106. 

1TALENCE,  council  of,  ii.  105. 

»  Valentinus,  his  (Gnostic)  idea  of 
justice,  ii.  228. 

Variata,  edition  of  the  Augsburg  Con¬ 
fession,  ii.  454. 

Vaughn,  i.  81. 

Victor  (Hugo  St.),  soteriology  of,  ii. 
291. 

Vincent  of  Lerins,  ii.  103. 

Voltaire,  i.  217. 

Von  Colln,  i.  85. 

ATERLAND,  i.  246,  275,  276,  287, 
290,  303,  321,  338,  386  ;  his  view 
of  Origen’s  trinitarianism,  i.  302  ; 
definition  of  Sonship,  i.  321  ;  of  gen¬ 
eration  by  will,  i.  325 ;  of  hypostatical 
character,  i.  340  ;  his  distinction  be¬ 
tween  self- existence  and  necessary 
existence,  i.  388. 

Wegscheider,  i.  218. 

Wessel,  soteriology  of,  ii.  324. 
Westminster  Confession,  origin  of,  ii. 
479  ;  its  distinction  between  justifi¬ 
cation  and  sanctification,  ii.  322 ; 
trinitarianism  of,  i.  382. 

Whewell,  i.  1,  362. 

Whitby,  ii.  26,  30. 

Wicliff,  i.  87 ;  soteriology  of,  iL 

333. 

Wiggers,  ii.  26,  51. 

Wolff,  i.  95. 

Wordsworth  (Christopher),  i.  255, 

287. 

Wordsworth  (William),  i.  6. 
Wurtemburg  Confession,  ii.  456. 

ZUINGLE,  ii.  153  ;  anthropology  of, 
ii.  174,  sq.  460,  sq.  ;  sacramental 
theory  of,  ii.  461,  sq. ;  his  fidei  ratio, 
ii.  459,  sq.,  467  ;  his  doctrine  of  pre¬ 
destination,  ii.  468. 


I 


